

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE


Edited by  
HENRY T. ROWELL

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, KEMP MALONE  
BENJAMIN D. MERITT, JAMES H. OLIVER  
EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

Honorary Editor  
DAVID M. ROBINSON

405  
.002

VOLUME LXXIV



BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS  
LONDON: ARTHUR F. BIRD  
PARIS: ALBERT FONTEMOING LEIPZIG: F. A. BROOKHAUS

1953

## CONTENTS OF VOLUME LXXIV

---

No. 293

	PAGE
The Reform of the <i>Comitia Centuriata</i> . By E. S. STAVELEY,	1
Epicurus on the Growth and Decline of the Cosmos. By FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN, - - - - -	34
<i>Quod</i> , Relative Pronoun and Conjunction. By ROBERT B. WOOLSEY,	52
Sejanus, Gaetulicus, and Seneca. By ZEPH STEWART, - - - - -	70
REVIEWS: - - - - -	86
 <i>Blegen, Caskey, Rawson, Sperling's Troy.</i> Volume I: General Introduction: The First and Second Settlements. Part I, Text; Part II, Plates (SAUL S. WEINBERG).— <i>Angel's</i> <i>Troy.</i> The Human Remains (SAUL S. WEINBERG).— <i>Nils-</i> <i>son's Geschichte der griechischen Religion.</i> Zweiter Band: Die hellenistische und römische Zeit (CAMPBELL BON- NER).— <i>Bengtson's Griechische Geschichte</i> (ELIAS J. BICKERMAN).— <i>von Fritz and Kapp's Aristotle's Constitu-</i> <i>tion of Athens and Related Texts.</i> Translated with an Introduction and Notes (STERLING DOW).— <i>Fine's Horoi:</i> <i>Studies in Mortgage, Real Security and Land Tenure in</i> <i>Ancient Athens</i> (JAMES H. OLIVER).— <i>Webster's Studies</i> <i>in Menander</i> (L. A. POST).— <i>Yale Classical Studies</i> , Volume XI, 1951 (RICHMOND LATTIMORE).— <i>Marmorale's</i> <i>Cato Maior. Secunda Edizione</i> (RICHARD M. HAYWOOD).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	112

## No. 294


	PAGE
<i>Imperium Maius</i> in the Roman Republic. By VICTOR EHRENBURG,	113
The Propitiation of Achilles. By DAVID E. EICHHOLZ,	137
Catullus, 35. By FRANK O. COPELEY,	149
NOTICE: <i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> ,	160
REVIEWS:	161
<i>Schachermeyr's</i> Poseidon und die Entstehung des griechischen Götterglaubens (MARTIN P. NILSSON).— <i>Whitman's</i> Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism (GILBERT NORWOOD).— <i>Grant's</i> Roman Anniversary Issues. An Explanatory Study of the Numismatic and Medallic Commemoration of Anniver- sary Years, 49 B. C.—A. D. 375 (ALFRED R. BELLINGER).— <i>Grene's</i> Man in his Pride: A Study in the Political Philosophy of Thucydides and Plato (MALCOLM F. MO- GREGOR).— <i>Barlow's</i> Martini Episcopi Bracarensis Opera Omnia (C. J. BISHKO).—† <i>Faider, Favez, van de Woe-            stijne's</i> Sénèque de la Clémence. Deuxième Partie: Com- mentaire et Index Verborum (WILLIAM HARDY ALEX- ANDER).— <i>Goldman's</i> Excavations at Gözlu Kule, Tarsus. Volume I (text and plates): The Hellenistic and Roman Periods (J. H. YOUNG).— <i>Klotz' C. Iuli Caesaris Commen-            tarii</i> . Vol. II, 2nd ed. (LLOYD W. DALY).— <i>Hadas' Aristeas            to Philocrates</i> (Letter of Aristeas) (MORTON E. ENSLIN).— <i>Katz' Plotinus' Search for the Good</i> (HANS-RUDOLF SCHWY- ZER).— <i>Reinach's</i> Gaius, Institutes: Texte établi et traduit (HANS JULIUS WOLFF).— <i>Zafiropulo's</i> Anaxagore de Clazo- mène: I, Le mythe grec traditionnel de Thalès à Platon; II, Théorie et fragments (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.).— <i>Zafiro-            pulo's</i> L'École Éléate: Parménide—Zénon—Mélissos (ED- WIN L. MINAR, JR.).— <i>Pasoli's</i> Acta Fratrum Arvalium Quae Post Annum MDCCCLXXIV Reperta Sunt (ALINE ABAECHERLI BOYCE).— <i>Hansen's</i> The Attalids of Pergamon (T. ROBERT S. BROUGHTON).— <i>Dinsmoor's</i> The Architecture of Ancient Greece: An Account of its Historic Develop- ment (A. HENRY DETWEILER).— <i>Johnson's</i> Egypt and the Roman Empire (NAPHTALI LEWIS).— <i>Robinson's</i> Excava- tions at Olynthus, Part XIII: Vases found in 1934 and 1938 (DIETRICH VON BOTHMER).— <i>Youtie and Winter's</i> Papyri and Ostraca from Karanis, Second Series (LIONEL CASSON).— <i>Ferrero's</i> Poetica nuova in Lucrezio (AGNES KIRSOOP MICHELS).— <i>Bataille's</i> Les inscriptions grecques du Temple de Hatshepsout à Deir el-Bahari (JAMES H. OLIVER).— <i>Radet's</i> Alexandre le Grand (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.).— <i>Labourt's</i> Saint Jérôme, Lettres, Tome II (ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE).	
BOOKS RECEIVED,	223

## No. 295

	PAGE
On the Importance of Land Tenure and Agrarian Taxation in the Byzantine Empire, from the Fourth Century to the Fourth Crusade. By KENNETH M. SETTON, - - - - -	225
<i>Discolor Aura.</i> Reflections on the Golden Bough. By ROBERT A. BROOKS, - - - - -	260
Aristotle, <i>Rhetoric</i> , III, 16, 11 (1417 b 12-20). By L. A. MACKAY, -	281
A Non-Latin Italic and Cornish Parallel? By LOUIS H. GRAY, -	286
REVIEWS: - - - - -	288
<i>Jacoby's Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker.</i> Dritter Teil. Geschichte von Staedten und Voelkern (Horographie und Ethnographie), B: Autoren ueber einzelne Staedte (Laender), Nr. 297-607 (HERBERT BLOCH). — <i>Jacoby's Atthis. The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens</i> (HERBERT BLOCH). — <i>Lasserre's Les Epodes d'Archiloque</i> (FRANZ STOESSL). — <i>Herodote, Histoires</i> , Livre VII. Texte établi et traduit par Ph.-E. Legrand (LIONEL PEARSON). — <i>Demou- geot's De l'unité à la division de l'Empire Romain</i> , 395- 410. Essai sur le gouvernement impérial (LUDWIG BIELER). — <i>Yale Classical Studies</i> , XII (W. C. HELM- BOLD). — <i>Braga's Catullo e i poeti greci</i> (J. P. ELDER). — <i>Roberts' The Antinoopolis Papyri</i> , Part I (J. F. GIL- LIAM). — <i>Beazley's The Development of Attic Black-figure</i> (EUGENE VANDERPOOL). — <i>Goessler's Wilhelm Dörpfeld.</i> Ein Leben in Dienst der Antike (MARGARETE BIEBER). — <i>Ernout and Meillet's Dictionnaire étymologique de la</i> langue latine: histoire des mots. Troisième édition, revue, corrigée et augmentée d'un index (JAMES W. POULT- NEY). — <i>Snell's Der Aufbau der Sprache</i> (JOSHUA WHAT- MOUGH). — <i>Webster's Greek Terracottas</i> (DAVID M. ROBIN- SON). — <i>Sutherland's Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy</i> , 31 B. C.—A. D. 68 (ALFRED R. BELLINGER).	
BOOKS RECEIVED: - - - - -	332

## No. 296

	PAGE
<i>Isonomia.</i> By GREGORY VLASTOS, - - - - -	337
The Declension of Latin Compound Adjectives. By JAMES W. POULTNEY, - - - - -	367
Is Plato's Seventh Epistle Spurious? By BERTHA STENZEL, - - -	383
The Meaning of the <i>Hisperica Famina.</i> By PHILLIP W. DAMON, -	398
The Exegetes of Athens and the Prytaneion Decree. By HERBERT BLOCH, - - - - -	407
The Horoscope of Ceionius Rufius Albinus. By O. NEUGEBAUER, -	418
More on the Consuls of A. D. 13. By JOYCE S. and ARTHUR E. GORDON, - - - - -	421
REVIEWS: - - - - -	423
<i>Duckworth's</i> The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment (PAUL MACKENDRICK).— <i>Beare's</i> The Roman Stage: A Short History of Latin Drama in the Time of the Republic (PHILIP WHALEY HARSH).— <i>Michell's</i> Sparta (KURT VON FRITZ).— <i>Post's</i> From Homer to Menander. Forces in Greek Poetic Fiction (J. A. PHILIP).— <i>Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome</i> , Vol. XX (ERIK SJÖQVIST).— <i>Blegen, Caskey, Rawson's</i> Troy. Volume II: The Third, Fourth and Fifth Settlements. Parts I and II (SAUL S. WEINBERG).— <i>Alfoldi's</i> A Conflict of Ideas in the Late Roman Empire: The Clash between the Senate and Valentinian I. Translated by Harold Mattingly (M. L. W. LAISTNER).— <i>Page's</i> Alcman: The Parthenecion (FRANCIS R. WALTON).— <i>Robinson's</i> Ancient History from Prehistoric Times to the Death of Justinian (TOM B. JONES).— <i>Diringer's</i> The Alphabet: A Key to the History of Mankind. Second and Revised Edition (W. F. ALBRIGHT).— <i>Degrassi's</i> I fasti consolari dell' impero romano dal 30 avanti Cristo al 613 dopo Cristo (JAMES H. OLIVER).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	451
INDEX TO VOLUME LXXIV, - - - - -	453



# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

---

VOL. LXXIV, 1

WHOLE No. 293

---

## THE REFORM OF THE *COMITIA CENTURIATA*.

In a clear and comprehensive study, published in its final form in 1916,<sup>1</sup> G. De Sanctis did much to solve the numerous problems presented by the third century reform of the Republican *comitia centuriata*. It is principally owing to his treatment that a general agreement has now been reached on several of the most hotly disputed questions. The view of Niebuhr and his school that in the reformed assembly the organization by classes was either completely abolished or subordinated to the organization by tribes has been finally discredited;<sup>2</sup> so too has the theory of the double *renuntiatio*, propounded in the first instance by the sixteenth century scholar, Pantagathus, and later adopted by Mommsen, who claimed to derive considerable support for it from his interpretation of certain sections of the extant *lex Malacitana*.<sup>3</sup> Despite the efforts

<sup>1</sup> *Storia dei Romani*, III, 1 (Turin, 1916), pp. 353-81.

<sup>2</sup> B. G. Niebuhr, *Vorträge über römische Altertümer* (Berlin, 1858), p. 114; Ph. Huschke, *Die Verfassung des Königs Servius Tullius* (Heidelberg, 1838), pp. 601 ff.; H. Th. Plüss, *Die Entwicklung des Centurienverfassung* (Leipzig, 1870); J. N. Madvig, *Die Verfassung und Verwaltung des römischen Staates* (Leipzig, 1881), I, p. 119.

<sup>3</sup> *Römisches Staatsrecht*, III<sup>3</sup>, pp. 409-13; *Le Droit Public Romain*, VI, 1, pp. 470-6; *Juristische Schriften*, I, pp. 319-20. For a demonstration that Mommsen was mistaken in his interpretation of the *lex Malacitana* see A. Rosenberg, *Untersuchungen zur römischen Zenturienverfassung* (Berlin, 1911), pp. 69 ff. Among others who have lent their support to such a view the most notable are L. Lange, *Römische Altertümer* (Berlin, 1876), II<sup>a</sup>, pp. 510 ff.; E. Klebs, "Stimmenzahl und Abstimmungsordnung der reformischen servianischen Verfassung," *Zeit-*

of De Sanctis, however, the fundamental problem remains unsolved. How exactly were the centuries in the reformed assembly co-ordinated with the tribes? Not only have the conclusions of De Sanctis on this subject been since very forcibly challenged, notably by P. Fraccaro;<sup>4</sup> a new document, now generally known as the *tabula Hebana*,<sup>5</sup> has come to light, which has already been called as evidence in defence both of the hitherto little favoured position latterly taken up by Mommsen<sup>6</sup> and of the more heterodox suggestions of Momigliano.<sup>7</sup> In view of these factors a further study of this vexed topic must be considered neither untimely nor superfluous.

The following discussion falls into two sections. In the first section that ancient evidence alone is considered which bears directly on the question of the co-ordination of centuries and tribes in the reformed assembly. In the second an attempt is made to show that the essential feature of the reform as determined by an interpretation of this evidence is such as accords most naturally with its other less debatable aspects and with the social, economic, and political conditions of the century.

## I

The one ancient author who in the extant part of his work expressly mentions the fact that the *comitia centuriata* underwent a reform is Livy.<sup>8</sup> Since the reform fell almost certainly

*schrift der Savigny-Stiftung*, XII (1892), pp. 230 ff.; G. W. Botsford, *The Roman Assemblies* (New York, 1909), pp. 225 ff.

<sup>4</sup> "La riforma dell'ordinamento centuriato," *Studi in onore di P. Bonfante*, I (Pavia, 1929), pp. 105 ff.

<sup>5</sup> This document was first published in *Notizie degli Scavi*, 8th series, I (1947), pp. 49-68.

<sup>6</sup> *St.*, III<sup>8</sup>, pp. 270-9; *D.P.*, VI, 1, pp. 305-16. See below, pp. 9-10.

<sup>7</sup> "Studi sugli ordinamenti centuriati," *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris*, IV (1938), pp. 509-20. See below, note 40.

<sup>8</sup> It has been thought that Dionysius of Halicarnassus was referring to the reform, when he wrote in the *Roman Antiquities*, IV, 21, 3, οὗτος δὲ κόσμος τοῦ πολιτεύματος (scil. the Servian system) ἐπὶ πολλὰ διέμενε γενέας φυλαττόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐρωμαίων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς κεκινηται χρόνοις καὶ μεταβέβληκεν εἰς τὸ δημοτικώτερον . . . οὐ τῶν λόχων καταλυθέντων. ἀλλὰ τῆς κλησέως (?) αὐτῶν οὐκέτι τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἀκριβεῖαν φυλαττούσης. This is the view of Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 74, and De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 353. As Mommsen originally pointed out, ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνοις

within the period covered by the historian's second decade,<sup>9</sup> the full description may be supposed to have been given in one of the lost books. Consequently the one allusion which is found in Livy's first book, following as it does the description of the original organization of Servius Tullius, is exceedingly brief and by no means easy to interpret. It reads: *nec mirari oportet hunc ordinem qui nunc est post expletas V et XXX tribus, duplicato earum numero centuriis iuniorum seniorumque, ad institutam ab Servio Tullio summam non convenire.*<sup>10</sup>

There is another passage in ancient literature, which, though it does not specifically mention a reform, implies its existence, in so far as the description given in it of the centuriate organization differs in certain respects from that given by Livy of the Servian system. This is to be found in the second book of Cicero's treatise *De Re Publica*. Unfortunately it follows immediately upon a *lacuna* in the text. From the opening words of the extant section it is clear that Cicero has been describing the institutions of Servius Tullius. That part of the *populus*, he says, which was not enrolled in the *centuria equitum*, was divided into five classes. He then continues:

curavitque (*scil. Servius Tullius*) quod semper in re publica tenendum est, ne plurimum valeant plurimi. quae discriptio si esset ignota vobis, explicaretur a me: nunc rationem videtis esse talem, ut equitum centuriae cum sex suffragiis et prima classis, addita centuria quae ad sumnum usum urbis fabris tignaris est data, LXXXVIII centurias habeat; quibus ex centum quattuor centuriis (tot enim reliquae sunt) octo solae si accesserunt, confecta est vis populi universa.<sup>11</sup>

---

cannot apply to the third century B.C. Dionysius must be referring to some less rigid system which was a development of his own day, resulting perhaps from the suspension of the censorship (cf. Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, pp. 108 ff.). The passage of Appian, *Bellum Civile*, I, 59, which was cited by Mommsen, *St.*, III<sup>a</sup>, p. 270, note 1; *D.P.*, VI, 1, p. 306, note 1, as evidence for a reform, was shown to have no relevance by E. Meyer, *Hermes*, XXXIII (1898), pp. 652-4.

<sup>9</sup> De Sanctis has convincingly argued as against Botsford, *op. cit.*, p. 214, that the reform was the result of one censorial act, and is probably to be dated to 241 B.C.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, I, 43, 12.

<sup>11</sup> Cicero, *De Re Publica*, II, 39.

The controversy which has long raged among scholars on the question of the number of centuries in the reformed organization, and consequently of the extent to which the centuries were co-ordinated with the tribes, is based fundamentally on the apparent contradiction between the testimony of Livy and that of Cicero. The latter is describing a system in which the first class contained 70 centuries,<sup>12</sup> unlike the first class of the Servian system, which contained 80. In so far as 70 is  $35 \times 2$ , it is natural to suppose that he is referring to the first class as it was after it had been reorganized in the way outlined by Livy in the phrase *post expletas V et XXX tribus, duplicito earum numero centuriis iuniorum seniorumque*; and thus that the total here given by Cicero of 193 centuries ( $104 + 89$ ) is applicable to the reformed organization. Livy, on the other hand, can quite well, and perhaps most naturally, be interpreted to be saying that the number of centuries after the reform was *not* the same as the number constituted by Servius—*hunc ordinem . . . ad institutam ab Servio Tullio summam non convenire*—and consequently not 193.<sup>13</sup>

It is proposed for the moment to defer discussion of the theory of Mommsen which makes an attempt to reconcile these two interpretations by postulating two distinct meanings for the word *centuria*.<sup>14</sup> On any other view it is obvious that they cannot both be correct. Either the *ratio* outlined by Cicero is not that of the reformed assembly, as it would appear to be, and therefore the total number of centuries was increased; or it is that of the reformed assembly, in which case the total number of centuries remained the same, and Livy cannot be saying what at first he seems to be saying. De Sanctis chose the former alternative, and adopted in its main essentials the view put forward by Pantagathus. According to him, the centuries of *all* the classes were co-ordinated with the tribes. There were after the reform 70 centuries in each of the five classes, two centuries, one of juniors and one of seniors, repre-

<sup>12</sup> This total of 70 for the centuries of the first class is reached by subtracting 18 centuries of *equites* and the supplementary century of *fabri tignarii* from the figure 89, as given by Cicero.

<sup>13</sup> For an outline of the Servian organization see Livy, I, 43; Dionysius Hal., IV, 20 ff.

<sup>14</sup> See below, pp. 9-15.

senting each of the 35 tribes. In addition to the 350 centuries so accounted for, there were, as in the Servian system, 18 equestrian centuries and 5 supplementary centuries, bringing the total in all to 373. Others have preferred the second alternative. The total number of centuries remained at 193; and only certain of the centuries within the classes were brought into co-ordination with the tribes, according to Rosenberg and Fraccaro those of the first class alone, according to E. Cavaignac<sup>15</sup> those of the first and second classes.

Which of these solutions is the more satisfactory? Can Livy be more easily interpreted to be saying something which is consistent with the more natural interpretation of Cicero, or Cicero to be saying something which is consistent with the more natural interpretation of Livy? On this question the arguments urged by Fraccaro are surely conclusive.<sup>16</sup> Cicero must be referring to the organization as it was in the late second century, when his dialogue is staged. The designation of the words *quae descriptio*, the question whether *nunc* is temporal or logical, and the problem as to which organization was assumed to be known to Scipio's interlocutors have been discussed *ad nauseam* with very little profit,<sup>17</sup> and, in view of the preceding *lacuna* in the text, it is impossible to reach any decisive conclusion by *a priori* argument. Such discussion, however, is unnecessary. If Cicero in the passage quoted was describing the Servian organization, he was guilty of a heinous mistake, of which it is difficult indeed to believe him capable. One of the most vital elements of the Servian system was that the absolute majority of 97 votes could be attained without reference to any centuries other than those of the first class and the *equites* ( $80 + 18$ ). Cicero, however, in his account not only speaks of 70 centuries of the first class by implication; he expressly points out that, as a result of the fact that the centuries in the first class, the equestrian centuries, and the century of *fabri tignarii* numbered only 89, it was necessary for 8 more centuries of the second class to record their vote

<sup>15</sup> "L'as et les comices par centuries," *Journal des Savants*, N.S. IX (1911), pp. 347-60.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 107 ff.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Mommsen, *St.*, III<sup>2</sup>, p. 275, note 1; *D.P.*, VI, 1, p. 311, note 4; Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 75 ff.; De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 354; Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, pp. 109 ff.

before an absolute majority could be reached. If Cicero was not aware of this element in the Servian system, he was mistaken not on a matter of detail,<sup>18</sup> but on its most important feature.

Rather than suppose that Cicero was guilty in this matter it would be preferable to assume that Livy was himself mistaken. This, however, is not necessary. His statement can be otherwise interpreted. It could, for example, be urged with Rosenberg<sup>19</sup> that *summa* designates not the total number of centuries in all classes, but the total number in the first class, and that Livy was thinking only of the change in that class, when he spoke of the "doubling of the tribes in centuries of seniors and juniors." This, however, is not entirely satisfactory. By far the most plausible suggestion yet offered is that of Tibiletti.<sup>20</sup> He regards *convenire* as an equivalent of *congruere* or *aptum esse* in this context, and interprets Livy to be saying that the original number of centuries, 193, was not very suited to the reformed organization in which centuries and tribes were co-ordinated. This is an indisputable truth.<sup>21</sup>

Both Livy and Cicero in their account of the Servian institutions point out that the structure of the *comitia centuriata* was highly timocratic. If the result of the reform in the third century

<sup>18</sup> This is the apology offered by De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 354. Botsford, *op. cit.*, p. 222, claims that the reform of the *comitia centuriata* was a gradual process, and that the account of Cicero befits a time after the complement of the first class had been reduced from 80 to 70 centuries, but before the centuries in the other classes had been increased in number. This lowering of the complement of the first class he assigns to 304 B.C. Such a view falls before the criticisms of De Sanctis. It is reasonable to suppose, as Livy implies, that the number of centuries in the first class of the reformed assembly, viz. 70, was derivative from the number of tribes after they had finally been made up in 241 B.C. to 35.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>20</sup> "Il funzionamento dei comizi centuriati alla luce della tavola Hebana," *Athenaeum*, N.S. XXVII (1940), pp. 228-9.

<sup>21</sup> Tibiletti appears to believe that Livy, so interpreted, implies that the centuries of all classes were co-ordinated with the tribes, and so provides strong support for Mommsen's reconstruction of the reform. This is not the case. Livy is merely pointing out that an organization comprising 193 units cannot very easily be brought into relation with another comprising 35 or 70. He gives no indication of how the difficulty was solved.

had been that the absolute majority could never be reached until the third class had recorded its vote, and that it was commonly not reached until the votes of the fourth class had been taken, it is, to say the least, strange that neither author gives any indication that there was an effective change in the distribution of interest within the assembly. Cicero writes of Servius: *curavit quod semper in re publica tenendum est ne plurimum valeant plurimi.*<sup>22</sup> This terminology is far from suggesting that the minority had ceased to carry most weight. Livy expresses the principles of the Servian system thus: *non enim viritim suffragium eodem vi eodemque iure promiscue datum est sed gradus facti ut neque exclusus quisquam suffragio videatur et vis omnis penes primores civitatis esset nec fere umquam infra ita descendederet ut ad infimos pervenirent.*<sup>23</sup> Too much cannot be based on the silence of Livy himself, in so far as he no doubt made further mention of the reform in one of his lost books; but, if in that book he not only gave the details of a sweeping reform which raised the total number of centuries from 193 to 373 and reduced the proportionate influence of the centuries of the *equites* and of the first class from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to less than  $\frac{1}{4}$ , but also dilated upon its full significance, it is beyond belief that no mention should have been made of the matter in the *Periochae*.

Consideration of these two crucial passages in Livy and Cicero alone, then, warrants the conclusion that the number of centuries after the reform remained at 193, and that the view of Pantagathus is untenable. Support for this conclusion, however, can be derived from extraneous references in ancient authorities to the working of the *comitia centuriata* in later Republican times, of which there are many.

In the *Second Philippic* Cicero draws a picture of the procedure in the assembly held for the election of a suffect consul in 44 B. C.:

ecce Dolabellae comitiorum dies, sortitio praerogativa; quiescit: renuntiatur; tacet. prima classis vocatur; renuntiatur. deinde ita ut assolet, suffragia. tum secunda

---

<sup>22</sup> *De Re Publica*, II, 39. Cicero also writes: *ita nec prohibebatur quisquam iure suffragii et is valebat in suffragio plurimum cuius plurimum intercralat esse in optimo statu civitatem.*

<sup>23</sup> I, 43, 10.

classis vocatur. quae omnia essent citius facta quam dixi.  
confecto negotio bonus augur "alio die" inquit.<sup>24</sup>

In this account there is no mention of the third class. The words *confecto negotio* imply that the necessary voting was over. The proceedings were stopped by the augur immediately before the *renuntiatio* of the votes of the second class, which, it is implied, would have determined the result. If this is the case, an absolute majority could be reached in the reformed assembly without reference to the votes of the third class; and consequently the total number of centuries in that assembly was not as many as 373.<sup>25</sup>

There are several references in the history of Livy to centuries which appear to be distinguished solely by the name of a tribe with the addition of the word *iuniorum* or *seniorum*.<sup>26</sup> There is no mention of the class to which the centuries concerned belonged; and the natural conclusion to be drawn is that there was only one century in the entire assembly which could be so designated. Admittedly, in all cases where the *centuria iuniorum* is mentioned, it is also the *centuria praerogativa*; and in so far as the latter was always taken from the first class,<sup>27</sup> it could be urged that Livy, in omitting reference to the class, assumes general knowledge of this fact. On one occasion, however, he speaks of the *Voturia seniorum*. Again the evidence is not absolutely conclusive, as the century in question is introduced as the consultant of the *Voturia iuniorum*, which was the *centuria praerogativa*, but Livy's usage is far more easily understood, if the epithet be regarded as a standard one, referring in any context to but one specific unit in the assembly.

Another rather important piece of evidence is a papyrus fragment, which refers to the centuries as being all of the institution of Servius Tullius.<sup>28</sup> The papyrus is probably of early Imperial date, and the author appears to be claiming with some emphasis

<sup>24</sup> *Phil.*, II, 82.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Mommsen, *St.*, III<sup>a</sup>, p. 276, note 2; *D.P.*, VI, 1, p. 313, note 1; Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 72; Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>26</sup> *Aniensis iuniorum* (XXIV, 7, 12), *Voturia iuniorum* (XXVI, 22, 4), *Voturia seniorum* (XXVI, 22, 11), *Galeria iuniorum* (XXVII, 6, 3).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Mommsen, *St.*, III<sup>a</sup>, p. 293, note 5; *D.P.*, VI, 1, p. 333, note 3.

<sup>28</sup> *P. Oxy.*, XVII, 2088: . . . *hae et ceterae cent[uriae quae] nunc sunt omnes Servi Tulli [qui pri]mus omnes centurias fecit.*

that the centuries of his time owed their origin to Servius, a claim which he surely could not have made, had the total number of centuries been increased by 180 in the third century B. C.

Passing mention should finally be made in this connection of the several passages in ancient authors, to be discussed more fully below,<sup>29</sup> in which the voting units in the *comitia centuriata* are referred to as "tribes." The followers of Pantagathus claim that these are decisive for their own view. That this is not the case will be demonstrated. First, something must be said of the theory put forward by Mommsen in the *Staatsrecht*, which has been recently revived by Tibiletti in the light of new evidence provided by the *tabula Hebana*.<sup>30</sup>

In his later work Mommsen rejected the view of Pantagathus, to which he had adhered in his youth.<sup>31</sup> He accepted the cogent arguments in favour of regarding the *ratio* described in the *De Re Publica* as that of the reformed organization, but he nevertheless still remained convinced that Livy in the first book implied that the reform resulted in an increase in the total number of centuries.<sup>32</sup> As a consequence, he proposed the view that there were in the reformed organization two kinds of *centuria*. Of one kind there were 373; of the other 193. The former had a continued existence, and were in all respects similar to the centuries of Servius; the latter were mere voting units, which came into existence only at the actual moment of voting and again immediately dissolved. The 18 *centuria equitum*, the 5 supplementary centuries, and the 70 centuries of the first class voted as single units. There remained 280 centuries in Mommsen's first sense, 70 from each of the four lower classes. These were in some way grouped so as to form 100 voting units. Mommsen himself made no serious attempt to lay down the principle on which the grouping of centuries was based.<sup>33</sup> It was left to others to work out how in the simplest manner this could have been done.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>29</sup> See pp. 16-23.

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 223-40.

<sup>31</sup> In his work, *Die römische Tribus* (Altona, 1844).

<sup>32</sup> *St.*, III<sup>o</sup>, p. 274, note 3; *D.P.*, VI, 1, p. 311, note 2.

<sup>33</sup> He does hint at a possible arrangement. Each of the lower four classes, he suggests, may have voted in 25 groups, 20 of which contained three centuries and 5 two centuries ( $60 + 10 = 70$ ).

<sup>34</sup> Klebs, *op. cit.*, p. 197, worked on the assumption that no junior

The theory found few supporters. It was summarily dismissed by Rosenberg, De Sanctis, and Fraccaro in turn as both unnecessarily complicated and impracticable.<sup>35</sup> The *tabula Hebana*, an extract from a *rogatio* of A. D. 19, reveals that the second charge is invalid. Such a system of voting was practicable, and such a system—or one very similar—was in fact practised in Imperial times. The *rogatio* concerns the procedure for the *destinatio* of consuls and praetors under Augustus and Tiberius. It makes it clear that voting on this issue was confined to a select body of senators and *equites*, and proposes that, whereas this body had since A. D. 5 recorded its vote in 10 centuries or units of vote, it should in future record it in 15 such centuries, five being now added in honour of the dead Germanicus. The system whereby the electors were to be grouped in centuries is outlined:

trium et XXX trib. excepta Suc. et Esq. pilas quam maxime  
aequatas in urnam versatilem coici e[t sortitio]nem pro-  
nuntiari iubeat, sortirique senatores et eq. in quamq. cistam  
suffragium ferre debeant; du[m in centur.] primas quae C.  
et L. Caesar. adpellantur sortitio fiat ita uti in primam II  
III IIII cistas sortiatur b[inas trib., in] V cistam tres, in  
VI VII VIII VIII binas, in X tres, in eas quae Germanici  
Caesaris appellantur so[rtitio fiat ita] ut in XI XII XIII  
XIII cistas sortiatur binas trib., in XV tres trib.; ita ut  
cum tribum unam cuius [nomen sorte e]xierit citaverit,  
senatores quibusq. in senatu sententiam dicere licebit qui ex  
ea tribu erun[t ordine vocet] et ad primam cistam accedere  
et suffragium ferre iubeat. . . .<sup>36</sup>

Here was a system of voting whereby members of several tribes were grouped together to form a single unit, which had a corporate existence only in so far as all who composed it voted into one urn. This artificial unit, furthermore, was known as a *centuria*.

and senior century from one tribe voted together in one voting unit, and reached the conclusion that the following was the simplest arrangement:

Seniors	$11 \times 3 = 33$	Juniors	$9 \times 3 = 27$
	$1 \times 2 = 2$		$4 \times 2 = 8$

This represents the grouping of 70 centuries proper into 25 voting units in each of the four lower classes.

<sup>35</sup> Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 79; De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 355; Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

<sup>36</sup> Lines 23-9.

It may appear remarkable that Mommsen, working without any knowledge of this *rogatio* or the system of voting prescribed therein, should have been led solely by an examination of the other literary evidence to postulate such a system as he did for the reformed *comitia centuriata* of the Republic. Indeed it is this fact which appears to have convinced Tibiletti that Mommsen's reconstruction is in its essentials the correct one. A more careful consideration of the case, however, reveals that this is not the obvious conclusion to be drawn. Admittedly, the strongest objection raised by the detractors of Mommsen, as it seemed, was that his system was far too complicated to be practicable; and this can no longer stand. There were others, however, which remain unanswered. If it could be shown that the introduction of such a system of voting into the reformed *comitia centuriata* of the Republic would have been singularly unnecessary and futile, and, at the same time, that Augustus had very good reason for introducing just such a system, the argument based on the similarity of the procedure described in the *tabula Hebana* and that outlined by Mommsen would be manifestly of less weight. Such a demonstration I believe to be possible.

According to Tibiletti there are two pieces of evidence which indicate that Augustus found the procedure which he employed for the *destinatio* of consuls and praetors in the Republican institution of the *comitia centuriata*.<sup>37</sup> Augustus himself wrote: *multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi*.<sup>38</sup> Suetonius says in his biography of Augustus: *comitiorum quoque pristinum ius reduxit*.<sup>39</sup> It is, of course, by no means certain that Augustus' resolve to cling to and to revive Republican forms extended to his plans for procedure in the select *comitia* responsible for *destinatio*, which was itself an innovation. Let it be assumed that it did, however. These passages in the *Res Gestae* and the *Divus Augustus*, as applied to this procedure, are still capable of two quite different interpretations. It could be said with Tibiletti that, because tribes or sections of tribes were grouped together by lot to form single voting units in the reformed *comitia centuriata*, Augustus took pains to introduce the same system into his select assembly which voted on the *destinatio* of consuls and praetors, in other words that he intro-

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 225.

<sup>38</sup> *Res Gestae*, 8, 5.

<sup>39</sup> *Divus Augustus*, 40, 2.

duced the system simply and solely for its own sake and for no further motive. It could on the other hand be argued, however, that it was not the complicated system of voting as such which Augustus wished to preserve, but other Republican forms which could not be preserved by any means other than the introduction of just such a system.

This distinction will be more clearly outlined by a closer consideration of Augustus' problem. He had brought into being a picked body of senators and *equites* who were to play a decisive part in the consular and praetorian elections. How were they to record their vote? There were two alternative solutions to that which was in fact adopted. Augustus, had he wished, could have allowed the tribe to be the unit of vote. As 33 tribes were represented on the body, there would then have been 33 votes recorded. It might be argued that to have so large a number of voting units in so small an assembly would have been to have put too much power into the hands of individuals or cliques. In this case the second alternative could have been adopted: the body could have been divided into a smaller number of clearly defined permanent groups without reference to the tribes to which each member belonged. In fact, of course, Augustus preferred to employ the system of voting detailed in the *tabula Hebana*. How is this to be accounted for? The answer of Tibiletti—which appears also to be that of F. de Visscher<sup>40</sup>—

<sup>40</sup> "La table de Heba et la decadence des comices centuriates," *Revue Historique de droit français et étranger*, 4th series, XXIX (1951), pp. 36-7. In his view the *tabula Hebana* affords "une brillante confirmation" of the hypothesis of Momigliano, *op. cit.*, that, although there were no permanent units named *centuriae* in the four lower classes, the tribes were grouped by lot within each class. In fact, however, for reasons stated in the text, it lends no more support to such a hypothesis than it does to that of Mommsen. Considered on its own merits, the view of Momigliano has little to recommend it. It is true, as de Visscher emphasises, that it does away with the necessity for postulating two kinds of *centuria* to which the members of the lower classes could be said to belong, one permanent, the other a mere voting unit: but it still leaves two kinds of *centuria* within the organization as a whole, the permanent units into which the *equites* and the first class were divided and the voting units into which the tribes of the lower classes were grouped at the time of the election. In other respects it is open to the same traditional criticisms to which Mommsen's thesis has been subjected.

is based on the assumption that the vital element in the Republican *comitia centuriata* which Augustus felt it incumbent upon him to preserve was an elaborate system of grouping by lot. This suggestion is not likely in itself to win wide acceptance, but it appears as even less plausible when it is considered that the senators and *equites* who were grouped for voting in the manner outlined in the *tabula Hebana* were men who, on any view of the third century reform, would never have been so grouped in the *comitia centuriata* in that they would have voted in the centuries of the first class or *equites*. There are features of the Republican electoral system, however, which Augustus can understandably have wished to preserve. One, perhaps the most essential element in that system, was the use of a *comitia centuriata* as distinct from a *comitia tributa* for the elections of major magistrates. Another, important for the advantages of the group-vote principle which it introduced into the *comitia centuriata*, was the co-ordination of centuries with tribes. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that these were the features of the *pristinum ius* which Augustus strove by his arrangements of A. D. 5 to retain in being? He could not institute voting by tribes, for that would be to create what was virtually a *comitia tributa*. He could not divide the assembly of his creation into a number of permanent *centuriae*, for that would mean that the tribal division would play no part in determining the composition of the units of vote and that the one constitutional principle capable of effecting a fair and proportioned representation of citizens throughout the Empire would be abandoned. Indeed, de Visscher's own suggestion that the select body of senators and *equites* was in principle, if not in essence, the resurrected *comitia centuriata*<sup>41</sup> lends considerable support to the view that

<sup>41</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-9. De Visscher is certainly justified in arguing as against E. Schönauer ("Rechtshistorische Erkenntnisse aus einer neuen Inschrift," *Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité*, VI [1951], pp. 191-260) that the vote on *destinatio* was something more than the equivalent of a prerogative vote in election by the full *comitia*. Whether or not his restoration in lines 46-7 of the *tabula Hebana*—*in m[erum] ad qu[m] c[on]c[re]t[us] oportebit pro]inde c[on]dat*—be correct, it clearly reflects the procedure which must have been adopted. The use of the lot to determine the order of the *renuntiatio* presupposes in itself that the voting might cease before all results were announced, and therefore that the decision of the body as a whole was quite distinct from any

these were the elements which Augustus sought to preserve. How absurd Augustus' claim would have been, if his assembly had been purely tribal in structure! How absurd, if voting had not, like that in every assembly since 241 B. C., been in some way based on the tribal division! This is a matter of the utmost importance. Once it be even established that Augustus *could* have had, let alone did have, other motives for making the arrangements which he did than the desire to preserve a complicated Republican system of grouping by lot, the *tabula Hebana* ceases to provide any sure clue to procedure in the reformed *comitia centuriata*.<sup>42</sup>

So far only one of the tacit assumptions of Tibiletti and de Visscher has been examined. It is, however, a further corollary of their view that, to their mind unlike Augustus, the legislator of the third century B. C. had good reason for introducing the system of grouping as an innovation. Yet what could that have been? Unless the reform is to be regarded simply as the development of the growing importance of the tribal system at Rome, it is far from easy to understand why the centuries of all classes should have been co-ordinated with the tribes at the cost of the introduction of so complicated an arrangement. Even if it is supposed that the fundamental purpose of the reform could only be served by the co-ordination of all five classes with the tribes, it is surely true that other more simple methods of doing this could have been devised, which would not have seriously affected the balance of power within the assembly. The legislator of the third century B. C. was not faced with the same problem as Augustus. He was not presented with a fixed number of units which he had somehow to group into a smaller number, as Augustus was presented with 33 which he had to group into 10. The total number of centuries could, it may be supposed, be altered at will.<sup>43</sup> Why so alter that number as to render

•decision of the full *comitia centuriata* (see below, p. 18). In fact, if the number of candidates it marked out was equal to the number of places to be filled, as is almost certain, it was in practice, if not in theory, the electing body.

<sup>42</sup>The opinion that the inscription throws no light on the Republican reform is expressed by H. Nesselhauf, "Die Neue Germanicus-Inschrift von Magliano," *Historia*, I (1950), p. 112.

<sup>43</sup>It is admittedly possible that the number, 193, had become so

necessary such a complicated system of grouping as Augustus was forced to adopt, and further, by giving the same name, *centuria*, to two totally different, yet equally important, entities in the one organization, to introduce an absurdity which Augustus did not? <sup>44</sup>

It appears that the chief argument for regarding the *tabula Hebana* as rehabilitating Mommsen's views on the reform of the *comitia centuriata* is a purely subjective one. The system of voting suggested by Mommsen is now proved to have been one practised in Rome. If the suggestion was made after a careful examination of the evidence, surely, it is urged, the similarity of his system and that in use in Imperial times is not coincidental. This argument is understandable and is justified. It is no coincidence; but Mommsen is not for that reason proved to have been correct. This can be illustrated by a comparison of the practical and theoretical problems which he and Augustus set out to tackle. Augustus found it necessary to group 33 units into 10. Mommsen, while accepting Cicero's *ratio* as that of the reformed assembly, believed that Livy definitely implied an increase in the number of centuries after the reform, and so, in order to reconcile the two accounts, found it necessary to group 373 units into 193.<sup>45</sup> It is not surprising and no coincidence that both arrived at the one possible solution. Once it is admitted that Mommsen was mistaken in his interpretation of Livy and hence unjustified in his premiss, there is no ground whatever for accepting his conclusion.

The view that there was an increase in the total number of centuries in 241 B. C., then, whether it be believed with Pantagathus that these centuries still remained the units of vote or with Mommsen that they were grouped to form voting units equal in number to the centuries of the Servian organ-

firmly established by 241 B. C. that it would have been regarded as an offensive violation of tradition to change it. In this case, however, it can hardly be supposed that it was permissible to increase the total number of permanent centuries to 373 in the way proposed by Pantagathus.

"It would have been simpler, for example, to raise the total number of centuries to 233, with 70 allotted to the first class and 35 to each of the other four. A majority could then still have been reached without reference to the votes of the third class.

<sup>45</sup> Assuming, that is, that the view of Momigliano is rejected. See above, note 40.

ization, must be rejected. There remained but one kind of unit known as a *centuria*, and the total number of such units continued to be 193. It follows, therefore, that not all the classes of the reformed assembly were co-ordinated with the tribes.

Rosenberg and Fraccaro held that it was only within the first class that a century was composed solely of members of a single tribe: the centuries of the other four classes were not in any way constituted by reference to the tribal division.<sup>46</sup> With such a view as this, however, it is extremely difficult to reconcile those numerous passages in ancient authors in which the voting units of the reformed *comitia centuriata* are referred to as "tribes."<sup>47</sup>

Polybius writes of the procedure in capital cases in his own day: *τοῖς γὰρ θανάτου κρινομένοις, ἐπάν ταν καταδικάζωνται, δίδωσι τὴν ἔξουσίαν τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἀπαλλάττεσθαι φανερός, καν ἔπι μία λείπηται φυλὴ τῶν ἐπικυρουσῶν τὴν κρίσιν ἀψηφοφόρητος, ἐκούσιον ἔαντοῦ καταγνόντα φυγαδέαγ.*<sup>48</sup> Rosenberg is unconvincing in his attempt to show that Polybius is here referring to procedure in a tribal assembly.<sup>49</sup> Capital cases were almost certainly tried in the *comitia centuriata* in the second century B.C. Polybius is speaking of the unit in that assembly whose vote decides the issue, the last unit, that is, to have the result of its vote announced. Such a unit must have belonged to the second class or below, and yet it is named a *φυλή*. Mommsen claims that the historian is in error in his terminology.<sup>50</sup> Fraccaro ignores the problem completely.

<sup>46</sup> Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 73; Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>47</sup> Many scholars have, of course, explained them by the supposition that the final *renuntiatio* was made not by classes, but by tribes (see above, note 3). To the damning arguments of Rosenberg and De Sanctis against this view can now be added another, provided by the *tabula Hebana*. This document, lines 38-46, informs us that the results of the voting in the select body which took part in the *destinatio* of consuls and praetors in the early Empire were announced but once, after the order for the *renuntiatio* had been determined by lot. It may be assumed, therefore, that there was also but one *renuntiatio* in the *comitia centuriata* of the Republic. This, as Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 82, indicates, took place after the voting of each class.

<sup>48</sup> VI, 14, 7.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 83-4.

<sup>50</sup> *St.*, III<sup>a</sup>, p. 357, note 4; p. 413, note 4; *D. P.*, VI, 1, p. 409, note 3; p. 476, note 1.

Cicero speaks thus of the circumstances of his own election:

meis comitiis non tabellam vindicem tacitae libertatis sed vocem unam praे vobis indicem vestrarum erga me voluntatum ac studiorum tulistis. itaque me non extrema tribus suffragiorum sed primi illi vestri concursus neque singulæ voces praeconum sed una vox universi populi Romani consulem fecit.<sup>51</sup>

Mommsen and Rosenberg are content to explain the phrase *extrema tribus suffragiorum* by referring it to the last tribe to vote in the first class.<sup>52</sup> Fraccaro quite rightly follows De Sanctis in rejecting this interpretation, but admits his inability to give to the phrase any significant meaning which can be reconciled with his own view.<sup>53</sup> Cicero cannot be referring to the last tribe to vote in the first class; but neither can he be referring to the last tribe to vote in the fifth class, as Tibiletti has suggested.<sup>54</sup> His concern is not to boast that his election was decided before all the possible votes had been taken and announced. It would be small credit to him, if it were so: for there can surely have been few cases in which it was found necessary to call upon the fifth class to record its vote. Rather is he drawing a contrast between the results of the voting and the enthusiasm of the assembly in his favour which enabled him to forecast the result with certainty before the voting commenced. His point is that he did not have to wait until the *deciding* vote was announced. *extrema tribus suffragiorum*, therefore, can only refer to the last unit which did in fact vote—or more probably to the last unit to have the result of its vote announced. This could not have been a century of the first class.

In Lucan's mocking description of the election of Caesar to the consulship there is the following reference to procedure: *fingit sollemnia campus et non admissae dirimit suffragia plebis decantatque tribus et vana versat in urna.*<sup>55</sup> The poet is referring

<sup>51</sup> *De Lege Agraria*, II, 4.

<sup>52</sup> Mommsen, *St.*, III<sup>3</sup>, p. 279; *D.P.*, VI, 1, p. 316; Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 ff.

<sup>53</sup> De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 357; Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>54</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 236-8. The word *tribus* is in any case inapplicable to a unit of the fifth class. See below, p. 21.

<sup>55</sup> V, 391-2.

to some form of *sortitio*. In so far as *tribus* is plural, this cannot be the *sortitio* by which the *centuria praerogativa* was chosen. It must, then, be the *sortitio* which determined the order in which the results within a particular class were to be announced, a *sortitio* such as is mentioned in the *tabula Hebana*,<sup>56</sup> which took place after the voting and before the *renuntiatio*. Now it is clear that a *sortitio* of this kind could only be of value, if it directly affected voting units within that class in which a majority could conceivably be reached. In elections at Rome the *renuntiatio* only continued until a sufficient number of candidates had acquired an absolute majority.<sup>57</sup> Thus the order in which individual results were announced within those classes in which it was possible that any candidate should acquire that majority was of vital importance, and could have considerable effect on the outcome of the election.<sup>58</sup> It is not easy, however, to think of any adequate reason why a *sortitio* should have been held to determine the order in which the results within the first class should be announced. On any view, it was impossible for a majority to be reached without recourse being made to the second class at least: a *renuntiatio* must always have been made of the voting in every century of the first class. That there was in fact no such *sortitio* seems to be suggested by Livy's reference to centuries of that class other than the *centuria praerogativa* as being *iure vocatae*.<sup>59</sup> It is, of course, a possibility, though not a very strong one, that Lucan has mistaken the assembly<sup>60</sup> or was totally unaware of Republican procedure; but, if this is not the case, he must be referring to a *sortitio* which determined the order of *renuntiatio* for centuries of the second class and below.<sup>61</sup> It appears, then, that he too, like Polybius and

<sup>56</sup> Lines 38-46.

<sup>57</sup> Those passages which speak of unanimous decisions of "all the centuries" (Livy, XXIV, 9, 3; XXVI, 18, 9; 22, 13; XXVII, 21, 4; XXVIII, 38, 6; XXIX, 22, 5; Cicero, *Pro Sulla*, 91; *In Pisonem*, 2; *Pro Lege Manilia*, 2) do not warrant the view that all the classes voted. See Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

<sup>58</sup> De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 365, illustrates this clearly.

<sup>59</sup> XXVII, 6, 3. Perhaps in the first class the *ordo tribuum* was observed. See below, note 92.

<sup>60</sup> So Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>61</sup> It is possible that the *sortitio* took place before the results of the voting in the first class were announced, and that the order so

Cicero, designates by the word *tribus* a century of one of the four lower classes.

There is one further passage which ought perhaps to be considered. Livy describes the action of Livius Salinator in 204 B. C. as follows: *praeter Maeciam tribum quae se neque condemnasset neque condemnatum aut consulem aut censorem fecisset, populum Romanum omnem, quattuor et triginta tribus, aerarios reliquit quod et innocenter condemnassent et condemnatum consulem et censorem fecissent.*<sup>62</sup> It is clear that Salinator was able to see some indication of opinion within the individual tribes in the results of the voting as they were announced. Rosenberg and Fraccaro say that he would have been content to judge the tribes on the strength of the vote of those of their members who were registered in the first class.<sup>63</sup> De Sanctis, on the other hand, while admitting that Salinator must have based his condemnation of the thirty-four tribes on evidence provided by the votes of but a portion of their members,<sup>64</sup> claims that that portion must have constituted a majority. If the voting was continued into the third class, as he supposes it was, six out of ten voting units from the same tribe would have recorded their opinion.<sup>65</sup> Of these two views the former is most certainly the more acceptable. De Sanctis ignores the essential fact that in the *comitia centuriata* numerical majorities counted for very little. Is not Salinator's action far more intelligible, however, if all the centuries which actually did vote on the issues in question were tribes or sections of tribes? The votes of the *equites* and the first two classes were taken as representative of the will of the *populus Romanus*. What more natural than for Salinator to take the votes of tribe members enrolled in the first two classes as representative of the will of the whole tribe?

There are other references in ancient authorities to *tribus* as determined was applied to all classes within which centuries were co-ordinated with the tribes. It is still true, however, that, if the first class *alone* was co-ordinated with the tribes, there would have been no need for such a *sortitio*.

<sup>62</sup> Livy, XXIX, 37, 13.

<sup>63</sup> Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>64</sup> Unless, of course, it is supposed that all the centuries recorded their vote. This, however, is a corollary of the theory of the double *recountatio*.

<sup>65</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 1, pp. 359-60.

units of vote in the reformed *comitia centuriata*.<sup>66</sup> They are capable of many interpretations, and are not conclusive for any view. The passages which have been considered, however, all invite the one conclusion, that centuries other than those of the first class were co-ordinated with the tribes. The total number of centuries in the reformed organization remained, as has been argued, at 193, and of these only 100 belonged to the last four classes. It follows, therefore, Mommsen's view being set aside, that the co-ordination of centuries with the tribes extended to the second and possibly to the third class, but extended no further. There are three possible arrangements which might have been employed. One is that suggested by Cavaignac, who assigned 70 centuries to the first class, 70 to the second, and 10 to each of the remaining three.<sup>67</sup> De Sanctis, however, quite rightly pointed out that such a disproportionate increase in the number of centuries allotted to the second class would be very hard to explain.<sup>68</sup> The other two involve the supposition that in one or more classes all members of one tribe voted as a single unit, and not, as in the first class, in two groups, one of juniors and one of seniors. The first three classes might have been co-ordinated with the tribes, in which case the centuries would have been distributed over the classes in much the following manner:

Class I .....	70	co-ordinated with the tribes
Class II .....	35	
Class III.....	35	
Class IV .....	10 (?)	
Class V .....	20 (?)	

Alternatively, the first two classes alone might have been so co-ordinated, in which case the following would have been the approximate distribution :

Class I .....	70	co-ordinated with the tribes
Class II .....	35	
Class III.....	20 (?)	
Class IV .....	20 (?)	
Class V .....	25 (?) <sup>69</sup>	

<sup>66</sup> Livy, *Periochae*, 49; Orosius, V, 7, 1; Cicero, *Phil.*, XI, 18. The reference in Livy, VI, 21, 5, is on any view an anachronism.

<sup>67</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 255.

<sup>68</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 1, pp. 357-8.

<sup>69</sup> The odd number constitutes no ground for objection. The distinction

Of these two arrangements the second preserves better the proportion of centuries allotted to each class in the Servian organization, which was as follows:

Class I .....	80
Class II .....	20
Class III.....	20
Class IV .....	20
Class V .....	30

If the second was the actual arrangement made, the complement of the third and fourth classes remained the same, while that of the second was increased by 15 at the expense of the first and fifth.

This arrangement is one which is unaffected by the arguments put forward against that of Pantagathus.<sup>70</sup> It is also one which enables a much more natural interpretation to be given to those passages in which voting units are referred to as "tribes"; for it involves the existence of one class, the second, in which a century was composed of all members of a single tribe within that class. Not only Mommsen, Rosenberg, and Fraccaro, but De Sanctis too must understand *tribus* or *φυλή* either to be a misnomer or to be applied to a unit containing only half the members of any one tribe in a class. The view of Tibiletti, who, despite his efforts to rehabilitate Mommsen, is rightly aware of the unsatisfactory nature of Mommsen's explanation of these passages, requires that the name was applied in the lower classes to all those, members of two or more tribes, who cast their vote into a single urn.<sup>71</sup> Neither account is satisfactory, the latter

between seniors and juniors was very possibly not observed in the lower classes. It could, however, be maintained that the complement of the fifth class was 24 centuries, and that the odd century was that referred to as the *ne quis scivit centuria* (Festus 177M, *P. Oxy.*, XVII, 2088).

<sup>70</sup> It still remains true that the epithet *Voturia iuniorum* cannot refer to any but one century in the entire organization: for the distinction between seniors and juniors was not observed in the second class.

<sup>71</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 236-8. Tibiletti, it is true, maintains that, consistently with his view, *tribus* can refer to a half-tribe in a single class. He argues that the phrase *extrema tribus suffragiorum*, as used by Cicero, *De Leg. Agr.*, II, 4, designates the last unit to vote rather than the

less so than the former. If, however, there was a class in which all members of a tribe voted into a single urn, and if the authorities quoted were in fact referring to units of that class when they used the expression *tribus* or *φυλή*, the passages present no difficulties. That this is so is in many cases demonstrable.

There can be little doubt that the election of Cicero was decided without reference to the votes of the third class: Cicero himself stresses the virtual unanimity of the electorate in his support. The election of Caesar, which is parodied by Lucan, must also have been undisputed, in which case the deciding vote was recorded by a unit of the second class. When this is realized, the poet's mockery appears more pointed. If it was a foregone conclusion that the votes of all 35 centuries of the second class would go in Caesar's favour, how ludicrous to perform the solemn formality of a *sortitio* and so to keep up the pretence that the order of the *renuntiatio* could effectively alter the result! In the condemnation and the elections of Salinator the centuries of 34 tribes were unanimous. Once again, then, the voting must have ended with the second class; for, excluding the equestrian centuries which were probably in agreement with the majority, the votes of the 34 tribes alone in the first and second classes will have been 102 (68 + 34). The same thing can be said of other occasions for which the units of vote are described by our authorities as "tribes."<sup>72</sup> Only Polybius of the authors quoted can be said not necessarily to refer to a vote in the *comitia centuriata* at which a decision was reached before the centuries of the third class were called; but he lived at a time when the number of occasions when a majority was reached on the votes of the first and second classes alone was

---

last unit to have the result of its vote announced, and consequently a half-tribe rather than a group of half-tribes. This is not the most natural interpretation of Cicero's meaning. The same can most certainly not be said of the use of *φυλή* by Polybius, however. The context here leaves no doubt that he is referring to a *renuntiatio*. On Tibiletti's view, therefore, *φυλή* must designate a group of two or three half-tribes which voted into a single urn.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Livy, *Per.*, 49: *ut comitiis plurimae eum tribus consulem scriberent*; Cicero, *Phil.*, XI, 18: *qui cum longe omnes belli gloria et virtute superaret, duas tamen tribus solas tulit*. If in both cases the large majority of tribes were in agreement, the voting must have ended with the second class.

no doubt so great as to explain, if not to warrant, his designation of the century which decided the issue as a *φυλή*.

It has been shown that there is no necessity to have recourse to strained interpretations of words or phrases in the writings of ancient authors. The more important evidence which bears directly upon the problem is perfectly consistent, and it invites but one conclusion. The stages of the argument may be briefly summarized:

- (1) There were units in the reformed assembly, known as *centuriae*, of which the total number was 193 (pp. 2-9).
- (2) There is no ground for the view that there were other units in that assembly, also known as *centuriae*, of which the total number was 373, and which were grouped together in some way to form 193 units (pp. 9-15).
- (3) The co-ordination of centuries with tribes could not, therefore, have extended over all five classes (pp. 15-16).
- (4) The view that the co-ordination of the centuries with the tribes was restricted to the first class is untenable (pp. 16-20).
- (5) Of the few remaining possibilities the most plausible, and that which explains most naturally the references to units of vote as "tribes," is that the co-ordination of centuries with tribes was restricted to the first and second classes, and that in the second class the distinction between seniors and juniors was abolished (pp. 20-23).

## II

The conclusions reached in the preceding section are based solely upon references to the working of the *comitia centuriata* in the later Republic. The problem can be approached in a very different way. What was the motive for the reform? Who were its sponsors? If it be found possible to give definite answers to these questions, much light will thereby be thrown upon its essential nature.

The great majority of scholars who have considered this matter have expressed the view that the reform was democratic in character, that it was in fact directed from outside against the *nobilitas*. Mommsen thought that such a conclusion was neces-

sitated by those aspects of the reform itself which are known to us beyond all doubt. The common line of argument, however, is that the reform was but one of many acts inspired by a so-called "democratic movement," which made itself felt at the close of the third and the beginning of the second centuries B. C. De Sanctis is a typical expositor of such a doctrine.<sup>73</sup> The agitation came from the middle-class small proprietor, the man enrolled in the third class of the census, who would stand to benefit by a reform such as Pantagathus supposed this to be. The late third century was marked by the growth of capitalism in agriculture and industry, and by a more extensive use of slave labour. As a consequence, the number of those qualified for enrolment in the first class became fewer, the complements of the individual classes more disproportionate. The small proprietor suffered in every respect. It was he who clamoured for the reform, and he who availed himself of the increased influence derived from it to elect leaders such as Flaminius and Varro to represent his interests.

This hypothesis is open to criticism on at least three major scores. First, it may be seriously questioned whether there was such a rift between the small proprietor and the *nobilitas*. Is it true to say that the middle classes had any substantial grievance? There is little reason to suppose that they were opposed to the tenure of high offices by members of the *nobilitas*. Apart from the fact that the oligarchic rule of the widened governing class was as yet young, the small proprietors of the third century are not in any respect to be compared with the ex-proprietor proletariat of the late second century, which fell an easy prey to demagogues who sought to further their own interests by incriminating the noble families. According to De Sanctis, the grievances were similar to those of the Gracchan supporters a century later, but the case against thus retrojecting the conditions of the late second century into the years before the Second Punic War has been argued by Fraccaro,<sup>74</sup> and more recently in greater detail by Tibiletti.<sup>75</sup> It is pointed out quite

<sup>73</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 1, pp. 332 ff.

<sup>74</sup> "Lex Flaminia de agro Gallico et Piceno viritim dividendo," *Athenaeum*, N. S. VII (1919), pp. 6 ff.

<sup>75</sup> "Il possesso dell'ager publicus e le norme 'de modo agrorum' sino

rightly that the economic factors which contributed to the conditions prevailing in 133 were not yet at work. The growth of a wealthy class, resulting in the large-scale importation of slaves; the enforced and prolonged absence of the smaller proprietor from his holding while serving in the field; the appearance of the *latifundia* and the consequent depopulation of certain of the rural areas date only from the Second Punic War; while the more serious consequences of such developments were not felt until many years later. Furthermore, in the third century land was plentiful, and was most certainly not preserved by the Senate for its own use. From the time of the large-scale distributions of land on the *ager Veiens* in 387, the Senate catered liberally for the needs of the Roman citizen population by viritane assignments and colonization.<sup>76</sup> It is consequently not easy to accept the suggestion that the feeling of antipathy among the agrarian middle-classes was sufficiently strong either to force the *nobilitas* to reform the *comitia centuriata*, or, when it had been reformed, to have any effect upon the issue of the voting.

A second objection to De Sanctis' view is provided by the evidence of the *fasti*. It appears that the hold of the *nobilitas* upon the direction of affairs was tightened rather than relaxed in the years following the reform. From 241 B. C. until the end of the century no more than five new *gentes* were represented in the consular office, a smaller number than for any corresponding number of years between the date of the Licinio-Sextian plebiscite and the reform.<sup>77</sup> De Sanctis attempted to forestall this objection. The absence of many *novi homines*, he thinks, could be explained satisfactorily without supposing that the structure of the electoral assembly remained unaltered—by the realization that there was a need for experience in military leadership among those who were entrusted with the highest offices of state, by the conservative respect in which the older families were held.<sup>78</sup> This is indeed true; and De Sanctis

ai Gracchi," *Athenaeum*, N. S. XXVI (1948), pp. 173-236; XXVII (1949), pp. 3-42.

<sup>76</sup> See T. Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, I (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 40-1, 59 ff. The fourth and third centuries saw at least 10 citizen and 27 Latin colonies.

<sup>77</sup> The *gentes Pomponia* (233), *Publicia* (232), *Apustia* (226), *Flaminia* (223), *Terentia* (216).

<sup>78</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 1, pp. 346-7.

appears to recognize that the grievances of the electorate were not such as to outweigh this respect. Why, then, it may be asked, did the supposedly aggrieved element clamour for the reform? To some, no doubt, the election of Flaminus and Varro to the consulship is something which demands explanation. But the view that these men were exponents of a policy rather than adherents of a faction, like other *novi homines* of this time, has little to support it. It springs from what I think to be an uncritical acceptance of Fabian propaganda preserved in the annalistic account, and from a tendency to interpret Flaminus' measures in the light of false preconceptions concerning economic factors.<sup>79</sup>

Finally, if it were granted that the "democratic movement" was a reality, it would be difficult to understand how the will of the aggrieved could have been imposed upon the governing oligarchy. Those who were not members of the governing class could do little; those who were cannot have been particularly concerned. It is one thing to talk of the existence of a group within the governing class which favoured economic reform; another to look upon that group as ready, if indeed it were to get the opportunity, to rob the oligarchy to which it belonged of its control, and in many ways beneficial control, of the most distinguished assembly in the Roman state.<sup>80</sup>

This last point is one which can legitimately be made against any who seek to regard the reform as a measure directed against the *nobilitas*. How was it carried? What explanation is to be given of the fact that a reform so radical in its nature, which must have been fiercely opposed by the reactionary elements in the state, was left unmentioned by Livy's epitomator? These

<sup>79</sup> I hope to treat this subject in more detail at a future date.

<sup>80</sup> Mention should be made here of the view of Frank, *C.A.H.*, VII, pp. 801-2. He believes that the reform was democratic, but that it was passed by the *nobilitas* with a view to saving the *comitia centuriata* from passing into disuse. He is wrong, however, in his statement that the only alternative to the *comitia centuriata* was the tribal assembly of the *plebs*, presided over by tribunes. The larger part of consular legislation must at this date have been carried in the *comitia populi tributa*; and there is not a shred of evidence that there was any movement on foot to transfer the elections of the major magistrates to this assembly.

difficulties do not stand, if the measure was carried by the *nobilitas* in its own interest. It remains, then, to ask whether the situation in the middle of the third century was such that some reform was needed to secure the control of the *nobilitas* over the *comitia centuriata*. I believe that it was.

In the fifth century B. C. the area in the immediate vicinity of Rome had been very thickly populated. However, the expansion which began with the doubling of the cultivable land after the defeat of Veii, and continued until in 264 B. C. no less than 8,000 square miles were covered by the Roman domain, had not been accompanied by a proportionate growth in the citizen population; and consequently it had considerably eased the overcrowding of the Campagna. The Roman farmer, who in the fifth century had dwelt on the doorstep of the city, if not within its walls, was now the occupant of land in incorporated territories much further removed. The effect of this development upon the distribution of interest in the Servian *comitia centuriata* is not far to seek. In the fifth century, the landowning section of the population qualified by the census to vote in the centuries of the first class could put in a regular attendance at the *comitia*; in the third century, this was no longer the case.

This gradual dispersal of the population was very probably accompanied by a heightening of the city's industrial activity following upon the re-establishment of contacts with Etruria. There is indeed little evidence that Rome engaged actively in commerce or in manufacture for export. The third century, however, did bring a revival of art, eight temples being constructed in its first three decades; and the almost continuous warfare must have created a demand for weapons, armour, vehicles, clothing, and all the other necessary equipment of an armed force in addition to that for the everyday requirements of the urban and outlying population.<sup>81</sup> The measures of the censors, Appius Claudius and Fabius Rullianus, in 312 and 304 B. C. testify to the growth of an appreciable element within the city which was not actively engaged in agriculture.<sup>82</sup> It is

<sup>81</sup> Cf. T. Frank, *An Economic History of Rome to the End of the Republic* (Baltimore, 1920), pp. 55 ff.

<sup>82</sup> Livy, IX, 29, 5; 46, 11-14; Diodorus, XX, 36, 1.

true that the authorities refer only to the employed classes of the lower census groups in this connection; but there must surely have been a due quota of employers also. Rosenberg confines the city population of the first class to bankers and usurers,<sup>83</sup> but he is not justified in so doing. There must have been many who were enrolled in the first class on the strength of some small holding in the city, and perhaps many more who, while principally engaged in industry or handicraft, had their money invested in property.

What were the effects of these trends upon the control of the electoral assembly by the *nobilitas*? Several scholars have recognized their importance for the whole problem of the reform, but they have failed to draw what, as it appears to me, is the obvious conclusion. Fraccaro, for example, while maintaining that the reform was sponsored by the nobility, pictures a conflict between the landowning classes of the original 16 tribes and those of the 19 new ones. The newer tribes extended over a far larger area than the older, their membership was far greater, and as a consequence the wealthy classes in the latter were in growing danger of being outvoted.<sup>84</sup> The premisses of this argument are sound, but the conclusion is far from certain. The reform, said to have been inspired by this fear among the members of the older tribes, would surely have aggravated rather than alleviated their plight. In an assembly such as the Servian *comitia centuriata* the proximity of the older tribes to the place of voting would have more than made up for their deficiency in numbers. In the reformed assembly, on the other hand, into which the principle of the group vote was introduced, the older tribes could only control a little under half of the total votes cast within those classes in which centuries were co-ordinated with the tribes. Apart from this, moreover, Fraccaro does not satisfactorily explain why the *nobilitas* should have encountered greater opposition in the new tribes than in the old.

Rosenberg is in several respects more to the point. He sees that the whole purpose of the co-ordination of centuries with tribes was to introduce the principle of the group vote into the

<sup>83</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 80-1.

<sup>84</sup> "La riforma," pp. 119 ff. This account is accepted by de Visscher, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

*comitia centuriata*. He sees too that it was against those enrolled in the urban tribes that the introduction of the group vote was directed.<sup>85</sup> The sponsors of the reform wished to do for the *comitia centuriata* what Rullianus had done for the tribal assemblies in 304 B. C., when he had confined the *forensis turba* to the four city tribes. He takes the strange view, however, that the wealthy urban voters, whose influence was curbed by the reform, were the clients of the *nobilitas*. Even if it be supposed with Rosenberg that they were almost all freedmen, this would not necessarily have been the case; for they were certainly no longer dependent on their previous masters.<sup>86</sup> But this assumption is itself quite unwarranted. It was surely from this urban population that the noble families had most to fear. They could rely on the wealthy landowning element from all parts. Its interests were much those of the *nobilitas*: it possessed that conservative outlook which respected the right of those to rule who were born into the governing circle and brought up among its traditions; and, if the election of a *novus homo* was favoured by some, it was not sufficiently a unity to give any appreciable backing to his candidature. Not so the urban dwellers. Their interests were in many cases opposed to those of the *nobilitas*: they no doubt had little respect for tradition; and they were rendered a unity not only by their common activities, but by their proximity of domicile and by the attitude of disdain with which they were regarded by their social superiors. These were

<sup>85</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 80 ff.

<sup>86</sup> The view that the *nobilitas* benefited from a substantial freedman vote is one which is based to a certain extent on a statement of Dionysius, IV, 23, 6, to that effect. It involves the assumption that freedmen were the clients of the aristocracy, and, if the doctrine is applied to the *comitia centuriata*, that the wealthy freedmen were equally so with the poorer. There was a time in the earliest days of the Republic, before the codification of law, when this may have been the case. By the end of the fourth century, however, conditions had altered. There were opportunities for freedmen to find a livelihood in agriculture or handicraft independently of their patrons' support. It was just because such freedmen were a danger to the proper working of the constitution that attempts were made in the third and second centuries to confine them to the urban tribes (Livy, *Pcr.*, 20; Livy, XLV, 15). It is significant that, when concessions were made, they were made to those who had landed property (Plutarch, *Flamininus*, 18, 1; Livy, XL, 51, 9; XLV, 15).

the men who constituted the real danger to the governing class in the third century. Though comparatively few in numbers, they were in a position to put in a regular attendance at the *comitia*, and perhaps, if the attendance from the country was small, to enforce their will upon it.

It would appear, then, that the distribution of interest in the *comitia centuriata* in the middle third century was such as to render the control of the *nobilitas* insecure. What means were needed, what methods were in fact adopted, to right the situation? We are now in a position to answer this question, and, in so doing, to interpret those known aspects of the reform which persuaded Mommsen that its nature was essentially democratic. The points on which he laid most emphasis were three:<sup>87</sup>

- (1) By the co-ordination of centuries with tribes the censorial power of deciding the composition of individual centuries was restricted.
- (2) It was no longer the case after the reform that a majority decision of the assembly could be reached on the votes of the centuries of *equites* and the first class alone.
- (3) The eighteen centuries of *equites* lost their prerogative rights,<sup>88</sup> while the *sex suffragia*, the six original centuries of *equites*, were relegated to a voting position between the first and second classes.<sup>89</sup>

Considered *in abstracto*, these three features of the reform appear decidedly democratic. Not so, however, when the purpose of its sponsors is taken into account.

In the old Servian organization, as Mommsen points out, the censors could play a large part in deciding how the individual voting units should be composed; but there must have come a time when their efforts to restrain the influence of the urban voters were no longer of much avail. A more effective and permanent system for ensuring the ascendancy of the landowning class was then to be desired. Only one solution was possible. It was to concentrate those voters whose influence was to be

<sup>87</sup> *St.*, III<sup>3</sup>, pp. 280-1; *D. P.*, VI, 1, p. 319.

<sup>88</sup> Cicero, *Pro Plancio*, 49; *Ad Quintum fratrem*, II, 14, 4; *De Divinatione*, I, 103; Festus, 249M.

<sup>89</sup> Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 82.

curbed in as few voting units as possible, and so to leave the others untainted. This in turn could best be done by applying to the *comitia centuriata* the solution adopted for the tribal assemblies in 304 B.C., that is by co-ordinating the most influential centuries with the tribes. A measure such as this, in order to be effective, required a reduction in the complement of the first class to 70 centuries, and so the loss to its members of the potential majority. But this was not, as Mommsen supposes, something desired for itself by the promoters of the reform. It was a necessary consequence of a course designed to avert a far more serious danger. It may be supposed, moreover, that the *nobilitas* took measures to safeguard their position under the new arrangement. The complement of the first class had been reduced to 70 centuries, and of these 8 were dominated by the members of the urban tribes whose influence it was their purpose to exclude. They could rely now on only 80 ( $62 + 18$ ) votes from the centuries of *equites* and the first class; and consequently 17 more were needed to make up an absolute majority. A natural solution to their problem was to co-ordinate the centuries of the second class also with the tribes, to raise the complement of that class to 35. They could then be more certain of at least 31 further votes in their favour.

Mommsen's third point is ostensibly his strongest. He wrote: "the right of voting separately, which was a primitive institution in the case of the *sex suffragia*, was transformed from an advantage into a disadvantage."<sup>90</sup> He gave no adequate reason, however, for suggesting that it was the legislator's intention to attack and humiliate the old patrician families. In fact, the Struggle of the Orders was long over. It would have been a singularly pointless piece of vindictive legislation to have relegated these six centuries of *equites* en bloc to a position in the order of voting inferior to that of the remaining twelve merely for the sake of so doing. The move can be otherwise explained. The influence of preceding votes on those which followed is well attested.<sup>91</sup> It may have been feared that the solid phalanx of urban centuries which had voted in the first class would have had some influence on the voting of the centuries of the second.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>90</sup> *St.*, III<sup>a</sup>, p. 292; *D.P.*, VI, 1, p. 332.

<sup>91</sup> Livy, XXIV, 9, 3; XXVI, 22; also references in note 88 above.

<sup>92</sup> This argument would have greater weight, if in fact the votes of

In this case it may be supposed that the *sex suffragia* were placed in the order of voting after the centuries of the first class with a purpose. The six centuries of die-hards least likely to be affected by the preceding vote were to act as *praerogativa* for the second class.

The three aspects of this great measure which led Mommsen to regard it as democratically inspired appear as necessary constituents in a scheme to secure control of the electoral assembly against all attack. The powers of the censors, restricted by the co-ordination of the centuries of the first and second classes with the tribes, were replaced by a much more effective means of curbing the influence of the wealthy urban population; the loss of the potential majority within the centuries of the *equites* and the first class, though perhaps in itself an evil from the point of view of the *nobilitas*, was yet a necessary one; and the so-called "relegation" of the *sex suffragia* may well have rendered their vote all the more influential.

The reform appears not to have been directed *against* the *nobilitas*, but to have been introduced *by* the *nobilitas* with a view to securing itself against a danger which now seriously threatened it. Until the closing decades of the Republic the noble families maintained their hold upon the supreme magistracy. *Novi homines* were few, and of them a great majority owed their success entirely to the support afforded them by a member of one of the long-established families. That this should have been the case despite the ever-increasing tendency of the

the eight centuries of the urban tribes in the first class were the last to have the result of their vote announced. It has been suggested, p. 18, that an established order was observed for the *renuntiatio* of the votes of the centuries of the first class, and it may well be that the urban tribes came last in that order. Indications to the effect that the urban tribes preceded the rustic tribes in the *ordo tribuum* (Cicero, *De Leg. Agr.*, II, 79; Varro, *De Lingua Latina*, V, 56; *C. I. L.*, VI, 10211) render this assumption slightly less probable, but these passages, it must be remembered, contain no reference to the actual *ordo* observed for the *renuntiatio* in the third century. The superior *dignitas* of the rustic tribes is attested by Livy, IX, 46, 14, and by the fact that relegation to an urban tribe was regarded as a punishment. Furthermore, Mommsen is perhaps correct in his view that the urban centuries were excluded from the lot which determined the *centuria praerogativa* (*St.*, III<sup>a</sup>, p. 293, note 5; *D. P.*, VI, 1, p. 333, note 3).

*nobilitas* to divide against itself testifies not only to the oligarchic structure of the reformed *comitia centuriata*, but also to the wisdom and foresight of those *nobiles* who by the reform guaranteed that their class should provide the oligarchs.

Two entirely independent approaches have now been made to the problem. In either case the conclusion reached as to the essential nature of the reform is the same. Consideration of the evidence for procedure in the *comitia centuriata* of the later Republic invites the view that the first and second classes alone were co-ordinated with the tribes, and that the distinction between seniors and juniors was not observed in the second. An enquiry into the prevailing political, social, and economic conditions of the third century suggests that the purpose of the sponsors of the measure could best be achieved by doing just so much and nothing more.

E. S. STAVELEY.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

## EPICURUS ON THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF THE COSMOS.

Most of the questions treated by Lucretius in his Second Book relate to the nature, shape, number, and movement of the atoms and are "physical" rather than cosmological questions. It is only at the end of the Book that Lucretius begins to deal with the Epicurean Cosmos or Cosmoi and while not yet entering upon the details of Epicurean cosmogony—a subject reserved to Book V—establishes two points that are of crucial importance for the Epicurean system: There is not only our world but an infinite number of worlds coexisting at one and the same time, and every Cosmos, far from being eternal, comes into being by a mechanical process, grows for a time, and then begins to decline and lose substance until it finally perishes altogether.<sup>1</sup> In proving the second thesis, Lucretius as a matter of fact concentrates upon our own world, yet there can be little doubt that his argument is meant to apply to every other Cosmos as well. The basic idea on which the argument rests emerges very clearly: For a long time the Cosmos grows by absorbing additional matter in the form of atoms which come in large quantities from outside, out of the *magnum omne*.<sup>2</sup> This increase continues as long as the atoms thus incorporated exceed in number those which the Cosmos gives off. There comes a point which Lucretius calls the *extremus finis crescendi* and which the Greeks would probably have designated as the *akme* of the Cosmos; at this juncture the amount of material absorbed balances that given off.<sup>3</sup> After this there is an excess of loss over gain and the Cosmos becomes weaker and weaker, losing not so much bulk as intrinsic compactness, until it finally breaks down<sup>4</sup> because in its weakened and so to speak senile condition

<sup>1</sup> II, 1023-89; 1105-72.

<sup>2</sup> *Quae magnum iaculando contulit omne*, v. 1108; cf. 1105-15.

<sup>3</sup> *Nilo iam plus est quod datur intra vitalis venas quam quod fluit atque recedit*, vv. 1118 f. Contrast the description of the earlier phases while the *auctus* (v. 1121; cf. *adauctu* 1122, *augescere* 1109) continues, vv. 1122-7, 1128-30.

<sup>4</sup> *Sic igitur magni quoque circum moenia mundi expugnata dabunt labem putresque ruinas*, vv. 1144 f.; cf. vv. 1131-49.

it is no longer able to resist the forces which attack it from the outside.

Students of Epicurus or Lucretius have had no difficulty in determining the place of this thesis in the history of Greek philosophy. The thesis as such is simply a restatement of a fundamental doctrine on which the Presocratics had been agreed—and which had almost been a matter of course for them: our Cosmos has a limited lifetime and as it has come into being by a gradual process so it will also in due course and under the operation of physical forces pass out of existence. To be sure, by Epicurus' time this venerable dogma was no longer unchallenged. Plato had come very near to making our Cosmos eternal,<sup>5</sup> and if he had barely refrained from taking the final step—though even then it was maintained that he had actually taken it<sup>6</sup>—Aristotle had certainly come forward with most emphatic proclamations of its eternity and divinity and had—esoterically as well as exoterically—marshalled very substantial arguments in support of this new conception of the world.<sup>7</sup>

A section of Lucretius' Fifth Book shows us that Epicurus made a determined effort to refute this new doctrine;<sup>8</sup> by contrast our section of Book II reaffirms the traditional doctrine without polemic, in fact without any reference to alternative views. Is the elaborate and carefully constructed argument by which Epicurus re-establishes the older thesis nevertheless a reflection of the new situation? In all probability yes, for Epi-

<sup>5</sup> See Plat., *Tim.*, 31 A f., 32 C 3, 41 A 7 f., 37 D 2.

<sup>6</sup> On the Academic interpretation of Plato's famous *γένοντα* (*Tim.*, 27 B 7) see especially A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 66 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Arist., *De Philos.*, 18-21 Walzer and *De Coelo*, A 9 ff. Cf. after Jaeger, *Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 140 ff., especially Le R. P. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismég.*, II: *Le dieu cosmique* (Paris, 1949), pp. 238 ff. and *pass.*

<sup>8</sup> See especially V, 235-415. The relationship of this section to ours in Book II presents difficult problems (a) with regard to Lucretius' own poem; for in V, 91-109 he speaks as though the *ruina* of the Cosmos were a *res nova* (v. 97) and (b) with regard to the Greek work or works on which he depends. I have no solution to offer but hope that the problem emerges more clearly when the argument of our section is seen in its historical context. For the historical background of V, 235-415 see my paper "Epicurus and Cosmological Heresies," *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 1 ff.

curus could not help being aware that what had been axiomatic for the Presocratics was by his own time a matter of serious question and scrutiny.<sup>9</sup>

However, these considerations give us the background only for Epicurus' thesis and for his anxiety to establish it; they do not help us towards a historical understanding of his argument or of the underlying conception of growth and decline. Regarding these, Cyril Bailey has in the commentary of his recent edition<sup>10</sup> contributed a number of helpful observations which may serve us as a starting point. He reminds us that the topic of growth and decline has been touched upon twice in Book I and that the explanation there suggested is the same as in our section: a body can grow only as long as "food" is supplied from outside (at I, 555 Lucretius speaks of a *summus finis* of growth which parallels the *extremus finis crescendi* of II, 1116). Bailey further points out that whatever matter is added to our Cosmos is distributed to its parts on the principle "like to like"; new particles of earth join earth, such of water join the water already present. In this he recognizes convincingly an echo of Empedocles' doctrine that like attracts like, though in Epicurus and, as a matter of fact, earlier in Leucippus and Democritus, this tendency is of course no longer due to the operation of Love.<sup>11</sup> Even more valuable is the observation that "the main idea with regard to growth and decay is the same both in individual creatures and in worlds" and "that Lucretius states [this idea] in full in reference to the body (1133-43) and then applies it to the worlds (1144-49)."

Considered carefully, this observation implies that if we wish to find more definite antecedents of Epicurus' argument we have to look in two directions; they may present themselves either in Presocratic cosmology or in 4th (and early 3rd) century biology. Hitherto the commentators have naturally enough given their main attention to Cosmology, with the result of

<sup>9</sup> Cf. E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (2 vols., Bari, 1936), ch. 8, where our section is discussed on pp. 504 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Titi Lucreti Cari *De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* (3 vols., Oxford, 1947), pp. 975 f.

<sup>11</sup> On this point see also A. Ernout and L. Robin, *Lucretée, De Rerum Natura, Commentaire exégétique et critique* (3 vols., Paris, 1925), *ad loc.* (II, 1112-15).

finding motifs of the "like to like" type. More specific cosmological tenets that might be compared with our section have, so far as I can see, not been tracked down. It has, for instance, barely yet been noticed that Democritus, according to a statement in Hippolytus, considered "the Cosmos to be in a state of *akme* until it is no longer able to accept anything additional from outside."<sup>12</sup> True, Hippolytus may have ignored details or nuances which would make a good deal of difference to us. Let us grant no more than provisional acceptance to his report.<sup>13</sup> Now if we compare the Democritean doctrine with the argument in our Lucretius passage, we realize at once that Epicurus has refined on what he found in his "source": while in Democritus the absorption of matter from the outside ends with the *akme* of the world, Epicurus defines more precisely: the process of absorption continues,<sup>14</sup> yet there is the difference that while up to the *akme* more is absorbed than given off, afterwards the reverse is true, and while the Cosmos, like any living being,

<sup>12</sup> A 40 (4) in H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (5th ed., Berlin, 1934-35): ἀκμάζειν δὲ κόσμον ἔως ἂν μηκέτι δύνηται ἔξωθεν τι προσλαμβάνειν. The doctrine is mentioned but no conclusion with regard to Epicurus drawn in a paper by William M. Green (*A. J. P.*, LXIII [1942], p. 51) which examines our section from an entirely different point of view.

<sup>13</sup> On Hippolytus and his *pretiosissimus Opinionum thesaurus* cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879), pp. 144 ff. It would be rash to discredit Hippolytus' statement on the ground that Epicurus, *Ad Pyth.*, 90 gives us a somewhat different impression of Democritus' doctrines: αὔξεσθαι (κόσμον) ἔως ἂν ἐτέρῳ προσκρούσῃ. Yet collisions between one Cosmos and another are mentioned also by Hippolytus (*ibid.*, 3). If it is really difficult to reconcile the motif of violent destruction with that of natural growth, *ἀκμάζειν*, and decline, which Hippolytus has *charta eadem*, we should remember that Democritus is not like other Presocratics a "one book man" (changes of doctrine, if not recantations or self-corrections, are actually attested for him by Plutarch, *De Vita Mor.*, 448 A, a passage which should some day be included in the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*). More serious may be another point: we cannot easily think of a reason why the Cosmos should cease absorbing atoms from outside. Was Democritus' doctrine perhaps after all closer to Epicurus' than Hippolytus would lead us to believe? Hippolytus' statement is without hesitation accepted by E. Zeller, *Dic Philos. d. Griech.*, I, 2 (5th ed., Leipzig, 1892), p. 890, n. 4; C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford, 1928), p. 146; K. Freeman, *Companion to the Presocratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1946), p. 302.

<sup>14</sup> This is implied vv. 1118 f., 1127, 1136 ff., 1141, 1148 f.

continues to take in new food until its very last stage, the intake becomes less and less in comparison to what it gives off to the outer world. Clearly, this revision of a Democritean tenet is of a piece with other refinements that Epicurus felt compelled to make.<sup>15</sup> Nor is the motive for this particular refinement hard to find. It suggested itself as result of the parallel between the Cosmos and an organic body which Epicurus keeps up throughout the argument. Thus our attention is once more directed towards biology.

The biological pattern of growth and decline which underlies our argument includes some interesting details. Several times it is stated that the food which we consume nourishes our organism by being distributed into the blood-vessels. It is not made clear whether or not it remains in them, but as not only the blood-vessels but our entire organism grows, as what is given off again comes likewise from our entire body, and as the cosmological construction has it that every kind of matter that is absorbed joins its kind, we may take it that in the body too the appropriate particles join their kindred in the tissues and build up our flesh, bone, sinew, etc.<sup>16</sup> When the body has passed its prime it loses so much and is inwardly so rarefied and flabby that it can no longer receive enough matter into its blood-vessels to make up for the constantly increasing losses.

We have already quoted Bailey's observation that all these points are first set forth with reference to the body and that the entire conception is then transferred to the Cosmos. It is a coherent and consistent theory of nutrition, growth, and decay. References to food as entering the blood-vessels recur elsewhere

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, p. 275 and *passim*. Illustrations abound, especially in the Physics. The atoms do not simply "move" but move downward, they have weight *per se* (see J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* [4th ed., London, 1945], pp. 342 ff.; Bailey, pp. 289 ff., 311 ff.); Democritus' concept of the *ἀμερές* is found in need of qualification and the limits of atomic size and of variations in form are defined more strictly (Bailey, 284 ff.), etc. On some corrections made by Epicurus in the theory of civilization and its gradual development see G. Vlastos' recent study, *A.J.P.*, LXVII (1946), pp. 51 ff.

<sup>16</sup> See "Hipp.", *De Carne*, 13 and below, pp. 46 ff. Cf. *Lucr.*, VI, 946 ff.: *diditur in venas cibus omnis, auget alitique corporis extremas quoque partes unguiculosque*. If food nourishes even the *extremae partes*, how could it fail to build up the basic tissues (for a standard list of them see II, 670, *ossa, crux, vena, viscera, nervi*)?

in Lucretius,<sup>17</sup> and the materialistic and mechanical aspects of the theory seem to be in harmony with the spirit of Epicurean physics.<sup>18</sup> Yet it would be a serious mistake to suppose that the theory as such originated in an Epicurean environment. What we have here has nothing to do with philosophical constructions but is simply the orthodox "scientific" doctrine which prevailed at Epicurus' time, having been established as the result of medical research.<sup>19</sup> We may assume that in its simplest form—and nothing more is incorporated in our section—it was widely or generally known among "educated" people and all that Epicurus did was to apply the most up-to-date doctrine of biological growth and decline to the Cosmos. To do so involved a measure of arbitrariness inasmuch as in Epicurus' own view the Cosmos is not a living entity but an aggregation of dead matter. About this we shall have more to say later.

With the history of the medical doctrine we may deal rather briefly.<sup>20</sup> Some intimation of it—perhaps the first—is found in the "Hippocratic" treatise *De natura hominis* (whose author Aristotle identifies as Polybus); here it is said that besides four main pairs of blood-vessels there are many others that start from the belly and "through which nourishment (*τροφή*) reaches the body."<sup>21</sup> In the treatise *De carne* this function is common to all blood-vessels. "From the belly and the intestines where food and drink are gathered (the blood-vessels) draw the finest and moistest substance" to serve as nourishment for every part of the body.<sup>22</sup> Similar views may be traced in the *De natura*

<sup>17</sup> IV, 955; VI, 946 f. (quoted in the preceding note).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, pp. 350 ff.

<sup>19</sup> According to frag. 293 (208, 28 Usener, *Epicurea* [Leipzig, 1887]) Epicurus' own and more specific view was that *ἀράδοσις* (i.e., the distribution of food in the body) comes about by the same rather complicated process which accounts for the attraction of iron by the magnet stone. Of this view no trace is to be found in our section.

<sup>20</sup> I have discussed some phases of it at greater length in my paper "Tissues and the Soul, Philosoph. Contributions to Physiology," *Philos. Rev.*, LIX (1950), pp. 435 ff.

<sup>21</sup> Ch. 11 (VI, 60, 10 Littré); cf. Arist., *Hist. Anim.*, Γ 3, 512 b 12.

<sup>22</sup> Ch. 13. The question whether this work belongs to the 5th or the 4th century is still *sub judice*; see the discussion and references in Karl Deichgräber *Hippokrates über Entstehung und Aufbau d. menschl. Körpers* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1935), p. 26. Deichgräber himself favors an early date, yet his arguments, while impressive, are of too general a

*pueri* (at least its author speaks of the φλέβες in plants as having a function of the kind).<sup>23</sup> Outside the Hippocratic Corpus, there is evidence that Democritus regarded the blood-vessels as vehicles of food.<sup>24</sup> Yet in no earlier writer do we find nearly so full and elaborate an account as Plato gives us in the section of the *Timaeus* where he describes the functioning of the human organism and explains with special care the processes of respiration and nutrition.<sup>25</sup> Here we read how the food (after having been cut up in the belly) is "pumped" into the blood-vessels, takes on the form and color of blood, passes on to the adjoining tissues, and there replenishes the losses that are inflicted on us by the operation of the surrounding elements.<sup>26</sup> This replenishment takes place according to the principle "like to like."<sup>27</sup> As long as the body is "young" the food assimilated surpasses in quantity the matter given off to the elements; later on, in the years of decline and γῆρας, the relationship is reversed until in the end the food supply is altogether inadequate to counteract the never-ceasing attacks from the outside and the body finally succumbs.<sup>28</sup>

The over-all picture which Plato here gives us of nutrition, growth, and decline is very close to, in fact it is fundamentally identical with that embodied in the Lucretius passage. Also not a few of the details agree. Compare in particular:

nam quaecumque vides hilari grande-      ὅταν μὲν δὴ πλέον τοῦ ἐπιρρέοντος  
scere adactu / paulatimque gradus      ἀπίη, φθίνει πᾶν, ὅταν δὲ ἔλαττον  
aetatis scandere adultae / plura sibi      αὐξάνεται (here follows an ex-  
adimunt quam de se corpora mit-      planation why in early age

---

nature to settle the issue. However, a good deal of our theory is probably presupposed in Democritus, A 153 (Diels-Kranz) and I would no longer deny (cf. *Philos. Rev.*, LIX [1951], pp. 455 f.) that it was known by 400 B. C. or even somewhat earlier.

<sup>23</sup> Ch. 26 (VII, 526, 21 Littré); cf. *De Morbis*, IV (by the same author), 40 (VII, 560, 8).

<sup>24</sup> See his explanation of how deer grow their horn (A 153; cf. note 22).

<sup>25</sup> 77 C 5-79 E 9; 80 D 1-81 E 5. For the understanding of these difficult sections I owe much to F. M. Cornford's excellent commentary (*Plato's Cosmology* [London, 1938]).

<sup>26</sup> *Tim.*, 78 E 5-79 A 4; 80 D 1-81 A 2 (definition, color, and function of the blood 80 E 4-81 A 2); 81 A 2-B 2.

<sup>27</sup> 81 B 2-4.

<sup>28</sup> 81 B 4-D4.

tunt / dum . . . non ita sunt late  
dispessa ut multa remittant / et plus  
dispendi faciant quam vescitur aetas  
(*scil.* as happens after the *akme* is  
passed, see vv. 1133-8, 1148 f.), vv.  
1122-7.

iure igitur pereunt, cum . . . ex-  
ternis succumbunt omnia plagis (vv.  
1139 f.).

nec tuditantia rem cessant extrin-  
secus ullam / corpora conficere et  
plagis infesta demare (vv. 1142 f.).

more is absorbed, later more  
given off), 81 B 4 ff.

*αὐτὰ . . . ὑπὸ τῶν ζεύσθεν ἐπεισιόν-  
των εὐπετῶς διαιρεῖται· φθίνει δὴ  
τὰν ζῷον ἐν τούτῳ κρατούμενον*  
(81 D 2-4).

*τὰ μὲν γὰρ δὴ περιεστῶτα ἔκτος  
ἡμᾶς τάκει . . . ἀελ* (81 A 4 ff.).

If later stages of the doctrine matter, we may mention that Aristotle too regards blood as the "last" form which the food takes in our body and may call to mind his famous comparison of the blood-vessel pattern with an irrigation system carrying the water (understand: the food) to every part and corner of a man's garden.<sup>29</sup> Regarding the doctrines of the great Alexandrian physicians our information is more than scanty; yet we do find Erasistratus cited for his opinion that "blood alone is nutriment" (*τὸ αἷμα μόνον εἶναι τροφήν*). Of still later authorities it will suffice to name Galen, *unum sed leonem*, who incorporates the theory—to be sure with many additions and refinements that had been worked out in the meantime—stressing once again the principle "like to like" as operating in the assimilation of the blood, i. e. the food, to the tissues.<sup>30</sup> In its essence the theory would seem to have been kept alive during the centuries that lie between Plato and Galen. As a matter of fact it has never been completely abandoned, though it has of course become subject to innumerable modifications, revisions, specifications.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> See especially *De Part. Anim.*, B 3, 650 a 32 ff.; 5, 668 a 4 ff., a 14 ff. The simile occurs in the same context in Plato, *Tim.*, 77 C 7.

<sup>30</sup> For Erasistratus see Anon. Lond. (cf. note 50), XXV, 27; XXVI, 33; for Galen, *De Nat. Pot.*, I, 10 f.; III, 1, 7, 15 (VI, 210, 12 Kühn the garden conduits reappear). See also his *De Usu Part.*, IV-VI *passim* and for a brief statement *In Hipp. De Nutr.*, III; XV, 262 Kühn. A summary of Galen's theory of nutrition may be found in Howard B. Adelman, *The Embryology. Tractates of Hieronymus Fabricius of Aquapendente* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1942), pp. 701 ff.

<sup>31</sup> For an alternative ancient doctrine ("absorption from crude food")

The commentators of Lucretius have failed to ask themselves whether the concepts of cosmic food and cosmic blood-vessels should be regarded as Epicurus' invention or whether we should look for their origin to Lucretius' poetic imagination.<sup>32</sup> If we consider the passage in the light of its antecedents, we have no choice but to regard the *cibus* and the *venae* of the world as part and parcel of Epicurus' arguments. What he did was to transfer the current theory about nutrition, growth, and decline from biology to cosmology, from the Microcosm to the Macrocosm.<sup>33</sup>

see my paper cited in note 20, p. 454, n. 81. One of William Harvey's arguments for the circulation of the blood is that in a given time—say one hour—the heart, according to his observations, throws out much more blood than the food that is taken in could supply (*De Motu Cordis*, ch. 9: *sanguis longe uberiore proventu in arterias et totum corpus diducitur quam ab alimentorum ingestione suppeditari possible sit, aut omnino, nisi regressu per circuitum facto*).

<sup>32</sup> C. Giusanni (*T. Lucreti Cari, De Rer. Natura* [Torino, 1896], II, p. 291) who discusses the section at length—noticing interesting parallels to the thought in Hor., *Sat.*, II, 3, 153; Sen., *Epist. Mor.*, 95, 22—appears to decide the question by implication in favor of Lucretius. His suggestion “le venae delle cose sono i foramina” (p. 290) is too sweeping and certainly does not hold good of organic beings in which the *venae* are—here as always in Lucretius—what the word commonly denotes. Incidentally, Epicurus appears to depend on physicians who had not yet learned to distinguish between the function of the veins and that of the arteries. This is the more remarkable as this distinction was established during his lifetime and led to the view that only the veins carry blood, whereas the arteries contain life—*pneuma* (contrast this with Lucretius who speaks of *venae omnes* as receiving food, vv. 1125, 1136, and calls them *vitales*, v. 1119). Thought should perhaps be given to the possibility that Lucretius himself worked out the argument and developed the analogy embodied in our section. However, so far as I know, no evidence is found anywhere in his work that he was capable of such feats of philosophical originality and independence.

<sup>33</sup> Perhaps I am going too far and Epicurus did not actually speak of the Cosmos as receiving food and having blood vessels ( $\phi\lambda\epsilon\beta\epsilon\sigma$ ). Note, however, vv. 1118 f. and their place immediately after a cosmological point. Note also *omnia*, vv. 1146 and 1147, and again the place of vv. 1146-49 immediately after the description of the cosmic *ruina*. In the writers who elaborate the parallel between the Macrocosmos and the Microcosmos—writers whose imagination is not known as restrained—the conception of cosmic blood-vessels does not seem to recur. The rivers as blood-vessels of the Earth represent a different conception; on some occurrences of it in Greek and Oriental writings see W. Kranz, *Gött. Nachr.*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., Neue Folge, II, 7 (1938), p. 151.

Lucretius is not guilty of what ancient critics might call *ψυχρόν* and *κακόξηλον*—and what in modern critical jargon could be termed an instance of “misplaced concreteness.” On the contrary, although Lucretius indicates plainly enough that the Cosmos does need *cibus* to replenish its losses, he has seen to it that the absorbing picture of the Cosmos in its growth, struggle for survival, and final *ruina* should remain undisturbed by the biological details which find their integration in equally impressive visions of the body as we see it *hilaro grandescere ad auctu* and majestically *gradus aetatis scandere aduluae* and as it passes from receiving a large flow of material to scattering its substance lavishly abroad.<sup>34</sup> These visions which open up before us in rapid succession take complete hold of our imagination and prevent us from dwelling too closely on the unpoetic and rather technical detail of food entering the *venae*.

Although this doctrine concerning the transformation and distribution of food meets us full-fledged for the first time in the *Timaeus*, the little that we know about its earlier stages suffices to discredit the idea that Epicurus owed his knowledge of it directly or exclusively to Plato's work.<sup>35</sup> That Epicurus should have borrowed a startling physical or physiological theory from the *Timaeus* would, I admit, not be completely unthinkable. Still, it would be something unparalleled.<sup>36</sup> In a close comparison of the two accounts some minor divergences come to light; in particular the reasons why after the *akme* the body cannot assimilate sufficient food to make up for the losses are somewhat differently defined.<sup>37</sup> And as there is nothing to suggest that

<sup>34</sup> Vv. 1122 f.; 1134 ff., 1137.

<sup>35</sup> What matters in this connection is not only the “Hippocratic” passages adduced above (pp. 39-40) but also the fact that in tracing the two large veins, which are the main vehicles of food-supply for the body, Plato clearly follows earlier descriptions of them (cf. Cornford, *op. cit.* [note 25], p. 305).

<sup>36</sup> That Epicurus was familiar with the content of the *Timaeus* is not open to doubt (see Wolfgang Schmid's study of the polemic against Plato in Book XIV of *repl. φύσεως, Epikurs Kritik d. platon. Elementenlchre* [Leipzig, 1936]). Presumably he had read the work, though he can hardly have derived much *ὑδονή* from it. Yet, even though there are a few other coincidences between the *Timaeus* and Epicurus' doctrines, I believe that we should not rashly assume Platonic influence so long as alternative ways of explanation suggest themselves.

<sup>37</sup> Nothing in the *Timaeus* corresponds to Epicurus' notion that after

Plato himself devised the theory of food being changed into blood and by the blood-vessel system carried to the tissues, there is nothing either that compels us to think of Epicurus as owing a direct debt to the account in the *Timaeus*. What the basic agreement between the two accounts really shows is that the medical doctrine in these matters did not change very much in the half century—or three-quarters of a century—that lies between the composition of the *Timaeus* (about 360) and Epicurus' elaboration of his system.

These considerations should also determine our opinion with regard to the one important piece of doctrine for which Plato and Epicurus-Lucretius are our only authorities: an organism grows as long as more matter "flows" into it than it gives off but begins to decline as soon as it loses more substance than it can take in. (Epicurus has in addition the physiological definition of *akme*: this is the state when gain and loss are equal.)<sup>38</sup> I will not contend that the doctrine is too materialistic to have originated with Plato himself; for after all Plato does incorporate it in his account and it could justly be argued that for him to devise so mechanical and materialistic a doctrine would be only one degree less likely than that he should accept it.<sup>39</sup>

the *akme* bodies are over-expanded, *dispessa* and *rarefacta* (vv. 1126, 1139), nor has the somewhat vague statement in vv. 1148 f., *nec venae perpetiuntur quod satis est neque quantum opus est natura ministrat*, a parallel in Plato. His explanation is that in youth the elements which compose our body (and are employed in the digestive process) are stronger and more compact than the elements in our food and drink so that they break them up, whereas later this is no longer the case. (*Tim.*, 81 B 5 ff. Needless to say, the triangles out of which Plato constructs the elementary particles would not reappear in Epicurus even if he had written with the *Timaeus* open before him, since this entire construction is anathema in his eyes—a detestable corruption of the true atomic theory.)

<sup>38</sup> Vv. 1118. It is slightly surprising that in v. 1130 Lucretius calls this stage *alcescendi summum cacumen* though the logic of this argument would rather suggest that it is the *cacumen augendi* or *crescendi*, the τέλος αὐξήσεως or whatever the Greek may have been; cf. vv. 1116, 1121, 1133. Yielding to this logic, Bailey translates "the topmost point of increase."

<sup>39</sup> We are definitely on the periphery of Plato's philosophy: neither the theory of Forms, nor, what is perhaps more to the point, his concept of Soul enables him to explain the phenomena of biological growth and decline. Note that  $\psi\chi\dot{\eta}$  makes her appearance in his scheme as soon as

It is more relevant to reflect that Aristotle, whose account of nutrition and the blood-vessels parallels Plato's in so many other items (which means that it reflects the same medical tradition), is bound to fail us in this one. For Aristotle, while quite aware of the problems concerning the relations between nutrition and growth and between gain and loss of physical substance,<sup>40</sup> has made a definite break with the mechanical-materialistic approach to the subject of "growth" (*αὔξησις*).<sup>41</sup> To put it briefly—and ignoring as a matter of fact some other interesting solutions or suggestions<sup>42</sup>—growth and nutrition are for him a function of the soul, more precisely of the vegetative or " nutritive" soul which he sometimes calls *θρεπτική*, sometimes *αὔξητική ψυχή*. Even youth, *akme*, and old age correspond to and reflect different phases of this soul-function and of its physical counterpart, the vital heat (*τὸ θερμόν*) in the region of the heart.<sup>43</sup>

The value of our formula and the reason why it was enunciated will become clear if we once more glance at the doctrines to which it is related. What in Plato's phrasing "flows in" (*ἐπιφρεῖ*) and what according to Lucretius *datur intra vitalis venas*<sup>44</sup> is of course food and drink. Now nutrition continues

he passes from *φθίνειν* and *γῆπας* to the subject of death (81 D 4 ff.). Contrast Aristotle's connection of *ψυχή* and *αὔξησις*.

<sup>40</sup> For the former problem see e. g., *De Gen. et Corr.*, A 5, 322 a 20 ff.; *De An.*, B 4, 416 b 9 ff.; *De Gen. Anim.*, B 6, 744 b 32 ff. (with the notes of A. L. Peck in the Loeb edition [London and Cambridge, Mass., 1943]); for the latter *De Gen. et Corr.*, A 5, 321 b 27, *τὸ μὲν ὑπεκρεῖ*, *τὸ δὲ προσέρχεται*, where, however, it is Aristotle's point that this is true only of the *ὑλὴ* of an organ or tissue, not of its *εἶδος*.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. his criticism of Empedocles, *De An.*, B 4, 415 b 28–416 a 18 (cf. *De Gen. et Corr.*, B 6, 333 a 35–b3).

<sup>42</sup> See the distinction made *De Gen. et Corr.*, B 5, 322 a 20 ff.: if the food is potentially (*δυνάμει*) flesh, we have nutrition; if it is potentially so-much-flesh, we have growth. H. H. Joachim's interpretation of this difficult passage (*Aristotle On Coming To Be . . .* [Oxford, 1922], *ad loc.*) has in some points been corrected by W. J. Verdenius and J. H. Waszink, *Philosophia Antiqua*, I, pp. 32 ff. Rather surprisingly this seemingly so abstract and so very "philosophic" doctrine has a parallel in a medical work ("Hipp.", *De Victu*, 34, *τρέφεται τὰ μὲν ἐs αὔξησιν καὶ ἐs τὸ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἐs τὸ εἶναι μόνον*, as in the case of *γέρωντες*).

<sup>43</sup> See especially *De Respir.*, 17 f. On the nutritive function of the soul see *De An.*, B 4 and for other references II. Bonitz, *Ind. Arist.* (Berlin, 1870), s. v. *θρεπτικός*.

<sup>44</sup> II, 1118 f.; cf. Plato, *Tim.*, 80 B 4.

as long as an organic being is alive, but growth—in the Greek sense of the word in which it is identical with increase<sup>45</sup>—continues only to its *akme*. In other words our formula clarifies the relation, and at the same time brings out the difference, between nutrition and growth. We need not doubt that physicists like Empedocles and Anaxagoras were able to distinguish between these two processes, yet our evidence suggests that they treated them along parallel lines, and that in some areas of their thought they tended to coincide. The principle “like to like” operates in both processes;<sup>46</sup> the new yet kindred matter that is added to our tissues when we eat and drink makes our body grow. Where organic beings were concerned, growth by nutrition was inevitably for these thinkers the paramount form of growth. It is quite possible that in their embryological speculations they did not distinguish the two functions at all and more than probable that they dwelt more on the earlier stages of human life than on the later. In Greek prose-writers of the 5th and 4th centuries the combination *ανέσειν καὶ τρέφειν οὐ τρέφειν καὶ ανέσειν* occurs frequently enough<sup>47</sup> to indicate how closely connected the two

<sup>45</sup> I am using the word “growth” as a convenient rendering of *αὔξησις*. In the view of modern biology “growth” continues as long as an organism is alive. This is clearly a different concept—not to say a different solution of the problem with which we are dealing.

<sup>46</sup> Aristotle states this in so many words, undoubtedly with the Presocratics in mind, *De An.*, B 4, 416 a 29: *φασὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ ὅμοιῳ τρέφεσθαι καθάπερ καὶ αὔξεσθαι* (while others hold the opposite view). For comments and references see H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocr. Philos.* (Baltimore, 1936), p. 92, n. 289. To his reference to Emped. B 90 (nutrition) I should add B 36 (*αὔξησις*, presumably of the Cosmos). The Hippocrates too operate rather often with the *ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον* principle; see e.g., *De Carne*, 13; *De Nat. Pueri*, 17, 22, 23, 26, 30; *De Morbis*, IV, 33. Note also the common sense view as formulated by Plato, *Phaedo*, 96 C 3-D 5. Our *Timaeus* passage reflects the medical tradition, that in Lucretius also the Presocratic.

<sup>47</sup> See “Hipp.” *De Prisca Med.*, 14 (I, 604, 8 Littré); *De Nat. Pueri*, 22 (VII, 514, 6 Littré), 30 (534, 12 Littré, also 536, 15); *De Victu*, I, 7, 25; Antiphon B 36 (Diels-Kranz); Plato, *Rep.*, VI, 509 B, VIII, 565 C (non-biological context); *Phaedr.*, 246 E; *Tim.*, 44 B (cf. 41 D, 82 D). In Aristotle note—in spite of what has been said above, p. 45—passages like *Eth. Nic.*, A 6, 1098 a 1 *τὴν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν* (see also *De Gen. Anim.*, Γ 2, 753 b 29; *De Vita et Morte*, 3, 469 a 26 where *ἡ τῆς αὐξητικῆς καὶ θρεπτικῆς, scil. ψυχῆς ἀρχή*, should be read, not, with some MSS, *καὶ τῆς θρεπτικῆς*; it is one and the same function).

concepts were for Greek feeling (that Epicurus too shared the habit of joining the two verbs is proved by Lucretius' *auget alitque* and similar turns of phrases).<sup>48</sup>

Yet the very closeness of the two concepts made it sooner or later imperative to define their relationship precisely.<sup>49</sup> We have no way of knowing how long before the *Timaeus* and by whom as the first our formula was framed. To understand its bearing we must remember that in some of the late Presocratic systems the Cosmos too grows as long as it grows by the addition of like to like, i. e., in the same fashion as human beings, animals, and plants. Yet while Democritus could safely suggest that the Cosmos after its *akme* will no longer take in matter, in the case of organic beings the relationship between "intake" and growth could for very obvious reasons not be defined in these terms.<sup>50</sup> Our formula does state what happens to living beings after their *akme* and establishes a clear and satisfactory relation between nutrition on the one hand and growth and decline on the other. Its formulation must have been an important and helpful step. The author of this biological "law"—whoever he was—evidently made use of a conception which for us likewise makes its first appearance in this text and context: throughout their existence organic beings "give off" matter to the elements that surround them. The notion is that the fire, water, air—and presumably also earth, though this is hard to visualize, even in the case of

<sup>48</sup> (Lucretius) "is particularly fond of this combination," Bailey, *ad I*, 229, where he refers to six other passages (*add I*, 56). Certainly—because it serves well as equivalent of the Greek combination.

<sup>49</sup> We have found reasons to believe (n. 46) that Empedocles treated growth and nutrition along parallel lines, applying the "like to like" concept to both; yet we need not therefore question the doxographic tradition (A 77; cf. A 70, 296, 18 Diels-Kranz) that he attributed *aὐξησις* to the operation of the "hot" principle. Note also that he ascribes the different condition of the body before and after the *akme* to the operation of Love in the former, Hate in the latter period (B 20).

<sup>50</sup> Cf. again Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.*, A 5, 322 a 23 *τρέφεται μὲν* (an organism) *ἔως ἂν σώγηται καὶ φθίνῃ, αὔξανεται δὲ οὐκ δεῖ*. Very true. The relation between *aὐξησις* of the body and *ἀποφορά* (*ἀπόκρισις, σύντηξις*) was also discussed by the physician Aeginius of Elis. His views on these matters as well as on *τροφή* are summarized by the *Anonymus Londinensis* (recently edited with a translation by W. H. S. Jones [Cambridge, 1947]), XIII, 21 f. Unfortunately we do not know whether Aeginius lived before or after Plato.

*ἀνυπόδητοι*—keep up a constant attack on us. The details of this attack are conceived along Empedoclean lines;<sup>51</sup> again each element takes out of us whatever is akin to itself (the fire particles in us are removed to join the fire in the Cosmos, the water particles the water, etc.).

Not only our reconstructions but also the context in which the formula occurs suggests that it was meant to apply to organic beings. There is no evidence that anyone before Epicurus attempted to transfer it to the Cosmos. Plato certainly restricts it to the beings within the Cosmos. Yet we have said that earlier physicists conceived of human growth and cosmic growth on parallel lines and we need not be surprised if even in Plato's discussion of growth the cosmic parallel appears for a moment. He knows, however, how to keep it within proper bounds. As the Cosmos has no growth and decline, the "law" as such does not apply to it; yet this is how he describes the manner in which the food that has been turned into blood is distributed to our tissues: "The particles in our blood when they have been broken up small within us and find themselves comprehended by the individual living creature framed like a Cosmos (*οὐρανός*) are constrained to reproduce (*μημεῖσθαι*) the movement of the world as a whole. Thus each of them is carried to its kind. . . ." <sup>52</sup> (It is in fact a part of Plato's cosmic construction that at any time movements are going on by which particles of earth are carried to the Earth, such of fire to the fiery layer of the Cosmos, etc.) <sup>53</sup> Thus far but no farther is Plato here prepared to go in accepting the parallel between Macro- and Microcosm.

<sup>51</sup> Emp., B 22. There is friendship (*ἀρθμα* v. 7; cf. B 17, 23) between each element in the Cosmos at large and those parts (*μέρη*) of it that have been temporarily severed from the main body by entering the fabric of something *θυητόν*.

<sup>52</sup> Tim., 81 A 6 ff.: . . . τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀναγκάζεται μημεῖσθαι φοράν (I have made use of Cornford's translation). The next sentence refers to the *κένωσις* and (*άνα*)*πλήρωσις* (see also 81 A 1) that are constantly going on in every part of a living organism; it is the first evidence of interest in the subject (*ἀναπλήρωσις τῶν ἀποφερομένων*) to which the great Erasistratus was to make such important contributions; see Galen, *De Nat. Pot.*, II, 1 (75 ff. Kühn); cf. M. Wellmann, *R.-E.*, s. v. Erasistratus, cols. 336 ff., 339.

<sup>53</sup> The most important statements to this effect are 57 C 2 ff., 58 B 8 ff.

The reason why Plato cannot use the formula for his Cosmos and must restrict the parallel to one phase of nutrition is obvious. His Cosmos remains forever in the same form—we may call it its *akme*—and has no growth or decline. Still, it is a fundamental conception of Plato's cosmology that our world is a *ζῷον*. He refers to it repeatedly by this designation and there can be no doubt that he is completely serious about it. His Cosmos is alive, has a soul, and also a body, and participates at least in one of the functions of other *ζῷα*, movement.<sup>54</sup> From this point of view the parallel between cosmic growth and human growth would actually have more meaning for Plato than for some of the late Presocratics whose Cosmos consisted of—presumably lifeless—matter. Now, if we turn to the chapter of the *Timaeus* which deals with the "body" and structure of the Cosmos,<sup>55</sup> Plato's anxiety to restrict the parallel is even more evident than in the account of human growth and nutrition. Not only does he state explicitly that the Cosmos has no eyes, no hands or feet, and no organs of respiration; he also gives us his reasons why it does not need them.<sup>56</sup> From our point of view two decisions are of particular interest. Since the Cosmos incorporates in itself the entire existing amount of the four elements nothing is left that could attack it from the outside, weaken it, and make it suffer illness, old age, and decline.<sup>57</sup> This is meant to contrast with the fate of individual living beings who are surrounded by the elements, exposed to their attacks, and bound to decline as soon as the elements take more out of them than can be replaced by the intake of food.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, since the Cosmos neither grows nor loses any of its substance, one might suppose that it needs food as little as breath or the capacity of vision. Rather to our surprise, however, Plato makes clear that it has food which is derived from its own substance: "nothing went out or came into it from anywhere; it was

<sup>54</sup> See especially 30 D 3, 37 C 6, 92 C 6, 36 E 5 (*σῶμα*), 34 A 1 (*κίνησις* and *σῶμα*).

<sup>55</sup> 32 C 5 ff.

<sup>56</sup> 33 C 1 ff., D 3 ff.; C 3.

<sup>57</sup> 32 C 5 ff., especially 33 A 2 ff.

<sup>58</sup> 81 A 4 ff., D 2 ff., cf. *περιεστῶτα ἔκτος* (81 A 4 f.) with *περιστάμενα ἔξωθεν* 33 A 4; note also the words *γῆρας* and *φθίνειν* in both passages (33 A 5 f., 81 D 3 f.).

designed so as to feed ( $\tauροφὴν \dots παρέχον$ ) itself on its own waste and to act and be acted upon entirely by itself and within itself.”<sup>59</sup> The constant changes of one element into another do in fact produce “waste” and at the same time new substance and thus we have here a peculiar kind of nutrition, unaccompanied by either growth or decline.

Evidently, our formula—the law of growth and decline—cannot apply to  $\zetaφα$  that are immortal, unaging, and changeless. Even so there is a certain paradox in the fact that Plato for whom the Cosmos is a living being exempts it from the law which governs the life of organic beings while Epicurus who conceives of our world as a particular arrangement of lifeless matter thinks the law should apply to it. Plato to be sure had his special reasons to which we have made reference; Epicurus, on the other hand, does seem inconsistent. Yet at least he appears to have known what he was doing. The doxographic tradition has preserved this statement: “Epicurus says that the Cosmos perishes in very many ways, like a living being ( $\zetaφον$ ) or a plant and in many other ways.”<sup>60</sup> The statement is quoted by Bailey in his commentary to Book V.<sup>61</sup> He expresses regret that “little has survived on the whole which deals with this particular doctrine” (*scil.* of the mortality of the Cosmos). With all due respect I should say that our entire section at the end of Book II presents a commentary and illustration of the doctrine.<sup>62</sup> As a matter of fact, it shows us not only that the Cosmos declines and perishes like a living being but also that it grows and reaches its *akme* in the same fashion.

<sup>59</sup> 33 C 7 ff.; cf. for the processes alluded to 56 C 8 ff., 58 B 4 ff.

<sup>60</sup> Frag. 305 Usener (Aetius, II, 4; 331, 24 Diels, *Doxographi*, see above note 13).

<sup>61</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 10), p. 1356. Bailey appears to refer the statement to the mortality of the Earth but Aetius' wording leaves no doubt that it was meant to apply to the entire Cosmos (*'Επίκουρος πλείστοις τρόποις τὸν κόσμον φθείρεσθαι*).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Bignone, *op. cit.* (note 9), II, pp. 504 ff., though I am less sure than he that Epicurus developed this doctrine in reaction to an Aristotelian theory. The words in Aetius *καὶ γὰρ ὡς ζῶν καὶ ὡς φυτόν καὶ πολλαχῶς* may be an “interpretation” of what Epicurus said in the part of his work which corresponds to our section in Lucretius. To me, however, this kind of interpretation—though far from bold—seems foreign to the doxographer's procedure. The words may well refer to a statement made by Epicurus in a different context.

In the teeth of considerable difficulties—caused by the details of current biological doctrine—Epicurus reestablished the Presocratic parallel between the development of organic beings and the history of the Cosmos. For him this was one way of proving the mortality of the Cosmos. We know that this thesis too is a part of his Presocratic heritage. That he could prove it also in other ways is shown by the arguments incorporated in Lucretius' Book V (vv. 235-415). None of these arguments makes use of the parallel; they are Hellenistic, not Presocratic arguments and show a definite emancipation from the traditional pattern which our section in Book II revives.<sup>63</sup>

FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

<sup>63</sup> For an analysis of these arguments in Book V see my paper cited in note 8.

I wish to thank Ludwig Edelstein, James Hutton, and Gregory Vlastos for kindly reading this paper and for offering suggestions which have caused me to modify a number of points.

## *QUOD*, RELATIVE PRONOUN AND CONJUNCTION.

In Latin, *quod* fulfills a double grammatical function, serving on the one hand as a relative pronoun, on the other as a conjunction. Syntactically these usages of *quod* seem far different from one another, but the evidence within the Latin language itself proves that *quod's* conjunctival usage is a development of its usage as a relative pronoun. I cannot say whether or not this evidence can be found in older languages. Professor Sturtevant in an article published in 1930 offers proof that the relative or connective value of the Latin relative stem is derived from Indo-European and also Indo-Hittite.<sup>1</sup> In a linguistic article of 1946 Miss Hahn submits Hittite evidence to indicate that the relative stem *kwi—kwo*—is a development of the indefinite, pointing out that “in Hittite a subordinate relative clause can scarcely be distinguished from a coordinate indefinite clause.”<sup>2</sup> On the basis of the conclusions of these articles, it seems to me quite possible that the Latin evidence which derives *quod* the conjunction from *quod* the relative might be a reflection of similar but more ancient evidence. I have found, in the Latin *quod* evidence, material which illustrates Miss Hahn's point, and possibly this could be used to demonstrate the development of *quod* in language prior to Latin. However, I do not profess to be competent to investigate it.

I know of two previous examinations of the Latin evidence. Miss Elizabeth Taylor in 1933 submitted to the Yale faculty a doctoral dissertation entitled “The Development of the *Quod* Clause,”<sup>3</sup> and Miss Hahn has published a note to the effect that she has examined *quod* and will publish the results at a later date.<sup>4</sup> Up to now the entire results have not been published, and I have only her summary conclusion that *quod's* conjunctival usage is the result of its use as an accusative of specification. Miss Taylor's dissertation is a commendable piece of work. She

<sup>1</sup> Curme Volume of Linguistic Studies, *Language Monographs*, No. 7, pp. 141-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Language*, XXII, pp. 68-85.

<sup>3</sup> Now available in condensed form in *Yale Classical Studies*, XII (1951), pp. 229 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), p. xxxviii.

has examined 5,000 examples of *quod* and defined the examples according to a wide range of categories. Her conclusion is, in brief, that "the nominative and especially the accusative functions of the neuter pronoun *quod* are the foundation of its development as a conjunction."<sup>5</sup> While Miss Taylor prefers to illustrate these functions without grammatical terms, nevertheless her accusative function amounts to Miss Hahn's accusative of specification.

The results of my own investigation differ from those I have cited. It is my belief that *quod* the conjunction rests not alone on any grammatical or functional usage of *quod* itself, but that it is based on that together with a development in the functional usage of the clause which *quod* introduces. To me, *quod* as a relative pronoun first seems to have a retrospective function, introducing a clause to relate a fact to a previous fact, the antecedent. Next pronominal *quod* has an anticipatory quality. It continues to relate a fact to an antecedent, but without the *quod* clause the antecedent is vague and entirely without meaning. This anticipatory quality also exists more literally, for *quod* and its clause are found without any antecedent. With this quality *quod* is grammatically an accusative of specification; nevertheless *quod* could not in my opinion by reason of this usage alone have come to possess for the Roman the idea which is basic in the English conjunction *because*. As a conjunction with such a meaning, it also is dependent upon the continued force of its early retrospective quality.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 249.

<sup>6</sup> The material for my investigation is taken from Livy (ed. W. Weisborn [Berlin, 1856]), Plautus (ed. Goetz-Schoell [Leipzig, 1898]), and the remains of early Latin (eds. Wordsworth [Oxford, 1874], and Merry [Oxford, 1898]). I first assembled the evidence according to Livy and then checked it against the evidence found in early Latin. In general in the discussion I have quoted from Livy alone, quoting from the early authors only when they furnish evidence which clarifies or is not part of, that in Livy. Since I do not believe that statistics have any more philological value than they do for textual criticism, I have not included any statistical indication of frequency of occurrence. Such material can be found in Miss Taylor's work. Her work is also a valuable and comprehensive digest of all functions of *quod*, both primary and derivative. I submit as evidence only what I believe are *quod*'s primary functions in the sense that they establish the criteria for

An early and seemingly obvious function of the relative pronoun *quod* is to fulfill what are reasonably the grammatical requirements of the literal definitions of the terms *relative* and *pronoun*. That is to say, as a relative pronoun *quod* stands in place of a noun and is related to a noun which precedes it. As an example consider the following:

Regium etiam nuntium mittit ad praefectum praesidii quod ab Laevino consule adversus Bruttios ibi locatum erat . . .  
(Livy, XXVII, 12, 4).

To Rhegium, also, he sends a messenger to the head of the garrison which the consul Laevinus had established there to guard against the Bruttii. . . .

In this example it is most important to observe that *quod* and its clause, so far as grammatical usage is concerned, have three characteristics: first, *quod*'s antecedent, for which it stands and to which it refers, is a neuter noun; second, the *quod* clause is not embraced by the clause which contains the antecedent; and third, the verb of the *quod* clause is in the indicative mood. These three grammatical characteristics permit one to grasp what the sentence might have been in basic or paratactic expression:

Regium etiam nuntium mittit ad praefectum praesidii.  
Praesidium (*or perhaps id or quod*) ab Laevino consule  
adversos Bruttios ibi locatum erat.

In other words, functionally speaking, there are here two plain statements of fact in the indicative. The second enlarges upon one noun in the first and, in so doing, limits by description a term of general application to a specific definition. In this case such a descriptive definition clarifies for the reader the circumstances of the garrison to which a messenger was sent. It is not just any garrison but one built by the consul Laevinus. Both

*quod* the conjunction as a development of *quod* the relative pronoun. The focal points of my discussion are the result of a great deal of study and many conversations with Professor C. W. Mendell of Yale. Indeed Professor Mendell (*Latin Sentence Construction* [New Haven, 1917], pp. 13 ff.) established the principles of the type of language analysis which my report embodies, and he first forecast a "new basis . . . for classifying the conjunctions . . . according to the underlying fundamental means of expressing sentence relations" (*op. cit.*, p. 213).

statements by themselves are grammatical and syntactical entities, but the intelligent meaning of each depends upon the relation of one to the other. Introduced by *quod*, the second statement is merely given second place in that it is related to its antecedent rather than vice versa. This, then, is the function of the literal relative pronoun *quod*: to introduce a clause which of itself (originally and syntactically a statement of fact) defines, or enlarges upon, a neuter antecedent.

Plautus in the *Trinummus* (968-9) provides an excellent example of the literal relative *quod* to illustrate its original quality of structural, that is paratactic, independence. Char-mides and the Sycophant are speaking:

- Ch. Adulescens, cedodus istuc aurum. Sy. Quod ego dem aurum tibi?  
Ch. Quod a me te accepisse fassus. Sy. Aps te accepisse?  
Ch. Ita loquor.  
Ch. Young man, hand over that gold and pronto. Sy. What gold am I to give you?  
Ch. What you have confessed you got from me. Sy. Got from you?  
Ch. That's what I said.

*Quod a me te accepisse fassus* is a statement of fact, and it is an independent statement. As such it defines a neuter antecedent, *aurum*. Thus the function of this *quod* clause is no different from that one taken from Livy. However, its grammatical usage is not the same in that it is not dependent but rather independent.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, in tracing the historical development of *quod*, I think that it is extremely important to adjust one's concept of the grammatical term *relative*. This term does not by reason of its function denote dependence; it has acquired such a connotation only by reason of its numerically predominant grammatical usage.

That a *quod* clause could function grammatically independently of the clause containing *quod*'s antecedent accounts for the lack of evidence which is found to emphasize any

<sup>7</sup> It is evidence of this nature which Miss Hahn (*supra*, n. 2) finds in Hittite. She writes: "A typical sentence can mean either 'some utensils are there, and these he picks up' or 'which utensils are there, these he picks up'." However, whatever the derivation of *quod* (i.e., from the indefinite?), its relative pronominal force in Plautus is unquestionably clear.

necessity for *quod* to be immediately subsequent to its antecedent. Of more importance in the evidence is the fact that with word order seeming of small account the *quod* clause is found not embraced by the clause containing the antecedent. The first Livy example illustrated this characteristic of the *quod* clause; nevertheless, the *quod* clause did also happen to follow immediately after its antecedent. This is not always the case:

vectigal ex agro eorum capimus, quod nobis non tam fructu  
iucundius est quam ultione (Livy, XXVIII, 39, 12).

we levy a tax on their property which is rather pleasant  
for us, not so much by way of profit as by way of revenge.

In this sentence the antecedent of *quod* has in its own clause the first position; and the *quod* clause is subsequent not to its antecedent noun but to the clause which contains that antecedent noun. This grammatical characteristic of separation of antecedent noun from *quod* seems an early one, for it represents the independence of the clause containing the antecedent noun and the *quod* clause. Such independence was, so to speak, original.

The third grammatical usage noted in the first example was the indicative mood of the verb of the *quod* clause. However, this verb is often found in the subjunctive, and it might be thought that this grammatical difference is created by a difference in function. Rather I am convinced that the subjunctive in a *quod* clause is explained not by a difference in the function of the *quod* or its clause but by a change in the function of the subjunctive. Cato provides a sentence which very adequately demonstrates the subjunctive and its function, both original and modified:

Vendat oleum, si pretium habeat, vinum frumentum quod  
supersit (*De Re Rustica*, 2).

Sell the oil if the price is right, the wine, and the grain  
which is left over.

This entire sentence is, so far as function is concerned, advice in the sense of command. *Vendat* is an example of the independent subjunctive, and it must be remembered that in the first place the subjunctive is an independent and not a dependent mood.

The independent subjunctive is generally recognized by grammarians as the volitive: this is to say that it is an expression of will. Its conjugation in the three persons is variously defined by hortatory, jussive, and optative. These three terms are to me of little consequence, because I have found that for elementary students they tend to detract from the imperative idea or the expression of will which underlies all three persons. To conjugate the volitive subjunctive is merely to limit the application of will or command to the first person, to a second person who is being addressed, or to a third person who is or is not defined. This last can, because of this lack of definition, simply be a command of will of general application; and it may be neatly translated by the English *one*:

Let one sell (*or better* one is to sell) that grain which is left over.

For the purposes of *quod* with the subjunctive it is necessary to observe that the general temporal connotation of the independent subjunctive is futurity. The fact of selling, in this instance, has not occurred, is not occurring, but is yet to occur. It is for this reason that I believe the subjunctive was adopted as one medium of dependency, for by its very nature it indicates an action yet to occur.<sup>8</sup> That is, it gives a sense of possible

<sup>8</sup> Tenney Frank's doctoral thesis (*Attraction of Mood in Early Latin* [Chicago, 1904]) is an excellent discussion of the manner in which such a change came about. Briefly, he shows that dependent clauses are subjunctive first because they contain the modal force in the subjunctive governing (i. e., independent) clause. From this, dependent clauses by the law of analogy developed as expressions in the subjunctive. Cf. his pp. 6, 7, 58. For the most part I agree with his solution for the origin of the dependent subjunctive, but with that for development I am somewhat but not entirely convinced. I attach great importance to the "modal force" in the subjunctive and define this force as that found in the independent imperative idea. The path to literal dependency I think can be explained for the subjunctive as one which starts when such independent imperatives are expressed dependently after *impero*, *peto*, etc. The dependent usage is continued in adjectival and adverbial clauses of purpose and result. True, the imperative idea is lost, but the temporal connotation to it is strictly kept. To me this subjunctive temporal connotation is an early and important characteristic of the dependent subjunctive. Cf. Handford, *The Latin Subjunctive* (London, 1947), p. 141.

eventuality but does not thereby necessitate positive actuality. It seems to me that this is exactly the point of the subjunctive in the *quod* clause from Cato. I translated: "the grain which is left over"; but the Latin subjunctive adds a connotation to the effect: "which will be left over." The use of the present tense in the English is in point of fact appropriate only if one understands that it is a present as applied to the future. Also, there is a second connotation to the Latin subjunctive: there is no guarantee, nor suggestion of it, that there will actually be grain left over. Thus one is involved with the adequacy of translation, and I suppose that it is best to add futurity to possibility and get the result: "the grain which might be left over." I have a personal prejudice against this translation, however, for it has been my experience that the elementary and advanced student is apt by an indiscriminate use of *might* to become confused with the subjunctive of *possum*. Be that as it may, however one conceives of the best translation, with regard to the function of *quod* and its clause, it is not essentially altered when its verb is in the subjunctive mood. It still has an antecedent noun which it defines. The difference is in the definition, for it defines not an actual fact such as "the garrison which Laevinus had left" but a possible fact. However, actuality or possibility, one as much as the other is a limitation and definition by description of an antecedent. Therefore, although *quod* has absorbed the development in language of the subjunctive from independent grammatical usage to dependent, the function of *quod* has not changed. It continues to describe its antecedent.<sup>9</sup>

There is one other grammatical development in the usage of the *quod* clause which must be discussed before one can freely turn to an examination of the factors which constitute functional development. This grammatical development brings more importance to the relation of the relative clause to its antecedent and enhances the definitive quality beyond that found heretofore in the literal relative pronominal clause. At the same time the quality of dependence of the clause changes,

<sup>9</sup> Arbitrarily I have not discussed *quod* with the subjunctive when used as part of an indirect statement in order not to be forced to interpret what the mood of the verb was in direct statement. This would necessitate discussion of "subjunctive by attraction," the complexities of which exceed the limits of this report.

for it ceases to be one of two independent statements and becomes one of more than two. Also, the *quod* clause is no longer separate from the clause with the antecedent; on the contrary it is a part of it. What we have is an indication of a change in simple, basic language rather than any momentous change in the function of the literal relative *quod*. Take, for example, the following sentence from Livy. In it we have what the grammarians call the second half of a compound, complex sentence:

... et classis Punica litori quod inter urbem et castra Romana erat adpulsa est ne quid praesidi Crispino submitti a Marcello posset (Livy, XXV, 26, 4).

Language developed, as others have pointed out, from statements of fact expressed in series to statements of fact modified adverbially or adjectivally by facts secondary to those primary.<sup>10</sup> "The Punic fleet put in to shore. The shore was between the city and the Roman camp. The purpose of the move was to make it impossible for Marcellus to send any part of a garrison to Crispinus." In developed form: "To the shore which was between the city and the Roman camp the Punic fleet put in so that no part of a garrison could be sent to Crispinus by Marcellus." The function of the *quod* clause defines and describes by relating to a general term a specific fact. The literal relative *quod* fulfills the same function. But the grammar of the *quod* clause is different, for the clause now is embraced by that clause which contains the antecedent. Comparing this with the previous evidence, the reasonable conclusion is essentially this: when the literal relative *quod* introduces a clause not included in the clause which contains the antecedent, grammatically nothing other is indicated than the fact that only two statements of fact, rather than more than two, are being connected. When more than two statements of fact are connected, one to the other, the *quod* clause for purposes of clarity is closely joined to its neuter noun antecedent.

Returning to the three grammatical characteristics which were observed in the early *quod* clause, it is now evident that in order to determine the function of the *quod* clause the only

<sup>10</sup> This is the change from parataxis to hypotaxis: e.g., Sturtevant, *Linguistic Change* (Chicago, 1917), pp. 133-5.

constant factor is the antecedent. Neither the position nor the mood of the *quod* clause affects its function. Consistently, whatever the grammatical characteristics, the literal relative *quod* and its clause have related to a neuter noun antecedent a statement of fact, thereby defining or limiting it by describing it.

A very distinct change in the function of the literal relative is evident when *quod* introduces a clause which relates a secondary descriptive statement not to an antecedent noun but to an antecedent fact or circumstance. Livy and Plautus furnish pertinent examples:

... ubi ego eum parentem appellavero, quod beneficio eius erga nos ac maiestate eius dignum est (Livy, XXII, 29, 10).

... once I shall have addressed him as *parens*, which (i. e., an appellation which) he deserves considering his rank and kindness toward us. . . .

Bonus volo iam ex hoc die esse—quod neque fiet neque fuit (Plautus, *Persa*, 479).

A good man I wish to be now from this day on—which (i. e., a wish which) neither will be true nor has been true.

In each of these examples the *quod* clause adds to one fact a second fact, and note that the antecedent fact is not only a grammatical entity but as well, lacking a better term, a sense entity. That is to say, the antecedent is grammatically and functionally complete as a statement with subject and predicate. By way of contrast, consider these words from Livy:

An me . . . victorem eundem non Alpinarum modo gentium sed ipsarum, quod multo maius est, Alpium . . . conferam . . . (Livy, XXI, 43, 15).

Or is it that I am to compare myself, master at one and the same time not only of the Alpine tribes but of the Alps themselves, which (i. e., a feat which) is by far the greater. . . .

In this case the antecedent, although it is a grammatical entity, is but a part of the sense entity. *Victorem ipsarum Alpium* is grammatically complete, a noun with an objective genitive, but it lacks complete meaning until it is put together with the clause of which it is a part. This is quite different from "I shall have addressed him as *parens*." It is my opinion that the important characteristic of the antecedent which one must

observe is that it is a fact or circumstance rather than a single neuter noun. That the fact or circumstance is expressed as a grammatically complete statement or phrase does not alter the descriptive function of *quod* and its clause. With either type of fact antecedent, the *quod* clause limits or defines it by expressing, as it does with a single noun antecedent, a secondary descriptive fact. The basic change in the function of the *quod* clause is not in its application as *quod* relative but as *quod* pronominal. Whereas with the literal relative *quod*, the *quod* substituted for a noun, it now substitutes for a combination of words which by their meaning in combination express a fact. In other words, *quod* now exhibits not only a single antecedent but also a multiple antecedent.

Linked very closely to the multiple antecedent *quod* is *id quod*, the *id* referring to a multiple antecedent.

... ratus Hanno non aliud quam tumultum ac secessionem, id *quod* et ante acciderat, Numidarum esse ad conprimendam seditionem processit (Livy, XXVI, 40, 9).

... Hanno, since he thought that the Numidians were doing nothing other than rioting and revolting, that (i. e., rioting and revolting) which they had done previously, set out to suppress the revolt.

In this example *id* ties up in one bundle, so to speak, a previous fact expressed by a word combination and by the meaning of the words themselves. The *quod* clause immediately follows the *id* and relates a secondary statement to it. Since the *id* is synonymous with the multiple antecedent, it follows that the *quod* clause is relative to it. The function of *quod* in this case is therefore exactly identical with its function as a relative with a multiple antecedent. That *id* is used synonymously with the content of the antecedent phrase and that *quod* syntactically refers to *id* does not in any way alter what the *quod* clause effects.

So far the function of the *quod* clause has been to serve to give additional information to limit or define a previous term or circumstance for which *id* may or may not be found as a synonym, and either the *quod* clause or the antecedent when read in the context of its own clause has been syntactically and functionally intelligible of and by itself. *Quod* next shows a

decreasing emphasis on an antecedent (in fact, eventually the antecedent is lost altogether), and in contrast it shows an increasing emphasis on the meaning and importance of its own clause. Evidence of this change in *quod*'s clause is found when the antecedent is *id*. The clause which contains *id* is syntactically intelligible but not functionally so. Quoting again from Livy:

Id modo eius anni in Hispania ad memoriam insigne est,  
quod mercennarium militem in castris neminem . . . Romani  
habuerunt (Livy, XXIV, 49, 8).

This is all that's worth remembering of that year in Spain, the fact that the Romans had in their camp no mercenary soldier.

It is evident that syntactically the statement *id modo eius anni in Hispania ad memoriam insigne est* is complete; yet lacking the *quod* clause it is not intelligible. *Quod mercennarium militem in castris neminem . . . Romani habuerunt* is synonymous with its grammatical antecedent *id*; and only when it is substituted for *id* does the sentence as a whole make sense. In other words at this point the *quod* clause is no longer retrospective, nor is it truly a relative. It does not relate by explanation a secondary statement to a prior antecedent, intelligible by itself or by its relation to the clause or phrase of which it is a part. On the contrary it has itself a primary role in the sentence as a whole. Without the *quod* clause the sentence would have no intelligible meaning. The antecedent is vague and entirely undefined, even in a general sense. The *quod* clause is at one and the same time the definition and the fact of the antecedent. To give this *quod* clause and its function a term, I shall call it *id quod* anticipatory-appositional.

It must also be noted that in this particular type of *quod* anticipatory the *quod* itself, speaking syntactically, plays no essential part within its clause. It is neither subject nor object of the verb, it does not express end of motion, nor instrument, nor place, or what have you. *Quod* by itself stands in apposition to the clause which it introduces and which is grammatically complete by itself without *quod*. I have therefore translated it by the phrase "the fact that"; applying a grammarian's term, it is accusative of specification. However, actually if one de-

scribes its function accurately, it is the nominative of specification, since it is an appositive to a clause which is synonymous with the grammatical subject *id*.

This is a marked development of the *quod* clause, both in function and structure. It seems to be the result of a gradual transition from *id quod* with a multiple antecedent. The transition to *id quod* anticipatory-appositional is marked by an increasing vagueness found in *id*, a vagueness dependent upon the proximity of the multiple antecedent.

Quod ad fugam impedimento hostibus erat, id ad caedem eos velut vincitos praebebat (Livy, XXVIII, 2, 9).

What hindered the enemy's flight, that offered them up for slaughter just as if they had been tied and bound.

This sentence is syntactically complete, but its full meaning is not evident unless it is read in its context. The sentence previous to it is: *Ceterum asperitas locorum Celtiberis quibus in proelio concursare mos est velocitatem inutilem faciebat*. This is the multiple antecedent of *id*. Yet note that the *quod* relative, although it grammatically enlarges upon *id*, in point of fact stresses a character of the multiple antecedent.<sup>11</sup>

However, the strict multiple antecedent for *id* disappears, and instead the general purport of what *id* is exactly is given in the context which follows the sentence with *id quod*. For example:

Gracchus ex equo desilit; idem ceteros facere iubet hortaturque ut, quod unum reliquum fortuna fecerit, id con honestent virtute. Reliquum autem quid esse paucis a multitudine in valle silva ac montibus saepa circumventis praeter mortem (Livy, XXV, 16, 17)?

Gracchus asks the others to do honor to "that which alone

<sup>11</sup> Plautus, *Bacchides*, offers an excellent example of this importance of the previous context to the meaning of *id*. Nicobulus is speaking to Chrysalus:

- (1) 989a Quod iubeo id facias  
explained by  
988 tamen ades.
- (2) 993 at enim id quod te iubeo facias  
explained by  
990c animum advortito igitur.

fortune has left them." Then he explains in a rhetorical question that for a few men in dire circumstances there isn't much left except death. And death is *id quod unum reliquum fortuna fecerit*. What *id* refers to is a fact which is related in the context in which the sentence with the *id quod* is set, but the explanation is given subsequently to the *id quod*. That is to say, the *id* has become indefinite by its separation from the thought to which it refers, and the *quod* relative attaches a definition to *id*, the full meaning of which is not given until later. This, it seems to me, is an early function of *quod* anticipatory. It characterizes *id* before that idea to which *id* refers is known.

In the examples quoted to illustrate this gradual influx of indefiniteness in *id*, one will note that as with the cases of the literal relative *quod*, the multiple antecedent *quod*, and the *id quod* with multiple antecedent, *quod* here is syntactically essential to its own clause. Specifically it is, in the cases given, subject or object of the verb. *Quod* does not lose this syntactical quality until *id* has become absolutely indefinite, its meaning completely dependent upon the *quod* clause. In other words when *quod* is strictly anticipatory, the sole explanation and definition of *id*, then it loses its syntactical role.

The evidence demonstrates that *quod* functions by itself in a manner identical with that of *id quod* anticipatory-appositional. The only difference is that *quod* lacks *id* to which heretofore it has stood in apposition. In contrast *quod* by itself is a relative to an idea contained in the context, an idea which is either prior or subsequent. Consider this sentence first of all:

Audeamus *quod credi non potest ausuros nos* (Livy, XXV, 13, 18).

Let us dare what cannot be believed we shall dare.

This is a perfectly good sentence, if only syntax is concerned. But its meaning is vague. One understands the clause "what cannot be believed we shall dare" only by grasping the context in which the entire sentence appears. Just previous to it, there has been the explanation that the only hope in the face of a powerful enemy is to effect that which is least expected. At this moment the foe hardly expects the Romans who are under siege to initiate an attack. But it is exactly this to which the Roman general refers with *quod credi non potest ausuros nos*. Here,

then, is a *quod* clause which is meaningless without the prior content of the passage.

Again from Livy:

In parte operis mei licet mihi praefari quod in principio summae totius professi plerique sunt rerum scriptores . . . (Livy, XXI, 1, 1).

Here I may claim what most historians have claimed at the very beginning of their greatest work. . . .

However, *quod* . . . *professi plerique sunt* . . . is not understood until there is added to it a subsequent clause *bellum maxime omnium memorabile quae umquam gesta sint me scripturum*, "that I am going to write about a war, the most memorable of all that ever have been fought." In this sentence the *quod* clause displays anticipation literally; it furnishes a descriptive fact for something yet to be defined.

Note in both of these sentences that *quod* syntactically is essential to its clause: in one, the subject, in the other, the object of the verb. Also it must be noted that *quod* stands in apposition, not to *id*, but to a multiple thought, prior or subsequent. In this, *quod* has merely changed the nature of its antecedent; it has not lost an antecedent.

The next sentence illustrates *quod* in an entirely different status:

Hannibalem ante omnia angebat, quod Capua pertinacius oppugnata ab Romanis quam defensa ab se multorum Italiae populorum animos averterat . . . (Livy, XXVI, 38, 1).

The fact that Capua, more stubbornly besieged by the Romans than defended by him, had lost for him the support of many Italian tribes, worried Hannibal above all.

Here *quod* introduces a statement which assumes a major role in the sentence, in this case the subject of the verb. *Quod* of itself has no retrospective force but is indicative of something yet to come: it is anticipatory. Also *quod* itself stands in opposition to the clause as a whole, that clause which it introduces. Finally, *quod* is not syntactically essential within its own clause. All this represents a major change in the function of *quod*. No longer does it relate a secondary descriptive fact to a previous antecedent, single or multiple; no longer does it have a syntactical part in the *quod* clause. It is neither retrospective nor

syntactically essential. It is anticipatory: it denotes that there is a meaningful clause following it. With this last quality, it stands as a single word in apposition to a clause. This is, again, the grammatical usage of "accusative of specification." Thus the evidence demonstrates that the most developed function of *quod* is anticipation, a function which depends upon its appositional character. Previously with *id* it was pointed out that this character was dual, for *quod* was in apposition not only to its own clause but, together with its clause, to the antecedent *id*. Consequently one may say that *quod* in acquiring the function of anticipation did not at first lose all traces of its early function of retrospection but preserved it to some degree, no matter how weak the antecedent was.

The conjunction *quod* clearly proves that its development rests on both functions, anticipation and retrospection. Its meaning, to the Roman, of the English word *because*, is the result of *quod* retrospective; the clause it introduces is a development of *quod* anticipatory. In tracing the characteristics of *quod* from what appear to be early conjunctival uses there is evidence of these features which have been shown to be descriptive of *quod* the relative. In a sentence which doubtless illustrates an early conjunctival use of *quod*, there are to be observed three functions which have thus far been examined: first, *quod* appears to have a retrospective force; second, it is non-essential syntactically within its own clause; and third, it is in apposition to the clause it introduces and therefore anticipatory:

Natura etiam adiuvabat loci, *quod* saxum cui inposita muri fundamenta sunt magna parte . . . proclive est . . . (Livy, XXIV, 34, 14).

The nature of the place also was a help, the fact that (because) the rock on which the wall's foundations were built is for the most part steep. . . .

*Quod* is non-essential syntactically within its own clause; *quod* is in apposition to its clause; yet *quod's* clause also defines the *natura loci*. In defining it, the clause specifically states in what manner or why *natura loci adiuvabat*. Since it thus relates a clause to a previously stated specification, *quod* admits of the alternative translation *because*. The point to be stressed is this: although *quod* as an accusative of specification introduces a

clause which is seemingly synonymous with a stated antecedent, *natura loci*, nevertheless the content of the *quod* clause explains the reason for a particular characteristic of the antecedent, the assistance of the *natura loci*. It is true that *quod* is retrospective, but it is not retrospective in exactly the same way it was as a pronominal relative. It does not relate to an antecedent a secondary fact or statement of fact; quite the contrary it relates to a statement of fact a primary quality or characteristic. Lacking this, the antecedent is somewhat vague. Only with the *quod* clause does it express a complete fact. In short, the *quod* clause tells why or for what reason the antecedent fact is a fact.

This is similar to the function of *quod* the conjunction in its most developed form. *Quod* as the conjunction *because* relates to a given fact the reason for it.

M. Marcello pro consule imperium esse populus iussit, *quod* post Cannensem cladem unus . . . prospere rem gessisset (Livy, XXIII, 30, 19).

The people ordered Marcus Marcellus to have the proconsular *imperium*, because (the reason for the order was that) he alone after the slaughter at Cannae had successfully performed his duty.

The difference between *quod* the conjunction as it is used in this sentence to express the reason for the accomplishment of a given fact, and *quod* the conjunction which tells why a given fact is true, lies in the appositional quality of *quod*. In its employment to express cause or reason for an action *quod* has lost its appositional quality, that is to say, its function as an accusative of specification. Oddly enough the *quod* conjunction to express cause appears similar to its original function as a relative with a multiple antecedent. However, remember that *quod* conjunction does not play an essential syntactical role within its own clause and that it does not relate to a statement of fact a secondary statement of fact. Rather it expresses a second statement of fact which serves to describe by definition the reason or cause for the action of the antecedent. It does not express a general descriptive definition of the antecedent but rather one particular one, its reason. Lacking the reason, presumably the antecedent could exist as a fact which might be described. For example, one could write:

M. Marcello pro consule imperium esse populus iussit, quod bonum erat.

The people ordered Marcus Marcellus to have the proconsular *imperium* which was a good thing to do.

In this case, the fact of ordering the proconsular *imperium* for Marcellus occurs; that it was good of the people to order it is merely descriptive definition. *Quod* the conjunction, on the other hand, has as its function the relating to one sentence, a statement of fact, a second, the express purpose of which is to explain the reason or cause for the action of the antecedent fact.

This function of *quod* is actually the result of a combination of both its retrospective and its anticipatory functions. The connection is clearly established by the examination of one other characteristic of *quod* conjunction, its relation to *id* in the causal ablative:

. . . Hanno . . . Graecas urbes temptavit, eo facilius in societate manentes Romana, quod Bruttios . . . Carthagiem-  
ium partis factos cernebant (Livy, XXIV, 1, 1).

Hanno attacked the Greek cities which kept their association with Rome more readily for this reason, because (the fact that) they observed that the Bruttii had made common cause with the Carthaginians.

In this sentence *quod* is a conjunction, fulfilling its function of explaining the reason for a given fact by introducing a second fact. But note, too, that *quod* has a vague antecedent, the ablative case of *id*. For *eo*, *quod* functions exactly as it did in *id-quod* anticipatory-appositional. That is to say, *eo* is synonymous with the *quod* clause, therefore it is appositional; but *eo* likewise lacks meaning without the *quod* clause, therefore the clause is anticipatory. *Quod* conjunction fully developed has no function of apposition, but its quality of relating a second fact to another given fact is akin to anticipation. Without the *quod* clause, what appears to be primary fact lacks meaning. The dependent clause, speaking grammarswise, the *quod* clause that is, states the reason why the independent clause is a fact.

The vagueness of *eo* and its lack of meaning without the *quod* associates it with the last stage of *id quod* anticipatory-appositional wherein *id* by itself depends for its intelligible meaning on the fact contained within the *quod* clause. The

important point is that in both *id quod* and *eo quod* the indefinite is eventually absorbed by *quod*. Thus the quality of apposition disappears, but that of anticipation is left. Nevertheless when *quod* absorbs *eo*, it preserves in its meaning *because* the causal idea which is basic in *eo*. Consequently *quod* the conjunction, although maintaining its quality of anticipation in the clause it introduces, nevertheless in its own meaning reflects its function of retrospection. It is through the development of both functions, retrospection and anticipation, that the literal relative *quod* is explained as the historical origin for *quod* the conjunction.

ROBERT B. WOOLSEY.

THE TAFT SCHOOL.

## SEJANUS, GAETULICUS, AND SENECA.

The many biographers of the younger Seneca have found scanty and imprecise evidence for his life and activities prior to his exile in the first year of Claudius' reign (41 A. D.).<sup>1</sup> His earliest extant work, the *Consolatio ad Marciam*, is now usually dated in the preceding year,<sup>2</sup> and although his remaining writings are often personal in tone and the third most extensive of any pagan Latin author, they have given for the earlier period no more than scattered indications or clues. Place of birth, early training, poor health, a trip to Egypt, family relations, an undated quaestorship: this is the meagre harvest which the literary historians have been able to glean from his works.<sup>3</sup> Other ancient sources have nothing to add, except for a novelistic anecdote in Dio Cassius of a brush with Caligula.<sup>4</sup> On the political and social activities which led, when Seneca was over forty and already prominent,<sup>5</sup> to his exile in connection with one sister of Caligula and to his recall eight years later through the influence of another there has seemed to be no information.

Modern writers on Seneca have therefore confined themselves to piecing together the explicit evidence from his writings and have in this way composed a sketchy account of his first forty or more years. Such a method had led very nearly to final results as early as 1490 (though confusion between the elder and younger Senecas still made difficulties), and after the work

<sup>1</sup> The most important biographies before 1900 are: Paulus Pompilius, *Vita Senecae* (Rome, 1490); Justus Lipsius, *De Vita et Scriptis L. Annæi Senecæ* (Amsterdam, 1605); Alfred Gercke, *Seneca-Studien*, in *Neue Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie*, Suppl.-Band XXII (Leipzig, 1896). Some of the better known of this century are: Carlo Pascal, *Seneca* (Catania, 1906); René Waltz, *Vie de Sénèque* (also issued under title *Vie Politique de Sénèque*) (Paris, 1909); Concetto Marchesi, *Seneca* (Messina, 1920); Francis Holland, *Seneca* (London, 1920); Paul Faider, *Études sur Sénèque* (Gand, 1921), with good enumeration of biographies since the fifteenth century, pp. 132-5, and critical edition of Pompilius, pp. 281-323.

<sup>2</sup> See below, note 78.

<sup>3</sup> Texts and discussion in Faider, pp. 155-72.

<sup>4</sup> Discussed below, pp. 80-1.

<sup>5</sup> *Tum maxime placens*, Suetonius says of him at about this period, *Caligula*, 53.

of Lipsius scholars have done little more than to repeat his conclusions, often less accurately or less completely. Some, like Marchesi and Holland, have merely translated the appropriate passages from Seneca; others, like Waltz, have interpolated with pure invention what they imagine the life of a person like Seneca might have been; at least one writer<sup>6</sup> has solved an imaginary problem (why Seneca did not give a more circumstantial account of his shipwreck) with a fantastic answer (Seneca suffered from permanent partial amnesia as a result of seeing his uncle's corpse at the time); a few, like Gercke and, most completely, Faider, have collected and evaluated intelligently what has seemed to them all the evidence available. None of this evidence, however, gives an adequate background for the events of the year 41 A. D., and only Waltz has vaguely seen that Seneca must have had some part in "le groupe des soeurs de Caius."<sup>7</sup>

More than enough evidence, however, to fill in this mysterious background lies waiting unnoticed in the Senecan corpus. Failure to recognize it springs from failure to recognize certain inconsistencies and problems, partly internal, partly evident through comparison with the historians. To take a striking example: in his *Consolatio ad Marciam* Seneca makes a violent attack on Sejanus with such terms as "*perfidum militem*."<sup>8</sup> Yet in three other works he mentions him without animus.<sup>9</sup> This is all the more extraordinary in that the elder Seneca says that Attalus, who was one of his son's most influential masters, was forced into exile by Sejanus.<sup>10</sup> An attack on the latter at least in connection with Attalus might have been expected. In the same passage of the *Ad Marciam*, further, he speaks with contempt of Sejanus' *cliens*, Satrius Secundus, through whom Marcia's father, Cremutius Cordus, had been destroyed. But it is known from Tacitus that Cordus was the victim of *two* of Sejanus' *clientes*, Satrius Secundus and Pinarius Natta.<sup>11</sup> So it is perhaps with a little surprise that we find in one of Seneca's

<sup>6</sup> L. Cantarelli, "Per l'amministrazione e la storia dell'Egitto Romano, II" *Aegyptus*, VIII (1927), pp. 89-96.

<sup>7</sup> *Vie de Scnèque*, p. 68, n. 1.

<sup>8</sup> 22, 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> *De Vita Beata*, 11, 11; *Ep.*, 55, 3; *Nat. Quacst.*, I, 1, 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Suasoriae*, 2, 12.

<sup>11</sup> *Ann.*, IV, 34.

letters a non-committal reference to Pinarius Natta as a social wit in terms which suggest that he might have been of the same circle as the author.<sup>12</sup> These two inconsistencies are in themselves not unnatural and would hardly call for explanation, were there not other evidence linking Seneca to a prominent group which had been favorable to Sejanus. It will be worth while to look more carefully at some of the figures who appear in Seneca's pages.

The greatest friend of the philosopher's last years was Lucilius Junior, to whom his latest works were dedicated. Not very much younger than Seneca,<sup>13</sup> Lucilius had been a friend as early as the exile, when the dangerous enmity of Narcissus and Messalina had not affected his loyalty.<sup>14</sup> This early connection has not been sufficiently noted, for it might have suggested that Seneca too had known well another friend for whom, as Seneca says, Lucilius had risked his life only two years before, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus.<sup>15</sup> Now Gaetulicus did not make his first appearance on the stage of Roman history in connection with his abortive attempt against Caligula in 39 A. D., in which he lost his life and to which Seneca here refers. In 26 A. D. he had shared the consulship with C. Calvisius Sabinus,<sup>16</sup> later governor of Pannonia, whose wife Cornelia, it has been plausibly suggested, may have been Gaetulicus' sister.<sup>17</sup> At the death of Sejanus in 31 A. D. Gaetulicus was commander of the legions in Upper Germany. His father-in-law, L. Apronius, was the Legate of Lower Germany. Both had been given their posts during the ascendancy of Sejanus.<sup>18</sup> This was not, however, the full extent of their connections with the fallen minister, for Gaetulicus' daughter had been engaged to Sejanus' eldest son (who was executed soon after his father),<sup>19</sup> and Apronius' son, L. Apronius Caesianus, was accused of *maiestas* in connection with the affair, but was pardoned.<sup>20</sup> In 34 A. D. Gaetulicus was himself accused (probably of treason) for his connections with Sejanus, but the

<sup>12</sup> *Ep.*, 122, 11.

<sup>14</sup> *Nat. Quaest.*, IVa, *Praef.* 15.

<sup>13</sup> *Ep.*, 35, 2.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 46.

<sup>17</sup> Groag, in *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, II, p. 85, no. 354.

<sup>18</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 73; VI, 30; Dio Cassius, LIX, 22, 5.

<sup>19</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 30; V, 8-9.

<sup>20</sup> Dio Cassius, LVIII, 19, 1-2.

charges were suppressed, reportedly because of his vigorous defence.<sup>21</sup>

In 32 A. D., furthermore, five other members of the nobility were charged with treason, among them Gaetulicus' former colleague (and perhaps brother-in-law), Calvisius Sabinus.<sup>22</sup> Now the latter is not mentioned in any of Seneca's works,<sup>23</sup> but two of the men who were accused with him are: Mamercus Scaurus and Annus Pollio are in fact introduced together in a manner which shows clearly that Seneca had taken his anecdote from the circle in which they moved.<sup>24</sup> A witty remark of Scaurus quoted elsewhere again indicates that it was this group which supplied Seneca with such gossip.<sup>25</sup> It can now no longer seem mere chance which led him to quote Pinarius Natta, another member of the Sejanus circle. The remaining two of the accused nobles, Annus Vinicianus and Appius Junius Silanus, will have significant parts later in our story. All five were saved, though Scaurus was later accused again and killed himself.<sup>26</sup>

It seems possible, therefore, to associate Seneca, partly through his own writings and partly through his friendship with Lucilius, with a number of the prominent friends of Sejanus. And this connection is entirely one-sided: not one of the known enemies of Sejanus appears in his works except Cremutius Cordus in the *Consolatio ad Marciam*.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 30. It is even probable that Gaetulicus and Sejanus were blood relatives, since the latter's mother was a daughter of a Cornelius Lentulus, but the relationships of the many Cornelii Lentuli are too little known for any assurance of this point. See *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, II, p. 328, table.

<sup>22</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 9.

<sup>23</sup> As Groag implies (*P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, II, p. 83, no. 351), he is surely not the Calvisius Sabinus of *Ep.*, 27, 5-8.

<sup>24</sup> *De Ben.*, IV, 31, 3-5.

<sup>25</sup> *Ep.*, 29, 6. Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus and C. Annus Pollio were consuls *suffecti* during the ascendancy of Sejanus, the former in 21 A. D., the latter in 21 or 22 A. D. For the coss. suff. of this period, many of whom must have been of the Sejanian circle, see A. Degrassi, "Osservazioni su alcuni consoli suffletti dell'età di Augusto e Tiberio," *Epigraphica*, 1946, pp. 34-9 and the informative remarks of F. W. Adams, "Some Observations on the Consular Fasti in the Early Empire," *A. J. A.*, LV (1951), pp. 239-41.

<sup>26</sup> In 34 A. D. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 29; Dio Cassius, LVIII, 24, 3-5).

<sup>27</sup> Asinius Gallus (*Ep.*, 55, 3) was perhaps an enemy of Sejanus, but

An attempt to explain the special position of this latter work might well start with an examination of what happened to the surviving group of *Seianiani*, especially those associated with Gaetulicus, after the death of Tiberius. Gaetulicus continued to hold his command in Germany; his father-in-law was perhaps dead: nothing is heard of him after 34 A. D.; Calvisius Sabinus kept his province of Pannonia; Pomponius Secundus, who had been kept under house arrest since 31 A. D. for shielding Aelius Gallus, was released;<sup>28</sup> M. Vinicius Quartinus, a friend<sup>29</sup> and probably a close relative of Annius Vinicianus,<sup>30</sup> had been married in 33 A. D. to Julia Livilla,<sup>31</sup> one of Caligula's sisters, and was now a part of the royal household. (Several strands meet in the person of Vinicius: not only was he the husband of Julia Livilla and connected with Vinicianus, but he also is familiarly mentioned by Seneca in the same passage in which he quotes Pinarius Natta);<sup>32</sup> Annius Vinicianus himself must have been associated with Caligula by this time, perhaps through his friendship with Aemilius Lepidus.<sup>33</sup> But it is Lepidus who now takes the center of the stage. His origins are uncertain;<sup>34</sup> possibly he was a brother of the notorious Aemilia Lepida,<sup>35</sup> the wife of Caligula's brother Drusus, who herself had been an agent for Sejanus.<sup>36</sup> By the beginning of the reign, at any rate, he was an intimate of Caligula's and was soon to marry the emperor's favorite sister, Drusilla.<sup>37</sup> Caligula's passionate devotion to his

his imprisonment was surely not Sejanus' doing, and he outlived the minister (Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 23; Dio Cassius, LVIII, 23, 6).

<sup>28</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 6, 2. This Aelius Gallus was not Sejanus' son, as was once thought (e. g. by E. Ciaceri, *Tiberio* [Rome, 1944], p. 318), but probably a very close relative through adoption. See A. Stein, *Die Präfekten von Ägypten* (Bern, 1950), pp. 16-17 and 195, n. 8. The names of Sejanus' sons are known from the *Fasti Ostienses*.

<sup>29</sup> Josephus, *Ant.*, XIX, 251.

<sup>30</sup> And so also connected with Vinicianus' father, Annius Pollio: Groag in *P. I. R.<sup>2</sup>*, I, p. 115, no. 677; I, p. 125, no. 701.

<sup>31</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 15.

<sup>32</sup> *Ep.*, 122, 12.

<sup>33</sup> Josephus, *Ant.*, XIX, 20 and 49.

<sup>34</sup> Balsdon (*The Emperor Gaius* [Oxford, 1934], p. 42 and genealogical chart) and the *Camb. Anc. Hist.* (X, Table 1) make him, without evidence, the cousin of Caligula, which is possible.

<sup>35</sup> Groag in *P. I. R.<sup>2</sup>*, I, p. 61, no. 371.

<sup>36</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 40; Dio Cassius, LVIII, 3, 8.

<sup>37</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 11, 1 and 22, 6; Suetonius, *Caligula*, 36, 1.

three sisters, Agrippina, Drusilla, and Livilla, whom he associated in his rule and with whom he is reported to have had incestuous relations, is well known.<sup>38</sup> Lepidus became a part of this close family group and after Drusilla's death was named by Caligula as his successor.<sup>39</sup> It is difficult to judge whether Lepidus had been connected with the group of Sejanus' friends before the beginning of the reign or not. His friendship with Vinicianus and eventual conspiracy with Gaetulicus would suggest so. His friendship with Avillius Flaccus suggests the opposite.<sup>40</sup>

It was apparently not nearly so clear to Caligula as it is to modern historians that Sejanus, not Tiberius, had been the real enemy of his mother, Agrippina, and of his brother, Nero, for at the very time that he was visiting the places of their death and honoring their memory, he was aiding and maintaining Sejanus' former friends. The anomalous position of his brother Drusus in the conspiracy may have been a confusing factor. Just as noteworthy, at any rate, as the favor which the emperor was now obviously showing to the former *Seianiani* (Gaetulicus' brother-in-law, L. Apronius Caesianus, was Consul-designate in 38 A. D.)<sup>41</sup> was the fate of Sejanus' former enemies. Within a year after the beginning of the new reign his greatest opponent and the agent of his destruction, Naevius Sertorius Macro, was forced to suicide.<sup>42</sup> This act of supposed ingratitude on the part of Caligula has been something of a mystery to historians,<sup>43</sup> but would be the logical reflection of a return to influence of Sejanus' old partisans. One of Macro's most prominent friends was recalled from office and condemned before the end of this same year: Avillius Flaccus, governor of Egypt since soon after Sejanus' death, was accused, not of maladministration, but of

<sup>38</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 3, 4; Suetonius, *Caligula*, 15, 3; 24, 1; 36, 1. An interesting sidelight in T. Mommsen, "Iusitirandum in C. Caesarem Augustum," *Gesammelte Schriften*, VIII, pp. 461-6.

<sup>39</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 22, 6-7; cf. Suetonius, *Caligula*, 24, 1.

<sup>40</sup> Philo, *In Flaccum*, 151; 181.

<sup>41</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 13, 2 and *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, I, p. 190, no. 972 *init.*

<sup>42</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 10, 6; Suetonius, *Caligula*, 26, 1.

<sup>43</sup> See Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius*, pp. 38-9, where Philo's fantasies (*Legatio ad Gaium*, 52-7) are in effect accepted.

plotting with Macro and Tiberius Gemellus. He was banished and later executed.<sup>44</sup>

In the middle of 38 A. D. Drusilla died.<sup>45</sup> Owing to the loss of Tacitus' account of this whole period it is hard to give exact dates for the subsequent events and equally hard always to distinguish cause and effect. It is clear, however, that at some point Agrippina entered into adulterous relations with Lepidus,<sup>46</sup> that Lepidus joined forces with Gaetulicus in a conspiracy against Caligula,<sup>47</sup> and that Livilla was also involved,<sup>48</sup> whether through her sister and Lepidus or through her husband, Vinicius. It is also clear that in the year 39 A. D. Caligula for some reason changed his opinion about Tiberius. In a speech to the Senate he defended his predecessor, charged the Senate (and thus the creatures of Sejanus) with responsibility for the injustices of the previous reign, and revived the law of *maiestas*.<sup>49</sup> In a passage whose significance has not been sufficiently recognized Dio Cassius says of this and the succeeding period, "In these and the following days many of the leading figures [were] condemned [to death] (for even of those who had been released from prison a large number were punished for the very same crimes for which they had been imprisoned under Tiberius)." <sup>50</sup> This is as clear an indication as one could hope to find that a reversal now took place of the policy of amnesty toward the sympathizers of Sejanus who had been prosecuted in the last years of Tiberius. The suicide at this juncture of Calvisius Sabinus, recalled from Pannonia, and of his wife Cornelia corroborates further the view that it was this particular group which was involved.<sup>51</sup> So closely associated with Gaetulicus during his lifetime, these two were not long to precede him in death.

Only by guesswork can one say whether Caligula finally discovered the truth about Sejanus' history and by his persecutions

<sup>44</sup> Philo, *In Flaccum*, 10-23; 151; 185.

<sup>45</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 11, 1.

<sup>46</sup> Suetonius, *Caligula*, 24; Dio Cassius, LIX, 22, 7; Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIV, 2.

<sup>47</sup> Suetonius, *Caligula*, 24; *Claudius*, 9.

<sup>48</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 22, 6-9; Suetonius, *Caligula*, 24, 3.

<sup>49</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 16, 1-8.

<sup>50</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 13, 2.

<sup>51</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 18, 4.

frightened the remaining *Seianiani* into conspiracy or whether he discovered a conspiracy and through investigating it first learned of facts which changed his attitude about Sejanus. Possibly his enlightenment proceeded in both matters *pari passu*. It is unlikely that he first learned the facts from the papers of the dead Macro,<sup>52</sup> for the latter had killed himself a year before the change appears to have taken place. It is perhaps significant that Domitius Afer, who had under Sejanus prosecuted two relatives and partisans of Caligula's mother and who was, probably on this account, prosecuted for *maiestas* by Caligula, effected a mysterious reconciliation with the emperor and was created Consul and left in Rome when Caligula started north to crush the Lepidus-Gaetulicus conspiracy.<sup>53</sup> Tacitus' account of his character would support the view that he gave at least a hint that his former Sejanian associates were not to be trusted.<sup>54</sup> Whatever the source of his information, Caligula hurried to Gaul in the late summer of 39 A. D., apparently taking Lepidus, Agrippina, and Livilla with him.<sup>55</sup> By early autumn Gaetulicus and Lepidus were dead, Agrippina and Livilla in exile. Three daggers taken from the conspirators were sent to the temple of Mars Ultor in Rome,<sup>56</sup> and the Arval Brotherhood sacrificed on October 27th *ob detecta nefaria consilia in C. Caesarem Aug. Germanicorum Cn. Lentuli Gae-tulici*.<sup>57</sup> Suetonius on the other hand speaks of the affair as the *causa Aemili Lepidi*.<sup>58</sup> Despite this violent end of some of its leading members, the group whose history we have been following was not yet wholly extinct nor divided: fifteen months later in the final, successful conspiracy of January, 41 A. D. one of the chief participants was Annianus Vinicianus, who in turn supported M. Vinicius as Caligula's successor.<sup>59</sup>

Before trying to reconstruct the events of 40 A. D. after the death of Gaetulicus and Lepidus (especially difficult since Dio

<sup>52</sup> As M. P. Charlesworth (in *Camb. Anc. Hist.*, X, p. 657) suggested.

<sup>53</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 19-20; cf. Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 52 and 66.

<sup>54</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 52; XIV, 19.

<sup>55</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 21, 1-2; 22, 3-9; Suetonius, *Caligula*, 39, 1; 43.

<sup>56</sup> Dio Cassius, LIX, 22, 7; Suetonius, *Caligula*, 24, 3.

<sup>57</sup> *C. I. L.*, VI, 2029; Henzen, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, p. XLIX.

<sup>58</sup> *Caligula*, 24, 3.

<sup>59</sup> Josephus, *Ant.*, XIX, 52 and 251 (text as emended by Niese).

Cassius also is here lacking as a source except through his epitomizers) we should examine two other, more tentative indications of Seneca's connection with the *Seianiani* in the earlier period. In his *Consolatio ad Helviam* he tells of an uncle who was Prefect of Egypt for sixteen years, whom he visited in Egypt, and who died on a sea voyage while being accompanied by his wife and Seneca.<sup>60</sup> The language of the passage has suggested to most scholars that the uncle died on the ship on his way home from his post to Italy. Only in recent times has this Prefect been identified as C. Galerius and the dates of his tenure fixed probably from 16 or 17 A. D. to 31 or 32 A. D.<sup>61</sup> The period of his office, then, corresponds exactly to the ascendancy of Sejanus. So far as is known, furthermore, his predecessor as Prefect had been Sejanus' father. And there appear, lastly, to be unusual circumstances connected with his departure from office. This departure corresponds in date, first of all, with the downfall of Sejanus, and although some caution must be used in relating all political events of the year 31 A. D. with that momentous change, yet a simultaneous change in the second most important imperial office appears significant. Secondly, the succession after Galerius may have been unusual. Dio (LVIII, 19, 6) speaks of a Vitrarius Pollio dying in office at about this time and being replaced by a Vice-Prefect, not from among the equestrian officials, but an imperial freedman, Hiberus, the only one ever known to hold this office. Since a Vitrarius Pollio was Prefect eight years later, however, this may be a confusion in Dio, and Hiberus may have followed

<sup>60</sup> *Cons. ad Helviam*, 19, 2-7. Seneca's trip to Egypt has been deduced from indirect evidence (see Faider, *Etudes sur Sénèque*, p. 167, n. 3) and has been the subject of some interesting reconstructions and fantasies, e.g. H. de la Ville de Mirmont, "La date du voyage de Sénèque en Égypte," *Rev. Phil.*, XXXIII (1909), pp. 163-78 and Cantarelli, article cited in note 6 above.

<sup>61</sup> The scholarship relating to the identification of Galerius with Seneca's uncle has been notably sloppy. L. Cantarelli made the original suggestion in *Röm. Mitt.*, XIX (1904), pp. 15-22. On page 21 the date of the guiding inscription (*C. I. G.*, 4711 = Cagnat, *I. G. Rom.*, I, no. 1150) should read 23 A. D., as also in *Aegyptus*, VIII (1927), p. 91, n. 5, where the reference to Cagnat is also misprinted. In O. W. Reinmuth's note on Galerius in "The Prefect of Egypt" (*Klio*, Beiheft XXXIV [1935]), p. 5, n. 6, read 23 for 27. The most recent and complete treatment is in A. Stein, *Die Präfekten von Ägypten*, p. 25.

Galerius.<sup>62</sup> Lastly, Galerius did not live to return to Rome. It would appear that at Sejanus' death Tiberius did not trust the administration in Egypt. One is reminded of the sudden death of the knight Mela, who is thought to have taken poison when recalled by Tiberius on charges of maladministration of his procuratorship.<sup>63</sup> The date and circumstances both point to a connection between Galerius and Sejanus. The political influence possessed by Galerius' widow at Rome<sup>64</sup> would then probably have been among the members of the pro-Sejanian party. It is just possible that these facts would also explain what has been always something of a mystery—the lateness of Seneca and his brother Novatus in entering the political *cursus*.<sup>65</sup>

One of the elder Seneca's closest friends was Junius Gallio, an intimate of the family and later the adoptive father of Novatus.<sup>66</sup> Now Gallio made a tactless speech in the Senate about the Urban Cohorts shortly after the death of Sejanus and paid for his lack of tact first by exile and later by arrest at Rome for an unknown period<sup>67</sup> (but the parallel with Pomponius [above, p. 74] suggests until the beginning of Caligula's reign). It has never been explicitly emphasized that the reason for such severity was not Tiberius' unreasonableness, but rather, as Tacitus implies in Tiberius' words (*satelles Seiani*), Gallio's close association with Sejanus and his friends. This would make still another link between the Senecas and that group. Though the political sympathies of the elder Seneca are not easy to determine from his own works, a pro-Sejanian bias is suggested by his attack on the accuser of Mamercus Scaurus.<sup>68</sup>

We are now in a position to review what must have happened

<sup>62</sup> See Reinmuth, *loc. cit.*, p. 5 and Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-6. Though Reinmuth is extreme in denying without proof the evidence of Dio, the eventual replacement of Galerius by Flaccus looks like the replacement of a Sejanus man by a Macro man.

<sup>63</sup> Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, XIX, 110. This was possibly a relative of Seneca, whose brother Mela was also an equestrian procurator (Tacitus, *Ann.*, XVI, 17). The name is uncommon (*P. I. R.*, s. v.).

<sup>64</sup> *Cons. ad Helviam*, 19, 2.

<sup>65</sup> Seneca, *Controversiae*, 2, *Pracf.* 4; Waltz, *Vie de Sénèque*, pp. 54-5.

<sup>66</sup> Seneca, *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae*, *passim* (see Müller's index); *P. I. R.*, II, p. 237, no. 494.

<sup>67</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 3; Dio Cassius, LVIII, 18, 3-4.

<sup>68</sup> *Suasoriae*, 2, 22.

in the year 40 A. D. After the failure of the Gaetulicus—Lepidus conspiracy we may suppose that their circle (which seems in nucleus to have been *Seianiani*, but had grown to include others, such as Agrippina and Livilla) was the object of suspicion and persecution. Lucilius faced torture at this time, or immediately before the discovery of the plot (as Seneca's language suggests).<sup>69</sup> It is hard to believe, in view of the other connections now established, that he was not already one of Seneca's friends. It is interesting to note that Seneca preserves in his works the names of more victims of Caligula, probably from this period, than any other writer.<sup>70</sup> Of particular interest among these victims is Julius Graecinus, who must have died in late 39 A. D. or 40 A. D., as Balsdon has shown, not in 38 A. D., as Tacitus implies.<sup>71</sup> He is another contemporary whom Seneca quotes familiarly on two occasions, once, significantly enough, in conjunction with Mamerius Scaurus,<sup>72</sup> which would suggest that his connection too with this group dated from the earlier period.

Against this background of conspiracy and suspicion in which the circle of Gaetulicus—to use a convenient term—was now involved it will be illuminating to examine two important passages, one from Dio Cassius, the other from Seneca. Dio<sup>73</sup> tells us that Seneca too was the object of Caligula's disordered jealousy, was condemned to death by the emperor after a too brilliant speech, and was saved by a courtesan who persuaded

<sup>69</sup> *Nat. Quaest.*, IV a, *Praef.* 15. The phrases *non mihi in amicitia Gaetulici Gaius fidem eripuit, cervicem pro fide opposui*, and *pro amicis omnia timui* suggest that Gaetulicus was still alive at the time. It is to be noted, further, that in Dio's account Seneca's own narrow escape (see below) comes before the death of Lepidus and Gaetulicus. There may then have been inquiries leading up to the discovery of the plot, but the apparent suddenness of Caligula's move against the conspirators is not consonant with a lengthy prelude. The investigations would more naturally have come afterwards. Caution in attempts to fix exact chronology is here again to be recommended.

<sup>70</sup> See Balsdon, pp. 98-9.

<sup>71</sup> Balsdon, p. 38; Tacitus, *Agricola*, 4. Balsdon makes the unproved assertion that Graecinus was alive at the birth of his son Agricola (June, 40 A. D., according to Tacitus, *Agricola*, 44). He must, at any rate, have been alive at his conception.

<sup>72</sup> *Ep.*, 29, 6.

<sup>73</sup> LIX, 19, 7.

Caligula that his victim was in such bad health he would die soon anyway. Though Dio claims Seneca's complete innocence of any suspicion of crime, the details of this anecdote have rightly been the object of considerable doubt,<sup>74</sup> but no one has emphasized that in its details it might be no more than a conflation from two other passages: Caligula's unfavorable judgment of Seneca's style is known from Suetonius,<sup>75</sup> while in one of Seneca's letters there appears the example of those "many for whom illness has delayed death and who have found salvation in appearing to be in a hopeless condition."<sup>76</sup> Without trying to identify the originator of these details, we can safely say that the sources are apparent. All that is left then is the report that Seneca was in danger of losing his life under Caligula. But this is hardly a surprise, once we have recognized all the evidence for his long association with the suspect circle of the *Seianiani*.

An unrecognized allusion to this same period is to be found in Seneca's own *Consolatio ad Helviam*. In the second chapter he enumerates, apparently chronologically, all the blows of fortune which his mother has suffered from the time of her birth until his own exile in 41 A. D. After speaking of the death of the elder Seneca, which is generally placed in about 39 A. D.,<sup>77</sup> he says, "I pass over all those dangers, all those fears which you endured as one after another they assailed you," and he then proceeds to the most recent events. These words have never been thought worthy of comment, probably on the ground that they were "pure rhetoric," and yet they must surely refer to the period when the circle of which Seneca and his mother were a part was suffering from the well-founded suspicions of Caligula. It is not unnatural, furthermore, that his language here should be so vague, for he had good reason when he wrote this *Consolatio* not to emphasize his connection with the group which had included Livilla and Agrippina.

To return at last to the *Consolatio ad Marciam*: datable on

<sup>74</sup> Marchesi, *Seneca*, p. 11; Faider, *Etudes*, p. 166, n. 3; Balsdon, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-6.

<sup>75</sup> *Caligula*, 53, 2.

<sup>76</sup> *Ep.*, 78, 6.

<sup>77</sup> Rossbach, in *R.-E.*, I, col. 2238; Teuffel-Kroll-Skutsch, *Röm. Lit.*, II, § 269; Faider, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

internal grounds to 40 A. D.,<sup>78</sup> it was written, as Seneca says in his introduction,<sup>79</sup> to console Marcia for the death of a son which had occurred more than two years before. Although there is no explicit explanation for this long delay, the reason is implied in Seneca's short account of the various sources of consolation which had proved worthless: he might have thought that these other factors would have made his type of consolation unnecessary, but now sees that Marcia is still so sorely mourning that one is more than ever needed.<sup>80</sup> Though this explanation has seemed to scholars a bit weak, no better one has been suggested, and Albertini concluded somewhat lamely, "Il est plus simple d'admettre que les choses se sont passées comme Sénèque le dit lui-même."<sup>81</sup> If in the year 40 A. D., however, Seneca was in considerable danger because of his association with friends of Sejanus, what would be more natural for him than to try to demonstrate that he had friends in the other camp as well and incidentally to attack Sejanus and his hangers-on and praise their enemy, Cremutius Cordus? The use of literary forms for personal and political ends quite external to their avowed object was no novelty in literary history and was especially prevalent at Rome in this period: the lines on Marcellus in the *Aeneid*, certain poems of Horace, the *Remedium Amoris* and some *Epistulae ex Ponto* of Ovid, the *Consolatio ad Polybium* of Seneca himself, and Martial's epigrams on the games at the Flavian amphitheater are among the most obvious examples. This indeed was the purpose of the *Consolatio ad Marciam*, a purpose which explains its composition three years after the loss for which it consoles and, more importantly, its attitude towards Sejanus and his friends so much at odds with the other notices in Seneca's works.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>78</sup> The fact that it alone of all the admitted early works contains no attack on Caligula seems to me conclusive evidence for its composition before the death of that emperor. The arguments of Albertini (*La Composition dans Sénèque* [Paris, 1923], pp. 14-15) for the year 40 A. D. are convincing.

<sup>79</sup> I, 7.

<sup>80</sup> I, 8.

<sup>81</sup> R. Pichon, "Les travaux récents sur la chronologie des œuvres de Sénèque," *Journal des Savants*, 1912, p. 221; Albertini, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>82</sup> The unsuccessful efforts of W. L. Friedrich (*De Senecae libro qui inscribitur de constantia sapientis* [Darmstadt, 1909]); "Zu Seneca de

It seems unlikely that this literary ruse should have been entirely responsible for saving Seneca. It is possible, as the story in Dio hints, that he had a friend in court who was still considered trustworthy by Caligula and who interceded on his behalf. One known figure, Crispus Passienus, possessed all the necessary qualifications, and the hypothesis of his intervention—this is pure speculation—would explain why a man who was notable for his friendship with Caligula<sup>83</sup> should have been the subject of an extraordinary tribute by Seneca in that same Preface to the fourth book of the *Natural Questions* in which Lucilius' loyalty to Gaetulicus is extolled.<sup>84</sup> Crispus' father seems to have been a friend of Seneca the Elder;<sup>85</sup> this might have been the origin of friendship between the sons.

Whatever the reason for his survival, Seneca outlived Caligula, though the experiences of those years return again and again in his writings—the figure of a monstrous emperor and his victims. And from the associations which had harrassed him at this time he had not yet escaped. When, a few months after her recall from exile, Livilla fell under the suspicious envy of the new empress, Messalina, it was Seneca, long a well-known member, as we now can see, of her circle, who was accused of immoral connections with her and sent into exile.<sup>86</sup> Livilla

constantia sapientis," *Wochenschr. kl. Phil.*, XXVIII [1911], pp. 1098-1102; "Zu Senecas Nat. Quaest. IV Praef. 7 und 8," *B. phil. Wochenschr.*, XXXIV [1914], pp. 1213-16, and articles on *De Beneficiis*, *ibid.*, same year. See Albertini, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-13) are a warning against attempts to find contemporary allusions in Seneca's works. It is nonetheless interesting that in the *Consolatio ad Marciam*, 2 and 3, Seneca draws a vivid contrast between Augustus' wife, Livia, and sister, Octavia, most unfavorable to the latter. This lengthy glorification of Tiberius' mother (at the expense of Caligula's other great-grandmother, wife of Marc Antony) would reflect admirably the change in Caligula's attitude toward Tiberius and that side of his ancestral line. The hostile or contemptuous use of the adjective *Aegyptius* (14, 2; 20, 4) may be a flattering allusion to Caligula's difficulties with the Alexandrians in the last year of his reign.

<sup>83</sup> *Scholiast ad Iuvenalem*, 4, 81.

<sup>84</sup> *Nat. Quaest.*, IVa, *Praef.* 6.

<sup>85</sup> Seneca, *Controv.*, 3, *Praef.* 10.

<sup>86</sup> *Quasi conscientius adulteriorum Iuliae* is the ambiguous phrase of *Scholiast ad Iuvenalcum*, 5, 109. Faider (*op. cit.*, p. 189, n. 3) piously but wrongly thought that the word *quasi* attenuated the charge. This

herself died in exile shortly afterwards. Once again the loyalty of Lucilius to members of his old group was tested, as it was to be a year later in 42 A. D., when one of the two survivors of the five nobles accused together in 32 A. D., Appius Silanus, fell a victim, like Seneca and Livilla, of the new enemies, Messalina and Narcissus.<sup>87</sup> And still another test of his loyalty came when Vinicianus, in a final attempt to throw off these opponents, died in the unsuccessful conspiracy of 44 A. D.<sup>88</sup> Only thirteen years had passed since the death of Sejanus, and it should be hardly surprising to find those who had been closely associated then still in league now. Nor should it be any more surprising to find P. Suillius Rufus, who had been unjustly treated during the ascendancy of Sejanus (perhaps as a partisan of Germanicus—Agrippina),<sup>89</sup> now one of the chief instruments of Messalina and Narcissus<sup>90</sup> and later the bitterest critic of Seneca.<sup>91</sup> But Seneca's trials as a member of this circle were almost over and the rewards soon to begin. On her rise to power in 49 A. D. after the death of Messalina one of Agrippina's first acts was to recall the exile, arrange for his praetorship, and appoint him tutor to her son Nero. We can now at last see clearly why it was Seneca particularly on whom she felt she could count as a tried and trusted aide.<sup>92</sup>

use of *quasi* as a substitute for *ut* (or better, Greek *ως*) to indicate merely the grounds of a judgment without prejudice as to truth or falsity is comparatively rare (not found in Lewis and Short's Harper's Latin Dictionary, *s. v.*), but is documented in the Forcellini-De Vit Lexicon, *s. v.*, § 9. It is interesting to note that the usage is especially characteristic of Suetonius, from whom the scholium is probably derived. *Concius*, as Marchesi (*op. cit.*, p. 13, n. 2) says, may mean no more than "cognizant," but it may also be a synonym of *nocens*, *particeps*, or *socius*, as Spelthahn indicates (*Thes. Ling. Lat.*, IV, p. 373). The crucial word in the phrase, however, as my friend and teacher, A. D. Nock, pointed out to me, is the plural *adulteriorum*. If the charge described were adultery, the singular *adulterii* or a different phrase would have been used. *Adulteria* is used often in Cicero and elsewhere to mean "loose morals" or "immorality" (see *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, *s. v.*).

<sup>87</sup> Dio Cassius, LX, 14; Suetonius, *Claudius*, 37, 2.

<sup>88</sup> Dio Cassius, LX, 15.

<sup>89</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 31, and F. B. Marsh, *Reign of Tiberius* (Oxford, 1931), p. 172.

<sup>90</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, XI, 1-5; XIII, 43.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII, 42-3.

<sup>92</sup> In view of the intimate and long-standing connection which has

Although this examination has, I believe, cleared up a certain number of unknown or unevaluated quantities in the history of the second quarter of the first century, its main interest lies perhaps in the contribution it may make to an investigation of Seneca's literary evolution. It has not been possible to show any clear evolution of doctrine and theory in Seneca's prose works,<sup>93</sup> no development in the sense in which Aristotle developed. There are, on the other hand, some indications that the spirit of opportunism which is so often present and sometimes so offensive in his writings tends to disappear as a controlling factor in the later works, as he makes a more genuine evaluation of the importance of externals and gains a deeper feeling for his relation to his cosmos, both in place and in time. Recognized, now, as a work of pre-eminent opportunism, the *Consolatio ad Marciam* stands at the beginning of this development, a mark from which to measure its progress.<sup>94</sup>

ZEPH STEWART.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

been traced here, the charges of adultery against Seneca and Agrippina (Dio Cassius, LXI, 10, 1; 12, 1) are hardly surprising.

<sup>93</sup> Marchesi's attempt (*op. cit.*, pp. 204-9) to show an evolution in Seneca's concept of the divinity is fruitless. As Marchesi's own quotations show (and see further Haase's *Index* in his edition of Seneca, *s. v. deus*), God is described in the same terms in both early and later works.

<sup>94</sup> I am greatly indebted in this paper to the careful criticisms and suggestions of Professors A. D. Nock and Herbert Bloch.

## REVIEWS.

CARL W. BLEGEN, JOHN L. CASKEY, MARIAN RAWSON and JEROME SPERLING. *Troy*. Volume I: General Introduction: The First and Second Settlements. Part I, Text: pp. xxiv+396; Part II, Plates: pp. xxvii; 473 figs. (including 59 maps, plans and sections). Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, for the Univ. of Cincinnati, 1950. \$36.00.

The University of Cincinnati excavations in the Troad were organized in 1931 with the threefold objective of 1) making a systematic exploration of the entire Troad to discover and map all ancient sites, as a means of settling the controversy over the identification of Troy, 2) searching about Troy for pre-classical tombs and, as its chief work, 3) re-examining the whole problem of Trojan stratification in the light of present knowledge of Aegean prehistory. This plan was carried out in seven successive annual campaigns from 1932 to 1938. The policy of publishing at once a preliminary report of each campaign not only made the important discoveries of the expedition available to archaeologists but very quickly made it obvious that Troy was to play an even greater rôle than ever before in the study both of Aegean prehistory and of the comparative archaeology of the Aegean and the Near East. The final publication has thus been eagerly awaited by prehistorians and the first volume to appear, that on Troy I and II, has more than fulfilled their expectations. There are to be four more volumes in this series, presenting the material from settlements III-V, VI, and VII-IX respectively, with a final index volume. In a series of supplementary monographs there will be reports on work in the Troad and also technical studies on the various materials from Troy. The first supplement, on the human remains, also has just appeared and will be reviewed below.

Of the forty-six strata of habitational debris making up the mound at Hissarlik, ten belong to the first, or earliest, citadel and seven to the second phase. In the recent excavations each of these sub-phases was isolated in undisturbed deposits in several areas, for the earlier excavations had so cut up the site that only relatively small areas remained for investigation within the mound. It is the careful area-by-area, level-by-level description of the excavations and the resultant finds which makes up the largest and most important part of this volume. Here each of the several authors describes those sections with which he or she was most closely associated in the actual digging; this portion of the work is one of the finest pieces of archaeological reporting in the literature of Aegean prehistory. These detailed descriptions of each phase of the first two settlements are preceded by a general discussion of each settlement as a whole. This is by way of introduction, summary, and conclusion, and includes discussions of previous excavations of strata of the period, of the general areas examined by the Cincinnati expedition, of the phases of the settlement into which the strata subdivide, and of the

architecture, pottery, and other finds from each phase. For each period there is also a brief description of external relations and chronology; the parallels for specific objects, both at and outside of Troy, are given in the catalogue that accompanies the detailed description of each area and level.

From the first it is assumed without question by the recent excavators that the Hissarlik mound is the citadel of the Trojans in the *Iliad*; their reconnaissances in the Troad have made this clear beyond any doubt. That the nature of the site varied little through the millennia and that Troy was almost always essentially a citadel, except perhaps for the more city-like settlements of Troy IX and VIII, and possibly III as well, have also been made evident in the new excavations. Equally remarkable is the establishment of the fact that throughout the thirty phases of the five earliest settlements there is an unbroken development in the material culture of Troy in its broader aspects and that all of these thirty strata, every one with architectural remains, belong within the Early Bronze Age of the Aegean. This is evidence of the greatest importance for dating that phase of Aegean prehistory and in the light of this knowledge it will be difficult to assign to those five settlements of Troy, and to the corresponding Early Bronze Age elsewhere, much less than the 900 to 1000 years, roughly the third millennium B. C., which the excavators have allotted them.

It must then be at about 3000 B. C. that the first citadel of Troy was founded. From the evidence of phase Ia, it already seems certain that Troy was a royal fortified stronghold. To the lowest level belongs a very sizable long, narrow house with an apsidal room at one end. Directly above this house was built the great megaron of Ib, a house 18.75 m. long and 7.00 m. wide, already exhibiting the characteristics which mark the palatial structures of Troy II and which eventually develop into the Mycenaean palace and the Greek temple. Although there is no evidence to support their contention, the authors repeatedly assume that all these houses had flat roofs, arguing (pp. 91-2) that there is no evidence of gabled construction in the East Mediterranean at this early date. This statement ignores the evidence found by Tsountas at Sesklo, which clearly argues for a sharply sloping roof, either shed or gabled, and because of the strong slope most probably the latter. What is more important, this contention of the authors violates the very principle of the relationship between plan and roof which is basic for an understanding of primitive house types. The plans themselves offer the strongest evidence that these buildings had gabled roofs. It is the climate which largely determines the type of roof, flat or sloped, used in any region, and once this is established the effect on plan is profound. Flat roofs allow great freedom in planning and rooms may be grouped almost without restriction, as, for example, was done in Crete. Sloping roofs, on the other hand, and especially gabled roofs, create the severest restrictions in plan, particularly in a period before the use of baked roof tiles, which make valleys possible. Gabled roofs preclude any arrangement of rooms other than a series in a straight line; the end rooms may be straight-sided, forming a long rectangular plan, or apsidal. What is particularly characteristic is the need

of space for drainage on either side of such buildings. When all these requirements are fulfilled by the plan of a building, as in the average megaron, it must be assumed that the plan was so arranged in order to make possible the use of a gabled roof. The megara of Troy, in all periods, are obviously designed with just such requirements in mind; this is most clearly shown in the case of megara IIA and IIB (see the plan of fig. 417) where a space of *ca.* 0.50 m. is left between the parallel sides of the buildings. This is for the drainage off sloping roofs; flat roofs would have joined over the area and the two walls would have been superfluous. The same careful isolation of parallel units is noticeable in later Mycenaean megara. The apsidal end, too, is organically a reflection of ridged construction, for the roof over these apsidal terminal units is a half-cone suspended from the end of the ridge pole, which in turn is supported by the cross wall which almost always separated the apsidal room from the adjacent rectangular unit; a center post could replace the wall. It seems, then, that the plans of the Troy megara, apsidal or rectangular, clearly bespeak gabled roofs. In this connection, it is of interest that in considering Wall 120 (p. 135) the excavators shy away from the possible connection with House 115 because of the complex plan that would result, a plan without parallel in Troy at so early a date. Such a plan would ordinarily develop if flat roofs were used.

It is to the middle phase of Troy I that the great section of fortification wall found in the central part of the mound is to be assigned. The strongly battered, massive wall was traced for more than a hundred meters, which was probably not quite half its original circuit. At the east tower of the south gate in this circuit was made one of the rarest and most interesting discoveries of the excavations. Here was found a barricade of three re-used slabs, the central one of which was the large sculptured stele decorated with a heart-shaped human face in low relief, the earliest example of stone sculpture from the Aegean area. The other two slabs were a kind of offering table; all three were probably from a very early fixed shrine. There is little other indication of the religious activities of the inhabitants of Troy I, except perhaps from the crude figurines found throughout the ten levels; burials found were only those of infants buried in and about the houses. It is the pottery which exhibits most conclusively the cultural continuity throughout Troy I and well beyond it; this is borne out too by the numerous finds of stone, bone, and even of metal in small quantities from the very beginning. Most important for comparative studies is the fact that imported Aegean pottery began to appear in Middle Troy I and continued to be brought into Troy and imitated there throughout the rest of Troy I and the subsequent settlements to early Troy V. The earliest imported ware is of Early Helladic II type, while the latest Early Helladic ware, found in Troy V, is of the type common at the very end of the Early Helladic period, so that the middle and final phases of the Early Helladic period are closely contemporary with some nineteen levels at Troy, represented by a total of eight meters of accumulation. But the trade was not in one direction only, for pottery from Troy found its way into many parts of the Aegean and

in the catalogues are cited numerous parallels for fabric, shapes, and decoration. It is in the treatment of this comparative material that one senses a distinct Aegean bias, understandable since the staff consisted of members highly trained in the Aegean field. They look primarily to the west for their comparisons, where, indeed, many are to be found, although not all are cited, for the study of the comparative material seems to have been done with less thoroughness than that which characterized the excavation itself and the rest of the publication. It seems likely that if the staff had included scholars as thoroughly steeped in Anatolian and Near Eastern prehistory as were its actual members in Aegean prehistory, a more correct perspective with respect to the position of Troy in this eastern orbit would have been obtained. It would be of tremendous importance for comparative prehistory if the excavators, who alone can know their material completely, would undertake supplementary studies in this direction; it is perhaps just as well that such further study should not delay the main publication. In one other field of comparative study the excavators would also seem to have an obligation, and that is in working over the vast mass of material from the earlier German excavations at Troy, evaluating it in the light of the new discoveries and pointing out the exact parallels between the old and the new. They alone are competent to do this and the material is now so much more significant because of the new excavations that a supplementary study would be of the greatest value. What little is done in the present volume only emphasizes the possibilities of the larger study. These suggestions are not intended as criticism of the present work; it is of first importance that the publication of the excavation itself continue with the exemplary speed with which the first volume appeared.

The investigation of the stratigraphy of Troy II proved even more difficult and involved than for the first settlement, largely because of far greater disturbance by the earlier excavators. But after the excavations the three phases of Dörpfeld increased to no less than eight, the first three of which correspond to Dörpfeld's. Through the period there is a steady and normal development from Troy I; the great fire that ended the earliest settlement was followed immediately by levelling operations preparatory to building the great fortifications of IIa. It was in phase IIc that the citadel was expanded and remodelled on a grand scale, focusing on the great megaron IIA with its colonnaded court and large propylon; the colonnade is an important discovery of the recent excavations, which also discovered an anta of megaron IIF and showed that IIR belongs to this same phase. The subsequent three phases are in a sense a degeneration of the magnificence of IIc and the final phase, IIg, consists of the debris of a great conflagration which swept the citadel; this is the burnt layer of Schliemann and, as in his excavations, it proved one of the most productive levels in the mound in architecture, pottery, and small finds of all kinds, including numerous objects of gold which are a faint reflection of the great treasures found by Schliemann, apparently largely in this same level. In their haste to flee the tremendous fire, the inhabitants of Troy left behind their possessions, with the result that archaeologists now

profit by one of the most complete pictures we have of so early a civilization.

While the material remains are essentially a development of Troy I types, there are innovations, such as the use of the potter's wheel, which is first in evidence in Troy IIb. From the same phase, or possibly the subsequent one, there comes a contracted burial of an adult female; except for the contracted burial of a child of about eleven years in phase Ic, the burials of Troy I were all those of infants. In IIIf there was another contracted burial of a child and in the last phase, IIg, still another, so that the custom of contracted burial seems already to have been well established in early Troy I and to have continued. The Aegean imports occur steadily and offer numerous points of comparison; Trojan types, too, continue to flow into the Aegean—not only pottery but metal work, bone objects, and a wide variety of small finds. It is most important for comparative studies to establish more closely the date of first appearance and the subsequent range of the *depas amphikypellon*, which is now shown to start in IIc and to continue well into Troy IV and perhaps even into V. Certainly there was a typological development, which will emerge with the publication of subsequent volumes and which should be important for dating the specimens found from Judeidah to Orchomenus.

In the presence of such riches as are offered by this volume, it is unreasonable to ask for more, especially if that would increase the already exorbitant cost of the set and the series, but one might perhaps ask for less and beg for a lower price. The double binding is a luxury, even though a separate volume of plates is easier to use; but the duplicate list of illustrations could have been eliminated for the sake of economy, as could also the three plates with figures 13 to 23. To reduce the cost drastically, however, and thus to make such volumes available to the scholars who should have them, greater subsidy is necessary. Archaeological expeditions such as this expend hundreds of thousands of dollars for labor, staff, and equipment, from which they derive only the information for publication. Since the publication is the total result of the excavation, it seems not unreasonable to ask that it, too, be subsidized by the expedition, so that the results get the circulation they deserve. It must, of course, be subsidized to a large extent; it is the additional sum that makes the difference between reasonable and exorbitant prices which must be budgeted in the expedition's expenses if the flow of information from such enterprises is not to become so restricted as to defeat the very purpose for which the much larger sums were spent.

The make-up of these first Troy volumes is excellent; the illustration is full, the figures are all of good size, but the use of the colotype process has had the usual result of making dark shadows impenetrably black. It would have added much to the usefulness of the work if the general plan of fig. 417, which must constantly be referred to for proper understanding of the text, had been placed at the end and so extended as to be open to view while the rest of the volume is in use. The many full and detailed drawings, plans, sections, and restored plans are the greatest help to the reader in making possible full comprehension of this highly complicated ex-

cavation; they epitomize the skill, the care, and the thoughtfulness of the director and his staff which are apparent throughout the publication. Archaeologists can but express their thanks for volume I and their eagerness to see the remaining volumes.

---

J. LAWRENCE ANGEL. *Troy. The Human Remains. Supplementary Monograph I.* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, for the Univ. of Cincinnati, 1951. Pp. 40; 14 pls.; 5 tables. \$7.50.

The first monograph to be published supplementary to the main five volumes on the Troy excavations has appeared shortly after the first volume of that series. In it are published in detail the skeletal materials found not only at the site of Troy itself but at other Troadic sites and some more distant in western Asia Minor and the Aegean. Although only one cemetery was found near Troy, several burials were discovered within the walls of the citadel. The total material thus assembled consists of only seventeen measurable skulls and skeletons of prehistoric date and eleven from historic times; a far greater number were too broken to be measured, but the many fragments have been described in the catalogue. Much of the very fragmentary material results from the introduction of the practice of cremation in Troy VI; but, although the bones were too destroyed to give any indication of racial characteristics, they could still be used for a study of age distribution. Such a study shows the very high infant mortality rate from Troy I to VI and suggests that the Trojan life expectancy at birth was not more than twenty years.

While the scant material was not sufficient for statistical analysis, the detailed study in the catalogue and the brief discussion and synthesis that follow it brought out indications of tendencies which, with extreme caution and reserve, could be made the basis of certain generalizations, presented in brief conclusions. These are, first, that from the very beginning there was much race mixture at Troy; secondly, that despite this there is a demonstrable racial continuity, especially noticeable in the persistence of the Mediterranean type. The earliest Trojan skulls are linked basically with the East; their connections become progressively less important as one goes clockwise to the southeast and south, the Aegean and the Balkans, and then to the north. The earliest people seem to be a combination of Mediterranean and Alpine types, possibly indicating the mixture of the newly arrived neolithic peoples with the Mesolithic Alpine substratum. For the prehistorian this should be a stimulating suggestion to look eastward for the predecessors of the earliest material culture of the Troad, a suggestion proposed already in the above review of *Troy I*.

This reviewer is not competent to judge the material presented here from the anthropological side, nor is this the audience for which it should be done. We can but admire the skill with which the work is accomplished and applaud the great caution of the author in proceeding from details to generalizations. With him, we

must wish for the accumulation of ever increasing evidence of this kind which, when preserved in sufficient abundance and studied with the same competence as are these Troadic remains, will form a most valuable supplement to the information obtained from material remains and, more than that, will serve as a guide to the excavator for the direction of his searches and researches.

SAUL S. WEINBERG.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

---

MARTIN P. NILSSON. *Geschichte der griechischen Religion.* Zweiter Band: Die hellenistische und römische Zeit. München, C. H. Beck, 1950. Pp. xxiii+714; 16 pls. (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, V, 2, 2.)

With the publication of this volume Professor Nilsson brings to completion an undertaking of such magnitude and such perplexing difficulty as would have deterred many able and industrious scholars. In fact it is doubtful whether any other student of ancient religion possesses the combination of profound learning, discriminating selection, effective arrangement and exposition, and the ability to work steadily and speedily, which was needed to carry the plan to a successful conclusion in a comparatively short time; for short it is if one bears in mind the difficulty and the immense quantity of the materials used. In a certain sense, the two stately volumes of this history represent the crown and consummation of the career which the author marked out for himself more than fifty years ago. Not, however, its conclusion, for the indefatigable researcher has already, since the publication of this monumental work, brought out a substantial monograph in the series of the Swedish Institute at Athens (*Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece*, 1951) and a welcome new edition of his *Opuscula* on Greek religion (same series, 1952), not to mention minor articles and notes.

Despite the fact that Nilsson's original and favorite province is the religion of Hellas, many readers will consider this volume the more remarkable of the two; for notwithstanding the complex origin of Hellenic religion and the foreign influences that affected it in the age before Alexander, its history is simple as compared with that of the religion or religions of Hellenistic and Roman times. It is not merely a question of an advancing evolution which shows us new aspects of the old religion, nor only the numerous Oriental influences that complicate its growth. The historian cannot evade the further task of assessing the impact of philosophy upon Greek religion, not to mention such forces as the gradual investing of rulers with the aura of divinity, the pressure of new social movements, and the growing need of a religion for the individual soul, which found its satisfaction in the mystery religions or in philosophical mysticism.

Such a work as Nilsson's bids defiance to the reviewer. A scholar competent to treat the work with the authority of knowledge applicable to the whole field would need far more space than a journal

could allow, and he might prefer to put forward his agreements and his differences of opinion in a book of his own. A less pretentious reviewer can point to places where recent research has gone beyond the stage known to the author; yet such additions would in any event be little more than bibliographical supplements. One can also, of course, enumerate imperfections in execution such as are unavoidable in a large book printed and proof-read under difficult conditions. But it would be absurd to dignify such minor criticisms with the name of a review.

The present writer's sympathy with Nilsson's robust sanity and his tenacious adherence to sound historical method is so strong that in all this long work he found no occasion to form a strongly dissenting opinion; and he is convinced that it is to Nilsson and like-minded investigators that the young student of ancient religion should look for guidance rather than to certain writers on myth and cult who evolve from their imagination, aided by psychological theories of doubtful applicability, interpretations which would be surprising to the ancients. What remains then is simply to give some account of the book, and offer a few minor corrections.

For convenience the author accepts the usual division of his period into Hellenistic (from the death of Alexander to the subjection of Corinth by the Romans) and Roman for the centuries that follow down into Byzantine times. He candidly acknowledges the inconvenience of this division when certain religious movements progress through the whole age with no perceptible breaks corresponding to the conventional divisions, thus forcing some undesirable repetitions. He also accepts the necessity, forced upon him by the plan of the *Handbuch*, of confining himself to Greek religion, leaving Roman religion to be treated in another work; but he rightly insists upon freedom to cross the boundary when servile respect for it becomes an absurdity, as in the cases cited on p. 4. In passing, attention may be called to Nilsson's plan to write a smaller separate study dealing with the religions of the western and northern peoples that impinged upon the remoter provinces of the empire (p. 4).

The first major division of the book, "Die hellenistische Zeit," is divided into four chapters, "The Hellenistic World," "The Religion of the old Greek States," "Religion in the Service of the Kings," and "Personal Religion and the Religious Outlook." The first of these, a necessary prelude, first discusses the significance of Alexander in the history of religion (in view of recent controversies one notes with interest Nilsson's friendliness towards Tarn's view of Alexander as a champion of world brotherhood); it then continues with the effects of political fragmentation in contrast with growing uniformity of culture throughout the Greek world. Attention should be called to the excellent summary (pp. 28-9) of the religious attitude at the opening of the Hellenistic period. The author then treats the individual regions of the Hellenistic world and the influence of local conditions upon the habits and the thoughts of Greek settlers in foreign parts. An analysis of the contemporary situation in the mother land of Greece concludes this survey of political and social conditions.

Next follows an important section (pp. 48-125) on the religion of the old Greek cities, introduced by some pages dealing with ancient

studies of cult and myth, especially the work of the Attid writers and the followers of Aristotle. The influence of schools, gymnasia, and ephebic organizations is next discussed, then *leges sacrae*, new cults and festivals, the right of asylum, mysteries, shrines of healing, clubs and other organizations, and foreign cults. The author is naturally concerned to exhibit, in contrast with his previous volume, developments, accretions, and innovations; but he is also at pains to show that in the Hellenistic period (as opposed to the Roman) the religion of the polis had not yet lost its force, and that foreign cults had to adapt themselves to the civic pattern and work their gradual transformation of the old religion from within (p. 124). Among the more important points developed in this section special attention should be called to the sound observation (not inapplicable to modern conditions) that the efficient business methods used in the administration of state cults gradually secularized and sterilized them (pp. 64, 99). Note also the emphatic statement that the Eleusinian mysteries actually grew in influence during the Hellenistic period, a fact which indicates that they had more effect upon the development of later mysteries than is generally recognized.

The section (pp. 125-75) dealing with the origins and development of the ruler cult must be passed over with no comment except that Nilsson shows a perfect command of the theme and his habitual good sense in judging the problems that beset it.

Most readers—certainly those who seek in this book a clearer light upon Greek and Roman authors and their world—will find in Chapter IV, "Personal Religion" (and the corresponding portion of the Roman section) the most valuable part of the book. Here, among other topics, Nilsson discusses the disintegrating effect of both educated and vulgar skepticism upon the former unquestioning faith of the individual as expressed in domestic and civic worship; the stronger emphasis upon  $\tauύχη$  as a force in human affairs; the uses and meanings of  $\deltaαιμονία$ ; and the foreshadowing of a monotheistic conception of the world as manifested in such expressions as  $\tauὸ\ θεῖον$ ,  $\thetaέος$ , as well as by other signs. Then follow important sections on superstitions; the belief in miracles; notions about a life beyond death; mysticism and syncretism; the religion of the philosophers; astrology, etc.

The second part of the work repeats the arrangement of the first, with some modifications, and as previously remarked, this repetition entails some re-handling of the same material and a number of cross-references. This part is longer not only because it covers a longer period, but also because of the steady increase and intensification of factors that operated to a less extent in the Hellenistic age. The sporadic deification of Hellenistic rulers had now crystallized into the cult of the Roman emperor. Foreign influences were multiplying and growing in power. Magic and astrology were broadening and tightening their hold upon the weaker minds. The philosophers were becoming leaders of religious sects, and wonder-workers, at least in the eyes of the vulgar; and it is for good reason that Nilsson devotes much space to such disparate figures as Apollonius of Tyana, Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus.

Perhaps the most important and certainly the most difficult part of this latter half of the volume is the long chapter on Syncretism

(pp. 555-672), from which no reader can fail to gain valuable instruction. It includes a careful discussion of the Hermetic writings, a masterly though cautious treatment of Gnosticism, and, further, important paragraphs on the alien gods, and their mysteries. Here the wise caution shown in pp. 657 ff. is especially praiseworthy.

Even the impatient student who begrudges the time needed for careful digestion of the work may be urged to read and meditate upon the instructive conclusions summed up in pp. 673-701, where the author deals with the effects on religion of the new conception of the cosmos and with the psychological basis of the later religion, ending with a useful retrospect. There are good indexes and sixteen plates, fewer than those allotted to Volume I; but, as the author says in his preface, the need for illustrations has been largely met by another work.

It would be ungrateful not to notice several valuable suggestions which Nilsson has dropped for the benefit of the young researcher on the lookout for a productive topic; e.g., pp. 62, n. 3; 86, n. 4; 183, n. 2, end (on following page).

Easily corrected typographical errors occur here and there, as at pp. 43, line 10; 65, n. 1; 95, n. 7; 103, n. 3; 191, n. 5, last line but one (omission of final alpha). Carelessness in making up the pages has caused the loss of letters or syllables at p. 243, middle, and on p. 365, note 2 and part of note 3 have been pied. The German printer's incorrigible habit of treating the capitals I and J as interchangeable has given Sir Harold Bell a wrong middle initial (p. 151, n. 2). The responsibility for a few other minor errors is uncertain. The name Gonatas is consistently printed with double *n*, on what authority I do not know (e.g. p. 41; p. 59, n. 4; p. 127, last line of text). P. 22, n. 1, the name is Tscherikower. P. 80, n. 6, the preposition *es* has dropped out of the inscription cited. P. 180, line 4, a slip of memory probably accounts for *Apollodoros* instead of *Artemidoros* (see the preceding page). P. 220, n. 3: "Book III of the Palatine Anthology" is really Book III in the Anthology of Cephalas, VII in the Palatine collection; in modern references, the latter is preferred. P. 236, line 12, dative instead of genitive forms are wrongly written in the first words of the quotation.

At p. 56 Nilsson inadvertently gives the impression that Callimachus' *Coma Berenices* is known only from Catullus 66, whereas twenty lines of the original have been known since the publication of *P. S. I.*, 1092 in 1929. At the top of p. 57, a reference to Dio Prus. 12 would not be superfluous. At p. 219, n. 2 one misses references to Diels' publication of a treatise *περὶ παλμῶν* in *Abh. Berl. Akad.*, 1907-1908, also to *P. Rylands*, I, no. 28, and Vitelli in *Atena e Roma*, VII, pp. 32 ff. Among the important works which appeared just too late for use mention may be made (p. 99, n. 1; p. 448, n. 4) of P. Amandry, *La mantique apollinienne*, 1950, and R. Flacelière's dissenting opinion in *Rev. des études anciennes*, LII, pp. 306-24; and (p. 663, n. 4) of H. C. Youtie's article "The *Kline* of Sarapis," *H. T. R.*, XLI (1948), pp. 9-29.

CAMPBELL BONNER.

ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN.

HERMANN BENGTON. Griechische Geschichte. Munich, C. H. Beck, 1950. Pp. XVI + 591; 12 maps. DM. 40 (bound DM. 46). (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, 3 Abt., 4 Teil.)

This is a book which is what it professes to be, a manual. Crammed with facts, references, and up-to-the-minute bibliography, yet clearly written and easy to consult, it offers a lucid and highly informative survey of Greek political history. A sketchy chapter on the "Hellenism in the Roman Empire" until Justinian (pp. 490-530), though hardly necessary, is, anyway, welcome. Maps, dynastic lists, and a chronological table (which ends with the Arab invasion of Egypt) add to the usefulness of the volume. The writer of a handbook must often rely on the work of other scholars. Since the author manifestly distrusts humbug and dislikes slovenliness, he is rarely taken in by fake scholarship (e. g. p. 322, n. 5). With regard to his accuracy, it is typical that, when speaking of the "Peloponnesian," the "Archidamian" war or of that of Laodice, he notes the first appearance of these designations in our sources (pp. 201, n. 1; 209, n. 2; 383, n. 4). Personally, I was, of course, pleased to see that the author refers to virtually all of my contributions to the subject (but vol. IV, 2 of Glotz' *Histoire Grecque*, of which I am co-author, mentioned on p. 533, has not yet appeared. In fact, by my fault). But in recommending the chapter on coinage in my *Institutions des Séleucides* (p. 401), he should have added that it is now antiquated in great part by the admirable monographs of the late E. T. Newell on "Eastern" and "Western" Seleucid mints. In so large a topic there is room for difference of opinion, but a review is not a proper place to enter into all the complicated questions of Greek history. Errors of fact are few, and will be easily corrected by the author himself. A strange misstatement of some importance may, however, be noted here: it is news to me that in Hellenistic monarchies the cult of the sovereign was "obligatory" for all his subjects (p. 409).

Yet, as soon as the author passes from collecting facts to judging them, he is disappointing. The Greek colonization of the eighth to the sixth centuries B. C. is for him "the expression of an elementary new sense of life, for which the limits of the home-country became too narrow" (p. 82). Does this empty sentence help us to understand this particular phenomenon of colonization, in its extent in time and space? Now and then, the author accepts the economic interpretation of history. Thus, p. 207, the trade rivalry between Athens and Corinth in the West is named as the immediate cause of the Peloponnesian war (this comes from G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides*, I, p. 324). I wonder whether the author means the competition for markets or for the supply of commodities? In either case, what does this mean in the context of Greek technique and psychology about 430 B. C.? As long as these preliminary questions are not even posed, the high-sounding "explanation" is a mere phrase. Some pages later (p. 213), the author offers the pure milk of Marxism. After the death of Pericles, the leaders of the war party in Athens came from "the stratum of big manufacturers, who made enormous profits on the war." Now even Aristophanes

does not say that Cleon and such were war contractors. In fact, in Athens, about 425 B. C., a politician lived in a glass house, watched by everybody with envy. If, to prolong the war, the armorer selling shields and spears (Ar., *Pax*, 447) or the crest-maker (Ar., *Pax*, 1210) supported a politician, he would not be one from their ranks. Why not Alcibiades, this ambitious war-monger, whose financial straits have been revealed by his recent (and best) biographer (J. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade* [1940], p. 135)?

With the same eclectic unconcern, the author accepts and repeats racial interpretations of history. We read, p. 31, that for the Greeks of the Mycenaean period, the Hittite Empire was "the model of a great State, dominated by the Indo-Germans." Did the Mycenaeans know the modern hypothesis that they were Indo-europeans? Zenon's Stoicism is "explained" by his (alleged) Phoenician nationality (p. 442; this puerility comes from M. Pohlensz, *Die Stoa* [1947]). Being Phoenician, the philosopher denied the supremacy of the *polis*, preached a universal citizenship embracing Hellene and barbarian alike, and centered ethics in the individual. Thus, Phoenicians become individualists. Yet, Tyre and Sidon were city-states exactly as Athens. On the other hand, it was Diogenes of Sinope who first called himself "cosmopolite," and it was Protagoras of Abdera who first declared that man is the measure of all things. But perhaps Diogenes was a Paphlagonian and Protagoras a Thracian? In fact, the leading Stoics came from Greek cities and colonies in Asia.

Now, a fusion between Greeks and natives, to be sure, was unavoidable. A Ptolemaic order from about 257 B. C. speaks of the native concubines of Greek soldiers and foreign residents in Syria (cf. M. Rostovtzeff, *Soc. and Econ. Hist. of the Hellenist. World*, I, p. 343). But it is rather astonishing to see how long and how successfully the Greeks preserved their ethnic purity in Egypt, that is even outside a Greek *polis*. The wife of a Temnian is from the same city in 284 B. C. (*P. Eleph.*, 2). A Cyrenean woman is wife of another Greek in 238 (*P. Petrie*, III, 7). Dryton, a Cretan, is married to a woman from Alexandria in 126 B. C. (*P. Grenf.*, I, 21). Even when a Greek girl is seduced by a *cinaedus*, his name is Dionysius (*P. Enteux.*, 26; 220 B. C.). The army of Alexander and his successors, from which the earliest Greek settlers in the East came, was a "mobile State," as Rostovtzeff (*op. cit.*, I, pp. 142 ff.) has shown. The families of soldiers were part and parcel of this "moving *polis*." Compare the fact that, in the first generation (1509-1538) after the discovery of America, more than 90% of the Spanish emigrants to the New World were male (*P. Chaunu, Rev. Hist.*, CCIV [1950], p. 96).

Exactitude as to the bare facts, uncritical acceptance of some current interpretation equally mark the chapter on prehistoric Greece. To refute the scholars who deny the reality of the Dorian invasion, the author writes (p. 47) that, of course, not what Thucydides or Pindar says about it, but only archeological and linguistic indices count. This is reversing the real relation of the facts. The geography of dialects can be of no help in the absence of pre-written evidence. Who can say, for instance, when the people of Crete began

to speak Doric (cf. now, P. Demargne, *La Crète dédalique* [1947])? And the ruins, even if datable, rarely reveal the cause of destruction (to refer it to an earthquake is the latest archeological fad). But since Thucydides (I, 12) says that the Dorians occupied the Peloponnesus eighty years after the Trojan war, that is about 1100 B. C., we can, if we believe this Greek hypothesis (or, if you prefer, call it "tradition"), accordingly explain archeological and linguistic data. On the other hand, "the Great Aegean invasion" from the Hungarian plains, ca. 1200 B. C. (p. 46) is a modern construction (on facts now cf. W. F. Albright, *A. J. A.*, LIV [1950], p. 170) which may or may not help to understand the Dorian wave. I remember, however, that in 1204 A. D. the Latins conquered Constantinople while about the same time, in 1223 A. D., the Tartars invaded Southern Russia. Yet, the two migrations have nothing in common.

The Greeks did not know anything about the immigration of their ancestors from the north, while, for instance, the hymns of Rig-Veda describe the life of Aryan tribes in the north-west of India. Instead of treating the Indo-european migration to Greece as a fact (pp. 25 ff.), the author of a Handbook should have warned his readers that we do not know who were the builders of royal tombs at Mycenae and of palaces at Cnossus. Of course, the author discovers an "Indo-germanic," that is military (*wehrhaft*), spirit in the Mycenaean civilisation. Three thousand years from now, another German professor will be sure that Dior's "New Look" was influenced by the German occupation of Paris. Is not there something Teutonic in the low neck-line? Of course, I am not suggesting that the kings of Mycenae or of Cnossus were not of Indo-european stock. I simply cannot know anything about them in the present state of our information. On the other hand, the problem itself is illusory. When will the "bourgeois" historians learn from the Soviet scholarship of today (tomorrow the poor souls may be ordered to preach the opposite doctrine), that ethnic groups are results and not starting points of historical process? The history of this nation and the Bible itself here agree with Communist professors. It has been rightly pointed out that a "people of Israel" did not exist before the settlement in Palestine (M. Noth, *Gesch. Israels* [1950], p. 5).

To understand the author's pathetic failure in interpreting history, it is sufficient to read his introductory chapter. For him, Winckelmann and German classicism (why precisely German? See A. Momigliano, "Ancient History and the Antiquarian," *Journ. of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, XIII, pp. 285-315) began the modern study of Greek history. The author does not even suspect that modern historiography, be it of Greece or of Germany, is one of the sequels and "by-products" of the French Revolution. Accordingly, except for Mitford, Thirlwall, and Grote (here the author follows R. v. Pöhlmann, his predecessor in the same *Handbuch*), he never notices the ideological background of historiography, not even with regard to J. Burckhardt (p. 11) whose *storiografia senza problema storico* (B. Croce, *La storia come pensiero*, p. 92) is so biased politically. This does not mean, of course, that we should

explain *La Cité antique* simply as a product of "reaction," as a Soviet author has recently done (M. Alpatoff, in *Vopros. Istor.*, no. 12 [1948], p. 117). But in the conclusion of his admirable book, Fustel de Coulanges himself indicated the political lesson of his historical construction. German historians of Greece were more discreet, although K. J. Beloch, for instance, expressly stated the contemporary implications of the so-called problem of Macedonian nationality (*Griech. Gesch.*, IV, 1, p. 1). The author docilely discusses the anachronistic, "modernizing," question, whether the Macedonians were Greeks or semi-Illyrians (p. 285), but he gives no inkling of the biases of Beloch, Ed. Meyer, U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Thus, these representatives of the parochial German nationalism appear in his book (pp. 8-9) as mouth-pieces of Clio herself.

The author was within his rights in limiting his book to the political history, despite the popular slogan that this form of historiography is outmoded. But political history does not mean the surface movements only, battles, diplomatic notes and such. Greek men lived and died for *eleutheria*, the real foundation of Hellenism (cf. A.-J. Festugière, *Liberté et civilisation chez les Grecs* [1947]). But what did *eleutheria* mean to them in this or that period? Did they recognize the liberty of the individual or did they sacrifice him to the tyranny of the omnipotent State? The problem was quite real when Benjamin Constant in 1819 propounded the latter thesis (*De la liberté des Anciens*). He influenced Hegel, Fustel de Coulanges, and J. Burckhardt. Was he right? In the handbook under review, quite significantly, the terms *eleutheria*, *Freiheit* refer only to the international sovereignty of the State. The author speaks of the Athenian appeal to Sparta before Marathon. But he does not mention that this dispatch of extreme urgency was transmitted by a runner and not a horseman,—a fact which is more illuminating for Greek history than the discussion of the reasons for the delay of Lacedaemonian help (p. 149). The author duly records Nicias' letter from Sicily (p. 224), but he fails to notice that, as late as 414 B. C., the generals in the field regularly sent oral messages to the Athenian government. The author innocently tells us that, like the work on the Erechtheum, Aristophanes' plays testify to "the flourishing spiritual life" in Athens during the Peloponnesian war (p. 202). Aristophanes' plays were produced at the cost of the state. But Aristophanes had complete freedom to favor the enemy and to preach peace during a war which was determining the existence of everyone in his audience. We must think of Jeremiah to find a parallel. Yet, Jeremiah spoke in God's name while Aristophanes was a jester. All this and more enter into political history if the latter is to be more than drum and trumpet propaganda.

A manual which nowhere teaches methodical doubt. A history, which, but for dates and names, never reveals the individuality of its theme. Yet, a highly informative account: facts, facts, facts. And I doubt whether anyone in Germany, or many elsewhere, could have done the work better, or even as well as the author: the accuracy of his erudition is really praiseworthy. Think of it, gentle reader: *mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*.

KURT VON FRITZ and ERNST KAPP. Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. Translated with an Introduction and Notes. New York, Hafner Publishing Company, 1950. Pp. xii+233. \$1.25 (paper); \$2.50 (cloth). (*The Hafner Library of Classics*, XII.)

Under the editorship of O. Piest and a distinguished committee (C. J. DuCasse, C. H. Faust, R. M. MacIver, R. Pound, and H. W. Schneider), the Hafner Library of Classics has published 13 works in philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy, all in English, of which one is a Latin classic, St. Augustine's *City of God*, and one a Greek classic—by chance, surely, not because it is in any useful sense a Greek counterpart to the *Civitas Dei*—Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*.

Just 60 years have elapsed since the British Museum announced in the *Times* its acquisition of the most famous of all papyri. Counting the present edition, which at this writing is the penultimate, but not counting mere reprints, there have been in all 33 editions of translations, as well as 33 editions in the Greek.<sup>1</sup> Allowing for a few editions which combine Greek and translation, the total gives a rate of almost precisely one edition a year since 1891. This figure ought to impress the latter-day "general" and "integrated liberal" educators and the stratospheric "social scientists," because Aristotle's monograph is austerely down-to-earth and factual; it does not contain one explicit sweeping generality.

What gives the present edition its distinctive character, setting it apart from all its predecessors (and making it a proper member of the Hafner series), is precisely the fact that its commentary shows the influence of the present-day tendency to generalize. The editors attempt to put the work into its philosophical setting, and even to provide some psychological background. They attempt this not only in a lengthy section of the Introduction, and in the content of many of the Notes, but also by including Related Texts: of course the Epitome of Herakleides [Lembos] and the fragments from the lost beginning, but also the surviving phrases from Aristotle's *Protreptikos*, from his *Politikos*, from his treatise *On Kingship*, and his *Alexandros*, and even the earlier parts of Plato's *Seventh Epistle*. The editorial treatment is similarly affected by time and place: it too has a refreshing, free, and philosophical tone. Since the second edition by J. E. Sandys (London, 1912) is now out of print, the present edition is the only edition with extensive commentary available in any language.

As to humbler aspects, one notes first the low price of all this series. The paper covers will do, and the format is not "cheap." The letter press is presentable and is almost entirely free of printer's errors: p. 3, line 24, for F. C. Kenyon read F. G. Kenyon; p. 42, line 4, for veer read ever; p. 56, bottom, for A. H. Trevis read A. H. Travis; even with Latinized spelling prevailingly, p. 13, note 11

<sup>1</sup> It may be noted that chs. 42-69 are used as reading in anthropology: *A Reader for General Anthropology*, edited by Carleton S. Coon (Holt, New York, 1948); Rackham's [Loeb Library] translation with brief introduction and comment.

should have Lesbos for Lesbus; on p. iii the present volume is labelled Number Thirteen in the Hafner Library, whereas it is listed as 12 in the advertisements at the back; and the date of Oppermann's (the standard) text should be given on p. xii as 1928, not 1929.

The editing of a text which involves much of Athenian history down through the fifth century, and almost the entire Athenian constitution as it was in the early 320's, is a formidable job. Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, both Professors of Greek and Latin at Columbia University, have attacked it courageously; quite apart from their many other studies (von Fritz's especially), they have certainly earned the title of polymath; and there will be few scholars who cannot learn something from the pages of this book. For my part, I am aware particularly of the force of their numerous adverse critical observations about the monograph's style and ambiguities. These criticisms are summed up on p. vii: "In its present form, it cannot have been intended for publication but was designed primarily to serve the needs of Aristotle himself and of his disciples." At the least, they have re-opened this interesting question.

The bibliography (p. xii) refers to Sandys<sup>2</sup> (1912) for earlier works; it might add that there is a bibliography of over seven pages, a bibliography hasty and incomplete, but useful, in the most recent scholarly text of the *Ath. Pol.*, that of H. Oppermann (Teubner, 1928), pp. viii-xv. Sandys' own commentary is surely less than "excellent" (p. ix). One of the many pleasant features of the book is that the editors adopt a kindly tone toward all their predecessors, but students could have been left with the impression that Sandys was "conscientious" (also p. ix). The editors cite only W. Jaeger and W. D. Ross for "General Bibliography," and under "Special Aspects" only H. Bloch, R. J. Bonner—G. Smith, S. Dow, W. S. Ferguson (*C. A. H.*, V only!), and W. K. Pritchett—O. Neugebauer. In the Preface (pp. ix-xi), last-minute account is taken of F. Jacoby's *Attis* (Oxford, 1949) and of J. H. Oliver's *Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* (Baltimore, 1950). In the course of the Introduction and the Notes, other books and articles are mentioned, but I hope the editors will not think me ungrateful in urging that there should be more. Students particularly need to know of G. Busolt—H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* (Munich, 1926; in the I. v. Müller—W. Otto *Handbuch*; index vol. by F. Jandebeur), which has A. Wilhelm's epigraphical additions; and of J. G. Headlam[—Morley]'s *Election by Lot at Athens* (ed. 2 by D. C. MacGregor; Cambridge, Eng., 1933). (Both of these are omitted also by Oppermann.) The list should be greatly enlarged.

The 64-page Introduction contrives to be interesting even about Authorship. Probably the best part, the part where the authors are most at home, is the long section (pp. 32-66) on The Relation between Aristotle's Treatise on the Constitution of Athens and his Political Philosophy. This is the most distinctive contribution of the volume. The Text, with "setup" for *πολιτεία*, is a translation aimed at today's students. On the whole it is not likely to mislead. Each chapter has such brief footnotes as are necessary for an immediate understanding, the real commentary being reserved for 200 longer Notes printed as an Appendix (pp. 149-200) under the same regular chapter headings. After the Related Texts, listed *supra*, there is an

Index of (Greek) Names and Places, and a General Index, which might have been combined, and might also have been made more usable: e. g. the entry Laws is followed by 36 undifferentiated page numbers.

One hasty mistake and one error based on deliberate consideration call for special mention. Neither is typical of the work as a whole, but the latter error may illustrate in extreme form the dangers of its method.

The translation of 24, 3 as found on p. 94: "For out of the income derived from the contributions made by the allies and from internal levies more than two thousand persons were maintained. For there were six thousand judges . . ." and other groups which, in the famous and important list which continues this section, add up to over 15,000. The first figure, given as δισμυρίους in the papyrus and as a reading never disputed, is of course not two thousand but twenty thousand. The error of translation evidently arose through mere haste and escaped all subsequent checkings and revisions, including the consideration necessary for six notes all devoted to this one section, *but* without any note being devoted to the total. So far as I have observed, this error stands alone in its grossness.

Out of the extensive array of facts which called for comment, doubtless some had to be slighted, and in such a place this uncharacteristic mistake is natural. With ch. 4, the constitution which in the papyrus is assigned to Draco, the situation is other. The editors accept this entire chapter as being (a) Aristotle's, and (b) historical. They are aware that both (a) and (b) have been questioned and—although they can hardly have appreciated the seriousness of the historical aspects—their acceptance is deliberate (introduction, pp. 8-11; notes on pp. 71-2, 152-3). Their reasoning is controlled by the summary given by the papyrus in ch. 41 and by *Pol.* 1274 b. In ch. 41, according to the text as we have it, only one constitution is recorded between Theseus and Solon; ergo, the editors conflate the institutions of chs. 3 and 4, making them two descriptions of one constitution—"one from a more evolutionary, the other from a more stationary, point of view." The statement in the *Politics* that Draco made laws, but "for an already existing constitution," is reconciled with *Ath. Pol.* 41 by taking the *ἐπί* of ἡ (*πολιτεία*) *ἐπί Δράκοντος* to mean "in the general period of." Thus there is no contradiction whatsoever: chs. 3-4 fit properly into the historical account, and into the series enumerated in ch. 41, bridging the gap between monarchy and Solon, and agreeing with the *Politics*.

Then, regarding these conclusions as established facts, the editors proceed to two further conclusions: (1) the question of whether Draco framed a whole constitution, and not merely specific laws, simply does not arise; and (2) since chs. 3-4 are indeed awkwardly inserted, "it is equally clear that the treatise either was never meant to be published at all, or, at least, was never revised for publication."

For this latter conclusion, other evidence is brought forward, and I have said *supra* that the editors seem to me to have succeeded in reopening the question. But *not* by the reasoning applied to ch. 4. Even the most casual attempt to fit ch. 4 into a factual narrative of the Athenian constitution would show that the alleged Draconian constitution is wildly anachronistic. The editors make no such attempt;

and there is no space, nor any need, here to provide details. So far from furnishing a control, ch. 41 shows the same clumsy hand at work, and the passage in the *Politics* shows either that Aristotle had changed his mind, or that someone other than Aristotle tampered with the text of the *Ath. Pol.*: I am not sure we shall ever know which.

Taking this extreme instance (i. e. the handling of the "Draconian constitution") as a whole, however untypical of the present book it may be, it does suggest a weakness of method. The very evidence, such as the broken nexus between the end of ch. 2 and the beginning of ch. 5, which ought to have been presented early, as part of the data of the problem, is reserved to reinforce conclusions, and to provide further dubious inferences. But all the earlier parts of the reasoning on this one subject are weak also, and the whole treatment of the "Draconian constitution" is a house of cards.

Considering the volume as a whole, it seems fair to say that the refreshingly general and critical qualities have been bought at a price. The price is an occasional lack of rigor, of matured and objective and exact judgment. Yet these faults are by no means constantly present in either the factual and historical or in the philosophical parts. As to the former, it is a pleasure to note, taking only one clear example, that this is the first edition to appear after the *κληρωτήρια* were identified, and that with respect to them the details given are sharp and correct.

The "Draconian Constitution" is treated in two other recent books: in Oliver's *Expounders* (mentioned *supra*), and in the latest translation of the *Ath. Pol.* in L. C. Stechini, ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ, *The Constitution of the Athenians, by the Old Oligarch and by Aristotle: a New Interpretation* (Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1950). If modern study of how Athens was governed were to be judged by these three treatments of this one topic, the verdict would be a sorry one, and the present generation of scholars would seem to have slipped backward. Doubtless there is today the double difficulty for many scholars, classical and other, of having grown up in the shadow of a generation which contained titans, and of having to master all at once the huge mass of scholarly writing which the older generation could take in its stride, because the study in its fulness was largely created in their lifetime. The four writers in question evidently could not *both* absorb what had been written about *Ath. Pol.* 3-4, and also apply insight and restraint.

Oliver's acceptance of the alleged Draconian matter was doubtless influenced by his desire to relate the 401 dicasts to his new discovery of pervasive triple divisions, triple assemblies, etc. This whole aspect of his book, which one reviewer considers the most interesting (*C. W.*, XLIV [1950/1], pp. 135-6), is hazardous and in need of much fuller development, as I think its author would be the first to admit. The most important part of the book is surely the brilliant and masterful treatment of the main theme, viz. the *Expounders*; and secondly, though it appears only briefly and as background, the social history of Athens under Rome, an account which in one leap surpasses all of Grainger. As to Draco, M. P. Nilsson in his superior review has already pronounced (*A. J. P.*, LXXI [1950], p. 424); I add details. Oliver judged that the odd *one* of the 401 (*Ath.*

*Pol. 4*) was a hint that the number should be divisible by three, and he emended the text to give 501; whereas the odd one in 401 is of course itself a prime indication that *Ath. Pol. 4* was forged in a period when the Athenians had learned to improve the dicastic courts by the addition of one dicast, to give 201, 401, etc., possibly as a result of some actual (even) tie vote, in any case to avert any future tie vote. The problem of how the odd man was allotted in Aristotle's day or earlier has not yet been solved (*H. S. C. P.*, L [1939], p. 25, n. 2), and consideration of it was below the generalizing level of the present three books. The Athenians did not, indeed probably could not, make the Cleisthenian boule 501; nor (in the years 411/10) the Four Hundred 401. Hence *Ath. Pol. 4* is muddled again: it should have 400, from the Four Hundred; but to emend 401 to give 400 in *Ath. Pol. 4* would also be the reverse of understanding the author of this chapter. He forged the wrong number; and Aristotle, deplorably but not unnaturally (considering that he does not trouble to explain how the odd man was selected for the dicasteria), or someone else who muddled *Ath. Pol.* later, swallowed the odd one along with the 400 and the rest of ch. 4.

Stecchini, like von Fritz and Kapp producing a book to put into the hands of today's students, for some of whom "education" must be "general" and lively even if not quite true, nevertheless heartily rejects ch. 4, and I am grateful for his generosity in a prefatory acknowledgment. But again I must hope that the author will forgive me for pointing out the price he has paid, in this instance, for liveliness: in plunging ahead to attempt to name the very person who inserted ch. 4, he has outrun all considerations except an insubstantial plausibility. What ought to be reserved for patient and restrained argument in learned journals—or suppressed—should not be thrust upon students. Stecchini's commentary is not so extensive as that of his seniors, the Columbia editors; in this instance, it is somewhat more true, or at least different in its kind of error.

[This review, submitted in March 1951, was based on the review copy. Copies purchased in Sept. 1952 contained Errata slips correcting the "two thousand" to "twenty thousand" in 24, 3 (on p. 94, in line 22), and adding in 13, 2 (on p. 81, in line 3) after "from the craftsmen" an omitted clause, "and these men held office in the year after Damasias."]

STERLING DOW.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

---

JOHN V. A. FINE. *Horoi: Studies in Mortgage, Real Security and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens*. Princeton, N.J., American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951. Pp. ix+216; 42 illustrations. \$7.50. (*Hesperia*, Supplement IX.)

For students of Isaeus and of the private orations of Demosthenes, John Fine, Professor of Classics at Princeton, has published with an index of passages an indispensable book, of which the thoroughness, fairness, caution, and good sense reflect great credit upon him, and of which the outward make-up reflects great credit upon the

new editor of *Hesperia* (Lucy Shoe) and upon the experienced printer (J. H. Furst Co. of Baltimore).

In Chapters I and II the author publishes 35 new mortgage stones and republishes about 30 old ones with obvious competence. It is clear that he has a thorough knowledge of the epigraphical sources and can distinguish between what is good, what is weak, and what is no evidence at all. In Chapter III he examines the physical characteristics of the extant *horoi* and the ancient references. "The purpose of these *horoi* was, in the interest of the creditor and any third party, to publicize liens on real property. . . . The presence or absence of mortgage stones could furnish a presumption as to the status of the property concerned . . . but in court a litigant could not rely on the evidence of *horoi* alone." The author shows that mediaeval references to wooden *horoi* probably go back to a misinterpretation of [Demosthenes], XXV, 69-70, and this is an indirectly very important determination, because it eliminates the only positive evidence in support of the theory that the absence of *horoi* from Solon to the end of the Fifth Century is due merely to the perishability of wood.

In Chapter IV the author examines the character of the Attic hypothec, a subject which eighteen or twenty years earlier was being debated among Italian students of ancient law. In 1932 the distinguished jurist Ugo Enrico Paoli published a volume of *Studi di Diritto Attico*, where he presented the theory that a hypothec which conferred a right *in re* was marked by possession of the security on the part of the creditor and by a continuative character. Arangio-Ruiz did not accept Paoli's theory, but Fine offers a full-scale and methodical refutation, not only by showing the inadequacy of Paoli's evidence, but by adducing evidence which Paoli apparently overlooked. (Since Paoli wrote, also, one significant piece of evidence has come to light, namely the *pôlêtai*-record of 367/6 B.C., *Hesp.*, 1941, pp. 14-27.) Fine does not judge Paoli's theory on the weakness of one or two arguments alone but on the inadequacy of all the arguments. Fine convinces the reviewer at least, when he reconstructs the Attic hypothec as a form of mortgage whereby the mortgagor retained possession of the property and the mortgagee upon foreclosure did not acquire any excess over the value of the mortgage. Fine assumes that the hypothec was a late development in substitution for the older form of mortgage known as the sale with right of redemption. However, the hypothec, to judge from the aforementioned *pôlêtai*-record, came into use for real estate before 367/6 B.C.

In Chapter V Fine investigates the contract called *mîsthôsis oikou* for the leasing of an orphan's estate when the guardian does not wish to manage the estate himself. Concerning the *apotimêma* Fine adopts a conservative view. He interprets it as the security which the lessee under such a contract provided, a type of hypothec, perhaps a forerunner of the later hypothec. A *horos* stone publicized the orphan's lien on the property offered as *apotimêma*. In Chapter VI Fine deals with the dotal *apotimêma*. After an examination of Paoli's view that the *apotimêma* here was something given to extinguish the obligation of paying back the dowry (*datio in solutum*),

Fine concludes that it was customary for the dotal debtor, whether husband or guardian, to furnish real property as security (*ἀποτίμημα*) to guarantee the payment or restitution of the dowry. The chapter concludes with additional comments about the status of the dowry during and after marriage, about the δίκη προικός and the δίκη σίτου.

In Chapter VII on the sale with right of redemption (*πράσις ἐπὶ λύσει*) Fine seems to the reviewer to have successfully refuted a theory advanced by a Greek jurist, Ioannes A. Meletopoulos. In his article in *Πολέμων*, IV (1949), pp. 41-72, Meletopoulos considers the literary and epigraphical evidence, but he makes, I now think, some unnecessary and even false assumptions. In the very important *pôlētai*-record of 367/6 B. C. it is recorded that the house belonging to a certain Theosebes was confiscated δῶνι πλείστος ὁξεῖα ἡ ἵποκειται Σμικύθῳ Τευθραστῷ ΗΦ δραχμῶν. Then other claims are listed as incurred by the father of Theosebes; the father had raised money by selling the property ἐπὶ λύσει. Though the editor of the inscription, Margaret Crosby, referred to the hypothec as "the original mortgage," Meletopoulos assumed that it was Theosebes who gave the hypothec to Smicythus. Fine argues that the hypothec had already been given by the father before the sale with right of redemption. In other words, the sale with right of redemption is, according to Fine, in this case a second mortgage on property already encumbered with a hypothec; the recipients of the second mortgage naturally assume the obligations to the first mortgagee; the state on confiscation acquires the right of redemption which is listed by the *pôlētai*. It seems to the reviewer that Fine, who argues that the sale with right of redemption gave the creditor more security, has a clearer view of the difference between this type of contract and a hypothec. He describes the sale with right of redemption as the earliest contract of loan developed by the Athenians in which real property served as security. It remained the most common contract for that purpose throughout the Fourth Century. Since the debtor immediately lost title to the ownership of the security, he could not contract a second mortgage on it, but actual possession varied according to terms of contract.

There is much more speculation in the last chapter than in other parts of the book, but it is candidly presented as speculation. Here Fine asks a fundamental question for students of Athenian history, to which no reply can help being rather conjectural: When did land become alienable in Attica? Fine has surely cleared away some misconceptions, and he has underlined the important fact that there is no real proof of the alienability of private land in Attica before the Peloponnesian War. He adduces some weak but positive evidence that the change in the system of land tenure was not unconnected with new conditions produced by the great plague. He argues, perhaps surprisingly but I think impressively, that true alienability was not introduced by Solon, and he concludes (with some reservation) that land became alienable during the Peloponnesian War.

This is one of those books which must be reviewed by scholars of various fields. It must certainly be reviewed by a competent jurist, one who can divest himself of preconceptions from Roman Law. But it must be examined first from other standpoints, and that

is why the writer of this review has ventured to offer his opinion based on some familiarity with the social background and with the literary and epigraphical evidence involved.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

---

T. B. L. WEBSTER. *Studies in Menander*. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1950. Pp. xi + 238. 25 s. (Publications of the University of Manchester, No. CCIX, *Classical Series*, No. VII.)

This is the first book in English, I believe, that is devoted entirely to Menander and nothing else, except for editions, translations, or theses. It is an important contribution, not only to Menander studies, but to the analysis of sources in connection with Plautus and Terence. For the author has not been content to analyze merely the genuine though fragmentary Menander that exists in Greek, amounting to a considerable portion of three plays. He spreads his net wide and believes that we can form a good idea of the character of some thirty-eight of Menander's hundred-odd plays. His index lists in fact seventy-two plays of Menander to which reference is made, including fifteen of which portions have been found in modern times on papyrus, and three hundred fragments. In the case of five plays of Plautus and four of Terence there are references to at least a hundred lines of each. The author's acquaintance with vases, with the history of comedy, and with the work of other scholars is impressive and leads to valuable results. The most valuable contribution, however, is that of the last two chapters, on Menander's relation to earlier Greek drama and to Greek philosophy respectively, which have not been published before.

The first four chapters are photographically reproduced from the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* (1946-1948) and deal with the reconstruction of fragmentary plays. For convenience they are divided into plays of reconciliation, plays of social criticism, and plays of adventure and satire. The article, "Forethoughts on Later Greek Comedy," which appeared in the same journal, is not reprinted but should be read as an introduction. When the Latin plays and the fragments are lumped with continuous scenes in the attempt to increase our quantitative knowledge of Menander, the result is certain to be repetitious and dull and to give the impression that Menander was so. That the longer scenes do not give this impression Mr. Webster well knows and in scattered statements shows that he knows. The methods used to reconstruct so many plays are necessarily hazardous and the results uncertain. I am not competent to discuss details and to do so would require another book, not a review, but I am sure that many new and good points have been raised and that the comprehensive scope of the book with full index and references makes it indispensable.

Since these chapters were originally produced during military service and presented as separate lectures, it is not surprising that there is some hesitation in approach. The plays adapted by Terence come out as plays of social criticism, because in them a rich youth is united with a poor heroine. The Greeks would have called this philanthropic or ethical, and Plato advocated just such unions in his *Laws*, but it seems to involve no attack on existing institutions. An ethical, not a political ideal, is exhibited. The title scene of the *Arbitration* is quite as philanthropic, but Webster classes this play with the *Perikeiromene* as a play of reconciliation, for in it a husband and wife are reunited. The *Samia* is classed as a single-character play along with *Aulularia* (*Apistos*?), while the Plautine adaptations mostly come out as plays of adventure and satire. Now the third act of the *Arbitration* consists of intrigue and adventure and the fifth of satire. Clearly an adapter could make what he would of it by emphasizing one feature or the other. Would it not be better to note the various themes that reappear in Menander and recognize that in any play he is likely to include several themes? To be sure, in certain plays a single theme will be outstanding. Often, however, the action will be built around one theme while interest is largely concentrated in the various scenes on others.

The statement on the jacket that Greek New Comedy is Comedy of Manners is at odds with the book itself. In current critical usage "manners" is the opposite of "morals" or "nature" and derives from the first sentence of an essay by Lamb (1822) on "artificial" comedy. See the first number of *Essays in Criticism* (1951), pp. 89-93, where F. W. Bateson traces the modern use of the term back only to 1876. It is absurd to apply the same term to Menander and to Restoration Comedy. Webster points out Menander's likeness to Sophocles in the serious treatment of character and action. He finds that siege scenes derive from the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, but *Medea* or *Orestes* or even *Agamemnon* supplies as good a point of departure. The likeness of Polemon in *Perikeiromene* to Homer's Achilles is recognized. The serious element in Menander, which is paramount, evidently comes from Homer and tragedy. I should not allow so much influence to Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Poetics* as Webster does, especially the latter. Menander had in actual plays models of much more complicated and striking effects than any listed by Aristotle. Menander's *agnoia* is not simply "ignorance"; it is the double ignorance that thinks it knows what it does not, in other words "misapprehension." Aristotle says nothing of psychological recognition, which is Menander's trump card.

There are some slips. The "obvious supplement" proposed for *Kitharistes* 35 is obviously wrong. It will not scan. Webster tries to keep his Greek Greek and his Latin Latin but bogs down (like the rest of us) with "Sosias" and *Heauton Timoroumenos* for Terence and "Iphigenia" in Greek. He has three plurals of "hetaira," all equally un-Greek. He is not quite sound on the position of women. Did a concubine always change her name when she became a hetaera, a fate with which Chrysis is threatened in the *Samia*? Why argue, then, that any character named Chrysis must be a hetaera, especially since we have one for certain who is

obviously at the moment a concubine. Glycera is wife in the eyes of Polemon, hetaera from Moschion's point of view, and who knows what for Pataecus? Probably concubine. Some citizens were also hetaeras, and in real life they might marry and gain the status of wife. It is all very protean and slippery, not conveniently arranged for classification. Nor should one speak of Greek heroines as seduced. That would belittle their virtue. I should not take *βάρβαροι* literally at *Georgus* 55 and should interpret 617K "They are Greeks," not "Greeks are men." The translation of 213K should make it clear that it is addressed to a man.

Here then is a book that will be useful and necessary to scholars, but that might deter the less advanced student and obscure for him the pure genius of Menander by its sheer abundance of detail. It should be welcomed then, not as scripture, but as learned and ingenious and intelligent commentary.

L. A. POST.

HARVEY COLLEGE.

*Yale Classical Studies*, Volume XI, 1951, edited by HARRY M. HUBBELL. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951. Pp. 317.

The largest contribution is "The Iambi of Callimachus" (pp. 1-168, subtitled "A Hellenistic Poet's Experimental Laboratory") by Christopher M. Dawson. This is, in the words of the editor and author, "as complete a text of the *Iambi* as is at present possible." The various papyrus fragments are combined with the previously known fragments, together with the διηγήσεις or reader's guides from the papyri, to form the text, which is here accompanied by a sound line-by-line blank verse translation, double running commentary on text and matter, and summary notes of each iambus. A final note (pp. 132-49) is concerned with the character of the *Iambi* as an organized book of moderate length poems. There is, in addition, a detailed bibliography, a concordance to the collections of Pfeiffer (of 1923), Schneider, and Gallavotti, and an index of ancient authors cited or quoted.

The work is a model of method which leaves the critic with no complaints, and nothing but praise. Dawson has, with deceptive ease, struck the exact mean in both types of commentary; he gives all the necessary materials, but though dealing with so erudite a poet temperately refrains from drowning us in his own erudition. A few minor queries follow, mostly arising out of the first Iambus, where the generally excellent translation leaves most to be desired. Line 26: ὡνδρες as "what crowds," but despite context the vocative should be retained. Line 34: "return" is unnecessarily weak for δινεῖν. Line 37: if λευκ[ας ἡμε]ρας is read, "red-letter" days is unfortunately misleading; the days of Bathycles were calm, not festal. Further, the story of Bathycles' cup, awarded by his sons to Thales and passed from sage to sage of the Seven until it came back to Thales, is surely not told in order to demonstrate that Thales was the wisest of the Seven, as Dawson (p. 23) would imply.

The point must rather be that each sage considers another more worthy than himself. 7, 2: Epeius φύγαίχνα could well be further elucidated in the light of *Iliad*, XXIII, 670. 10, 1: I do not understand, in the context, why ἥσ should be translated "sow." 13, 30-33: for the parcelling out of modes of verse, it would be worth while to cite Choerilus of Samos, Fr. 1, 3 Kinkel: νῦ δῷτε πάντα δέδωται, ἔχοντις δὲ πελπάτα τέχνα. In fact, the literary theories behind this thirteenth Iambus, which is itself literary theory, might well have been more thoroughly exploited.

These are relatively minor details. A major contribution of Dawson's edition is that it shows the thirteen iambi with their introductions *in order*, and his most significant large-scale speculation is on the principles behind that order. We may perhaps question Dawson's contention that "no author would be satisfied by a kaleidoscopic hodgepodge of unrelated compositions," for some authors of short poems, at least in modern times, seem well satisfied with precisely that; but we must agree that so careful and so self-conscious a character as Callimachus would have demanded an orderly collection. Dawson shows "diversified coherence" by summarizing length, dialect, metre, and subject matter of the ordered iambi, and his table (p. 143) makes it clear that for Callimachus not only the structure of the poems themselves, but the composition of the poems into a book, was a work of art. The return in 13 to literary theory introduced in 1 could have been more heavily emphasized. That we are thrown forward, for our own enlightenment, to Roman *Gedichtbücher*, is necessary and welcome. I only wonder why Dawson considers it impossible to throw back beyond the Hellenistic period, to Theognis and other writers of numerous short poems. In fact, his own dictum concerning "hodgepodge" has to force him in that direction.

This is, I repeat, an exemplary and most welcome edition of the *Iambi*.

J. F. Gilliam publishes "Some Latin Military Papyri from Dura" (pp. 169-252). The papyri are part of the archives of the 20th Palmyrene Cohort, and fall into two groups. One deals with the assignment of horses to troopers during the period 208-209 A. D. Details include description and value of horses in question. The second group, of four papyri, of which two are dated respectively 233 and 239 A. D., are day-records or log books of the cohort, recording its strength, watchword, oath, and various items such as special duties, recruiting, soldiers AWOL, etc. Both sets are lucidly presented with text, translation, and commentary.

Archibald W. Allen writes on "Elegy and the Classical Attitude Toward Love: Propertius I. 1." Allen disavows Lachmann's biographical methods and assumptions, and undertakes "only to examine the elegy in its relation to the context of ideas amid which it was written and to interpret particulars in the light of the conventions of ancient erotic poetry" (p. 258). The poem is then dealt with by passages of text with running commentary. The opening introduces Cynthia, and the stricken Propertius. *miser* means he is subject to that kind of love which is disaster and loss of all personal control, and the point is well illustrated from

numerous parallels. The world is upside down, normal consolations fail and the lurid and the incredible offer their temptations. Propertius uses here conventional concepts of deep love, but he does not use them conventionally, and he makes no point except to depict his own suffering. We need no knowledge of further circumstances to understand this.

Clarence W. Mendell, in his article on "Horace, *Odes II. 18*" (pp. 281-92) examines the ode from the point of view of "the influence of Horace, the Lyric Poet, on Horace, the Satirist," and studies both source and future of the commonplaces which appear in this lyric whose content so much resembles satire.

In "Another Drachma Dedication" (pp. 293-6) Antony E. Raubitschek suggests reading δραχμὰς in the dedication of Phanariste inscribed on the altar of Krisa.

Christopher M. Dawson adds a "Postscript to *Yale Classical Studies*, Vol. IX," giving one addition to the list of mythological landscape paintings there contained, and one new interpretation.

Alfred R. Bellinger publishes five "Greek Coins from the Yale Numismatic Collection" (pp. 305-16), including one from Anaphe and one of Mithridates I of Parthia, which give rise to interesting historical speculations.

RICHMOND LATTIMORE.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

E. V. MARMORALE. Cato Maior. Secunda Edizione. Bari, Giuseppe Laterza e Figli, 1949. Pp. 266.

This edition has a long preface written in answer to a reviewer of the first edition, Bernardi. The author makes it plain that to him the chief value of the book is in its emphasis on Cato's role as a champion of freedom (a term which he does not define), Scipio Africanus being, of course, the great adversary. For Marmorale, Scipio was the initiator of Caesarism (a term which he does not define).

The arguments in favor of this point of view are rather general. I find them unsatisfactory both in themselves and as compared with the careful and detailed presentation of the political movements of the period which a number of scholars have developed in the last twenty-five years. H. H. Scullard's *Roman Politics*, for instance, the most recent book on the subject, is based on intense study of all this work and on equally intense original work. In it we find no such picture of Scipio and Cato.

Pp. 19-173 discuss Cato's life and activity. All his writings are carefully placed in their setting, and a number of small points are discussed. This is sound, but no better than what was already available. Pp. 177-266 are in a way a repetition of pp. 19-173, for they form an estimate of Cato written in ordinary biographical style with emphasis on the larger issues. This section is sound, if somewhat discursive, except for the author's theory of the danger to the state from Scipio.

It may well be, too, that Cato is given more credit than he deserves for patriotic disinterestedness and for breadth of view. Scullard feels that Cato often acted from party interest rather than public interest. The reader's opinion of Cato's breadth of view or lack of it will presumably depend on his opinion of how sensible it was in those days to try to fight the forces which promoted greater sophistication and the corresponding changes in moral standards.

Marmorale has tried not to idolize Cato. He does well to remark that we should be on guard against doing Cato an injustice by taking a half-humorous view of him because of his crudeness and impetuosity.

RICHARD M. HAYWOOD.

WASHINGTON SQUARE COLLEGE,  
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

### BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Rupprecht (Karl). *Abriss der griechischen Verslehre*. München, *Max Hueber Verlag*, 1949. Pp. 64.

Russo (Carlo Ferdinando). *Hesiodi Scutum. Introduzione, testo critico e commento con traduzione e indici*. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia" Editrice, 1950. Pp. 224. (*Biblioteca di Studi Superiori*, IX, Filologia Greca.)

Salama (Pierre). *Les voies romaines de l'Afrique du Nord*. Alger, *Imprimerie Officielle du Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie*, 1951. Pp. 142; 12 pls.; map in folder.

Sartori (Franco). *La crisi del 311 A.C. nell' Athenaion Politeia di Aristotele*. Padova, "Cedam"-Casa Editrice Antonio Milani, 1951.

Schachermeyr (Fritz). *Poseidon und die Entstehung des griechischen Götterglaubens*. Bern, A. Francke Ag. Verlag, 1950. Pp. 224. Fr. 13.80.

Schnayder (Jerzy). *De Periegetarum Graecorum Reliquiis*. Lódz, 1950. Pp. 95. (*Societas Scientiarum Lodziensis*, Wydział I, Sectio I, Nr. 8.)

Schutter (K. H. E.). *Quibus annis comoediae Plautinae primum actae sint quaeritur*. Groningen, *De Waal*, 1952. Pp. 159.

Schwartz (Jacques). *Lucien de Samosate. Philopseudes et de morte peregrini avec introduction et commentaire*. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1951. Pp. 113. (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg*, Textes d'Étude, 12.)

Siemers (Th. B. B.). *Seneca's Hercules furens en Euripides' Hercules*. With a summary in English. Heerlen, N.V. Mij. tot Exploitatie van het Limburgsch Dagblad, 1951. Pp. 111.

Smith (Morton). *Tannaitic Parallels to the Gospels*. Philadelphia, Society of Biblical Literature, 1951. Pp. xii + 215. (*Journal of Biblical Literature*, Monograph Series, VI.)

Snell (Bruno). *Der Aufbau der Sprache*. Hamburg, *Classen Verlag*, 1952. Pp. 220. DM. 14.50.

Steechini (Livio Catullo). *ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ. The Constitution of the Athenians by the Old Oligarch and by Aristotle. A New Interpretation*. Glencoe, Illinois, *The Free Press*, 1950. Pp. 112. \$2.50.

Steidle (Wolf). *Sueton und die antike Biographie*. München, *Verlag C. H. Beck*, 1951. Pp. 188. (*Zetemata: Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Heft 1.)

Stein (Arthur). *Die Präfekten von Ägypten in der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Bern, A. Francke Ag. Verlag, 1950. Pp. 248.

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

---

VOL. LXXIV, 2

WHOLE No. 294

---

## *IMPERIUM MAIUS IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.*

1.\*

In the much discussed questions of Augustus' position in the successive stages of his career<sup>1</sup> we nowadays know better than in Mommsen's time that the legal or constitutional issues are less than the whole story. A number of well-known books which need not be recorded here have taught us to what extent constitutional matters, especially in revolutionary times, are under the impact of personal and social forces. But it sometimes looks as though we might be in danger of regarding social and political questions as so predominant that we are inclined to forget how legally-minded the Romans really were, and in particular how important it was for the new ruler to "create the elaborate façade of Republican legitimacy."<sup>2</sup>

Even Augustus' emphasis on his *auctoritas*, though not referring to a truly legal issue, nevertheless intends to focus public opinion (if only of posterity) on a constitutional rather than a purely social aspect. Like the name of Augustus or the title of *princeps*, the conception of *auctoritas* grew into a formal and

\* This paper owes a great deal to the criticism of some of my friends who read it at various stages of completion. I am particularly grateful to the late Arthur Stein, to A. Momigliano, and to H. H. Scullard. The typescript of this article was my contribution to the unprinted *Festschrift* for M. Gelzer in December 1951, on the occasion of his 65th birthday, and to him the article is therefore again dedicated.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the recent interesting survey by G. E. F. Chilver, *Historia*, I (1950), pp. 408 ff.

<sup>2</sup> A. H. M. Jones, *J. R. S.*, XL1 (1951), p. 112.

possibly even legal meaning which enabled it to appear side by side with such factors of constitutional law as *potestas*, *imperium*, *imperator*, and others. All the important features of Augustus' constitutional position, however, were looking back, as it were, to their Republican antecedents.

Among these the concept of *imperium maius* is of great importance. Mr. Last has written what he calls a note on this subject,<sup>3</sup> though we may well regard it as a particularly illuminating article, however limited in its intention and scope. It is a partial answer to Professor M. Grant's important and provocative work *From Imperium to Auctoritas* (1946). The following pages would never have been written but for Last's paper; yet, it seemed possible to go somewhat beyond his remarks which are intended to clear the ground rather than to draw historical conclusions. It will be seen that the following discussion is based on the assumption (which is also Last's) of the fundamentally legal nature of the issue concerned. This does not necessarily mean that it is maintained that the Romans in general, and all the time, were aware of the more subtle legal distinctions. What is maintained is that a full understanding is hardly possible without ascertaining the predominance of legal issues, a predominance which was never completely disregarded, not even by Sulla or Caesar, to say nothing of Augustus.

Last defines two different types of *imperium maius* which he somewhat baldly calls A and B. We shall see whether we can find better names for them. The distinction between them was hardly so fundamental and certainly not so obvious as Last maintains; but, to say the least, it is a very helpful working hypothesis, and we shall make grateful use of it in this paper. *Imperium maius* is most commonly the means by which an otherwise insoluble conflict between two *imperia*—or perhaps we had better say between two persons *cum imperio*—is avoided. It is put into force on such occasions only when there would be a clash between the two; otherwise it is dormant. Another type of *imperium maius* provides a permanent power which is always and everywhere applicable, to make its holder responsible for, and predominant over, every other Roman magistrate. Both types are expressions of the same fundamental power which the

<sup>3</sup> H. Last, *J. R. S.*, XXXVII (1947), pp. 157 ff.

higher magistrates held as a legacy from the king's power. *Imperium maius* is, above all, simply and purely *imperium*, though seen in its relations to other *imperia*. The two types, derived from the same source, are essentially Republican, the one of an ordinary, the other of an extraordinary kind; both are "constitutional," though both may be liable to unconstitutional, un-Republican developments or distortions.<sup>4</sup>

2.

It is an established fact that the consuls have an *imperium maius* over all regular magistrates *cum imperio*, whether praetors or promagistrates. It is equally certain that such an *imperium maius* is only brought into action on the (very rare) occasions when a conflict of power arises. Since Leifer made it clear,<sup>5</sup> there has been general agreement that each *imperium* is complete, indivisible, and comprehensive in itself, though in practice it may be confined to a certain field of activity, the original *provincia*. In normal conditions, no consul would ever interfere with a praetor's jurisdiction or a proconsul's provincial governorship. If conditions were not normal, various things might happen, although we seem to have only one single piece of evidence (Val. Max., VII, 7, 1) for an *intercessio* by a consul in a juridical decision of a praetor. The relations between consuls and promagistrates provide richer evidence; for example, such peculiar occurrences as the one reported by Livy (XXVI, 9, 10): in order that a proconsul could march with his troops through the city without becoming subordinate to the consuls, he was exceptionally given *par cum consulibus imperium*.<sup>6</sup> It is a similar case, though the other way round, when the consul Ti. Claudius in 202 B. C. was sent to Africa as *pari imperio*

<sup>4</sup> Grant's more recent distinction between "active" and "passive" *imperium maius* is somewhat misleading; to say the least, it is not obvious without further explanation. Cf. M. Grant in *Studies in Roman Economic and Social History in Honor of Allan Chester Johnson* (1951), pp. 107 ff., where more literature referring to Last's article is mentioned. [M. Grant, *The Six Main AES Coinages of Augustus* (1953) was published too late to be considered in this paper.]

<sup>5</sup> F. Leifer, *Die Einheit des Gewaltgedankens im römischen Staatsrecht* (1914), Introduction and Part II.

<sup>6</sup> This episode may be unhistorical (see, e. g., G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, III, 2, p. 338), but as evidence for constitutional procedure it is probably quite accurate.

*cum Scipione imperator* (Livy, XXX, 27, 5).<sup>7</sup> The consular *imperium maius* was of particular importance in pre-Sullan times when consuls were frequently engaged in warfare abroad and might have to enter provincial territories. According to Cicero (*Ad Att.*, VIII, 15, 3) they were *more maiorum* allowed *omnes adire provincias*, and their *imperium* would naturally overrule that of any governor in whose province they were (cf. also *Phil.*, IV, 4, 9).

Things became more complicated with the extension of the empire and the growing incongruity of the position of ordinary Roman magistrates with their tasks. When Sulla fixed the competences of magistrates and promagistrates as *domi* and *militiae* respectively, he tried to overcome the difficulties by a scheme which worked well in fairly normal conditions.<sup>8</sup> But for most of the period between Sulla and Augustus conditions were anything but normal, and soon it happened again that consuls and praetors went abroad, although they frequently did so only towards the end of their term of office in order to embark on the military tasks connected with their proconsular provinces.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the introduction of extraordinary commands was imposed on Rome both by the force of external circumstances and by the rise of powerful individual generals. Such a command could easily lead to a clash between the extraordinary *imperium* and other regular *imperia*. As Last emphasizes, the task of fighting piracy provided an outstanding occasion—although not at the earliest occurrence of which we know. In 103 B. C. the praetor M. Antonius fought the Cilician pirates (Livy, *Per.* 68; *Obsequ.*, 104; *Trog.*, *prol.* 39), a campaign which led to the creation of the province of Cilicia. His *imperium* was, so it seems, prorogued as a proconsular *imperium* for 101 and 100 B. C.,<sup>10</sup> but there is no evidence that his *imperium* covered a

<sup>7</sup> On the question whether the *par imperium* of the consuls implied a right of veto, see D. McFayden in *Studies in Honor of F. W. Shipley* (1942), pp. 1 ff. (though not entirely convincing).

<sup>8</sup> Even then, the consul's *imperium maius* could become active by way of letter, and when it took the form of an advice rather than a command (Cic., *Ad Fam.*, XIII, 26, 3), we are reminded of Augustus in the Cyrene edicts.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the list in M. Gelzer, *Abh. Preuss. Akad.*, 1943, No. 1, pp. 41 f.

<sup>10</sup> Cic., *De Orat.*, I, 82; cf. T. R. S. Broughton, *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVII (1946), pp. 35 ff.

wide area or that any arrangement was made regarding the relations between his *imperium* and that of the governor of any near province.<sup>11</sup>

It was different when in 74 B. C. his son, also as a praetor, received a command against the pirates which Cicero (*Verr.*, II, 2, 8; 3, 213; cf. [Ascon.], *Verr.*, II, p. 206) calls an *imperium infinitum*, that is to say, an *imperium* not confined to one province or even to one theatre of war.<sup>12</sup> Velleius (II, 31, 2) expressly tells us that this *imperium* was equal to that of Pompey in 67: *paene totius terrarum orbis imperium*. Thus the local extension of the *imperium* was without prescribed limits (cf. Cic., *De Leg. Agr.*, II, 46); but while Pompey's command was at once granted for three years, that of Antonius was probably prolonged annually until *bellum adversus Cretenses parum prospere gestum morte sua finivit* (Livy, *Per.* 97). Pompey's *imperium* is defined as an *imperium aequum in omnibus provinciis cum proconsulibus* within fifty miles from the shore (Vell., II, 31, 2). It was undoubtedly an *imperium pro consule*,<sup>13</sup> and Last is obviously right against Mommsen (*St. R.*, II, p. 655, n. 1) in assuming that the words *cum proconsulibus* refer to Pompey's relations to all provincial governors, whether ex-consuls or ex-praetors, because at that time even an ex-praetor would, as a governor, have proconsular *imperium*.<sup>14</sup> We can be

<sup>11</sup> In the well-known Delphic inscription with the Greek translation of a *senatus consultum* against the pirates (*S.E.G.*, III, 378), which belongs to 101 or 100 B. C. (H. S. Jones, *J.R.S.*, XVI [1926], pp. 155 ff.), no hint is given of such an arrangement although the governors of Asia and Macedon are mentioned.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero's *imperium infinitum* is not an official expression; cf. Gelzer, *loc. cit.*, p. 40. Béranger in *Mél. de Philol.* . . . offerts à J. Marouzeau (1948), pp. 19 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Dio, XXXVI, 37, 1. Siber's different theory on Pompey's (and Augustus') *imperium* has been refuted, e. g., by Syme, *J.R.S.*, XXXVI (1946), pp. 149 ff.; Gelzer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 38 ff.; and Chilver, *loc. cit.*, pp. 427 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. P. Willems, *Le sénat de la république romaine*, p. 571, n. 5. Incidentally, it has become a common habit to speak of a proconsular *imperium*, although it is rarely used by ancient authors. H. F. Pelham once pointed out (*Essays*, pp. 65 ff.) that this was, in fact, the consular *imperium* of a magistrate acting *pro consule*. However, at least for post-Sullan times, this is a legal theory rather than a constitutional fact (E. G. Hardy, *Studies in Roman History*, I, pp. 287 ff.). At any rate, the term *imperium proconsulare* has become a convenient expression which cannot be misunderstood. It would be pedantic not to use it.

sure that in no earlier command had greater power been granted to one man (dictatorial power excepted) than to Pompey by the Lex Gabinia of 67 B. C. If, therefore, in '74 something was decided about the relation between Antonius' *imperium* and other *imperia*, it could only have been on the basis of an *imperium aequum*. Antonius had not at his disposal the same amount of money and military forces as Pompey had. Yet, by his inconsiderate and ruthless actions he became *orae maritimae qua Romanum esset imperium curator nocentior piratis* (Sall., *Hist.*, III, 2). It seems likely that this was so on the basis of an *imperium aequum*, though it may be doubted whether it included more than the coast itself. Velleius does not make it clear whether the generous limitation *usque ad quinquagesimum miliarium a mari* was valid for Antonius too, and we may well doubt it. He would probably have had less cause to pillage the shores of Roman provinces if he had had the support of large sections inland.

It may be asked why the Lex Gabinia met with such strong opposition, although Antonius had been given the same kind of command seven years earlier. The differences in the extension of time and actual power cannot really account for it. Velleius (II, 31, 4) explains the different attitude of the senatorial majority by the difference of the two men concerned: *raro enim invidetur eorum honoribus quorum vis non timetur*. This is perfectly true. In addition, Antonius had got his command through a factional intrigue: *gratia Cottae consulis et Cethegi factio in senatu* (Ascon., *loc. cit.*); the memory of his father may also have helped him. At any rate, the experience of '74 was not of a kind to encourage the senate to repeat the scheme, least of all to give a similar command to a man so much more formidable than Antonius. The senate, not unnaturally, was afraid of the great man rather than of the great command. They knew that they were unable to find anyone in their own ranks who would be capable of undertaking the great tasks of the empire and yet remain a commissioner of the senate. Lucullus was the last of that kind. The senate's acquiescence in granting unique power to a man of Antonius' calibre shows its irresponsibility. The ruling class, unable to produce leaders both loyal and capable, was nevertheless prepared to adopt a measure which was bound to strike at the heart of Sulla's con-

stitution, the very basis of the senate's own rule. When in different circumstances the senators tried to go back on their former decision, they were no longer free to do so. The door was opened for the renewal of the revolutionary methods of the Gracchi: in 67 the opposition of the tribune Trebellius was silenced by an illegal voting on the abrogation of his tribunate (Dio, XXXVI, 24, 4; 30, 1 f.).

Pompey's power and competence were greater than anything previously granted to any commander. It was an *imperium pro consule*, but it was not an *imperium maius* over other proconsuls. The combination of such a powerful position with an *imperium aequum* was bound to lead to difficulties which could easily be foreseen; they could be avoided only if severe restraint was exercised by all concerned. There was, however, apart from a dictatorship which was out of the question for Pompey no less than for the senate, no traditional form of *imperium maius* which could meet the new situation. The *imperium aequum*, which Velleius mentions, simply reflects the fact that Pompey held a proconsular *imperium* just as every provincial governor did. What had to be expressed in the law was that Pompey was allowed to exercise his *imperium* in another man's province. Thus, if Gabinius did not ask for an *imperium maius*, he concentrated on what was practicable. An extraordinary command, covering all the seas as well as Italy and large sections of each single province, that is to say, almost the whole empire, was all that was needed, and at the same time something big enough to rouse the strongest opposition.

There is one other aspect of the Lex Gabinia. Pompey appointed his own *legati*, and they received an *imperium pro praetore* (App., *Mithr.*, 94; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 750). He held an *imperium maius* in relation to his *legati*, but this was the normal *imperium maius* of an army commander. Mommsen, in a passing remark (II, p. 657), compares the position of *dictator* and *magister equitum*, because according to the Lex Gabinia holders of *imperium* were not elected by the people, but nominated by the superior magistrate. But there is more in it than that. Mommsen shows the way himself by referring to the position of consul and praetor during the later years of the Hannibalic War, when the praetors commanded in various parts of Italy while one of the consuls was commander-in-chief. Pompey's *legati*, who were

appointed by him and among whom there were even *consulares*, held a position of a purely military character, such as Labienus held whom Caesar calls *legatus pro praetore* (*B. G.*, I, 21, 2). The whole scheme was part of the military hierarchy, and the *imperium* of the *legati* was not independent; they commanded under Pompey's *auspicia*. Yet, the scheme could easily be applied outside the purely military sphere. Pompey followed it up after 55, and it became an important precedent for the imperial administration.

When in the following year by the *Lex Manilia* Pompey was given the command against Mithridates, he received an *imperium* which included the provinces of Cilicia and Bithynia, the latter having been added to Lucullus' former *imperium* (*Dio*, XXXVI, 42, 4; *Plut.*, *Pomp.*, 30, 1; *App.*, *Mithr.*, 97, 446 f.). At the same time, he kept the proconsular power which he held by virtue of the *Lex Gabinia*, and thus still had his army and *legati* and ruled the sea (*Cic.*, *De Imp. Pomp.*, 50, 58; *Plut.*, *loc. cit.*). Our sources are unanimous about the unheard-of amount of power united in one man's hand; but even so it is never said that he held an *imperium maius*.<sup>15</sup> There was really no need to go beyond the *imperium aequum* of the *Lex Gabinia*, since the chances of collision were, if anything, smaller than in the war against the pirates. Perhaps we can say that there was an accumulation of several *imperia*, or if we prefer to maintain the unity of Pompey's position, we had better speak of a proconsular *imperium*, covering a *provincia* which was constituted by several *provinciae* and the command of all forces east of Italy. This practically amounted to an *imperium maius*, for there was hardly a chance for a provincial governor to oppose any of Pompey's actions. Legally, however, it seems more likely than not that it was still an *imperium aequum*. Though Appian in his description of Pompey's power clearly exaggerates, it should not be overlooked that he expressly states that the *imperium* of the *Lex Manilia* was the same as that of the *Lex Gabinia* (*ἐπὶ τῆς ὁποίας ἔξοντις*). The reasons for avoiding the *imperium maius* must still have been the same as a year before.

We realize that the special grant of an *imperium maius* as part

<sup>15</sup> I cannot accept Gelzer's view (*loc. cit.*, p. 36; *Pompeius*, p. 89) that Pompey's *imperium* in the provinces not directly under his command was an *imperium maius*.

of an extraordinary command was far from being acceptable even when it concerned a person of Pompey's standing. This observation is confirmed by the fact that about a decade later, in 57 B. C., an unsuccessful attempt was made at introducing it. Cicero (*Ad Att.*, IV, 1, 7) tells us that, when Pompey was given the *cura annonae per quinquennium . . . toto orbe terrarum*, a second proposal was moved by Messius, but defeated, to add not only overwhelming financial and military power, but also *maius imperium in provinciis quam sit eorum qui eas obtineant*. The involved way in which Cicero describes this power seems to confirm that it was something quite new. Mommsen (II, p. 655, n. 2) compares this *imperium maius* with that of the consul as the original leader of a military expedition;<sup>16</sup> but if it had been nothing else, how are we to explain the excited opposition which after this "unbearable" proposal regarded that of Cicero as "modest"? Pompey was not a consul, though his *imperium* was again *pro consule*. Messius, it is true, *omnis pecuniae dat potestatem et adiungit classem et exercitum*, and the question could easily be raised whether a *curator annonae* needed strong military forces at all. Still, the senate at that time must have got used to big commands, and it seems more likely that the main objection was to a legal power which by tradition was incompatible with a proconsular *imperium*.

Last calls this case the last in the Republican history of the *imperium maius* (type A), and the next episode, the *imperium* of Brutus and Cassius, is "at least the prelude to monarchy." It sounds surprising that not the position of Caesar, but that of his murderers, gains such a title; we shall return to this question. Mention, however, should here be made of Pompey's position during the later years of the Triumvirate. He then ruled the two Spains by *legati*, and Caesar (*B. C.*, I, 85, 8) calls this *novi generis imperia*. Is this mere propaganda? In a sense, Pompey's position was a repetition of that established by the Lex Gabinia. But for one thing, the military task in Spain did not require special sub-commanders as did the war against the pirates; least of all did it require legions in Italy. Moreover, Pompey not only stayed in Rome, but in 52 he combined his proconsular *imperium* with the consulship — for some

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Cic., *Ad Att.*, VIII, 15, 3, quoted above, p. 116.

months even *sine collega*. Whether we take this position as an accumulation of two *imperia* (as Caesar probably did) or imagine the proconsular *imperium* as swallowed up in the consular one, Pompey's position was, in fact, that of a dictatorship without the odious name.<sup>17</sup> And yet, legally there was no *imperium maius*, apart from that normally inherent in the consulship and naturally incapable of justifying Pompey's present position. Constitutional forms had been used to confer unconstitutional power. The view has often been expressed that Pompey in 52 created a precedent for the Principate.

The result of our investigation into the nature of the "ordinary" type of *imperium maius* during the Republic is that it remained what it had originally been, the *imperium* of a higher magistrate, in particular the consul, in relation to a lower magistrate or promagistrate. Beyond this, there was what can perhaps be described as a cautious gradual approach towards combining such an *imperium maius* with an extraordinary command, though it is more important to realize that the obstacles proved too strong and that that stage was never reached.

### 3.

The second type of constitutional *imperium maius* is that of the extraordinary magistrate. The dictator, originally called *magister populi*, whatever the origin and the early history of the office,<sup>18</sup> is—together with the *magister equitum*—the one legal extraordinary magistrate in the unimpaired constitution of the Republic. The wisdom of the institution is obvious. Its chief aim was to provide a single military leader in times of emergency, the *dictator rei gerendae causa*,<sup>19</sup> without endangering the unmonarchical or even anti-monarchical nature of the *res publica*. The dictatorship was therefore limited to a maximum

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Gelzer, *Pompeius*, p. 186.

<sup>18</sup> These questions, much discussed in recent years, are beyond the scope of this paper. Views differ widely, but there is at least some agreement in the negative: the *magister populi* was not a magistrate created as the *unus collega maior* of the two consuls.

<sup>19</sup> In Degrassi's list of dictators (*Inscr. Ital.*, XIII, 1, 622 ff.) we find for the whole period from 501 to 202: 49 *dict. rei gerendi causa* or *seditionis sedandae et r. g. c.* (17 extant and 32 supplemented), compared with 32 (19 + 13) of other titulature.

extension of six months, while, on the other hand, it provided power originally free from *provocatio* and *intercessio*, overriding all other *imperia* everywhere and all the time. The dictator had a *vis maior ad coercendos magistratus*; he could even threaten the *tribuni plebis* with removal from office (Livy, V, 9, 6 f.). This incident of the fifth century, which can be open to doubt, finds its parallel in the full light of history when in 203 B. C. the dictator P. Sulpicius *pro iure maioris imperii consulem in Italiam revocavit* (Livy, XXX, 24, 3).<sup>20</sup> It is obvious from a number of passages mentioned by Mommsen and Last that the consuls served in war under the dictator's *auspicia* and were generally subordinate to his command. I should hesitate to say that consuls and praetors "tended to become something like the dictator's *legati*" (Last, p. 159), because they still held their *imperium* outside the military sphere; even a dictator would not easily interfere with the praetorian jurisdiction or the consul's right of convening the senate. We are, however, bound to emphasize the difference in the relationships between the various *imperia*; although only for a limited period and in conditions of emergency, the dictator's *imperium maius* was permanently and everywhere in force.<sup>21</sup>

If we disregard (as I believe that in this context we can) the position of the *decemviri legibus scribundis*, the earliest example of an overriding power similar to that of the *dictator rei gerendae causa* is Sulla's dictatorship. Ever since Mommsen described both Sulla's and Caesar's dictatorships as "ausserordentliche constituerende Gewalten," it has become customary to separate them from the old Republican dictatorships and to treat them as strictly outside the constitution. I believe that this view is open to serious objections and that the two dictatorships have

<sup>20</sup> Cf. also Livy, VIII, 32, 3; *Dig.*, I, 2, 2, 18; Mommsen, II, p. 155.

<sup>21</sup> This description does not include the relation between the dictator and the *magister equitum*. The latter's legal position is anomalous. Rosenberg (*R.-E.*, IX, col. 1207) speaks of a relation identical with the consul-praetor relation. Cicero, *De Leg.*, III, 3, 9, gives him *par ius* with the *iuris disceptator*, i. e. again the praetor. In the order of offices, however, the dictator figures above the consul, the *magister equitum* between praetor and censor, i. e. as the lowest magistrate *cum imprio* (Mommsen, I, p. 562). The anomaly of the position of the *magister equitum* culminated in the co-ordination of Minucius with the dictator Fabius Maximus (cf. H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, pp. 274 f.).

an important place in the history of *imperium maius*. I was glad to find my own silent non-acceptance of the prevalent opinion supported by Wilcken<sup>22</sup> in an eloquent, though in parts highly controversial, paper.

It is true that, when Sulla became dictator, the ancient office of the same name had been out of use for about 120 years (Vell., II, 28, 2). Mommsen (III, p. 1240) recognized its decline in the third century from the fact that Hannibal's march against Rome in 211 did not lead to the nomination of a dictator. Wilcken comes to a similar conclusion because as early as in the fourth and third centuries dictators were being appointed more frequently for the administration of less urgent tasks than previously, such as *comitiorum habendorum caussa* or for purely religious duties like *clavi figendi caussa* and *feriarum constituanturum caussa*. In such cases the dictator took the place of a consul who was absent from Rome, a situation not uncommon from the later years of the Hannibalic War onwards.<sup>23</sup> Military emergencies arose beyond the seas, and an office of six months' tenure was no longer adequate to meet them. Thus it disappeared. An additional reason was that the ruling nobility more and more disintegrated into factions, the mutual jealousy of which must have been an obstacle to the voluntary and legal submission of senate and consuls to the higher, if temporary, *imperium* of a dictator.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> U. Wilcken, "Zur Entwicklung der röm. Diktatur," *Abh. Preuss. Akad.*, 1940, No. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Mommsen, III, pp. 156 f. Wilcken (p. 5) mentions among the "special, mostly non-military competences" even *seditionis sedandae et rei gerundae caussa* which appears in 368 B.C., though Degrassi supplements it for 494 B.C. *Sed. sed.* sets a task of domestic emergency; it would be a legitimate variety of *rei ger. c.* even if it stood alone. The titulature *comit. hab. c.* appears first in 351 and dominates the period down to 202. It involved important political business, and in 208 was even combined with *rei ger. c.* Thus, Wilcken's argument does not quite stand exact scrutiny, but the fundamental results are not impaired. Degrassi's list still shows ten [*rei ger. c.*] between 345 and 301, but none during the Pyrrhic and the First Punic Wars.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. in general Scullard, *op. cit.* (with Gelzer's review, *Historia*, I, pp. 634 ff.). There is no doubt that the misuse of the office by the two brothers Servilius in 202 had something to do with its discontinuance (Scullard, pp. 80 f., 278 f.). But this is "the occasion rather than the real cause of the end of an institution of which the authentic form had ended in 216 with the last *dictator reigerundae caussa*" (Scullard, p. 279).

The needs of the growing empire, on the other hand, increasingly required the employment of capable and independent commanders abroad. When in 210 Scipio took over in Spain he probably was the first *privatus cum imperio*.<sup>25</sup> This was a break with constitution and tradition which showed that as early as that the existing constitutional forms were no longer adequate, while the need of individual leadership in times of internal or external pressure remained. For a long time, no real solution was found, though no dictator was legally appointed after 202. The anxieties of the conservative majority of the senate are still reflected in the charges against the Gracchi that they were aiming at monarchical power. The senate eventually found the right expedient in the *senatus consultum ultimum* which fittingly replaced dictatorial power. When Optimus in 121 B. C. thus received the senate's backing which enabled him to proceed against Roman citizens, Plutarch (*C. Gracch.*, 18, 1) describes him as "the first to use dictatorial *imperium* during his consulship."

The gap of 120 years does not disprove *a priori* that Sulla intended to revive, and to some extent did revive, the ancient office. The cumbersome process by which he had himself nominated (since no consul was available) and his prompt nomination of a *magister equitum* clearly resulted from his desire to follow the legal traditions as far as possible. He naturally could not accept the six months' limitation. In the letter to the *interrex* who was to nominate him he proposed to rule "until the city, Italy, and the whole empire, which were shaken by civil and external wars, were firmly set up again" (App., *B.C.*, I, 98). This gave him full freedom to terminate his dictatorship whenever he liked. Perhaps Wilcken is right in assuming that as early as then Sulla was determined to abdicate one day, though that cannot be proved. I do not think his contemporaries saw more than an empty phrase in the words quoted, and it seems unlikely that at that moment even he would have acknowledged any "compulsion to abdicate."<sup>26</sup> This is a first important difference between the two forms of *dictatura*.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. W. Schur, *Scipio Africanus u. d. Begründung der röm. Weltherrschaft* (1927), p. 24; H. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War* (1930), p. 113; A. Momigliano, *Bull. Comm. Arch.*, LVIII (1930), pp. 33 f.

<sup>26</sup> Wilcken (p. 7): ". . . die mit der Diktatur verbundene Abdankungspflicht."

A second difference is in their competences. Sulla had not only “to quell the revolt and to wage war”; in fact, he had finished with that when he became dictator. He set himself the task of reconstructing the state, and therefore he became *dictator legibus scribundis et reipublicae constituendae* (App., *loc. cit.*). The title does not appear in inscriptions or on coins, nor is it extant in the *Fasti*; but it seems justifiable to trust the literary evidence. If we assume (as we obviously must) that the ancient office had always been qualified by the description of a special task, though it was usual to speak of its holder simply as a dictator,<sup>27</sup> we have no right to doubt that the similar evidence about Sulla is equally correct.<sup>28</sup> The title *leg. scrib. et r. p. const.* describes the task and the position of the man who was to give Rome a new constitution and new laws and who therefore stood above all existing laws. If somebody wants to argue that, because this was so, Sulla’s position was outside constitutional boundaries this cannot be simply denied; but even so it remains true that he had developed what had been a purely constitutional power. It can also be asserted that a dictatorship of this kind implied—in contrast to the traditional forms—that there was no fixed time limit. Nobody but the dictator himself could decide when in his view the state was “set up” again. A symbol of Sulla’s position is the fact that he had his lictors not only *militiae*, as the old dictator used to have, but inside the *pomerium* as well.<sup>29</sup> The lictors at the same time symbolise Sulla’s unrestricted *imperium maius*: δικτάτωρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπάτοις ἦν (App., *B. C.*, I, 100), as the dictator of old within the framework of his smaller task.<sup>30</sup> Sulla held the *imperium maius* of the dictator in its original form, that is to say, constitutionally free from *provocatio* and *intercessio*.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, it is not

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Mommsen, II, pp. 156 ff.; p. 703, n. 3.

<sup>28</sup> Sulla, of course, did not issue his laws by his dictatorial power only; in true constitutional practice, they were sanctioned by the people. In this as well as in the emphasis on *legibus scribundis* he seems to have followed the example of the *decemviri*; but they had been in office almost four centuries earlier, and there was no connecting link between.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Mommsen, I, p. 383.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. also the description of Sulla’s ἐξοντα in Plut., *Sulla*, 33, 2.

<sup>31</sup> Mommsen, II, pp. 734 f.; *provocatio domi* against the dictator was allowed (Festus, p. 198), probably from 300 B.C. onwards (Mommsen, II, pp. 163 ff.).

surprising that his rule, unlimited as it was in power and extent, and preceded by the terror of the proscriptions, appeared to most Romans then and later as tyranny and *dominatio*.

Sulla took care not to abolish the consulate, although he put a ten years' interval between two tenures of the office, thus limiting its political influence (App., *B. C.*, I, 100). He went, however, one step further than simply to keep the office going. In 80 B. C. he became a consul himself (App., 103). This has generally and, I think, rightly been interpreted as a first step towards ending the dictatorial régime. It implies, on the other hand, that Sulla was dictator and consul at the same time, and while he had a consular *par imperium* in relation to the other consul of the year, he retained his own dictatorial *imperium maius* which gave him power also over his colleague. It has been shown that the title of *imperator* became more frequent during the second and the beginning of the first century.<sup>32</sup> This was due, above all, to the growing importance of the acclamation of a victorious general by his soldiers whose loyalty to their commander became increasingly influential. But when Sulla called himself *imperator* and the Greeks translated it by *αὐτοκράτωρ* (*O. G. I. S.*, II, 442), this meant more than the great and victorious general. It was, in fact, an expression of the dictator's *imperium maius*.

To sum up, we can say that Sulla, while founding his position on that of the dictator as the traditional holder of an unlimited *imperium maius*, gave it a form shaped by the conditions of his own time and the task which he had set himself. This "new-model dictatorship" (Last, p. 162) was, so it seems, modelled after the old dictatorship, although it had outgrown its limitations.

Caesar's first dictatorship (49 B. C.) rested on a nomination similar to that of Sulla, that is to say, on an attempt to adhere to legal procedure—in the sense of the old office—as far as the situation permitted. As Cicero had foretold (*Ad Att.*, IX, 15,

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Momigliano, *loc. cit.*, pp. 42 ff.; G. de Sanctis, *Studi Riccobono*, II, pp. 57 ff. The earliest example is Scipio in 209 (Livy, XXVII, 19, 4), although Momigliano (cf. also Rosenberg, *R.-E.*, IX, col. 1141) has some doubts about it, because Polyb., X, 40, 5, does not use the word *αὐτοκράτωρ*. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, p. 66, unhesitatingly speaks of a proconsular command and of the *imperium minus* of the propraetor Iunius Silanus.

2), a praetor took the place taken by the *interrex* in Sulla's nomination. Caesar abdicated after only eleven days. This fact seems sufficient reason for his not having appointed a *magister equitum*; his later actions put it beyond doubt that in this respect he did not intend any deliberate departure from the tradition. During the eleven days Caesar held elections (*B. C.*, III, 1, 1), made some urgent financial arrangements, extended full franchise to the Transpadani, and acted as dictator in celebrating the *feriae Latinae* (*B. C.*, III, 2, 1). Two of these activities were connected with the ancient office by tradition, and that was Mommsen's reason for his original reconstruction of the *Fasti Capitolini*, which he later discarded and which Wilcken again accepts: *dict. sine mag. equ. comit. habend. (et fer. lat.?) c.*<sup>33</sup> Thus Caesar was not, as Mommsen assumed, *dictator rei publicae constituendae*, a title out of place at this early stage and, in fact, excluded by the abdication after eleven days. On the other hand, it goes too far to call this first of Caesar's dictatorships one of those "with smaller competences of a special character" which often lasted for a few days only (Wilcken, p. 16). If it ended after eleven days it did so chiefly because of Caesar's keen desire to get on with the war (*B. C.*, III, 2, 1 f.). He would hardly have taken the trouble to celebrate the *feriae Latinae*—hard pressed for time as he was—unless he had become a dictator at least partly for this very purpose. Thus it is likely that his *dictatura* included in its official titulature: *feriarum Latinarum causa*, though, as we have seen, this need not have appeared in the *Fasti*. It was certainly more important to get constitutional life going again. That was done by fulfilling another of the traditional tasks of a dictator, and the one which for a long time had been predominant: that of holding the *comitia*. It is fully justifiable to include this function in the reconstructed *Fasti*. Caesar could have hardly made it more manifest than by accepting these two traditional tasks that he wished to stress the appearance of legality. This is indeed what we should have expected him to do after his attitude before the outbreak of the Civil War. But it is equally significant that he

<sup>33</sup> Degrassi has only *com. hab. c.* and not *fer. lat. c.*, and that is probably right. It was quite common that minor tasks were not mentioned in the *Fasti*, if there was already a major title connected with the dictatorship (cf., e.g., Scullard, *Roman Politics*, p. 277, note VIII).

did not feel bound to the narrow limitations set by the titulature of his dictatorship. When during those few days he imposed a number of important measures, he extended the competence of his office and made use of its general *imperium maius*.

Immediately after Pharsalus, Caesar was nominated *dictator iterum* by his fellow-consul who also appointed Mark Antony *magister equitum* (Dio, XLII, 21, 1; cf. Cic., *Phil.*, II, 62 and 71; Plut., *Ant.*, 8, 4). The former nomination followed the legal procedure, although Caesar began his term of office not before he was in Alexandria, probably in October 48. Antony's nomination was not quite legal, since normally the *magister equitum* was appointed by the dictator himself. But as it was done at Caesar's request, this was a minor and purely formal alteration caused by Caesar's absence from Italy; the spirit, if not the letter, of the law was maintained. Mommsen regards this dictatorship again as a *dictatura r. p. const.* of indefinite time-limit in the Sullan style; but Dio (XLII, 20, 3) and Plutarch (*Caes.*, 51, 1) expressly assert that for the first time in history a dictator was nominated for one year. Dio also tells us (21, 1 f.) that the augurs objected to Antony being *magister equitum* for a whole year, and this remained one of the complaints when Antony was later blamed for his illegalities (Dio, XLV, 28, 1; XLVI, 13, 1). We have no right to doubt the tradition of a one-year dictatorship.

It has been shown<sup>34</sup> that Caesar's *denarius* with the inscription *dict. iter. cos. tert.* does not necessarily prove that he still held his second dictatorship when already consul for the third time (i. e. in 46); the coin legend can be explained as a first example of the custom which later became normal of showing the highest offices reached so far. Hirtius' *aureus* with *Caesar cos. ter.* belongs to that part of 46 when Caesar had abdicated his second and not yet started on his third dictatorship (Jan. 1-April 6). If Wilcken is right, Caesar was actually not dictator from October 47 onwards, and for the rest of the year only *cos. design. III.* Antony too, of course, was *magister equitum* for one year only and played no part during the winter and spring (Cic., *Phil.*, II, 71). It is not surprising that Caesar, with the prospect of difficult campaigns still before him and, on the other

<sup>34</sup> By H. A. Andersen, *Cassius Dio u. die Begründung des Prinzipats* (1938), pp. 23 ff.

hand, enjoying himself in Egypt, could not accept a six months' time-limit. But it is perhaps surprising that he accepted the one-year limit. It was, I believe, a matter-of-fact alteration of the old and obsolete rules, but no violation of the prevailing general concepts of public life in which the annual term of office was a normal feature. Is it really necessary to assume that Caesar needed the analogy of the annual dictators of Alba to conceive the idea?<sup>35</sup> As for the titular competence of the second dictatorship, it is hard to say what it was. Wilcken, following others, thinks of *rei gerendae caussa*, and this is likely enough.

The question arises whether between his second and third dictatorships Caesar was without an *imperium maius*. We should certainly expect that he was not. As a consul he held the normal *imperium maius* from January 1, 46; but that alone would hardly have been what he needed, and during the last months of 47 he had not even that. Wilcken believes that Dio's statement (XLII, 20, 1) that he was *πολέμων καὶ εἰρήνης κύριος* means that important powers were expressly conferred upon him. Dio mentions this under the year 48; but he adds: *προφάσει τῶν ἐν Ἀφρικῇ συνισταμένων*, which makes the conclusion almost inevitable that it belongs to the winter 47/6. But what is the Latin equivalent of *πολέμων καὶ εἰρήνης κύριος*? I do not think there is one, and Dio's statement seems not very helpful—unless it is an inaccurate description of Caesar's "military" *imperium* which clearly included the right to declare war and conclude peace. Caesar naturally retained the command of his army after his dictatorship had ended. But I refuse to believe in a military *imperium* separate from all magisterial power. That probably means that Caesar still held a proconsular *imperium*, but if it was to serve his purposes it had to be a general *imperium maius* of the dictatorial type, to be held not only in the East but even in Italy and Rome.<sup>36</sup> If this is so (and it remains hypothetical) it would have been the first time that a dictatorial

<sup>35</sup> Wilcken, pp. 20 f., following a remark by Mommsen (II, p. 172), stresses Caesar's relation to Alba and thinks it likely that he knew and followed the story as told by Licinius Macer that the Roman dictatorship had derived from Alba.

<sup>36</sup> I do not know whether Dio's vague statement would justify the assumption that Caesar received the dictatorial *imperium maius* by a formal decision of the senate.

*imperium maius* was linked to a general proconsular *imperium*, and thus encroached on the field in which even the consular *imperium maius* had not been established. We shall see that exactly this kind of position came into being after Caesar's death, a fact which gives some support to our view of the power which Caesar held in the winter 47/6.

After Thapsus Caesar received the annual dictatorship for ten years (Dio, XLIII, 14, 4). Thus a recurrence of the time gap in his dictatorial power was prevented in future. Wilcken assumes that, apart from the extension over ten years, this was simply a repetition of the second dictatorship. However, although Caesar had still to fight his last campaign in Spain, his real task was no longer *rem gerere*. His competence could, of course, be nothing less than that, but it could be more—in fact, something more appropriate to what his aims were henceforth. He was given the *praefectura morum* for three years,<sup>37</sup> and that makes it abundantly clear that he no longer felt inclined to keep close to Republican traditions. While Lepidus was made *magister equitum* (Dio, XLIII, ind. 1, 1; 33, 1), he was also Caesar's colleague in the consulship (Dio, *loc. cit.*; Plut., *Ant.*, 10, 2). Since the ten years' tenure was fixed beforehand, Caesar's annual designation<sup>38</sup> was a mere formality. Mommsen, and Wilcken with him, even take it for granted that these designations were all pronounced at the same time in 46: "this was the form in which the ten years' dictatorship was conferred." Although the annual principle was nominally maintained, there was little left of the old magistracy. It seems possible that this at last was a *dictatura rei publicae constituendae*, the only title, if there was one at all, which then was really suitable for Caesar's aims, the one which Mommsen wanted to attribute to all of Caesar's dictatorships. Perhaps our view is supported by the consideration that Caesar's triumph in 45 was no longer one over external enemies as that of 46 had been (App., *B. C.*, II, 101; cf. Vell., II, 56, 2), but was officially celebrated as one over Roman citizens (Plut., *Caes.*, 56, 7 f.; Dio, XLIII, 42, 1), that is to say as one falling under *rei publ. constituendae* rather than *rei gerendae caussa*. There is no particular difficulty in assuming that Caesar's dictatorships did not always bear the same title;

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Adcock, *O. A. H.*, IX, p. 931, n. 5.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Bell. *Hisp.*, 2: *dictator tertio, designatus dictator quarto*.

as late as 45 B. C., any specific title must have meant little to him. Nor was Caesar compelled to abdicate every year before he began the next year's term to which he had been designated beforehand. At that date, constitutional niceties had ceased to count, and dictatorship had become the vehicle of absolute power, a true *imperium maius infinitum*.

From this "full-size" dictatorship it was only a small step to the permanent dictatorship of 44. In its psychological effect, however, it was a great change indeed, for it did away with the nominal re-designation and thus made Caesar's position an open *dominatio*. He abdicated as *dicator IIII* and became at once *dicator in perpetuum*. The form of the magistracy remained, but in its content and very character it was replaced by a rule contrary to all Roman traditions. If the ten years' dictatorship had been *rei publ. constituendae*, the permanent one could not be less. The view that a *dictatura rei publ. constituendae* is incompatible with a *dictatura in perpetuum*<sup>39</sup> rests perhaps on a conception more legalistic than Caesar in 44 would have admitted; but though that objection need not be accepted, it seems quite possible that the permanent dictatorship had no qualifying title.

Caesar created a new form of dictatorship; but if our investigation is not mistaken, that form was the culmination of one coherent development which could be traced from the ancient Republican office through Sulla's rule and Caesar's various forms of dictatorship.<sup>40</sup> The dictatorial *imperium maius* ended in monarchy.

#### 4.

It now seems possible to draw some conclusions from the double trend of the history of *imperium maius*, which we have tried to trace. We repeat that the type which we have sometimes called the consular *imperium maius* was a normal feature of regular constitutional life, which could not be easily adapted to the exigencies of later times. The other type was confined to the dictatorship, that is to say, to an extraordinary, though originally equally constitutional, magistracy. This type was taken up, however altered and extended, by the two revolutionary dictators Sulla and Caesar. We have called it the dictatorial

<sup>39</sup> Wilcken, p. 25; cf. Mommsen, II, p. 714.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Last, *C. A. H.*, IX, pp. 283 f.

*imperium maius*, and there seems no possible objection to that name. We may call the other type "consular," as long as we keep in mind that the proconsular *imperium* was, in fact, *pro consule* and therefore not different in kind.<sup>41</sup> Otherwise the type could only be called the non-dictatorial *imperium maius*.

The Republic in its latest period was faced with the frequent necessity of investing the holders of certain special commands with overriding power. We saw that the senate showed the greatest reluctance to grant an *imperium maius* to a holder of a proconsular *imperium*. Pompey, under the Lex Gabinia and again after his second consulship, held proconsular power, but not an *imperium maius*. If his followers had succeeded in having it conferred on him, it would have been of the non-dictatorial type: *maiis imperium in provinciis quam sit eorum qui eas obtineant*. Sulla and Caesar, on the other hand, used the dictatorial *imperium maius* to master civil disruption on a scale never experienced before. The further history of *imperium maius* was shaped not only by their example, but also by the conditions of state and empire, by the danger of complete disruption. Dictatorship died on the Ides of March, but the dictatorial *imperium maius* survived.

Caesar, while creating the most powerful form of *dictatura*, had, in fact, degraded the character of the office and of its *imperium maius*. He went so far as to delegate his power to men without office or senatorial rank. "The constitution was mobilised for its own destruction by the weapon of the *imperium maius*."<sup>42</sup> But the weapon was fatal only because it no longer expressed the Republican spirit, and had become the weapon of monarchical revolution. It is significant that Caesar's coins usually show *DICT* but never *IMP*. The dictatorial *imperium maius* had once been a legal basis for extraordinary, though temporary, power. Legality and temporariness had gone, and with them most of the substance of what was characteristically Roman. Nothing remained but the fact that the *imperium* was extraordinary. Although it is true that this quality was at the

<sup>41</sup> See note 14 above. The words ordinary and extraordinary which we have used occasionally to distinguish the two types are perhaps better not used, because they have a fixed meaning with reference to magistrates or commands.

<sup>42</sup> M. Grant, *From Imperium to Auctoritas*, p. 413.

very core of the old office, Caesar's notorious cynicism, which ridiculed not only Sulla as an illiterate in politics but the *res publica* as a mere name without substance (Suet., *Caes.*, 77), shows that in the end naked power no longer cared for the cloak of respectability and tradition. One by one, the constitutional rules decayed and became empty forms which after the dictator's death were used even by the protagonists of *libertas* without much respect for Republican traditions.

Brutus and Cassius when they went out to the East held proconsular *imperia*. But while they were mobilising against the Caesarians they held unlimited power covering the *transmarinae provinciae* "from the Ionian Sea to Syria" (Livy, *Per.* 122; App., IV, 58; cf. III, 63; Vell., II, 62, 2). Grant assures us (p. 414) that "no doubt, in view of their scruples, only a tenure for the duration of the emergency was envisaged." However that may be, Brutus, at any rate, overrode the *imperium* of Hortensius, proconsul of Achaea, Macedon, and Illyricum.<sup>43</sup> The liberators, by force of circumstances, were not free to act simply as Republican magistrates. If naturally they did not expect to retain their power *in perpetuum*, it was left to them to decide when they would give it up. Although it was an *imperium infinitum* as far as the East was concerned, it was not *aequum* like Pompey's in 67. Their position was similar to Sulla's dictatorship, based on a dictatorial and not only a consular *imperium maius*. If we have been right about Caesar's position during the winter of 47/6, Brutus and Cassius followed his example. If that assumption is mistaken, it was in 43 B. C. that men who held only a proconsular *imperium* were first invested with a general *imperium maius*. This *imperium maius* was of the dictatorial type, another proof that the consular type could not be given to the holder of a proconsular *imperium* in his relations to other holders of such an *imperium*.

That Brutus and Cassius held a dictatorial *imperium maius* is confirmed by the fact that other Republicans had different ideas.<sup>44</sup> Cicero had previously proposed (*Phil.*, XI, 30) a proconsular *imperium* for Cassius which was to be *maiuss* in relation to any governor in whose province Cassius would be present.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Grant, pp. 33 f.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Last, *J. R. S.*, XXXVII (1947), p. 162.

Cicero maintained Republican standards though he went beyond what in our view had been Pompey's position. His proposal of a non-dictatorial *imperium maius* was not accepted; it would probably have proved impracticable.

As regards the dictatorial powers of the *tresviri r. p. c.*, true Republicans proclaimed that their *imperium* was illegal and that the consular *imperium maius* was as different from that of the triumvirs as *libertas* was from despotism.<sup>45</sup> Appian (V, 19; 43; 54) attributes such an attitude to L. Antonius who in his description becomes a somewhat idealised figure. There was propaganda on both sides, but it reflected the genuine fight which still went on between the dying Republic and the rising Monarchy.

There can hardly be any doubt that Octavian retained a dictatorial *imperium maius* down to 27 B. C., though there may still be disagreement on his exact legal position between 32 and 27. There were many analogies, though perhaps more differences, between his career and that of Pompey.<sup>46</sup> From the beginning Octavian had some legal advantages over Pompey, but against Grant (p. 418) it must be upheld that at first his *imperium—pro praetore*, though *cum consularibus ornamenti* (Cic., *Phil.*, V, 45 f.; *R. G.*, I, 5; Livy, *Per.* 118)—was not an *imperium maius*. It was granted on January 7, 43,<sup>47</sup> and this date became the *dies imperii*, as from that date Octavian-Augustus was never without *imperium*. There is, however, a second day, August 19th, when, in the same year 43, Octavian entered his first consulship. Tacitus says (*Ann.*, I, 9; cf. Dio, LVI, 30, 5): *idem dies accepti quondam imperii princeps et vitae supremus*, because it was also the *dies tristissimus* of Augustus' death in A. D. 14.<sup>48</sup> Tacitus wants to stress the coincidence of the two dates of beginning and end; but we can also say that it was August 19th which for the first time gave Octavian an *imperium maius*, naturally of the consular type.

If Augustus held any *imperium maius* after 27 B. C., this,

<sup>45</sup> Cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, p. 208, n. 1.

<sup>46</sup> For the comparison Pompey—Octavian cf. W. Weber, *Princeps*, I, pp. 130 f.; Gelzer, *Abh. Preuss. Akad.*, 1941, No. 14, pp. 26 f.

<sup>47</sup> See Ehrenberg and Jones, *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tibcrius*, p. 44.

<sup>48</sup> Ehrenberg and Jones, p. 50; Tac., *Dial.*, 17, 2, is confused.

according to Last, must also have been of the same type. Augustus seems to claim this by his famous sentence in *R. G.*, 34 about his having no more *potestas* than his colleagues. The complement to this statement is, of course, the claim: *auctoritate praestiti omnibus*. Chilver<sup>49</sup> has rightly reminded us that, although *auctoritas* and *potestas* may be antithetical concepts, they were not incompatible; in fact, they were interdependent. As our intention was to deal only with Republican times, we may perhaps simply conclude with the reminder that Augustus could hardly be satisfied with an *imperium maius* exercised only when it collided with another proconsular *imperium*, and that a proconsular *imperium* combined with a dictatorial *imperium maius* had possibly been held by Caesar before he accepted a ten years' dictatorship, and was certainly assumed in 43 by the very defenders of the Republic.

VICTOR EHRENBURG.

LONDON.

<sup>49</sup> *Historia*, I, p. 425.

## THE PROPITIATION OF ACHILLES.

At the end of her recently published book, *Homer and the Monuments*, Miss H. E. Lorimer turns from archaeology to poetry and gives a detailed analysis of the *Iliad* and of the *Odyssey*. She sets out to show that in spite of discrepancies and other weaknesses each poem is an artistic unity bearing the stamp of single and not of multiple authorship. Miss Lorimer treats the difficulties in the two poems with exceptional candour. She never attempts to make light of them or to explain them away by special pleading. This forthright approach leads her in her study of the *Iliad* to put forward a suggestion which is both arresting and disturbing.

This suggestion arises from the speech which Achilles makes in reply to Patroclus early in Book XVI. This speech is one of the crucial passages of the *Iliad*, crucial in its bearing on the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon, and no less crucial in its bearing on the quarrel between unitarians and analysts. It is crucial in this second sense because Achilles appears to leave out of account the offer of amends made to him in Book IX. In the course of this speech (XVI, 49-100), Achilles tells Patroclus that he will not return to the battlefield. He might do so if Agamemnon treated him kindly (71-3). Patroclus must fight in his place (64 ff.). He must, however, remember that Achilles is anxious to recover Briseis and to receive compensation for her loss (83-6). Therefore he must not push his attack too far. If he scores a decisive victory on his own, he will make Achilles lose face (86-90), and in this event (so at least we must suppose) restitution will not be made.

“The whole of that speech excludes the idea that the restoration of Briseis had already been offered.” So writes Leaf,<sup>1</sup> and his view is probably shared by all the analysts, all who believe that the *Iliad* was elaborated by a succession of poets.

Miss Lorimer agrees that this passage is inconsistent with Book IX.<sup>2</sup> She no doubt thinks that unitarians tend to under-

<sup>1</sup> *The Iliad*, vol. I. p. 770.

<sup>2</sup> *Homer and the Monuments*, p. 463.

estimate the difficulties of the passage, and here it is hard to disagree with her. But she herself is a unitarian. She therefore concludes that Homer himself added Book IX together with VIII and X, which cannot stand independently of Book IX, after the rest of the *Iliad* had been completed.

This is not altogether a new idea. Schadewaldt suggests that Homer himself may have been responsible for introducing certain minor modifications into his own work.<sup>3</sup> Miss Lorimer applies the idea in a much more drastic form. But certain objections occur to one at once. For instance, Thetis in Book XVIII (448-50) seems to know about the embassy in Book IX, while the final settlement of accounts between Achilles and Agamemnon in Book XIX lays the greatest emphasis on the gifts offered previously. If Homer was careful to make these books conform, why was he careless with Book XVI? Again, even if Book X is a later addition,<sup>4</sup> could Homer's *Iliad* have ever existed without Book VIII, the book in which Zeus at last decides to carry out his promise to Thetis and bring about the utter defeat of the Greeks, the book which in other words announces the programme for the next phase of the war?

No less serious are the objections that can be raised on general grounds against the alleged insertion of Book IX. No one could prompt them more effectively than Miss Lorimer herself. She writes:<sup>5</sup> "The book is an organic part of the *Iliad* and its removal would be a mutilation. The value of the poem would be grievously lowered, and that in respect of qualities which are most truly Homeric. Not only is the tension increased, the suspense heightened: the whole situation acquires a new depth and significance as we watch a tragic hero prepare his own doom." There follows a somewhat dubious interpretation of Book IX, which, however, does not diminish the force of the argument which the author directs against herself. Miss Lorimer concludes: "The death of Patroclus would be rather a lamentable stroke of fortune than the work of the man whom he loved and who within the limits of a haughty and vindictive nature did love him. Nothing short of the consciousness of guilt could have broken Achilles and so given us a glimpse of the nobility which

<sup>3</sup> W. Schadewaldt, *Iliasstudien*, p. 165, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See Schadewaldt, *op. cit.*, p. 142, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 480.

in spite of all had its part in him.” Apart from the last, tendentious remark, few would quarrel with this statement. The remorse that strikes Achilles when he hears of Patroclus’ death is only intelligible when it is viewed against his refusal of amends in Book IX. With the memory of that lost opportunity to prompt it, his remorse is a proper, and in fact a noble, expression of self-condemnation; without it, it is merely an outburst of hysteria. But what Miss Lorimer has previously said is much more significant. Can we really believe that Homer could ever have intended to compose a tragedy that was merely “a lamentable stroke of fortune”? Would he have ever embarked on a theme so lacking in moral seriousness, so essentially un-Homeric? The change which Miss Lorimer presupposes is not merely quantitative, not just a matter of more tension and more suspense. It completely transforms the poem and makes it into something new. She herself implies as much: “the whole situation acquires a new depth and significance.” If so, can we really believe that any change so radical was a mere afterthought? General considerations alone make Miss Lorimer’s suggestion highly suspect. Nor can it be justified on more particular grounds. In the first place, there is one detail in the speech made by Achilles in Book XVI to which only Book IX can give a meaning. In lines 61-3 Achilles says: “I did indeed say that I would not end my anger until the shouting and the battle came to my ships.” These lines, which cannot be omitted without destroying the sense, refer to Book IX, lines 650-5: “I shall not think of war and bloodshed until wise Priam’s son, noble Hector, comes to the huts and the ships of the Myrmidons, killing the Argives, and besmirches the fleet with fire. Then at my hut and my black ship I think I shall curb Hector, eager for battle though he be.” If Achilles had not felt himself bound by this decision in Book XVI, he would have had little excuse for still refusing to fight. After all, his hope, expressed in Book I, 409-12, that the Greeks should be penned together at their ships, is already fulfilled.

Nor are the “discrepancies” between Book XVI and Book IX “incurable,” as Miss Lorimer asserts.<sup>6</sup> The first of these occurs in XVI, 71-3: “They would soon run away and fill the

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 482.

channels with their dead if only King Agamemnon had kindly feelings (*ἡπτα εἰδεῖη*) for me." The analysts think that the last remark is inconsistent with Book IX, although Leaf very scrupulously argues that the inconsistency is more apparent than real. "Of course," he writes,<sup>7</sup> "Agamemnon has done all in his power to show friendliness to Achilles in the Embassy, which therefore appears to be ignored; but it is no doubt true that *ἡπτα εἰδεῖη* refers to the whole course of Agamemnon's action." This misses the point from the outset. Leaf assumes that Agamemnon's offer had been kind, but Achilles did not think so. He thought, rightly or wrongly, that it was a mean and cowardly trap, as we shall find later. Consequently there is no discrepancy. What Achilles says about Agamemnon in this passage is in complete harmony with his views about Agamemnon's behaviour in Book IX.

Finally, there is the difficult statement of lines 83-6: "Listen while I bring to your mind my last decisive word, so that you may win me great honour and glory from all the Danai and they send back to me that lovely girl and offer me fine gifts as well." This statement may well have influenced Miss Lorimer more than any other in framing her conclusions. Certainly the analysts are entitled to ask if Achilles has forgotten that these very things were offered to him in Book IX. If so, how can Book IX be reconciled with this statement? The analysts assume that it cannot be; Book IX must be a later addition to the poem. The unitarians sometimes agree that it cannot be reconciled, in which case they resort to athetesis; sometimes they rob the passage of its emphasis, like Schadewaldt, who even so has to admit that there is a "slight discord";<sup>8</sup> and sometimes, like Monro (*ad loc.*) and Drerup,<sup>9</sup> they assume a change of mood on the part of Achilles. He did not want Briseis and the presents before; he does want them now. Now it is true that Achilles is apt to change his mind. For instance both in Book I and in Book IX he threatens to return to Thessaly and then decides after all to stay. But in both cases the change of mind is accompanied by a change of mood, which is due in

<sup>7</sup> In his textual note *ad loc.* Monro concurs.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 130. He translates line 83 "Hör mir, was ich dir ans Herz lege."

<sup>9</sup> *Homerische Poetik*, I, p. 365.

Book I to the intervention of Athene, and in Book IX to the affectionate behaviour of his friends. In neither case is the change arbitrary. Here it would be highly arbitrary; nothing prepares us for it. No; so long as Achilles is resigned to staying at Troy, retribution is one of the things he wants;<sup>10</sup> only, and this is the vital point, he must have it on his own terms and in his own time. That is one reason why the offer made by the embassy in Book IX was unacceptable, as we shall see.

If, then, restitution is something which Achilles had to reject in Book IX, but still greatly desires in Book XVI, how is he to secure it, with Patroclus just going off to fight? Actually he is faced with a dilemma. He had said that he would not fight until Hector came storming up to his hut. Had he waited for this to happen, a victory over Hector might have been suitably followed by an honourable reconciliation and a profusion of gifts from the grateful and repentant Greeks. But now that he has relented to the extent of allowing Patroclus to fight, it is virtually certain that Hector never will reach Achilles' hut. So Achilles has effectively blocked his natural re-entry into the battle and with it any immediate prospect of gaining restitution by his own efforts. Patroclus must act for him. But it is a hazardous business; hence the careful instructions: "Listen while I put into your mind my last, decisive word." If Patroclus goes too far and wins an overwhelming victory, it is he who will get the glory. "You will make me all the more dishonoured" says Achilles bluntly (XVI, 90) just after this passage. Patroclus must go so far and no further. He may clear the lines. If he does this, the Greeks, we must suppose, will *unconditionally and unreservedly* give Achilles all that he expects in the way of restitution and gifts and honours, reserving for him alone the credit for their delivery at the hands of Patroclus and the Myrmidons, whom he had sent to their aid when all seemed lost. Of course, when restitution is in fact made, Patroclus is dead and Achilles no longer cares very much whether he has it or not. But that is because Patroclus is dead, not because Achilles ever doubted whether restitution was worth having in itself. If, then, we can assume that Achilles rejected the offer when it was

<sup>10</sup> Schadewaldt, *op. cit.*, p. 130 points out that Achilles never speaks of renouncing Briseis.

originally made in Book IX, not because it was improper in itself, but because it was made in the wrong spirit at the wrong time, the statement which we have just been considering seems not unintelligible. What is more, if this interpretation is sound, there no longer exists any inconsistency between any part of this puzzling passage in Book XVI and any part of Book IX, and the single authorship of the *Iliad* can be defended without resorting to Miss Lorimer's honest, but desperate expedients.

To complete the case for such an interpretation, we must examine Book IX in order to see if we are justified in suspecting that Achilles had special reasons for rejecting the offer made to him at that time. But in passing, we may notice Book XI, lines 608-10, a passage which has also caused joy to analysts and sorrow to unitarians. Achilles, who has taken no part in the proceedings since Book IX, has been watching the Trojan attack on the camp from the stern of his ship. He calls to Patroclus, who is to go and find out the name of a wounded man who is being carried away from the battle. This is a turning-point in the story since the enquiry leads ultimately to Patroclus' participation in the battle and his death. Achilles begins by saying "Now, noble son of Menoiteus, my heart's delight, I think that the Achaeans will be standing at my very knees in supplication. For the plight that has come upon them is past all bearing." The analysts point to this passage as a further proof that Book IX is a late insertion. If the embassy in Book IX is an original part of the poem, why, they ask, does Achilles speak as if no overtures had yet been made? Unitarians are hard put to it to find an answer.<sup>11</sup>

The way to a simple solution, however, has been indicated by Schadewaldt.<sup>12</sup> The emphasis in the passage falls on *περὶ γούνατ' ἔπι*, "at my knees," and on *λιτόσομένος*, "in supplication." It is true that the Greeks made an offer of restitution in Book IX. But they did not come as suppliants nor did they speak like suppliants. They attempted to impose certain terms; Achilles must first relent. Suppliants do not impose terms. They beg for forbearance and hope for the best. At the present juncture this no doubt is what Achilles hopes for and looks forward to. He fore-

<sup>11</sup> See for example the all too subtle distinctions drawn by Drerup, *op. cit.*, I, p. 366.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

sees not a negotiated bargain, but an abject surrender, possibly with Agamemnon as beggar-in-chief. At one moment, in Book XIV, we almost expect the offer to be renewed under these conditions. Hector has broken through to the ships and Agamemnon is in despair. But his morale is restored by Diomede and Poseidon, a counter-attack is staged, and the crisis passes. And when the crisis recurs in Book XV, it develops with such rapidity that there is no time for a formal deputation, only for Patroclus' frantic appeal. But this is by the way. We need return to the present passage only to draw what appears to be the obvious conclusion. If Achilles here says nothing of the previous embassy this is not because he has forgotten it or the poet has chosen to ignore it. The reason is merely that the earlier deputation and the one which Achilles now has in mind are two entirely different things. The embassy of Book IX approached him in a way which he found disagreeable. This one, if it takes place, will conduct itself with a most gratifying humility. Here too the difficulty turns out to be an illusion.

This passage, like the passage at the beginning of XVI, shows clearly that Achilles was bent on obtaining full amends for his injury. Why then did he reject the offer made to him in Book IX? Was the offer itself inadequate or was it made in the wrong spirit? Critics are hopelessly divided on this point. For example Professor C. M. Bowra<sup>13</sup> thinks that the offer is a generous one and that it absolves Agamemnon from all guilt, while Achilles by perversely rejecting it puts himself in the wrong and thereby deserves the further suffering that is coming to him. Professor S. E. Bassett<sup>14</sup> comes much nearer to the mark. He argues that the offer itself is inadequate because it deals with the injury on a low plane, as if the taking of Briseis merely involved a material loss to Achilles and not also an affront to his honour. There is no mention of any apology. The offer is also made in the wrong spirit. Odysseus presents it without the slightest expression of sympathy or friendship for Achilles. Therefore Achilles was bound to reject it. Part of what Bassett says is true so far as it goes, but it hardly goes far enough. Otherwise, he seems to stress certain points unduly at the expense, and even to the neglect, of others that are more important.

<sup>13</sup> *Tradition and Design in the Iliad*, pp. 18 ff.

<sup>14</sup> *The Poetry of Homer*, pp. 195-9.

Odysseus (lines 225-306) explains that the Greeks have suffered a severe defeat. It is doubtful if they will save the ships. The Trojans are encamped outside the wall and Hector boasts that the next day he will break in and set the ships on fire. Achilles must bestir himself and save the Greeks; otherwise it will be too late. He must remember his father's advice and put an end to his anger. "Agamemnon offers you worthy gifts *μεταλλήξαντι χόλοιο*, if only you relent" (260-1). A list of gifts follows:—cauldrons, gold, horses, slave-women, the return of Briseis herself, a city to sack, and later, after the return to Greece, a daughter to marry and seven towns to rule over. "This will be accomplished for you *μεταλλήξαντι χόλοιο*, if only you relent" (299). Having thus repeated at the end of the list, the formula with which he had introduced it, Odysseus closes with an appeal for compassion.

"No apology," writes Bassett,<sup>15</sup> "Not a word of friendship."<sup>16</sup> These omissions are surprising, but they do not go to the root of the matter. Incidentally, no apology is made even in Book XIX, when the ceremony of restitution is finally carried out. And in any case it is reasonable to assume that Achilles is more decisively influenced by what Odysseus does say than by what he does not.

What does the offer imply? Just this, that Achilles is to recover Briseis and get all the other things *provided that he first relents*. The offer is thus conditional and therefore, as Achilles sees it, not genuine. Rightly or wrongly, he feels that he is the object of a plot and his reply to Odysseus makes this abundantly clear. Agamemnon is trying to trap him (345, 375). The offer is only a "scheme . . . which they have planned" (423-6). And once Agamemnon has persuaded him to fight, there is no guarantee that he will not behave as outrageously as he did before. Once bitten, twice shy (375-6). So far as Achilles can tell, Agamemnon is not genuinely sorry; he merely wants to inveigle Achilles on to the battlefield. His aim is primarily not to appease Achilles, but to make a convenience of him. The injury being what he thought it was and the offer being what he thinks it is, Achilles is bound to be implacable. He may have been mistaken in his interpretation, but the mistake

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 199.

was one which an aggrieved and haughty spirit in the throes of hatred and mistrust could hardly avoid making.

Not only does Achilles refuse the offer; he also threatens to return home. He no longer thinks glory worth fighting for and, furthermore, is apparently no longer interested in securing amends for his injury. What is the cause of this violent reaction? It is probably wrong to look for a completely lucid explanation. After all, Achilles is not in a rational frame of mind and many different strains and stresses are at work in him. But Homer does not usually leave things to chance; in fact he normally thinks that two excellent reasons are better than one good one. Now most of Achilles' strains and stresses have been operating for some time. Therefore we ought at least to look for a new factor powerful enough to tip the scale and induce this new mood of indifference and despair. What is this new factor?

We have seen that Achilles regards the offer as a plot. But there is more to it than this. For him it is not merely a plot, but a plot in which his best friends are implicated. They have all "ganged up" with Agamemnon. This is made plain by Achilles when he says (lines 345-7): "He will not convince me. No; with you, Odysseus, and the other leaders must he consider how to keep off the raging fire from the ships." And again in lines 612-14 he warns Phoenix not to play Agamemnon's game; if he wants to be a friend of Agamemnon, he cannot go on being a friend of Achilles. Bassett, in his comments on the embassy,<sup>17</sup> makes much of the fact that Achilles has for many days been neglected by his friends. But arguments based on what may or may not have been happening behind the scenes, just like arguments based on what is not said in speeches, are apt to miss the point. We must keep our eyes on the text. However neglectful of their social duties his friends may have been in the past fortnight, the one thing of which Achilles here and now is certain in his own mind is that his friends have betrayed him; before he was dishonoured, now, except for Patroclus, he is without friends. It is not altogether surprising that he is utterly disillusioned and thinks of throwing in his hand. That this in fact is what brings about his decision to leave is shown by what follows. Phoenix takes up the appeal and in the course of his

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

speech introduces a touching reminder of the affection that he has always felt and still feels for Achilles (485-95). This appeal does not affect the attitude of Achilles to the offer of amends, but that does not mean that it does not influence him at all. It does make him waver in his decision to go home. "At dawn," he tells Phoenix, "we shall consider whether to return to our country or stay here" (618-19). Still more marked is the effect which Ajax produces. Ajax reminds Achilles that the envoys are guests beneath his roof, guests moreover who "aspire above all others to be the nearest and dearest to you of the Achaeans" (640-2). Assured in this way that his friends are still friends, Achilles talks no more of going home and obviously means to stay. His rejoinder to Ajax is the remark quoted earlier, that there will be no fighting for him until Hector reaches the huts and ships of the Myrmidons (650-5). Thus, although the embassy fails in its purpose, the ground lost by Odysseus is finally recovered by his colleagues. Drerup<sup>18</sup> and others are utterly wrong in implying that the embassy is without result. It is of course ineffectual as an embassy. But it does lead, as Bassett so admirably shows,<sup>19</sup> to one most important result, namely the fatal decision of Achilles to stay, but not to fight of his own accord until Hector reaches his own part of the camp. But to say that it leads to a result is an understatement. If this analysis is sound, it moves towards its conclusion in accordance with a simple, but grand design, skilfully conceived and brilliantly executed.

In his reply to Odysseus, Achilles seems to give up any idea of obtaining restitution. But this renunciation is only temporary. His decision to stay brings it back into the picture.

What changes, then, are required in order to make it acceptable? Bassett would say, the addition of an apology.<sup>20</sup> But, as we have noticed, no apology is made in Book XIX. And yet honour in some form is due to him; Achilles says so in his reply to Patroclus ("that you may win me great honour . . .", XVI, 84). Actually it takes the form of a banquet, proposed by Odysseus (XIX, 179-80): "But later let him gratify you with a rich banquet in his hut, so that you may not lack anything that is due to you." This proposal is seconded by Agamemnon .

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, p. 366.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 196

and the banquet is the one which is so reluctantly and perfunctorily attended by the mourning Achilles at the beginning of Book XXIII (35-61). One may think that a banquet is rather a niggardly way of expressing great public esteem. To a Greek it probably seemed good enough. After all, eating at the public expense in the Prytaneum (*σίτησις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ*) was one of the highest honours that an Athenian could win for his services to the state.

Secondly the offer must be made without conditions. The guilty party must sue for forgiveness. If anybody is to state terms, Achilles himself will do it. This is why for a moment in Book XI he gloats over the picture of himself receiving a deputation of suppliants pleading under extreme duress.

Extreme duress. This is really the key to the situation which Achilles has in mind, this, together with the humiliation of Agamemnon. In his reply to Odysseus Achilles said that no gifts, however sumptuous, would win him over unless Agamemnon "made up for the whole grievous outrage" (IX, 386-7). What this means can be seen if we turn back now to Book I. There, in lines 407-12, Achilles asks his mother Thetis to intercede with Zeus "to see if he will consent to help the Trojans and pen the Achaeans, while they are slaughtered, by the sterns of their ships and along the seashore, so that they all may have joy of their king, and the far-ruling Agamemnon, son of Atreus, too may recognise his blind folly in failing to honour the best of the Achaeans." In other words, Agamemnon is to suffer for the outrage he has committed by undergoing the humiliation of a disastrous defeat. Nothing is said here about restitution, but this, the humiliation of a disastrous defeat, is clearly the setting in which Achilles would like restitution to be made. That at least is what Thetis thinks and she, if anybody should know, because she is both a goddess and Achilles' mother and should be able to read his mind, if anyone can. She translates Achilles' request to Zeus in the following terms (I, 508-10): "Olympian Zeus, our maker of plans, I beg you to repay him for his loss and bestow strength upon the Trojans until the Achaeans make amends to my son and advance him in honour." Agamemnon must be taught a lesson that he will never forget. According to Achilles he deserves no less. And being Agamemnon, he will not make an offer that is genuinely and wholeheartedly intended

to satisfy Achilles' pride until he has learnt his lesson. The offer of Book IX was made at a time when Agamemnon feared disaster, but had not yet experienced it. The time was therefore not yet ripe for the one party to act contritely and for the other to respond without suspicion. In Book XI, the conditions are more favourable. Disaster seems imminent. If Agamemnon cares to send a deputation of suppliants to Achilles or even to come as a suppliant himself, Achilles will find it hard to resist such an appeal, and Agamemnon may save himself from defeat. But in spite of this an offer delivered under such conditions might not be unwelcome to Achilles, for although Agamemnon would avoid the humiliation of defeat, he would do so only by incurring another humiliation no less severe, that of abasing himself in person or by proxy before the man he had wronged. However, these are day-dreams. The moment when they might have become real passes away. Generally Achilles thinks of the restitution as taking place not under the immediate threat of a debacle but in consequence of it. When the crisis comes to a head, Patroclus appeals to Achilles and Achilles cannot resist his friend's entreaties or wait for the disaster to reach the climax that was to have been the signal for his own intervention. Patroclus must intervene in his place, but must do so, nevertheless, without spoiling Achilles' chances of obtaining amends. This, as we have seen, is why Achilles reads Patroclus his coolly calculated memorandum on reparations and war-aims (XVI, 83-6). And what happens in the end? Patroclus dies; so Achilles after all relents first and receives the gifts afterwards, just as he had been asked to do in Book IX.

Homer more than once describes a wise man as one who looks backwards and forwards (*πρόσσω καὶ ὄπίσσω*). This is what he himself does all the time in his poetry. It is strange, and yet not so strange, that he forces the same procedure on his interpreters. This study began with Book XVI and made its way forward to Book XXIII and backward to Book I, in pursuit of a single thread, the theme of the restitution due to Achilles. Its aim was to show that this thread is spun throughout the *Iliad* with consistency and singleness of purpose. How far it can be said to bear upon the question of authorship is for others to judge.

## CATULLUS, 35.

The cumulative comment on this poem, although massively learned and very informative, leaves the reader with a sense of disappointment; he feels that he has learned much, but that he still does not know what the poem means, what its author's purposes and intentions were, and what he wished his readers to know and to feel. For the commentaries leave unanswered, or answer only in a hesitating and uncertain way, the questions which are really crucial: why did Catullus invite Caecilius to come to Verona? Why is he so insistent on haste? Why does he allege that a *puella* has been Caecilius' reason for hesitation? Why does he declare that the *puella* conceived her passion for Caecilius upon reading his *incohata Dindymi domina*? Why does he make such a point of the *unfinished* character of Caecilius' work? On these primary questions hang at least two others: what were the *cogitationes* of vs. 5, and who is the *amicus suus meusque* of vs. 6? Until these questions are answered in a sensible and plausible, if not in an authoritative way, we cannot say that we have really understood Catullus' poem; it remains nebulous and vague, and thereby loses much of its charm and its poetic validity.

The reasons for our failure to answer these crucial questions are not far to seek. They lie in our concept of the commentator's task. He has been expected to gather, sift, and record under appropriate lemmata such factual material as will identify persons and places, indicate dates, explain syntactical peculiarities, demonstrate sources and influences, and illuminate style. We have required him to confine himself to that which can be proven or at least substantiated by objective data; we demand that speculation and theorizing be based on such data and kept to a minimum; we frown on flights of the imagination and exclude personal and subjective judgments. By this method we have learned a great deal, and it is probably true that our use of it has given us a vastly clearer and sounder view of ancient literature than was possessed by those who stood much nearer to it in time. Whenever it can answer our questions, it is the method to be preferred above all others.

Sometimes, however, it falls short of its goal, and, as in the case of the poem we are here discussing, leaves us without the understanding which we need, and which is the ultimate aim of all scholarship. For the factual data on which to answer the questions raised by Catullus' poem are not now available, and in all likelihood never were. They were known to Catullus and to Caecilius, but probably to very few, if any, others. The fact that Catullus included the poem in his published works (or that his literary heirs did so, if we wish to insist that Catullus did not publish his poems himself) shows clearly enough that the poem was expected to have meaning to its ancient readers, even without a background of factual data; the poet felt that his readers should be able to supply out of their own minds the conditions and presuppositions which gave the poem its meaning. In short, he expected them to use their imaginations; he may even have felt that some share of the joy in reading poetry was derived from the creative activity of the reader's own mind.

If the commentators had been willing to accept this view and had truly confined themselves to the listing of appropriate factual data, all would have been well. Unfortunately this is not the case, for they have gone farther and have attempted to answer by the objective method questions which were never intended to be so answered. Their answers, as might have been anticipated, are equivocal, hesitant, and unsatisfactory; far from revealing meaning, they serve only to obscure it. They create problems where none exist; they leave the reader with the discouraging feeling that a lifetime of learning will never reveal meaning to him, that the obvious meaning can never be right, and—worst of all—that ancient poetry had best be laid aside as incomprehensible.

The application of the objective method to the crucial questions raised by Catullus' *c. 35* has resulted in several confusing and obfuscating answers. We are told that Caecilius may have been a member of the school of *novi poetae*, and that Catullus' invitation had something to do with that fact. This answer is based on an objective study of the adjective *tener*. Since it does not matter whether Caecilius was a *novus poeta* or not, the statement that he "may have been" one only confuses the issue by bringing in irrelevant considerations. No objective answer to

the problem of haste can be found other than the suggestion that the poet may have been expressing himself jocularly, a theory based on the obvious hyperbole of vss. 8-15. The best reason that can be adduced for the appearance of the *puella* in the poem is that Catullus wished to pay her a compliment. Here the editors have recourse to a literal reading of *Sapphica puella Musa doctior*, vss. 16-17. One editor, Baehrens, has noted the importance of the word *incohata*, and has suggested that by its use Catullus wished to express his critical opinion of Caecilius' poem — i. e. that it needed more work — but few have followed him in this suggestion, and Baehrens himself, having made it, drops it without carrying it through to its logical conclusion. To most editors, *incohata* presents only a problem in translation: does it mean "unfinished," i. e. a rough draft of the whole, or "just begun," i. e. just the introductory lines. This is a problem which does not even exist, as a study of the dictionaries *s. v. incohare* should have shown. As for *cogitationes*, the objective method has led to some very strange theories — that it means "certain weighty matters" (Merrill), "unbekannte Mitteilungen" (Riese), "progetti poetici" (De Gubernatis) and "something political" (Ellis). The obvious meaning of "thoughts" seems to have been discarded for little reason other than that it was obvious. *Amicus suus meusque*, the editors say, means either Catullus himself, or a third party, some mutual friend of Catullus and Caecilius; parallels are cited in support now of the one, now of the other. When the decision is for the third party, no attempt is made to explain his presence, but much is made of the question of his identity — a question which cannot be answered and does not need to be, since the identity of this putative third party has no bearing on the meaning of the poem.

The insidious aspect of such comment lies in its leaving the reader with the feeling that this is all that can be done; if meaning is not thereby revealed, then he must conclude that meaning cannot be revealed, and that any attempt on his part to discover meaning will be necessarily speculative, subjective, and unscholarly. Yet is this not to deny the very nature of poetry? Is not the poet's chief function to lay before us images and ideas, whether abstract or concrete, which are to have meaning for us, as they had for the poet himself, because of the implications

and associations discoverable in them by the exercise of the two functions of imagination and reason? And if this be granted, does it not then become the task of the commentator, after he has gathered and absorbed all available and pertinent factual data, to apply his imagination and his reason to the discovery and revelation of meaning? No doubt it will happen from time to time that different scholars will come up with different meanings for a given poem. But this is a fault that not even the objective method has been able to obviate, and in any case is it true that a poem, like a problem in arithmetic, can have only one right "answer"? Ideally, we should like to find, finally and incontrovertibly, the meaning which the poet himself intended, yet how often can we be sure of doing this, even with our own English and American poets, let alone with an author some two thousand years dead? If we avoid anachronisms, absurdities, and impossibilities, if we take due account of all facts that are available, if we conscientiously familiarize ourselves with our author, his methods and habits of thought and expression, the meaning which we eventually discover cannot in the nature of things be too far wrong. And if my meaning is different from, or even contradictory to, yours, have we done anything but demonstrate the essential richness of the poem in question? Certainly a plurality of meanings is better than no meaning at all.

To return now to our example, Catullus, *c.* 35, let us see what can be done. We may begin with two facts, both objectively demonstrable; the first, that this is an "occasional" poem, i. e. a poem based on an incident of some sort, the second, that the key to its meaning will probably be found in its concluding line or lines. For the first fact nothing but an examination of the poem is necessary; it is an invitation, and an invitation must always arise from some set of circumstances, or incident. For the second, a quick glance at almost any group of Catullus' short lyrics (or "iambics," if we prefer to use his own term) will demonstrate his habit of placing the key thought, the unifying idea, at the end. (Rather than list the examples of this practice, I should challenge the reader to find one in which this is not the case.) Now it is certainly true that if we are to understand an occasional poem, we must have a reasonably clear picture of

the occasion on which it is based, or out of which it grew. If we may assume that Catullus had the sound poetic sense to know that a brief lyric must preserve unity of thought — and will anyone deny that he did? — then the key thought or unifying idea at the end of the poem should be related in some logical or at least plausible way to the occasion which suggested the poem.

Let us begin, then, with the concluding thought: *est enim venuste Magna Caecilio incohata Mater*: “It is indeed a charming piece of work, that unfinished ‘Magna Mater’ of Caecilius.” Now there are only two ways in which we may interpret this remark. It means either that Caecilius sent Catullus the “first draft” of his poem, hoping that Catullus might have some suggestions which would aid him in the writing of a finished version, or that he sent him a version which he (Caecilius) considered finished, but which Catullus felt needed further work. Whichever of these alternative explanations we may eventually adopt, we certainly now know why Catullus invited Caecilius to come to Verona: it was so that he might discuss Caecilius’ poem with him. This reason, and only this reason, ties the beginning and end of Catullus’ poem together; any other suggestion destroys its unity. There is nothing in the poem which contradicts this reason for Catullus’ invitation or makes it improbable or illogical; furthermore, it does not require us to assume the existence of any elements not revealed by the poem as it stands. It presents a plausible connection between the occasion for the poem and the key thought of the poem. Above all, it is simple and natural, and does not require for its apprehension any learned apparatus or collection of factual data — and we must remember that the ancient reader probably knew very little more than does the modern about the special relations or circumstances which prompted the writing of the poem.

The next question — why is Catullus so insistent on haste? — both compels and enables us to make our choice between the two alternative explanations of the concluding line of the poem. For if Caecilius sent Catullus an acknowledged “first draft,” why should Catullus have been in such a hurry to discuss it with him? There would appear to be no reason why Caecilius, under such circumstances, should have been told that “if he was smart” (*si sapiet*), he would “burn up the road” (*viam vorabit*)

from New Comum to Verona. The admonition, *si sapiet*, with its abrupt hint of trouble if Catullus' invitation is not complied with at once, precludes the supposition that his demand for haste is motivated by his own enthusiasm and excitement: we cannot say that he was so full of ideas that he could hardly wait to impart them to his friend. Furthermore, how are we to account for the repetition of the word *incohata*, and for its presence in the key line of the poem? If Caecilius had represented his work as only an unfinished version, why should Catullus have felt it necessary to remind him twice of something he already knew and had himself acknowledged? And does not the final, critical line of Catullus' poem fall a little flat if it merely records an obvious fact, known to both parties from the beginning?

If, on the other hand, we follow Baehrens in seeing in *incohata* a *tacita censura* of Caecilius' work, we find a ready explanation both for Catullus' haste and for the repetition and critical position of the word *incohata* itself. To take the second, and simpler, problem first, the word is repeated for the sake of emphasis and is placed in the critical final line for the same reason. Thus Catullus tells Caecilius, and also his subsequent readers, that he considers Caecilius' work "unfinished," and that this is to be the main consideration in the conversation which he wishes to have with him. In effect, he is saying, "Your poem is charming, but in its present form, it won't do: it needs additional work. Won't you come and talk this over with me?" Since Catullus was notoriously impatient with "unfinished" poetry (see e. g. cc. 17, 95), and since *venustas* was one of the qualities he most prized, the phrase *venuste incohata* becomes a neat and subtle oxymoron, and thus gives excellent point to the concluding line of his poem. If one wonders why Catullus bothered to be so subtle and so indirect — wonders, in other words, why he did not come out flatly with his critical opinion, one may find justification for his indirection in either of two ways: his reason may have been purely literary, in that it gave him the opportunity of creating point in his final line, or, as Baehrens suggests, he may have used indirection because he wished to soften the blow and to avoid unduly hurting or discouraging his young friend. Since, as the phrase *meus sodalis* shows, Caecilius was a friend of his, and since Catullus was very sensitive about hurt-

ing, even in a small degree, those whom he loved (see e. g. *c.* 12, esp. 10-17), the latter theory appears the better; moreover, as I shall show later, this theory is more nearly in harmony with certain other parts of the poem.

If then, the poem had been regarded by Caecilius as "finished" but by Catullus as still "unfinished," we can now find a possible approach to the problem of haste. If we may assume that Caecilius had sent his poem to Catullus in the hope of admiration and praise, rather than of criticism, and if he had indicated his intention of releasing the work to the public immediately, we can at once see why Catullus is in a hurry: he wishes to prevent premature publication. Caecilius was a young man (for whatever else *tener*, vs. 1, may mean, it certainly indicates the poet's youth); he was inexperienced; he had not felt, as Catullus doubtless had, the crushing force of critical condemnation. Catullus can visualize what will happen to this enthusiastic and promising young poet if his poem gets into the hands of the critics in its present form. This same consideration helps to explain Catullus' own gentleness in offering his *summatum* opinion that the poem needed further work. Thus he says to Caecilius, "Come, and come quickly!" And why did he not simply say, "Don't publish yet!" Again, it was in order to spare Caecilius' feelings and to avoid discouraging him, for the indirect hint is always less deflating than the direct statement.

This argument becomes more conclusive, and is more nearly consonant with the rest of the poem, if we assume that Catullus' poem is his *second* invitation to Caecilius. The abrupt, even if jocularly exaggerated, phrase *si sapiet viam vorabit* is more intelligible if Caecilius had refused an earlier invitation, or had put Catullus off, alleging some previous commitment. Perhaps in his first note Catullus had simply suggested that Caecilius come to see him, hoping that his position of relative importance in the world of poetry would be enough to bring the younger man to him in time. But Caecilius had sent a vague reply, saying that he was "busy" and would "hope to come some time soon." Possibly, too, he had sensed that something was wrong, since Catullus' note had not contained the anticipated praise; he may have reiterated his own opinion that his work was finished and ready for the copyist. Now Catullus is really concerned:

the poem must not go out as it stands; Caecilius must come at once, no matter how "busy" he may be. In this poem, then, he insists on haste, and to show that he really has something to say to Caecilius, he lays before him, gently but insistently, his opinion that the work is not as well done as Caecilius thinks.

And see, too, where our argument is leading us: we can now explain the presence of the *puella* in Catullus' poem. For what is she, if not the excuse which Caecilius had offered for not accepting Catullus' first invitation? ("Thank you for your invitation," says Caecilius, "I shall be glad to come one of these days. I'd come now except that I'm much engaged with a *puella*, and I don't feel that I can leave her right at the moment.") There is of course nothing new or startling about this suggestion; there could hardly be any other reason for the inclusion of the *puella*. But we have now managed, as editors hitherto have not, to connect her with the other elements in the poem and to show how she is part of a carefully integrated and unified scheme of thought.

What, then, of the passage (vss. 8-17) which deals with the girl's passion for Caecilius and with her poetic taste? Catullus says that she has been madly in love with Caecilius ever since she first read his *incohata Dindymi domina*, and that her having been so is proof of her superlative poetic judgment; she is indeed "more skilled in the art of poetry than Sappho's Muse" (*Sapphica puella Musa doctior*). Her passion is alleged as the reason for Caecilius' rejection of Catullus' first invitation; she was so madly in love with Caecilius that she could not bear to have him leave, even for the relatively brief trip (about 100 miles) from New Comum to Verona. Is all this intended merely as a compliment to the girl, as Kroll suggests? Does not this suggestion introduce a foreign element into the poem, and disrupt its unity? For must we not seek elsewhere, along lines of thought not thus far suggested by the poem itself, to account for Catullus' compliment? If we do this, we shall find ourselves debating whether or not the girl was herself a poetess (Kroll) and even what her social position was (Friedrich), questions which cannot be answered by anything in the poem or by anything connected in any immediate way with its train of thought. Furthermore, are these lines truly complimentary? They have a distinctly hyper-

bolous quality — the girl's wild entreaties to Caecilius not to leave, as if he were about to go to the ends of the earth, and not just to Verona, the ascription of her passion to her having read Caecilius' "unfinished" poem, the assertion that she knew more about poetry than Sappho, the "tenth Muse," herself. The exaggeration is patent; if these lines were a compliment, they were a very clumsy one, and altogether too susceptible of an ironic interpretation.

How then can we connect them with the basic thought of our poem, logically, and without violating its unity? We may elaborate the character of Caecilius' excuse, and say that he refused Catullus' first invitation not merely because he was engaged with a girl, but specifically because she had begged him not to leave. In this case, Catullus is here indirectly quoting his friend's reply, when he says that the girl has thrown her arms about his neck and begged him a thousand times not to go (vss. 8-10). Or Caecilius may have said only that his *puella* preferred him not to go, and all the rest — her wild entreaties — may be Catullus' own invention.

Let us leave it at that for the moment, and pass on to the two questions of the origin of the girl's passion, and of her poetic taste and judgment. For the first, one can hardly imagine Caecilius' having himself declared that the reading of his poem had set the girl's heart afame (vss. 14-15). But he may well have asserted that his poem was an excellent piece of work, that he was proud of it, and felt that it was ready for publication. This very consideration, as we have seen, probably occasioned Catullus' concern, and motivated his own pointed declaration that Caecilius' poem was *incohata*. In this light, the lines may be seen to be Catullus' jocular reply to Caecilius' dangerously high opinion of his own work: "if it's as good as you say, perhaps it is the cause of that mad passion which your *puella* has conceived for you and which is now the cause of your refusing my invitation!" If this is true, then it is perhaps better to ascribe to Catullus, rather than to Caecilius, the picture of the girl's entreaties. Now the whole passage is a unit. Caecilius has refused Catullus' first invitation on grounds of his preoccupation with a girl, and has reiterated his opinion that his poem is a finished piece of work. Catullus laughingly puts the two

together, draws an amusing and exaggerated picture of Caecilius' sweetheart beseeching him to stay, and declares ironically that it must be that — “finished? no, my friend, unfinished!” — poem that has been the cause of her passion.

As for the matter of the girl's poetic taste and judgment, these can now be seen to be a natural outgrowth of Catullus' hyperbolous description of her love. They are in effect a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole idea. Such passion — if the poem is as good as Caecilius thinks — can be accounted for only on grounds that the *puella* is a person of remarkable literary discernment, a very *Sappho rediviva*. The jest would be cruel except for its good-natured and obvious humor; moreover it is rescued from cruelty by the last line of Catullus' poem. The oxymoron, *venuste incohata*, not only points up Catullus' opinion that Caecilius' poem needs more work; in addition it makes very clear his further opinion that that work is good, even if still unfinished. It is an excellent poem, full of promise of eventual *venustas*, but it must be worked over and polished before it is released for the critics to pounce upon. By this interpretation of the *puella* and the remarks which are made about her, we are brought back, as we should be, to the central and critical thought of the poem and to the circumstances and considerations which occasioned the writing of it.

In the light of this interpretation of the poem, there will be little difficulty in explaining the *cogitationes* of vs. 5 and the *amicus suus meusque* of vs. 6. For the *cogitationes*, are, as they ought to be, “thoughts.” What thoughts? What thoughts indeed, if not, as Baehrens again suggested, in a very hesitant way, the thoughts of someone about Caecilius' poem, someone's criticisms of that poem. To take the word in any other way completely disrupts the unity of Catullus' poem, and leads to wild and completely unfounded speculation (Ellis' “something political” is a triumph of in consequence). If our poem were made more meaningful by some other interpretation, we might forgive, although we should have to regret, its disrupted unity; but it is not made more meaningful; it is simply made obscure and puzzling. All that remains is to explain Catullus' choice of words. *Cogitationes* is rather vague and general, and suggests nothing about the nature or content of the “thoughts.” For

this there are two reasons. The general term is indirect, and therefore less likely to hurt and discourage Caecilius; it is thus of a piece with *venuste incohata* and the jocular, although emphatic, demand for haste. Further, the content of the thoughts is adequately suggested, or at least suggested as far as Catullus cares to at this point, by the rest of the poem, and particularly by the repeated *incohata*. After reading the poem, Caecilius cannot have been in much doubt as to what was in store for him at Verona.

As for *amicus suus meusque*, who again could this be, if not Catullus himself? He is certainly the "someone" whose "thoughts" he wished Caecilius to hear. There is no problem of Latinity here; the parallels in support of this interpretation are just as convincing as those on the other side. This being so, what is to be gained by disrupting the unity of the poem by introducing a third party? He merely raises the unnecessary question as to why Catullus, in a matter involving the judgment of poetry, should be reporting the thoughts of someone other than himself. It is certainly clear that Catullus did have an opinion about Caecilius' work; in point of fact, he writes in his poem about very little else. The "obscure" phrase *amicus suus meusque* is not really obscure at all; it is indirect, to be sure, and for the same reason that *cogitationes* is indirect. It is also mildly jocular. Its indirection and its jocularity are both for the purpose of reassuring Caecilius.

Now we can reconstruct the occasion for the poem, and tell its whole story. Caecilius has sent Catullus a copy of his *Magna Mater*, giving him the impression that he considers it a finished job, ready for publication. Catullus reads it, and becomes concerned. The poem shows great promise, but if it is released in its present form, it will be bound to bring down the critics on Caecilius' head, and possibly to hurt and discourage him. He invites Caecilius to come to see him, hoping that he need do no more than that. But Caecilius misses the point of the invitation, and replies that he can't come, since he is at the moment absorbed in a love-affair. Disappointed, too, that he had not received praise for his work, he reiterates his opinion that it is ready for publication. Now Catullus writes c. 35, telling Caecilius that he really must come, and quickly; he has certain

"thoughts" which he wants Caecilius to hear. His poem is excellent — so good, in fact, that the reading of it must have been the cause of that tremendous passion which Caecilius' lady has conceived for him, and which is holding him at New Comum. She is a girl of real taste! But he must come anyway; his work is charming but — unfinished. Thus we can see our poem for what it is, a graceful invitation and offer of help. Its prevailing note is a sensitive kindness, coupled with unswerving honesty. Catullus is anxious not to hurt his young friend and not to see him hurt by others. Caecilius has real promise; he must not be discouraged by over-harsh criticism. At the same time he must be told the truth, that his *Magna Mater*, however excellent and indicative of real ability, is far from finished, and must be carefully reworked before it will be acceptable as good poetry.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

FRANK O. COPLEY.

---

*SUPPLEMENTUM EPIGRAPHICUM GRAECUM*

THE TWELFTH and subsequent volumes of *S. E. G.* will take the form of an annual review of Greek Epigraphy. As far as possible, it will give references to work done during each year on or relating to Greek inscriptions, and will reprint new or emended texts. The arrangement of the contents will be by geographical areas, on the general pattern of the early volumes of *S. E. G.*. The editor and publishers are confident that this will be a service which epigraphists, and classical scholars generally, will appreciate and find helpful.

The editor would, therefore, be grateful if scholars who publish studies on Greek Epigraphy, or substantially using epigraphic material, would send him a notice (or if possible a reprint) of their work. Their co-operation in this way would be much appreciated, and would greatly aid him and the publishers in making *S. E. G.* as complete as possible.

All communications should be addressed to:—

A. G. WOODHEAD, Esq.,  
CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE,  
CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND.

---

Part II of Volume XI, which was left unfinished at the death of the previous editor, Dr. J. J. E. Hondius, will be published as soon as possible.

---

## REVIEWS.

FRITZ SCHACHERMEYR. *Poseidon und die Entstehung des griechischen Götterglaubens*. Bern, A. Francke AG Verlag, 1950. Pp. 221; map.

In late years Poseidon has been put into the foreground in the research of early Greek religion. Professor Wilamowitz gave voice to the opinion that Poseidon, the husband of the Earth, was the chief god of the Greeks before Zeus;<sup>1</sup> and Paula Philippson wrote a book<sup>2</sup> in which she tried to show that Poseidon was the oldest god of the Greeks, the husband of the Earth Goddess, who later split up into Zeus and Hades. There are some points common to her book and Schachermeyr's though he does not mention hers,—deservedly, for it is rather fantastic and arbitrary. He acknowledges the priority of Zeus (p. 131).

His is a remarkable work written by a scholar well known for his research in the prehistory of Greece and the neighbouring countries; in fact it is the first serious and well documented attempt to lift the veil which covers the genesis of a Greek god in prehistoric times through a fusion of Greek and indigenous elements.

The author takes it for granted that the Greeks immigrated with the beginning of the Middle Helladic age, about 1900 B. C., an opinion which is shared by most scholars, and during this age lived a rustic and sedentary life. Then, about 1570 B. C., came a sudden flash of lightning (*blitzte es mit einem Male auf*, p. 7); the Mycenaean age began. This is no less than a wonder and one may reasonably ask for a cause, an impulse which brought about the abrupt change from the sedentary, pastoral, and agrarian Middle Helladic conditions to the glorious efflorescence of the Mycenaean civilization. Many scholars think that it was due to a fresh invasion of Greeks.<sup>3</sup> But I do not quarrel with the author on this question. I take his standpoint as a working hypothesis.

I begin with ch. V, for in this the author lays down the premisses for the Indo-European, viz. Greek, elements of Poseidon. The horse existed in Central Europe from paleolithic times, but not in Greece where it appears only in Middle Helladic; horses' bones were found in the settlement of Malthi in Triphylia.<sup>4</sup> How the horse was used

<sup>1</sup> U. v. Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, I, pp. 211 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Paula Philippson, *Thessalische Mythen* (1944); cf. my review, *Gnomon*, XXI (1949), pp. 75 ff.

<sup>3</sup> The author recognizes only the invasion of the Greeks in the beginning of the Middle Helladic age and that of the Dorians at the end of the Mycenaean age. He says, p. 8, that the descendants of the immigrants split up into three dialect groups, Ionians, Aeolians, and Arcadians.

<sup>4</sup> I remark in passing that in Troy horse bones do not appear until the sixth city, where they are common (N. G. Geijvall, "The Fauna of the Different Settlements of Troy," *Bull. de la Société des Lettres de Lund*, 1937/8, ii, p. 4).

is uncertain, but it was not harnassed to the light war chariot which appears for the first time in the Mycenaean age. In these early times it may have been wild or half-wild, may perhaps have had some cultural significance. We do not know anything for certain.

The only means of penetrating into times before the separation of the Indo-Europeans into different tribes or peoples is to argue back from what is known of these peoples. The author reviews not only the available information about old peoples but also folklore in regard to the horse. He offers, of course, only a selection, for the materials are immense.<sup>5</sup> The associations (*Vorstellungskoppelungen*) are very various, e. g., the horse and the wind, the sun, etc., but the author selects those with the water, the Nether World, and Fertility. I think he ought to have paid more attention to another animal, often associated with the water,—the bull. It appears in old Norse mythology and is very prominent in Greece. The river god Achelous is represented with a bull's head. Pamisus is represented as a bull on an inscribed votive relief from his sanctuary at H. Floros in Messenia.<sup>6</sup> It may be more than a metaphor when Homer says that in the battle with Achilles the river god Seamander lowed like a bull.<sup>7</sup> Poseidon is called *taύpeios*, his servants at Ephesus *taύpot*, a festival of his *Taύpia*, a blackfigured vase represents him riding on a bull with the trident in one hand and a fish in the other.<sup>8</sup> This constant association of river gods with the bull, which certainly is old and pertains also to Poseidon, is passed over too lightly.<sup>9</sup>

Ch. II is devoted to the next task, to find out the most old-fashioned Greek cults and myths of Poseidon which may be carried back into the Middle Helladic age. The author finds them in some queer Arcadian cults and myths; in other provinces there are but slight remains. In these Arcadian cults and myths Poseidon is coupled with Demeter, but this Demeter has at her side another goddess, who is variously named: Kore, Soteira, often Despoina.<sup>10</sup> At Thelpousa the myth was related that Poseidon pursued Demeter who transformed herself into a mare. In the shape of a stallion he begat upon her the horse Arion and a daughter whose name is not to be revealed to those not initiated; hence Demeter was surnamed

<sup>5</sup> I venture to make two additions, one from the Bronze age of Scandinavia, the famous sun-chariot from Trundholm, a horse harnassed to a big, gilded sun-disc; and another from modern Swedish folklore in which the "brook-horse" (*bäckahästen*) is conspicuous. I have heard of a farmer who, when he wanted a drive, went down to the river and shook his horse-bit. Up came the brook-horse and let himself be harnassed.

<sup>6</sup> Reproduced in my *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I, pl. 50, 3; see further *ibid.*, p. 221, with note 10.

<sup>7</sup> *Iliad*, XXI, 237.

<sup>8</sup> Reproduced in Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, IV, pl. Ib.

<sup>9</sup> See p. 145 and p. 105: *Ganz ausser Acht blieben ja z.B. die dem Stiere geltenden Koppelungen (u.a. Stier—Wasser und Stier—Gewitter).* Sie spielen aber in die Poseidonvorstellungen nur als eine Art Beigabe hinein und sind für ihn wenig spezifisch. This is questionable.

<sup>10</sup> On the Arcadian "Great Goddesses" see also my *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I, pp. 450 ff.

Erinys. A like myth was told at Phigalia, but it is not said that Demeter bore a horse, only Despoina. She was called "the black one" and had an image with a horse's head in a cave: on its head were figures of dragons and other animals; in one hand she held a dove, in the other a dolphin, it is related. I add the last items which the author passes over. Other cults and myths are less important. I refer the reader to the book, pp. 15 ff. These myths are of course pre-Dorian, although partly combined with later elements.

The author emphasizes the chthonic character of the Arcadian Poseidon. He says, p. 15, that he *in den Augen der ältesten Griechen vor allem ja Unterweltsherr und Todesbringer gewesen ist*. This is not warranted by the testimonies. His reasons for such a statement are probably two presuppositions. One is that the horse is considered to be a chthonic animal which carries man to the Underworld. The learned treatise of Professor Malten<sup>11</sup> has not succeeded in demonstrating this thesis. The horse or the horse's head in a frame on the reliefs with funeral banquets does not refer to such a belief but is an indication of nobility: the dead man had been a horse-keeper. The other reason is that the author without question takes Demeter to be a chthonic goddess. He keeps to the time-honoured identification of fertility with the Nether World. Although very wide-spread, this opinion is not sufficiently well founded. Demeter was a goddess of sowing, mowing, and threshing, but her daughter was identified with the dreary Queen of the Underworld. How this came about I have tried to show in another book. Secondly the author identifies tacitly the Arcadian Demeter with the common Greek Demeter. Names are very unreliable evidence for identification. In fact the Arcadian Demeter is very dissimilar to the ordinary Demeter. She is one of the two Arcadian Great Goddesses who have special relations to the world of animals, not only to the horse. I refer to what was said above of the image of Demeter at Phigalia. At the temple of Lycosoura, where Poseidon Hippios was said to be the father of Despoina, terracottas are found with human bodies and heads of rams and bulls (or cows), and on a preserved part of the veil of Despoina of Damophon's statue human figures with heads of various animals are represented. It is not accidental that the Arcadian Demeter had Artemis at her side at Zoitia.

From these preliminaries we come to the synthesis. The immigrating Greeks brought with them the stuff of a religion but not anthropomorphous gods, the author says. They had Zeus; to this point I shall come back below. The author speaks even of a hostility to images on the part of the Indo-Europeans (e.g., p. 122); this is contradicted by the Bronze Age rock carvings of Sweden. Their religion was in an amorphous state. They had certain associations of which some are important for the genesis of Poseidon, namely the association of the divine with the horse: of the horse on the one hand with the Underworld and the belief in the dead; on the other with the liquid element (water, wells, lakes, rain, clouds). By this and by thunder and lightning fertility was favoured, says the author.

<sup>11</sup> L. Malten, "Das Pferd im Totenglauben," *Jahrbuch des deutschen archäologischen Instituts*, XXIX (1914), pp. 179 ff.

In Greece the Greeks found an anthropomorphous goddess, the Great Minoan Mother, an all-embracing goddess, Lady of the Underworld, of the Earth, and of Fertility. She had at her side a male partner. With her example the Greeks created the god Poseidon and made him her mate and gave him the name "Husband of the Earth," but he kept his theriomorphous shape of a horse and transferred it to Demeter too (e.g., p. 139). I cannot help seeing a certain contradiction in these two statements.

This construction is very ingenious, but I have grave doubts about its reliability. I shall not dwell on the questionable identification of Fertility and the realm of the Dead; but I am not able to believe in the syncretistic, theological concept of the Great Mother, although I know that she is the vogue among many scholars. In spite of the author's tacit rejection I keep to my well-considered critical attitude.<sup>12</sup> He feels obliged to call in the Great Mother of Asia Minor in support of the thesis (p. 124) and to give a nod to the rejected view, writing that the question is not of a single goddess but of a cycle of ideas and representations which sprouted up around the principle of the female deity (p. 123). But conceding that this syncretistic goddess existed in Minoan Crete at some time, is it probable that she existed on the mainland of Greece at the time when the Greeks immigrated and brought about the end of Early Helladic and the beginning of the new Middle Helladic age? We know nothing at all of the religion of the mainland in these early times, only that its civilization was backward. Further, the concept of the Great Mother is inferred from monuments which belong to Late Minoan or the later part of Middle Minoan. None goes back into Early Minoan. It seems rash to state that she was worshipped as early as Early Minoan and at all events that in this age she was known in the mainland. To this objection there is a hint of reply in the author's words about the Great Earth Mother of the Mediterranean peoples around the Aegean (p. 72). I do not want to discuss her, for here we encounter an instance of opinion, of subjective interpretation of certain monuments.<sup>13</sup> The Great Minoan Goddess had a paramour. The Greeks created Poseidon, who also had associations with the Underworld and Fertility, as her husband. Thus, this god came into being. Being a god of the Underworld he became also god of earthquakes in a country in which earthquakes are deplorably frequent.

The author acknowledges Zeus as the divine representative of the patriarchal society of the Indo-Europeans (p. 131). He was a real god, and to him the "Heavenly Twins" (*das nothelfende Brüderpaar*) are added (pp. 107 and 118). It seems not impossible that, just as the Indo-Europeans knew a god of the atmospheric phenomena, they also had a god of rivers, lakes, and water who was theriomorphous or even anthropomorphic. But the author rejects this opinion, rightly I think, because no corresponding god or his name is found with another Indo-European people. But is it not conceivable that the Greeks created such a god on their own, on

<sup>12</sup> See my *Minoan-Mycenaean Religion*, pp. 334 ff. (2 ed., pp. 389 ff.).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 247 ff. (2 ed., pp. 289 ff.).

the example of Father Zeus and perhaps a few other gods, without having recourse to the Great Minoan Goddess as a midwife? If the water spirit was thought of in the shape of a horse or a bull this was but a small step.<sup>14</sup>

But such a view leaves out of account the etymology of the name of Poseidon which is accepted by many scholars. The author exposes honestly the difficulties and uncertainty with which it is beset and even admits that it is rejected by a colleague of his (pp. 13 ff.), but he adds that his results will stand, even if the etymology is rejected. However, I cannot avoid a suspicion that this etymology was the starting point of his argumentation. It is due to Professor Fick,<sup>15</sup> but best known through a paper of Professor Kretschmer.<sup>16</sup> The name Ποσείδων, Ποσειδᾶν, Πορειδάν (the forms vary much; the basic form was Ποτειδάφων) is said to be in origin a word complex, πόσις or πότις Δᾶς, in the vocative. There are certain difficulties in this etymology<sup>17</sup> and I have expressed my doubts. I have asked Professor Frisk, whom I thank warmly for his helpfulness, for his expert advice and his clarifying letter has in a certain measure dispelled my doubts. This etymology is possible,—not more. The second component, δᾶ, is said to be an Aegean word, for it is very rare, occurring only in a few exclamations, especially in the tragedians, and interpreted by the scholia as γῆ. It is also recognized by many scholars as the first component of the name of Demeter. The objections of old Ahrens are still worth considering, even if his own explanation is impossible.<sup>18</sup>

There is another etymology of the name of Poseidon, proposed long ago by Ahrens and recently taken up by Professor Grégoire.<sup>19</sup> He connects the first element with πόσις, "drink," considers Ποσειδάων to be an extended form like Ἀμυθάων, etc., and adduces also the

<sup>14</sup> In this connexion it may be permitted to refer to some words of an eminent philologist, Professor Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen über Syntax*, I, pp. 15 ff. He says: The Indo-European language had two words signifying "fire," neuter πῦρ, Umbri. *pir*, masculine *ignis*, Lit. *ugnis*, Russ. *ogun*, which originally were used beside each other. Schulze and Meillet have proved that the neuter word was used in a purely material sense, the masculine in a personal sense. In Sanskrit *Agni* is a god. Likewise there are two words signifying "water": *ūdwp*, Umbri. *utur* in a material sense, and beside these a feminine word in Sanskrit and Iranian with an apparent personal notion; Germ. *ahva*, Lat. *aqua* denote the live water, the river. If there were in Greek a word with such a notion it would decidedly be a help to our understanding of Poseidon.

<sup>15</sup> *Studien zur griechischen und lateinischen Grammatik*, edited by G. Curtius, VIII (1875), p. 307.

<sup>16</sup> For references see my *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I, p. 417, note 3.

<sup>17</sup> Professor Kretschmer ventures not to accept the Pindaric ἐννοσίδας = ἐννοσίγαος, which seems very convincing, because it may be a recent formation after the type of e.g., Πελοπίδας (see *Wicner Studien*, XXIV [1902], p. 524, n. 1).

<sup>18</sup> H. L. Ahrens, *Dc dialecto dorica* (1843), p. 80.

<sup>19</sup> H. Grégoire, "Asklépios, Apollon Smintheus et Rudra," *Mémoires in 8° de l'académie de Belgique*, XLV, I, p. 14, n. 1.

word *ποταμός*. But here the difficulties are still greater. Professor Frisk writes to me that the change of the radical vowel in *πο-* is secondary; originally it must have been *πω-* or *πι-* (*πίνω*). *πόσις* has only the significance of "drink," and even if it is possible to translate it by "water" the sense of "drink" is at the bottom. *ποταμός* is difficult, though it looks simple. Commonly it is connected with *πέτραι*, which seems to be the best but by others, i. e. Wackernagel and Specht, with *πετάννυμι*. As usual, etymology does not help us to any certain decision. This is the case also with *Δημήτρος*. If *δῆτ-* is *δᾶ* = *γῆ*,<sup>20</sup> it is possible that the Earth, taken in the sense of (*ζείδωρος*) *ἄρουρα* and as described in a famous fragment of Aeschylus,<sup>21</sup> has developed into the Demeter whom we know, the goddess of sowing and harvest. But here too there is a rival etymology: Ionic *ζεάτι*, Cretan *δηάτι*, "corn." Professor Frisk remarks that this presupposes that *δῆτ-* *δᾶ* belongs to Doric dialects, in which *ζ* is replaced by *δ*, for *ζ* is original in this word, Sanskrit *yáva*, Lit. *javai*.

Poseidon, as the author depicts him, was a "bucolic-chthonic," theriomorphous god in the shape of a horse, created in the quiet life of shepherds and agriculturalists in the Middle Helladic age. He survived as such only in remote Arcadia; elsewhere he underwent changes which obliterated his original character. The first change came about when in the Mycenaean age the light war chariot was introduced and as a consequence a nobility arose which loved and appreciated horses for war, chase, and sport. When the horse was much used for profane purposes, it was so to say secularized, *déclassé*, and vanished as a chthonic animal, although this aspect was not quite forgotten (pp. 150 ff.). The invading Dorians took over the cult of Poseidon but had no understanding of its old forms; his mating with the Earth Goddess and his horse-shape were forgotten. He was rationalized. He was too much bound up with the powers of Nature to be elevated to a higher moral plane (pp. 155 ff.). The rivers and the wells had their own deities, so Poseidon became the god who sent up water from the depth (pp. 141 ff.).

In the countries around the Saronic gulf Poseidon had come into contact with the sea, and this aspect of him, which was not original, came into the foreground with the Ionians of the islands and the coast of Asia Minor, when it was colonized at the end of the Mycenaean age. He was adapted to the life of a seafaring people, old sea daemons were associated with him, and Amphitrite became his consort. In this age his old attribute, the thunderweapon, was transformed into the fisherman's utensil, the trident.<sup>22</sup> In Homer

<sup>20</sup> Kretschmer in *Wiener Studien*, loc. cit., p. 523: "uralter Lallname," originally "Mutter."

<sup>21</sup> Aeschylus, *Danaides*, frag. 44 Nauck (2 ed.): printed in my *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I, pp. 431 ff., together with other similar passages.

<sup>22</sup> The author shares, pp. 144 and 164 ff., the opinion of Wilamowitz and others that the trident of Poseidon was originally the thunder-weapon, but does not quote Chr. Blinkenberg, *The Thunderweapon in Religion and Folklore* (1911), who tried to prove it with a wealth of materials. It is not sufficiently proved; the trident is an obvious attribute of Poseidon as a god of the sea.

he is Lord of the Sea. He is more dreaded than loved; he is too much bound up with the forces of Nature to be able to be invested with higher religious ideas.

The two last chapters, VII and VIII, are appendices treating of Pegasus and the Trojan wooden horse. The author thinks that the myth of Bellerophon is a historical reminiscence of a Mycenaean knight errant and that Pegasus is the horse which carried the thunderweapon of Zeus<sup>23</sup> and which Indo-European immigrants had brought with them to Asia Minor. In Greek myth he was confused with the horse of Poseidon. The author is certainly right in regard to Bellerophon and to the Anatolian origin of the myth of the Chimaera. But although there are many Anatolian names ending in *-ασος*, the old etymology which connects Πήγασος with πηγή<sup>24</sup> is tempting, for horses are often said to call forth wells and many wells are named after the horse. Archaic Greek art loved to provide deities and animals with wings. But it is a minor question whether Pegasus is Greek or Anatolian; it is certain that an Anatolian myth has been fused with Greek myth.

The Trojan horse seems to contain as many hypotheses as it once contained Greek heroes. I do not want to discuss the various guesses, only to relate the author's view briefly. He starts from Professor Blegen's discovery that the sixth city of Troy was destroyed by an earthquake. Poseidon was the god of earthquakes and appeared at that time in the shape of a horse. The expedition of the Greeks to Troy succeeded in taking the city only with the help of the earthquake, perhaps some time after it had happened. Troy VIIa was sacked by barbarians. The destruction of Troy by an earthquake caused by the horse-shaped Poseidon, who in Homer is its enemy, is the origin of the myth; but in Asia Minor the horse-shaped Poseidon was forgotten and a Homeric poet made a bold invention, rationalizing the story, and the wooden horse soon became popular. Perhaps there is a trace of the old myth, the author adds, in the myth of the marine monster that Poseidon sent, according to the story of Laomedon. This explanation is of course very hypothetical, as the author admits, but it is ingenious and appeals more to me than other less probable interpretations of the marvellous horse.

The creation of Greek religion in the prehistoric age through a fusion of indigenous and Greek elements is a problem as important as fascinating. The present book is a very sagacious attempt to penetrate into this problem which is covered with a thick darkness. That I agree with the author on many points will appear to the reader of my paragraph on Poseidon in the first volume of my *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*. I have raised objections on other points and, perhaps, on those which the author values most highly. They depend on questions of principles. Everyone who does not approve of the principles which I have laid down in my treatment of the Minoan-Mycenaean religion will judge otherwise.

<sup>23</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony*, 276 ff.

<sup>24</sup> η may have vanished by analogy, says Professor Frisk, comparing δρυγή — δρυῖλος, etc.

But I think that a scholar sometimes ought to have the courage to acknowledge ignorance, even if hypotheses, stated to be such, are a necessary means of promoting science. I have learnt much from Schachermeyr's book in both directions, positive as well as negative. It is well worth reading attentively and considering closely.

MARTIN P. NILSSON.

LUND UNIVERSITY.

---

CEDRIC H. WHITMAN. Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. v + 292. \$4.75.

This work is best summarized on p. 244. While describing four grades of moral activity, Professor Whitman writes:

"The third level is the level of the hero himself, the center of Sophocles' tragic world. The hero's arete, as the most active moral force in nature, differs qualitatively from the values of the first two levels by being both divine and human at once. It is human because it is moral, but its existence creates a process of becoming divine. Because of its qualitative difference from the world, it conflicts below with the first two levels and moves toward the fourth, which is Deity itself, or, in more Hellenic terms, the divine substance of all things. Yet because the fourth level is above morality as it is above humanity, the relationship is one of keen life-and-death conflict. And herein of course lies both the moral glory of tragedy and its human poignancy."

Vigorous and stimulating, the book is nevertheless a failure. Its more novel contentions are not proved or even rendered plausible. The discussion contains, indeed, divers excellent remarks, but is too often vitiated by misstatement of fact, incorrect handling of Greek, self-contradiction, or freakishness. This censure must be justified straightway by examples.

#### A. Misstatements.

P. 32: Oedipus is "taken up into heaven."

62: "We learn from a messenger . . . that Ajax . . . would be purified. . . ." Not a word of this does he utter.

82: Orestes' redemption is called the climax of the *Oresteia*.

137: "Six robbers" attacked Laius. Sophocles gives no hint of this number.

158: "To the audience, as to Electra, Orestes is dead." They have seen him in the flesh and heard him called by name.

190: In *O. C.* "there is no *deus ex machina* in any sense."

235: "In virtue I, a mortal, conquer you, great god!" This (*Herc. Fur.* 342) Whitman attributes to Heracles. The words are Amphytryon's.

B. *Misrepresentation of Greek.*

P. 12: "A regular Athenian nobleman" does not correctly render Ion's description of our poet as *εἰς τῶν χρηστῶν Ἀθηναίων.* χρηστός never unequivocally refers to noble birth, and here it is gently patronizing: "worthy."

111 (*Trach.* 29): *νὺξ γὰρ εύσάγει* cannot mean "night brings him home": *κατάγει* would be needed for a man who returns from abroad. But the passage does not refer to Heracles at all.

111, 117 *bis*, 139 (*Trach.* 459): "Why is knowledge terrible?", though not grammatically wrong for *τὸ δὲ εἰδέναι τί δεινόν;* is misleading by its air of grim profundity. She obviously means no more than: "I am quite prepared to hear the truth."

115 (*Trach.* 596 f.): "Suffer" cannot be right for *πράσσεις*: the whole situation forbids. Deianeira here is assuredly not passive, but courageously takes the initiative.

163 (*El.* 516): *ἀνεμένη στρέφει* is "you are ranging at large," not "you are behaving impudently."

194 (*O. C.* 565): *οὐδέν' ὄνθ'* cannot here mean "a nothingness," which would necessitate another negative before *ὑπεκτραπούμην.* *οὐδέν'* must go closely with that verb: "I would not turn from anyone" *ξένον ὄντα,* "who is a stranger."

C. *Self-Contradictions.*

P. 104: "These protagonists [of *Trach.* and *O. R.*] lose and lose terribly"; but on p. 150 "in the *Trachinia* and *Oedipus Rex* . . . human virtue fulfilled its function without failure," which in its turn is contradicted on p. 247 as regards Deianeira.

173: *Philoctetes* contains "a *deus ex machina* . . . organically fitted to the action"; yet on p. 177 this *deus* "motivates nothing," and on p. 190 he is "technically at least, outside the plot."

215: *Oedipus* is suddenly styled "Everyman." If this book emphasizes anything, it is the hero's "qualitative difference" from ordinary folk.

218: Though on p. 190 "he becomes a god," we now learn that he is a "dead *numen*." Whatever "god," "*numen*," and "dead" may be held to mean, is it conceivable that anyone can be all three?

244: Here, and often elsewhere, Godhead is stated to be "above morality." But on p. 190 Whitman tells us that in *O. C.* "the gods are moral perception and inner law." In the latter case, how do the moral hero and the moral gods come into conflict? In the former case, what of the frequent assertion that the hero becomes a god? Of this contradiction he later reveals awareness; for on p. 250 we learn that "the eternity of God receives . . . the impress of the moral power of man." The gods (or God) somehow become (becomes) "converted." But this reception of impact, this becoming, is a process, which must imply time; yet we are often told that the gods are timeless.

D. *Other Oddities.*

P. 76: "his (Ajax') position is actually rectified in the eyes of all but . . . Agamemnon and Menelaus." What of the whole Greek army? And should not "rectified" be "justified"?

88: ". . . neither does Creon [in *Ant.*] conflict directly with the divine world."

156: "Heroism is always ill-timed."

169: Why symbolize what is "already illustrated"? But he is obsessed by symbols: on p. 70 Athena is used "to symbolize the inner being" of both Ajax and Odysseus; and on pp. 216 f. Oedipus (in *O. C.*) "dwarfs all the earlier heroes by becoming his own symbol."

179: Philoctetes "in the end beats society to its knees." This is the strangest remark in the book.

186: "Sophocles keeps us aware of the problem of free will, when Philoctetes says he will never *willingly* see Troy again." Again? When was he there before? The line (1392) has no such word. And nowhere in the play can I detect a trace of this "problem."

202: Oedipus "knows the 'token of his fate,' and therein creates a historical self." What can be the meaning of those four last words? The book is too rich in such pompous obscurities.

212 f.: "[Oedipus does not] hesitate to identify himself subtly with that divine force" which summons him. The support for this unwarranted remark is alleged to be *O. C.* 1540, 1520 f., 1542 ff.

It is high time that we sought a pleasant change by recording some of Whitman's admirable *obiter dicta* or longer passages.

Pp. 22-41: This chapter, "Scholarship and Hamartia," is excellent, and ought to improve all future discussion of Greek tragedy. In particular it should kill the fashion of devoting twenty pages to dragging Aristotle in and the next twenty to pushing him out again.

39: "It is impossible that Sophocles could really have believed in the theodicy of Aeschylus and yet have concentrated upon the fate of the individual exclusively, or written single plays; for if the Aeschylean scheme had been true for him, it would have compelled some mention, or proof—in short, a trilogy. . . ." "Human responsibility now fills both foreground and background." This supplies an attractive explanation (p. 63) of a flaw in the constitution of *Ajax*.

85 f.: A trenchantly sensible account of Antigone's spirit and manner.

103: "The process of justification, which in the *Ajax* had required a long scene of debate, is drawn organically within the principal scheme of the *Antigone* by means of an elaborate technique of antitheses."

132-8: A masterly appreciation of Jocasta—perhaps the most effective passage in the book. "If Jocasta views her religion intelligently, Oedipus surely views his intelligence religiously."

150 f.: Whitman brilliantly contrasts Homer's Achilles and Odysseus.

153: A delightful gibe at the victims of "a reckless confusion as to what Sophocles was pious about."

*ibid.*: The matricide "for Sophocles was not the climax but merely the denouement."

154 f.: A paragraph full of discernment on Orestes as a "frame" for Electra.

What, according to Whitman, is Sophocles' conception of a hero? No full definition will be found, but a few statements should be

noted. As they more than once refer not to the poet only but to his contemporaries also, we must clear the ground by looking first at Chapter XI, "Sophocles and the Fifth Century."

On p. 221 we read: "Athens can scarcely be said . . . to have achieved all her ideals. That, however, is irrelevant. The ideals were there, and Sophocles . . . was only the subtlest and most profound exponent of the heroic idea." For this no definite evidence appears, unless we accept as such the fact that in the procession of knights on the Parthenon frieze "each figure is an ideal norm subtly individualized by its own personal beauty," together with the turgid assertion that the knights show "how germane it was to the age to see in each individual the immanent, and in some degree, normative and divine cosmos." Pericles' Funeral Speech should not have been added; its sublimity and searching precision forbid us to declare that it echoed feelings harboured by the average Athenian, unless we find undeniable proof that it did. Whitman also considers contemporary discussion of God or the gods. We must not call this irrelevant, for it springs from his belief that the hero becomes a god; and he next duly returns to this divine hero, offering "traces" of a fifth-century belief in the personal immortality of noble men. These traces are epitaphs and similar passages, of which "it might be maintained that even in antiquity they were mere modes of praise." So they were: and he destroys this part of his case by confessing that such immortality "had little to do with the other world, or the soul, as such, and everything to do with the dynamic Athenian approach to life in this world." Now for the statements mentioned a moment ago.

Pp. 59 f.: "There are two qualities deeply rooted in the Greek view of heroism. . . . The first is self-destructiveness. . . . The other quality is . . . intimacy with the gods." The former characteristic staggers one. Does it mean that the hero habitually commits suicide? That is plainly untrue. That he fails to achieve his purpose? No: Whitman insists that the protagonists of our seven plays all triumph. Does it mean, finally, that the hero fails to impress posterity? Whitman constantly mentions the "kleos" won by heroes, and Oedipus at least has in our day become an eminent if sinister figure. Nevertheless, he persists in this fancy: "the arete of heroes . . . is built upon an inward daemon of self-destruction," etc. As to the second characteristic, intimacy with the gods: how can it be attributed to Antigone, Deianeira, or Electra?

65: Ajax possesses "a standard which will not relax one jot of its requirements in the face of any circumstance."

80: "For the Athenian mind, individual personality was a scheme of excellence." "Personality" is the word for which the reader has been waiting.

140: "Oedipus can hardly emerge as a pattern of heroic virtue. . . . But Sophocles has not forgotten to invest his hero with that kind of arete which the myth and his traditional sagacity afforded him . . . intellectual supremacy and honesty." The hero, then, may be very far from "virtue."

241: "'inward divinity,' the arete of the heroic tradition." What more than greatness is meant by "divinity" Whitman nowhere explains.

Of these heroic qualities, three—self-destructiveness, intimacy with the gods, inward divinity—are (to say the least) questionable. The remaining three—an inflexible standard, personality, arete compatible with dreadful acts—are marks of every hero. But do they comprise the whole truth? We need to be told far more about will-power and personality, about the relation of these with righteousness. Ajax must have given Whitman some bad moments. Despite his words on Oedipus, just quoted, he feels bound to whitewash Ajax. On p. 97, he boldly exhibits him as "good," though on p. 69 he has charged him with "crimes"—only (on p. 78) to hail him as "a monument of moral triumph."

Personality and will, both gigantic, both intensely focused—these mark the hero everywhere, on the tragic stage and the floor of earth alike. In him mere existence wields a strange potency; against man and circumstance he thrusts a will that death itself cannot break, only annul. Whether he is virtuous or wicked matters nothing here: he may excite our love, even our worship; or our hostility, even our abhorrence: invariably he casts upon us a spell of awe and passionate concern. Beside him, the commonplace upright man dwindles to a pygmy. Look at Macbeth and Banquo, Goriot and Rastignac, at Henchard beside Farfrae in Hardy, at Ahab beside anyone you please in *Moby Dick*; or compare Themistocles and Aristides, Caesar and Cato, Cromwell and Hampden. So in Sophocles compare Ajax and Odysseus, Antigone and Ismene, Deianeira and Hyllus, Electra and Chrysothemis, Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, Oedipus with Creon at Thebes, in Attica with Theseus. That is what we mean by giving the title "Great" to Alexander, Charlemagne, and Napoleon. Ajax too is great, not by "inward divinity," but by his overwhelming vitality, prodigious will-power, and superb poetical imagination. He is also a scoundrel.

On dramaturgy we have cited admirable sayings, but must now quote passages where misunderstanding of Sophocles' art has induced or fostered, or been inspired by, perverse opinions.

Pp. 66-9: The poet is rebuked by the scholar for damaging, if not denying, the latter's theory. "The metaphysic of such heroic morality . . . is always difficult to explain, and . . . the use of the divine figure of Athena has greatly obscured the issue." "As if to clarify the dubious situation, Sophocles inserts a passage later on. . . . Unfortunately, this explanation only makes matters worse." "If all this be taken in the least literally, simple chaos follows." Then why not change your view of Sophoclean ideas and method?

P. 68 (see also 70): "Finally, he made the goddess limit the punishment of Ajax to one day—a strange procedure. The usual Olympian method was far more simple and direct." Sophocles was not only a great dramatist, but also an accomplished "man of the theatre." He uses sundry . . . tricks, to be blunt: *Oedipus Rex*, in particular, owes much to them. In *Ajax*, the twenty-four hours' limit (irrational, to be sure) has no other purpose than to increase the tension.

Chapters VIII and IX, on *Electra* and *Philoctetes*, are vitiated by the doctrine that "Sophocles' last period is 'purgatorial,' in that it deals with the soul's use of time" (pp. 149 f.). Electra's self-

realization by this aid is a figment. Nor is any proof suggested that she changes, beyond her resolve to slay the usurpers herself, which of course springs from her sudden belief that Orestes is dead. But now comes a big surprise. Whitman himself grows suspicious, and practically disowns "purgatory" for this play: "it involves only a very small degree of either serenity or tragic knowledge, and its significance is far slighter than in" *Philoctetes* and *O. C.* (p. 152). He resents Sophocles' failure to cooperate and utters a series of protests, among them a complaint that *Electra* "is almost too perfect"!

But purgatory has much weight in his treatment of *Philoctetes*: "the emphasis is on heroic endurance in the loneliness of heroic rightness." What a description of his Lemnian sojourn! It leads up to discussion of Heracles' epiphany and Philoctetes' change of purpose, pages that in ruthless perversion of plain fact and well-nigh miraculous infatuation with a mare's nest outdo every other critical extravagance known to me.

Whitman's view is stated on p. 177. Neoptolemus "promises falsely to take Philoctetes home, and ends by promising it truly. And this true promise is actually of far greater importance to the solution of the plot than is the brilliant but completely symbolic appearance of the divine Heracles, whose presence motivates nothing, though it sets the seal of reality and truth upon an end already achieved." If Heracles has nothing more sensational to say than "Bravo!" he should not have troubled to show himself. But he says exactly the opposite. "I have come to stop the journey on which you are starting": that is, the voyage not to Troy but home-wards, in defiance of the Greek host. Language could not be plainer: voicing the purpose of Zeus (v. 1415) he has come to make Philoctetes change his mind. But (says Whitman) the latter has already withdrawn his rejection of the Greek summons, being touched by the alteration in Neoptolemus. That is no less amazing. Until Heracles appears, Philoctetes remains inflexible: prayers, threats, promises of healing and glory move him not an inch. Yet Whitman pursues his will-o'-the-wisp, even discovering certain stages in this conversion. If the hero feels thus, why in the name of both sanity and dramatic effect does he not tell his friend the good news directly and plainly? If anyone still doubts Philoctetes' unbroken stubbornness up to the last moment, let him look again at vv. 1402-7, where the two friends *talk about what they will do at home*: for them, the outcast's refusal of Troy is even now fully accomplished.

The simple, however unwelcome, truth is that Sophocles committed what modern critics must call a gigantic blunder, stultifying his hitherto magnificent tragedy with a conclusion forced on him by the legend that he assumes he must accept. He had at his disposal none of the later treatises on dramatic technique: that is all; and we must make the best of it, recalling a similar collapse of the Furies at the close of Aeschylus' career.

Several sentences from "The Metaphysic of Humanism" have been examined earlier. More intelligible and satisfying, it may be thought, is another statement. On the last page stands this avowal:

"Love, and a sense of wonder, illuminated the suffering with which Sophocles gazed into the ultimate mysteries, and no effort of prosaic criticism will ever outline, even dimly, the profundity of his religious insight." The last phrase deserves, not indeed denial, but a shrug. That our poet possessed such insight is highly doubtful. The earlier words are true. I have long felt that all he can or does teach us about the gods and their dealings with mankind is communicated by the Messenger's unsurpassable speech in the *Coloneus*, which shows us what we are to think: that is, nothing; and what we are to feel: namely, awe. "The rest is silence."

GILBERT NORWOOD.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

---

MICHAEL GRANT. Roman Anniversary Issues. An Exploratory Study of the Numismatic and Medallic Commemoration of Anniversary Years, 49 B. C.-A. D. 375. Cambridge, University Press, 1950. Pp. xxiv + 204; 2 pls.

Professor Grant is the admiration of numismatists for his energy in collecting data on the Roman coinage, his acumen in interpreting it, and his thoroughness in publishing it. Since his training is basically historical he is by no means satisfied to discover and describe a new or little-known type; he must find out what it means. He has contributed some important theories to Roman numismatics and innumerable valuable individual suggestions. He has now produced a book, exploratory in nature, whose thesis is that many Roman issues were struck to commemorate the anniversaries of important occasions, including the issuance of earlier coins. The existence of anniversary issues is beyond dispute: coins specifically celebrating *saecla* and the *decennia* and similar terms of various emperors are known to everyone. We are now invited to investigate subtler connections for which the types or the dates themselves furnish the evidence.

A review which should attempt to assess the validity of all the suggestions made would be longer than the book, nor is it possible to group them according to their degrees of certainty. What is more important, since the work is presented as an experimental essay, is to analyze the method and try to see how successfully it leads to the intended conclusions. It must be said to begin with that the best informed reader is certain to find an abundance of things in the book that he had never thought of before and that it puts in the clearest possible light the amount of benefit that can be obtained from the comparative study of the types of different reigns. To choose an illustration out of many possible: the temple of Vesta appears on coins of Tiberius dated June, 22-June, 23 (p. 34). These are connected with the DIVVS PATER AVGUSTVS series and are related to the death of Augustus and accession of Tiberius (Aug., 14—an anticipated decennial) and to the *respublica restituta* of 27 B. C. (a semi-centennial). Subsequent reminiscences are Nero's

aurei and denarii with VESTA and temple attributed to 64 or soon thereafter (pp. 80 f., semi-centennial of Augustus' death); Vespasian's sestertius with VESTA and temple dated 73 (p. 9, 60th anniversary of Augustus' death); Caracalla's aureus showing him sacrificing before the temple of Vesta in 214 (p. 123, bimillennium) and Postumus' aureus with similar type in 263-4 (p. 135, 250th anniversary). This is an interesting sequence never before noticed and certainly strongly suggesting a continuing memory of the connection between Vesta and Divus Augustus. Observations of such previously unnoticed reminiscences fill the book. If I now turn to ways and places where I cannot agree with the author, he will not suspect me of having missed or ignored the matters wherein we are in agreement.

It seems to me that he has tried to prove too much and has seriously compromised his case by the mixture of strong arguments with weak. It is true that an accumulation of possibilities may be impressive, and the reader may be induced to accept a doubtful case because of its many parallels. But, on the other hand, it is true that, if investigation seems to invalidate one of the parallels, the reader may be led to reject the whole group as unsound. It would seem that the safest approach, methodologically, would be to establish first the coins which could be proved to celebrate anniversaries, then relying on the analogy to establish probable cases, leaving remoter possibilities to be suggested to the reader when he is already convinced of the main principle. Unfortunately the book is organized on a very different scheme, the emperors being taken in chronological sequence and the more and less plausible material being mingled. It will be seen that the example of the temple of Vesta cited above is drawn from five different places in the book, and while the references forward and back are scrupulously given, any critical reading is a slow business. This has been partly foreseen, and the Introduction (pp. xxi f.) suggests an order of reading for doubters. This is a help—but not enough of a help to such stubborn doubters as reviewers sometimes are.

The introduction presents an honest attempt to meet such objections as the author can anticipate, and deals adequately with the paucity of supporting evidence from literary sources. But there are questions which need a stricter analysis than is provided. For example, in discussing why the mint authorities so frequently omitted any specific reference to the occasion the issues were supposed to celebrate, the author says, "If, in (say) making an issue on the half-millenary of the temple of *Salus*, they had specified the occasion, the allusion would have been lost on the thousands who had not heard of the anniversary and were not interested in it. It is therefore for the benefit of this less educated and less Romanised section of the population that anniversary issues are made to omit any direct allusion to the occasions on which they were struck." But how is this section of the population benefited? Great emphasis is laid on the value of the coins as propaganda (a theme much developed of late). Surely this should induce the moneymen to spread information as widely as possible; if there were people who were not aware of the half-millenary of the temple of *Salus*, make them aware of it. What

gain would there be to the government in confining their message to the people who already knew what they intended to say? It is a fact that there are many types which might carry a particular meaning to the informed and only a general meaning to the uninformed, but that is to be explained not by the choice of the moneymen but by their limitations. It may seem absurd to moderns that they should not think of the advantage to be gained by being specific regularly as they were sporadically, but it is no more absurd than their refusal to adopt the device of marking denominations, which had been used here and there since the 5th century B. C. There is no use in our being petulant with them for not seeing what seems obvious to us, but it is a mistake to assume preference instead of inadvertence. What we must do in each case is to ask ourselves who could be aware of the suggested meaning of a coin and how the meaning could be conveyed by the inscription, by the type, or by the mere occasion of minting. These are fundamentally different, since the third means requires knowledge which the coin does not itself supply, and Grant's failure to differentiate is the cause of many of his suggestions which I find it difficult to accept.

Memorial coins may be of two general classes of which American money furnishes convenient illustration. One is that of the commemorative half dollars. In 1935, e. g., a half dollar was issued to mark the tercentenary of the state of Connecticut. Not only the types but the very existence of the coin is a result of the celebration. It is not expected to be an important addition to the currency and in fact its circulation is negligible. The other class is exemplified by the nickels. In 1938 a new design for the nickel was authorized. The types chosen were the head of Jefferson and a picture of the Jefferson Memorial. If we did not know the date it would be easy to assume that it celebrated some anniversary of Jefferson. But it does not. It celebrates the erection of the building, which, if I remember correctly, was planned but not completed for the bicentenary of his birth. It is important to realize that the reason for the striking of the coin was financial and not sentimental. Nickels would have been issued in 1938 if there had never been a Jefferson. And if there had been a Republican administration in 1938 nickels would have been issued with quite a different type. Now Grant recognizes, as had Pink before him (p. 60), the essential difference between main and minor Roman issues. But while he sees the particular appropriateness of minor issues for commemorative purposes, he continues to believe that major issues might owe their existence, or at least the time of their appearance, to an anniversary. This would need a great deal of proof to support and there is no proof available. That a major issue may have a type appropriate to its date of issue is clear, but money is a practical matter, and the imperial government which was a practical body neither minted important issues in advance of the need for them nor delayed them after they were needed for the propaganda value of the type.

The argument suffers badly from the iteration of the word "precisely." Without meaning to be unfair I am driven to quote, as illustrative of the author's dilemma, a phrase from p. 45: "These types had all abounded precisely in C. 17 B. C." Throughout the

book we are constantly adjured to believe that intervals are exact, and the dating constantly turns out to be *circa*. The attempt to achieve precision is subject to so many compromises that I do not believe it is worth the effort. In the first place there is the great latitude in the intervals suggested; I have noted 25 different ones which include not only the usual multiples of 5 but, in the East, 4, 7, and 8 as well. Considering that there are frequent instances of anticipation of a year, or delay of a year the system seemed to be a very flexible one. In addition there is the possibility that a later moneyer might be mistaken in an earlier date (p. 114; p. 128, note 2). Since there are so many instances where the date cannot be exactly determined the reader might be pardoned for suspecting that the proven cases of precision may be no more than happy accidents. But does not this seriously affect the basic thesis of the book?

Discussion of a specific case or two will illustrate my doubts better than any generalities. The author takes 2 B.C., the quarter centenary of the *respublica restituta* and the 750th anniversary of the founding of Rome to be an appropriate date for "the inauguration of the great C. L. CAESARES series of aurei and denarii (pp. 82 f.). This series from Lugdunum (*B. M. C. Empire*, I, pp. 88-91, nos. 513-43) has for its reverse type Gaius and Lucius, togate and veiled with pontifical instruments. Without entering the lively debate on the problem of dating we may admit that 2 B.C. is a suitable year for the beginning of the series. But what is its anniversary character? It would not seem that the portraits of the two young princes would recall either the arrangements of 27 B.C. or the founding of Rome to even the most sensitive Roman perception, while, on the other hand, the honors to Lucius would give an immediate occasion for the type which would be instantly apparent. The *prima facie* function of the type, then, is to celebrate the contemporary event, not the earlier ones. Admittedly the earlier ones might have occurred to the user with an interest in coincidences, but the important question to settle is this: can there be any advantage for propaganda in the celebration of an anniversary by the issuance of types which make no reference to the occasion and therefore seem to leave its recollection to those who remember it anyhow sufficiently to recognize the coincidence of dates?

There is a further and perhaps more fundamental question concerning this series. The mint of Lugdunum had been idle since 6 B.C. Are we to suppose that the date of its reopening for an issue obviously of great fiscal importance was determined by sentimental considerations? The author's remark on the dates, "it is tempting to relate to it the inauguration of the great . . . series," sounds as though he thought it possible. I am not persuaded. I should suppose that Lugdunum must have begun to coin because new money was needed, and that the utmost effect of a contemporary event or an anniversary celebration would be to dictate the choice of a type—in this case appropriate to the former but not to the latter.

Types whose appropriateness entirely eludes me appear so often in the book that I have an uncomfortable feeling that I must be missing something important that should be obvious to me. It is

suggested, for example, that Nero's Alexandrian coinage of the year 3 (56-59) may be connected with "the 100th year after the conferment of imperium on Augustus in 43" (p. 84). We are given a number of pieces of evidence for the importance of that date (though none for its significance in Egypt). But it turns out that none of the types of that year has the least reference to Augustus. They deal explicitly with Nero himself (Vogt, *Die Alexandrinischen Münzen*, I, pp. 28-30; II, p. 9). Could the Egyptians be reminded of one emperor by reference to another simply because the reference was made on an anniversary?

Even when the type is appropriate the connection with its supposed model may be so tenuous that inspection leads to its rejection. In 287 and the succeeding years Carausius issued coins with PAX AVG and the type of Pax standing left with olive wreath and scepter (pp. 145 f.). This is classed as one of his types "that appear to have an anniversary character." The evidence is that Pax had been used on the accession issues of Antoninus Pius in A. D. 138 "and was deliberately repeated just 100 years later on the brief mintages of Gordian I." Carausius' coin would then celebrate not only his own accession but the 150th year since that of Pius. This will not bear scrutiny. In the first place we must dispose of Gordian I. A very rare denarius of his with the inscription PM TRP COS PP has a female figure (?Pax) left, diademed, holding branch and scepter. The lady may be Pax, though she is not named. She may also be a reminiscence of another lady holding branch and cornucopia on a sestertius of Pius of 138 bearing the legend PONT MAX TR POT COS SC. This one undoubtedly is Pax, since the same figure accompanies the inscription of PAX AVG in 140-144. But the chance of any Gallic or British subject of Carausius being acquainted with the denarius of Gordian I is so remote that it must be ignored. And what of the chance of their being familiar with the type of Pius? For the author's thesis it is necessary that they should not only recognize the identity of the two figures, but should know that the coin of Pius (the one without the inscription PAX) was an inaugural issue and therefore 150 years earlier than that of their rebel lord. Otherwise they might be pardoned for supposing that what was being imitated was the PAX AVG on the common denarii of Severus Alexander, a century nearer their time. Frankly this anniversary connection seems to me impossible. I can imagine no effect produced on the populace by this assumed relation, and if the populace was not affected, the choice of types then becomes a game which the moneyers played for their own amusement.

The book is very carefully documented and no attempt is made to warp evidence or present questionable conclusions without their appropriate modifiers. None the less, it is inevitable that later references to a controversial point tend by their brevity to suggest too great an assurance in the original conclusion. For example in regard to Alexandria we read (p. 85) that the tricennium of Tiberius' death "is the only possible explanation of the billon tetradrachms of Nero's thirteenth year with the head of Tiberius." To this there are two objections. First, there are other possible explanations (Vogt, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-7). Second, another tetradrachm was struck in the

same year with the name and portrait of Augustus. The two certainly belong together, since it is the only occasion when either of them appears on Nero's Alexandrian coinage, and no explanation will serve which accounts for one but not for the other. Yet the celebration of Tiberius' death is later used as precedent (pp. 91, 97, 166). It is necessary, therefore, to pursue all the ramifications of each case before it can be safely accepted.

This long catechizing of Grant is justified by his position among those who are developing the immense resources of numismatics for the understanding of antiquity. It is the merit of his book that it has put before us for the first time the highly reminiscent quality of the Roman coinage, not merely between contiguous reigns, but between reigns widely separated. This is a theme which will repay further investigation, but that investigation should be more strictly disciplined. I do not believe that, with the evidence now available, coincidence of date without appropriateness of type is sufficient to prove the anniversary character of an issue. Nor do I believe that approximate coincidence can be converted into exact coincidence on any principle of the supposed preference of the Romans for exactitude. I believe we must be on our guard against a *petitio principii* in assuming that the Romans noticed things and then making that assumption the reason for their appearance. A more rigid testing of possible anniversaries will, I am sure, give us a shorter list but one much more useful for the study of the Roman coinage.

ALFRED R. BELLINGER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

DAVID GRENE. *Man in His Pride: A Study in the Political Philosophy of Thucydides and Plato*. The University of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. xiii + 231. \$4.00.

Grene's intention, as set out in the "Preface," is to establish for Thucydides and Plato "a kind of intellectual personality, complete, alive, and individual." Fifth-century Athens, he believes, is more important for us than is any other period; the total humanity of political life in our society and in Athens is such that "it is man and man alone . . . who is both the source and the resolution of conflict." Thucydides and Plato are selected to illustrate this thesis because they, and only they, define "the range within which . . . all political speculation in the West can be seen to move." The completeness of their view of man, historically and politically, is, so to speak, an alpha and omega.

Thucydides is "The Man Who Looked On" and in eight chapters Grene examines the fifth century through his eyes. "The World of Thucydides" supplies the background by citation of the Athenian speech at Marathon in "History of the Peloponnesian War" and the Athenian Dialogue. The reader may thereby observe three points: "the uniformity of the tone of intellectual discussion

and the gradual progression in the practical means of implementing the trends of political thought in the last quarter of the fifth century" (p. 7).

"Our Knowledge of Thucydides" (Chapter II) is notable for its perceptive treatment of the speeches (pp. 21-3). "The Problem of Thucydidean Polities" (Chapter III) balances Jebb's conclusion (that to wrest a theory of ethics or politics from Thucydides is impossible) against Shorey's (that the prominence of conscious calculating reason in life is responsible for the intellectualism of Thucydides, himself an ethical positivist). But Grene is not satisfied and turns to the Athenian concept of power; it was inevitable, he argues, that the morality of empire should become the morality of the individual citizen.

Thus are we led to Chapters IV and V, "Thucydides and the Athenian Democracy" and "Thucydides and the Athenian Empire." In the first Grene dwells upon the significant differences between the Athenian and later democracies; he notes in Thucydides' comments an anticipation of the later oligarchic philosophy. In the second he allies Thucydides with the doctrine of power, aspiration toward which is the most basic of human qualities; Thucydides can despise democracy but he has no moral rebuke for the empire.

"Historical Necessity" (Chapter VI) brings us to the core of the study. To Thucydides war is the unavoidable culmination of the long struggles of the Greek states; it will settle no ultimate problem, however, and the cycle will recur so long as human nature remains unchanged. This is the law of historical necessity as Thucydides first describes it in the *Archaeology*. An understanding of the cause will not avert disaster; it will supply to the statesman with foresight the means of coping skilfully. Themistocles and Pericles bear witness.

Chapter VII ("Chance and Pity") is a digressive consideration of what Grene regards as the few notable moral comments in the *History*: on the destruction of Mycalessus, the death of Nicias, and the constitution of Theramenes. These are related, for they belong in the realm of chance rather than necessity; and chance filled Thucydides with awe.

It is within the laws of historical necessity that Thucydides finds his highest political value. In Chapter VIII ("Beyond Necessity") Grene undertakes to locate this value more precisely. He contrasts the "virtue" in Antiphon with "what is considered virtue" in Nicias. He judges that the ruthless efficiency (virtue) of the true statesman (e.g., Antiphon, Themistocles, Pericles) need not, for Thucydides, carry with it personal success. Virtue is embodied in the great deed, which, good or bad according to conventional morality, is yet unique; for the nation virtue is power or dominion over others. "It is to Pericles," therefore, "that we must look for the most significant expression of Thucydides' admiration" (p. 86). Pericles is the unyielding autocrat in whom "Thucydides may have seen the transcendence of the materialism in which he believed" (p. 92).

Chapters IX-XIII are given to Plato, "The Man in the Dust-storm." In the first ("The Word and the Deed") Grene lays before

the reader at some length the views which he will urge. Plato's thought is dominated by "the connection between the multiplicity of concrete detail, of the actions and implications of the world around him, and an immutable and single existence behind them" (p. 95). His early work "bears on the actual creation in art or life of an approximation of the order and design he believed lay hidden in and behind the world he saw." In the later stages "the impulse comes . . . from the need for certainty in respect to the forms" (p. 96); his interest in practical activities declines and an almost entirely mystical conception of intellectual work appears (p. 101).

Grene now passes through the dialogues, period by period; he deals with rhetoric, the power of persuasion exercised by statesmen; he analyses the *Republic* and the *Laws*; he notes the concern for the individual in the Socratic dialogues and the simultaneous admiration for a caste society and unchangeable laws. He devotes a chapter to the failure in Sicily and concludes with "The Road to Dicte," where he leaves Plato with the *Laws*, in which "life has at last been superseded" (p. 204). Throughout he insists that Plato is of the fifth rather than the fourth century, that the historical setting of the dialogues is authentic, and that Socrates is (except in the *Parmenides*), as Plato writes of him, almost a static figure. "The political tragedy of Plato's life," he remarks, is "his total inability to bring his state into being" (p. 155).

The essays on Plato seem to me interesting and without basic flaws. The study of Thucydides, however, produces an impression that is fundamentally untrue. I have read it three times and have decided that it is provocative and insidious; this is why I have summarized it chapter by chapter, although I may not have done complete justice to it. Thucydides emerges as the coldly efficient recorder of the activities of an unprincipled state; he, like that state, worships success. Grene creates this effect, I think, by carefully selecting his evidence and then fitting it into his theory; what does not fit is omitted.

The root of the trouble is Grene's refusal to understand the real nature of the Confederacy of Delos and the distinctive stages in the development and life of the Athenian empire. He does not recognize that the Confederacy was originally a voluntary organization of equal and autonomous states, which automatically sacrificed some part of their sovereignty in the common weal; Athens did not obliterate their "external autonomy" nor was it *her* League of Delos (p. 43). Furthermore, the oaths sworn at Delos by all participants show that they did at that time think of the alliance as permanent (p. 51). Grene should, with a glance at Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.*, 23, 5), ask himself what Thucydides has to say in I, 96-99.

This kind of misrepresentation, so common in the glibly superficial thinking about empire today, makes it easy to write of "the creation of power in the name of nothing except itself" (p. 5), an empire built by the Athenians "with nothing to stand between themselves and the suffering and injustice they caused" (p. 6), "a theory of human nature based essentially on nothing but animal desires and their satisfaction" (p. 28, where the Funeral Speech

would at least impede the argument), and "the tyranny . . . in Alcibiades and . . . in Critias . . . a philosophically conceived monster bred of the collapse of any collective political morality but an exact replica . . . of the dimensions and quality of the political morality of the Athenian state for nearly eighty years" (p. 33; cf. p. 40, where no reference is made to the career of Cimon the empire-builder). The argument is too sweeping and must lead to distortion; it ignores the atmosphere in which the Confederacy was born, it ignores the potentialities of the Panhellenic Congress (449 B. C.), it ignores the benefits brought to the allies by Confederacy and empire. Grene presents one side only, without respect for chronology.

Again, the allusions to democracy are muddled. The standard and incorrect opinion that Athens insisted on democracies within the empire is repeated (pp. 36-7; see now Meritt, Wade-Gery, McGregor, *A. T. L.*, III, pp. 149-54). The contemporary fashion is to confuse internal political democracy with imperial administration (p. 37); imperial policy, in fact, has little connexion with democracy at home and it is quite irrelevant to emphasize a contrast. On p. 38 Grene distinguishes between "the will of the people of Attica" and the judgement of "their elected governors"; the terminology is anachronistic and it is doubtful if, in a direct democracy, such a distinction can be made. Similarly, I object to the adjectives when the Council of Five Hundred is called "a permanent governing body" (p. 39).

In the first chapter (p. 7) Grene assumes that the speeches of the Melian Dialogue, basically, were delivered; it is a large assumption. But on p. 73 he fails to realize that these speeches are, in themselves, Thucydides' moral condemnation of Athenian imperialism at its worst. This failure, this expectation that moral commentary will carry an identifying label, weakens the chapter on "Chance and Pity."

The most abused individual is Nicias, a well-meaning incompetent (p. 81), "who made his political fortune largely by doing nothing" (p. 38), who arranged a peace with Sparta "at a moment not very propitious to Athenian imperial interests and certainly at a moment which delivered Sparta from various difficulties" (p. 46), whose alleged friendship with Thucydides explains the latter's comment on his death (p. 74). This is not, for me, the Thucydidean Nicias. Of course, Grene does not appreciate (pp. 39-40) to what extent Nicias was a Periclean or to what extent the Peace of Nicias was a Periclean peace, urgently needed by a financially depleted Athens (V, 14, 1-2; for the finances see *A. T. L.*, III, pp. 342-4 with note 94). Why, specifically, was the war fought and what is said in the peace about Peloponnesian grievances? What did Athens lose of her prewar holdings? And how do we account for Sparta's immediate embarrassment? Thucydides' own sympathies lay with the advocates of peace (V, 16, 1: Cleon and Brasidas are dead, decent men can bring the war to a close), as represented by Nicias, who may have lacked the glamour and genius of Pericles but who did his duty, though the policy may often have been contrary to his judgement; hence the genuine pathos of Thucydides' obituary for him. Grene

thinks it was purely fortuitous (p. 75) that he was deprived of Lamachus (by death) and Alcibiades (by arrest). If this is so, then anything at all may be called fortuitous and history becomes mere chance.

There are assertions that cannot be supported by evidence. I question whether, in 416, Athens made a series of moves to extend her empire (p. 7). How (p. 33) did the earlier tyrannies bridge the gap between feudalism and plutocracy? Despite Grene (p. 46), the affair of the Herms reveals oligarchic activity before 411 B. C. (see, e.g., VI, 60, 1).

Grene's style is erratic. In general he is vigorously fluent; at times, as my quotations perhaps imply, he is so wantonly extravagant as to approach jargon and destroy comprehension; occasionally he commits appalling errors. "Different than" (p. 86) we cannot tolerate; "as to" is misused (*passim*); "greater than them" (p. 84) is an elementary blunder; "would" for "should" is less serious. A clause masquerades as a sentence on p. 74; other impostors mar pp. 6 and 83. The intended meaning is affected by the absence or presence of commas on pp. 25, 112, 211.

Revision of the proofs has been competent. "Mytilene" is preferable to "Mitylene" (e.g., pp. 29, 32); "democracy" has lost a letter on p. 33; "or" has become "of" on p. 124; violence has been done to "Thueydides" on p. 57; for "vii" read "viii" on p. 216 (note 1 to Chapter VII). Errors in dates occur on pp. 35, 55, 164, 165. Note 16 on p. 212 needs revision in the light of Lenz (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXII [1941], pp. 226-32) and Ehrenberg (*A. J. P.*, LXVI [1945], pp. 113-34).

The practice of gathering the notes at the end of a volume may lead to improvement in the aesthetic appearance of the text; but books are meant for readers, most of whom dislike the constant leafing to and fro that is imposed upon them. There is no index.

I have lingered upon the faults in the study of Thueydides because they seem to me so basic as to invalidate the author's major thesis; he has not been impartial with the evidence. Yet my strictures must not obscure the enjoyment that has been mine in reading the volume. It contains much that is acute in its analysis, and it merits serious attention; it is written with enthusiasm. I recommend it to the critical; I should hesitate to place it in the hands of the uninformed.

MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.

- CLAUDE W. BARLOW. *Martini Episcopi Bracarensis Opera Omnia*. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, for the American Academy in Rome; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. xii + 328. \$3.50. (*Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome*, XII.)

The writings of St. Martin of Braga (*ca. 510/20-579/80*) throw considerable light upon cultural and ecclesiastical conditions in the obscure sixth century kingdom of the Sueves in former Roman

Gallaecia, and in addition provide invaluable materials for the text and medieval circulation of certain of Seneca's moral essays. These works pose difficult editorial problems less by their extent than by their varied character and diverse manuscript traditions. Professor Barlow's edition is the first complete, modern, critical one, and completely replaces not only the hitherto unique collected edition of H. Flórez in Tomo XV of *España Sagrada* (2nd ed., Madrid, 1787), but also more recent editions of single pieces, such as that of the *De correctione rusticorum* by Caspari (Christiania, 1883) or of the poems by Peiper in *Mon. Germ. Hist., Auct. Antiq.*, VI, Pt. 2 (Berlin, 1883). Several score Hispanic, Carolingian, and post-Carolingian MSS have been painstakingly identified and collated for this admirable new edition, the fruit of many years' devoted labor, and their numerous variant readings are reported in a full apparatus criticus. The text is conservatively established on the basis of those MSS, notably the Hispanic ones, that are now for the first time proved of superior authority by construction of intricate *stemmata codicum*. With the exception of the canons of the first and second Bragan councils, and St. Martin's own *Canones*, where further work is required, this text can safely be pronounced definitive. There is also a helpful biographical sketch of St. Martin; and each principal work is prefaced by an exhaustive study of its date and circumstances of composition, sources, MSS and editions, and medieval circulation. As might be expected from the editor in this same series of the *Epistolae Senecae ad Paulum et Pauli ad Senecam quae vocantur* (Vol. X, Rome, 1938), particular attention is paid to Senecan questions, with reference both to textual emendation and to Seneca's use and influence in the Middle Ages.

As assembled here in its totality for the first time, the Martinian corpus includes five ethical tracts, *Pro repellanda iactantia*, *Item de superbia*, *Exhortatio humilitatis*, *De ira*, *Formula vitae honestae*; three brief poems; the *Sententiae patrum Aegyptiorum*, an anthology of monastic anecdotes excerpted from the *Apophthegmata patrum* and translated into Latin; the well-known polemic against pagan survivals in Suevic popular Christianity, the so-called *De correctione rusticorum*; two short pieces on triple immersion at baptism and on the date of Easter; a collection of Eastern conciliar canons, translated into Latin as *Canones ex orientalium patrum synodis*; and, conjecturally, the canons of the synods of I and II Braga.

As regards the five ethical tracts, Barlow shows that the first three, based chiefly upon Cassian's *Instituta* and *De superbia*, display no Senecan traces. The *De ira*, however, is essentially a re-weaving of passages from Seneca's essay of this title, with numerous readings correcting extant Senecan MSS. On the basis of St. Martin's method here, Barlow concludes that his *Formula vitae honestae*, a tract on the four cardinal virtues well known to the Middle Ages, rests in like fashion upon a hypothetical lost Senecan work of similar content; but, given the *Formula's* indebtedness to extant writings of Seneca, as demonstrated by both Bickel and Barlow himself, and the need to review the whole subject of the cardinal virtues in Christian (and notably Hispanic) Latin literature before Martin, this conjecture must remain *sub judice*. Since both the *De ira* and the *Formula*

date after 570, it follows that St. Martin's interest in Seneca reflects his Spanish milieu, not his earlier Pannonian or Byzantine periods; and this calls for more intensive exploration than here attempted of the Senecan elements in Spanish Christian literature of the Visigothic period.

In discussing the translations from the Greek, Barlow admirably clarifies the place of the *Sententiae* in the tangled literary history of the *Apophthegmata*, but fails to explain adequately just why this second translation was made of a work earlier rendered into Latin by St. Martin's own pupil, Paschasius. The relations between the two versions need further attention. It is erroneous to state that the *Sententiae* even in part were designed to serve as a monastic Rule; the work is in no sense a code of daily regime, and Dumium undoubtedly used an oriental Rule or, more likely, several collected in the typically Gallegan *codex regularum*. As for the *Canones*, their textual tradition, along with that of the canons of I and II Braga, is so closely bound up with the whole vast evolution of the early Western canonical collections that Barlow's treatment cannot be regarded as final. Besides being unable to use either for the *Canones* or the Bragan canons the indispensable Hispanic MSS, he has not consulted the critical text of the two councils in H. Bruns, *Canones apostolorum et conciliorum* (2 vols., Berlin, 1839) and has overlooked the excellent study of the origins of the *Hispana* collection in P. Séjourné, *Saint Isidore de Séville: Son rôle dans l'histoire du droit canonique* (Paris, 1929). Barlow claims St. Martin's translations from the Greek were closely literal, yet the *Canones*, as he admits, often vary from the Greek; and the fact that they include canons for which no Eastern original can be found, but which apply directly to local Gallegan problems, also points to greater editorial freedom on St. Martin's part than Barlow allows.

The demonstration that the authentic title of the *De correct. rust.* is *De castigatione rusticorum* is altogether convincing. It is unfortunate that Caspari's and McKenna's studies of this work led Barlow to slight investigation of its sources, since neither of these writers is satisfactory on this point. While he properly uses the *Scarapsus* of Pirminius in establishing the text of this work, Barlow might well have scrutinized more closely Pirminius' Visigothic connections and the extent to which the textual tradition proves him, rather than Eligius, responsible for the trans-Pyrenean circulation of its MSS.

On three points of major interest further research is clearly called for. Barlow offers *stemmata* for the individual works of St. Martin but attempts no synthesis of his results for the corpus as a whole. The partial collection of the literary writings preserved in our most trustworthy MS, Escorialensis M. III. 3 (saec. x) indicates such a collection probably circulated alongside MSS of some of the separate works. For example, it is significant that for the three shorter moral tracts and the *De ira* no non-Hispanic MSS occur, whereas the *De correct. rust.*, although known in Gaul as early as ca. 650, apparently first found general circulation with Pirminius, a Visigothic refugee from the Arab invasion of Spain. Just as this points to a possible connection between the Muslim conquest of the Tarragonensis and the dispersion of at least this one Martinian work

in the eighth century, so the first appearance of the *Formula* and the *Sententiae* in the late ninth and tenth century Carolingian MSS indicates a quite different time and channel of transmission. In the latter case the MS tradition runs back, it may be suggested, to those active Gallegan scriptoria established in Eastern Asturias, Liébana, and Castella Vetula, the importance of which as a link between Galicia and Carolingian civilization is just beginning to be understood.

A second unsettled problem calling for further study is that of the *lectiones* for the feast of St. Martin, published in the *Memorias para a historia eclesiastica do arcebispoado de Braga* (Lisbon, 1732-47) and here reprinted as Appendix 16. Barlow relies heavily upon this text (1) to fix the years 556, 558, and 579 as the dates respectively of St. Martin's elevation to the see of Dumium, his consecration of the new Dumian basilica, and his death; (2) to confirm the title *De castigatione rusticorum* for the *De correct. rust.*; and (3) to authenticate a passage on St. Martin in cap. xxxv of Isid. Hispal., *De vir. inlustr.* Such confidence in a late, unseen, and unstudied MS may well be justified but only after critical examination of its merits. True, the very precision of its dates is appealing, yet the lessons as such are obviously a feeble, poorly organized cento of second-hand materials compiled no earlier than the twelfth century; cf. *inter alia*, the use of both the Spanish and Incarnation eras; and note that no cult of St. Martin existed in Galicia before the twelfth century (P. David, *Études historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal* [Lisbon-Paris, 1947], p. 215). The alteration in Lect. I of the Isidorian *Dumiensis monasterii* to *Dumiensis ecclesiae* reveals a compiler ignorant of that see's monastic organization and not averse to editorial revision; this places all his Isidorian variants under suspicion. It may be added also that since the dates in the important Lect. IX emphasize Dumium and completely ignore the elevation to the Bragan metropolitanate, they doubtless reflect the tradition not of Braga but of Mondoñedo, which claimed direct descent from Dumium.

Finally, much still remains to be done with the Byzantine and monastic background of St. Martin's work and writings, a subject receiving too little attention in the present study. St. Martin's arrival in Galicia from the East at a time when the Byzantines were reconquering Baetica, his familiarity with Greek, and his translations from Byzantine ecclesiastical MSS still need to be treated. Above all, the monastic traditions planted in Galicia, the peculiar organization of the abbey-bishopric of Dumium, and the program of monasticizing the Gallegan church, initiated by St. Martin and carried forward in the next century by St. Fructuosus of Braga, present problems central to a full understanding of the Martinian writings. Understandably enough, Barlow has not undertaken to tackle these larger questions on the periphery of his edition, but he has accumulated a wealth of new materials for their ultimate solution.

C. J. BISHKO.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.

PAUL FAIDER (†), CHARLES FAVEZ, PAUL VAN DE WOESTIJNE.  
 Sénèque de la Clémence. Deuxième Partie: Commentaire et  
 Index Verborum. Brugge (België), "Du Tempel," 1950.  
 (Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, Werken uitgegeven door de Faculteit  
 van de Wijsbegeerte en Letteren, 106<sup>e</sup> Aflevering.)

This volume demands of the reviewer an initial paragraph or two by way of explanation. It is the second part of a work begun long ago by Professor Paul Faider, of which Part I was issued in 1928 as No. 60 among the publications of the Faculty of Letters in the University of Ghent. This first part contained, besides Professor Faider's revision of the text of the *De Clementia*, an extensive introduction dealing with (a) the external circumstances which elicited the work's original publication in antiquity; (b) the internal character of the treatise; (c) its political trend. Other calls on Faider's time and energies drew him away from the completion of the task he had designed to complete by a second part which would consist of a translation and a commentary (see Préface, p. 9).

How the work came to be resumed in the dark year of 1940 is touchingly told in Faider's preface, surely one of the noblest documents ever penned by a scholar's hand as he wrote of events  $\muείζω \eta$  κατὰ δάκρυα surrounding him and his country in an evil time. Amidst the bestialities of men of ill-will he was able, none the less, to reaffirm courageously his simple faith in the God who had always been to him a Real Presence; meantime he turned back amid the hideous outer confusion to his uncompleted task, and in his Préface he has given, in brief, a solid vindication of the Roman philosopher and statesman, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, one of the noblest vindications because so utterly sane, composed in no spirit of self-deception or of intention to deceive others, but in the clear light of an understanding scholarship.

It became, then, his purpose to prepare the Commentary, in which he designed, while still abiding by the general terms of his Introduction of 1928, to clarify or rectify certain details of the latter and also "que j'y rencontre, ne fût-ce que pour les discuter, certaines thèses récentes auxquelles des passages perpetuellement controversés ont donné naissance." But his powers of endurance broke down under the distresses of the war, and Professor Faider died before the end of 1940, leaving completed, or almost so, only that portion of the commentary running to and including the note *ita enim* on p. 53, that is, to I, 3, 3 of the text.

After the war was over, Professor Faider's widow entrusted the task of completing this commentary to Dr. Charles Favez, formerly chargé de cours at the University of Lausanne. It has proved a happy choice indeed; those who are familiar with the work already done in Silver Latin (particularly in Seneca) and in the later period by Dr. Favez over a period of many years, will need no word of the present writer's to emphasize the quiet, persistent skill of the scholar and the natural spirit of the gentleman which Dr. Favez has brought unfailingly to his several tasks. Moreover, in this particular case he shared with Faider a community of approach to the subject,

as they had come to know each other from a correspondence extending over many years and from the rare joy of one personal meeting; all of this has made it peculiarly possible for him to pick up Faider's work and carry it forward without creating any sense of hiatus. Faider has been peculiarly *felix opportunitate continuatoris*.

The commentary has several virtues; high among them stands, as might be expected, its preciseness of statement; no frayed edges, no loose threads. Of course this is partly a quality which inheres in the French language; it happens to be particularly well exhibited here from the pens of Faider the Belgian and Favez the Swiss. The whole commentary is from this point of view recommended to American students, so often interminably subjected to German vagueness by their instructors, as an example of clarity, arrived at by first determining what to say and then finding the *mots justes* whereby to say it.

The commentary is liberally strewn with acute remarks on the vocabulary of Seneca, which turns out, on the whole, to be more Ciceronian than Quintilian would have believed; on the perpetually subtle arrangement of words and phrases; on deliberate rhetorical devices, some closely related to the *declamationes*. The present reviewer had originally made a large selection of illustrations under these heads, but it is too extensive for inclusion in this report, while the task of selecting particular examples would be unprofitable and the result perhaps misleading. Syntax is also touched upon but only lightly; Seneca's grammar is, on the whole, of the classic type. One is reminded, however, that there is room for more exact studies of the Senecan syntax than is at present provided by the *Sénèque Prosateur* of Professor René Waltz, grateful as we are for what he has given us; there are a number of smaller details requiring fuller development.

The commentary accents, without tedious discursiveness, scores of facts of the most varied interest which appear in the treatise or in connection with it, such as (1) Seneca's contempt for "scholarly" precision in history (p. 20, foot); (2) Seneca's unfavorable opinion, in general, of women (p. 61, foot); (3) Trajan's admiration for Seneca's statements of the principles of political action (p. 91, med.); (4) Seneca's resentment of the contemptuous charity of the rich as a class (p. 151, med.); and (5) his deep consideration for the "mine-run" of humanity, "dont il est si rarement question dans la littérature latine." Students of the French classic drama will enjoy the frequent comparisons so aptly made between some dictum of the Roman moralist and the stately verses of Corneille or Racine, while the classicist will think of the large field of interest, by no means as yet fully explored, in the relation of Seneca's plays with his moral essays. Some young American scholars are at present adventuring (*non sine gloria*) in this area.

There remains the question of the text. The Vaticano-Palatinus 1547, indicated by the letter N, holds, of course, first place as MS authority, transcribed though it was by a stupid and ignorant copyist, in a hurry to be done with his scriptorial assignment. A host of minor errors was thus produced; these have been gradually eliminated in the course of the centuries and the total of those remaining unsolved is not large. Faider was liberally disposed towards

"common sense" corrections, and Favez agrees with him in finding Préchac, faithful follower of Havet and his rather wooden *Critique Verbale*, over-conservative in such matters, too much given to explaining the inexplicable in order to avoid the change of a letter, as it were.

As for the largest MS question involved, it is admirably set forth on pp. 46-50, almost the last contribution made to the commentary by the hand of Faider himself. The argument is extensive and can only be summarized here, and that not too satisfactorily. In brief, Faider's A (pp. 47-9) deals with "la disposition traditionnelle de l'ouvrage: pluralité des livres, ordre des chapitres," etc. The difficulty here lies in making all the things taken up in the traditional Book I capable of being resumed under any one single abstract term; "à moins que l'on ne suppose une lacune dont l'étendue resterait à préciser, le terme [manumissio] doit exprimer une notion fort générale, en tout cas assez vague." Under Faider's B we are introduced (p. 49) to Préchac's view that originally the *De Clementia* consisted of one book only, which we possess in its entirety; it became broken up and confused in the process of transmission. Consequently Préchac interpolates the entire content of our present truncated Book II between I, 3, 1 (immediately following the summary) and I, 3, 2. Faider's arch treatment of this thesis must be read in the French to be fully enjoyed. Finally in C is stated the hypothesis of Vallette (*Mélanges P. Thomas* [1930], pp. 687-700), namely, that Book I, in its present shape, contains only a part of the treatise, mutilated or even unfinished, and that Book II, still less complete, represents only a different editing of our Book I. But Faider dwells on the critical importance of the phrase *prima pars* (I, 3, 1); the Book I that we possess deals with the natural disposition of the human heart to mercy, constituting, it would appear, the first part of a whole disquisition on clemency, whatever it may be that is concealed under the hotly debated and challenged word *manumissionis*. Thus Faider concludes the statement of positions; he offers no solution of his own, nor does it appear likely that a satisfactory one can be found, short of a revelation. On the same topic, briefly touched upon, one should also consult the remarks of Favez (pp. 128-9).

There are a number of other passages where more or less difficulty has arisen; in these cases Favez has collected the suggestions, old or new, that have been offered for amelioration, usually without comment. The reviewer is obliged to Favez for having taken the special trouble to include among the conjectures set forth some offered by himself in *C. P.*, XXXI (1936). One or two seem quite reasonable, once the dust has been brushed from them by kindly housekeeping.

One must not forget the Index Verborum to the *De Clementia* prepared by Professor van de Woestijne; the generous spacing of the entries makes it a pleasure to use, especially in these days of huddled indexes. In default of the long-deferred appearance of the *index omnium verborum* of Seneca's prose works, formerly proceeding under the chief editorship of the late Professor Oldfather of the University of Illinois, we are still obliged to rely on *disiecta membra*. There are three errors in the present index which the reviewer has noted: the doubled initial vowel in *imminebat* (p. 187);

*sueurit* for *succurrit* (p. 217), the correction of which will involve a transposition with *succurret* immediately following; *voluminus* for *voluminis* (p. 224).

It is a piece of pure affectation to append a list of errata in printing found in the volume; perhaps the most serious one on the Latin-French side occurs where *damnum* has displaced *domum* (p. 76, foot). The Greek quotations suffer from numerous small defects relating to accents, breathings, and subscript iotas; errors of this kind will be found as follows: p. 41, foot, where we have trouble with lack of accent twice and with a 332° for 332° in the reference; p. 62, eleventh line from foot, missing iota subscript in the nominative participle; p. 65, med., πόλλοι for πολλοί; p. 75, line 4 where καὶ fails to get the benefit of encliticism; p. 116 in the quotation from St. Paul, another iota subscript missing and a grave accent usurping the place of a rough breathing; p. 142, thirteen lines from the top, where the acute accent needs yet further retirement; and p. 153, where the kappa of the οἰκτίρμονες at the end of line 2 is needed equally in the same adjective in line 3.

The reviewer trusts that he has done full credit to the work of Dr. Favez. Of the one hundred and forty-eight pages of commentary one hundred and eight are from his hand alone. They demonstrate amply his high qualifications as a Senecan scholar and his wide acquaintance with the whole field of Latin literature, besides constituting a beautiful *monumentum amicitiae*.

WILLIAM HARDY ALEXANDER.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

---

HETTY GOLDMAN (ed.). Excavations at Gözlu Kule, Tarsus. Volume I (text and plates) : The Hellenistic and Roman Periods. Contributors: D. H. Cox, H. Goldman, V. Grace, F. F. Jones, A. E. Raubitschek. Princeton, N. J., Princeton Univ. Press, 1950. Text: pp. vi + 420; Plates (bound separately): 276 figs., 9 plans. \$36.00.

The mound of Gözlu Kule lies on the southwest edge of the Classical (and modern) town of Tarsus; it is a suburb, then, and not Tarsus itself, which is the subject of this book, a point which should be remembered by readers of this journal. The site was chosen for excavation primarily as a spot to test the stratification of Prehistoric Cilicia; had it been excavated fifty years ago, the entire material studied in the present volume would have no doubt been thrown in the dump with never a word about it. Instead, we have two large volumes filled with information of the greatest importance to classical archaeologists, information which we owe in part to the progress of modern field archaeology, but in much greater part to the vision and diligence of the excavators, to whom all of us must be most grateful.

Certainly the site would never have been chosen as a source of information about historic Tarsus; it has been sadly mutilated by almost countless pits cut through the upper strata in Islamic times, and even more so by French military installations placed there in 1921. Despite these drawbacks, a great deal has been retrieved, which can be roughly dated to the following periods: Late Fourth Century B. C. ("Early Hellenistic"); Third Century B. C. into the Second ("Middle Hellenistic"); Second Quarter of the Second Century ("Late Hellenistic"); about 150 to 50 B. C. (called "Hellenistic-Roman"); First Century to Early Second Century ("Early Imperial"); Second Century to Late Third Century ("Middle Imperial"); and finally Late Third Century on to the Late Seventh ("Late Imperial"); of the last period, very little has been found later than the Fourth Century. These periods have been segregated more by "units"—that is, houses, graves, sealed fill, etc.—than by stratification; anyone who has excavated a site where there has been much stone building in Roman times knows how little stratification can be surely distinguished; and yet a few cross sections to show accumulation in the difficult fill at this site would have been welcomed by other field-workers.

Of buildings there are few, and those of little importance. There are traces of the *cavea* of a theater on the site, but no other public buildings except the remains of a concrete circuit-wall. There are nevertheless private buildings of interest: the earliest is a bronze-foundry of Early Hellenistic date, unhappily badly preserved. More important is a large house (Middle Hellenistic) of peculiar plan, including rooms identified as "*oecus andron*," "*pastas*," "*megaron*," and bath. These names are questionable except for the bath; the "*pastas*," for example, is in the court rather than alongside it, an arrangement elsewhere unknown. (This room also is paved with a mosaic of strange design: a narrow central panel with dolphins around a circle enclosing a rosette, with side-panel of wheels and palmettes, the whole surrounded by successive borders of waves, and egg-and-dart.) The only other structure of importance is a factory for making lamps and figurines, of the Second Century A. C., including two "*ovens*," apparently used as kilns. This building also furnished some sealed deposits and an important dump of molds. The rest of the fill is composed of parts of houses, cisterns, drains, etc., of minor interest; finally, there are many graves, all of a humble nature. Traces of considerable burning were noted early in the Late Roman period, and it is suggested that they may be associated with the conflict between Licinius and Maximian, although they may equally well be the result of an unrecorded conflagration.

Nine beautifully drawn plans elucidate the text of the excavation. It is a pity that in two cases (Plans 1 and 8) the architect neglected to include on the plan itself the scale. Plan 8 is precisely as Plan 7 and thus presents no difficulty, but for Plan 1 the scale was left to the printer (who cites it as 1:100, whereas in fact it appears that it should be 1:1000). This correction should be made in the book, since Plan 1 is the master-plan for the entire site, and at first glance is most misleading.

Chapters I and II, written by Miss Goldman, are devoted to excava-

tions and chronology; pp. 36 f. are important to the reader since here is set forth briefly the absolute chronology. Chapter III, by Miss Cox, is perhaps the most important chapter of all to the classical historian. It is a discussion of the coins, and in it is an excellent historical treatment of the Hellenistic coinage of Tarsus, which includes a useful history of the city in Hellenistic times. The coins found at the site are chiefly bronze, but Miss Cox discusses the silver issues as well. A brief discussion of Imperial coinage is appended. It may be noted that it was impossible to include the coins found in the fourth and fifth campaigns in the present treatment.

In Chapter IV Miss Jones joins Miss Cox to describe and classify the lamps. (Incidentally, note 1 on p. 84 contains a *caveat* which might well be heeded by all who work in the future on lamps.) The lamps are here divided into nineteen groups, which together give an unbroken series from Early Hellenistic to Late Roman times. This grouping is based upon Broneer's Corinth "types" and shares with the Corinth volume the unhappy practice of not clearly indicating the types on the plates. Comparison with the Antioch lamps, very useful in this neighborhood, is also given. It seems to this reviewer that in all these discussions of lamps, if we are ever to have a universal lamp corpus, lamps of foreign manufacture should be rigorously separated from local products. After all, the lamps foreign to Tarsus (here, from various Hellenistic sites including Greece) will probably occur in better series at the site of manufacture, whereas this publication of the Tarsian lamps will for a long time remain the standard reference. Lamps should some day furnish us with extensive information on ancient trade-routes; here at Tarsus, for example, Hellenistic lamps show active trade with other Greek centers, the First Century A. C. shifts the trade to Italy, and, from the Second Century on, lamps and their molds (here of plaster) are local, though one may suspect that the molds themselves are borrowed from imports. Group IX (*ca.* 150—*ca.* 1 B. C.) comprises lamps of a kind found from Vindonissa in Gaul to Seleucia on the Tigris; if it could be proved that these lamps all come from one site originally, it would be most important for our knowledge of Late Hellenistic commerce, but this would entail closer analysis of the clay biscuit than can be given by "grey," "pink," etc. (which only are useful for the firing of individual pieces). Group IV is composed of molded lamps, apparently imported; they are the earliest molded lamps on the site and are stratigraphically dated as early as the late Third Century B. C.—a very important contribution.

Chapter V, on stamped amphora handles, is contributed by Miss Grace; though not a member of the expedition, she was happily able to examine the stamps on the spot. In footnote 5 on p. 136 she makes a significant correction in her table previously published (*Hesperia*, III [1934]), and notes that there is also much to correct in Hiller's list of eponyms (*s. v.* "Rhodos," *R.-E.*, Suppl. V). The present publication offers *termini* for some types hitherto indefinite, confirms one Cnidian type, and occasionally helps with Rhodian chronology.

Chapter VI, "The Pottery," is done by Miss Jones and comprises, as far as this reviewer can judge, the most concise and lucid treatment

of Hellenistic and Roman wares thus far available for the Eastern Mediterranean. This chapter alone will assure *Tarsus I* a place in every field archaeologist's portable library of essential books, when his work lies in this area. Considerable indebtedness is here expressed to Mrs. D. C. Spitzer (Roman pottery from Corinth) and Henry Robinson (early Roman pottery from the Agora at Athens). We may hope that plans are under way to publish these important studies. Space forbids a detailed review here of Miss Jones' results, but in any case this whole section should be read by all archaeologists working with such materials.

The last important chapter, by Miss Goldman, deals with an astonishing quantity of terracotta figurines found in the course of excavation; their number is in part explained by the factory already mentioned, but others must have been made in Tarsus itself, not only for local consumption but very likely for extensive export trade. Again, Miss Goldman's study is one of the most important to appear in many years on this subject. The locally made figurines are for the most part strongly Hellenizing, but the method of manufacture strikes an Egyptian note. Plaster molds were apparently used throughout (some have been recovered)—a method very strange indeed for a Greek city. Furthermore, it appears from the text that the Tarsians had only a very limited understanding of plaster and its use: the plaster must have been poured over the matrix instead of being brushed on, thus leaving many air-holes in the mold and consequent bumps and warts on the clay figurines. It is a bit disappointing that Winter's arrangement, strictly by subject-matter and without regard to chronological sequence, has been so closely followed. However, stratigraphical date, where present, is given after each example, and, where context gives no clue, Miss Goldman's work on comparative chronology demonstrates an extraordinarily keen eye and a comprehensive knowledge of the *genre*.

Only a few individual pieces can be noted here: 42, a Tyche, looks much later than Middle Hellenistic but is dated stratigraphically; 55, a torso, carries the "Praxitelean" curve *ad absurdum*; 147 is made from a cast of a coin; 151, a young Heracles, is from a fine Hellenistic mold; 203 is a good Neo-Classical head—Hadrianic?; 466, to this reviewer the finest head of the lot, should be late Second Century, but not early Third.

The book closes with miscellaneous finds, at Tarsus of little importance, and the inscriptions (few and of negligible value), which are ably edited by Dr. Raubitschek.

Following the text is a long chart of objects arranged chronologically. It is useful enough, but must have added considerably to the cost of manufacturing an already expensive book.

J. H. YOUNG.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

A. KLOTZ. C. Iuli Caesaris Commentarii. Vol. II, 2nd ed. Leipzig,  
B. G. Teubner, 1950. Pp. xxii+169. \$2.35. (*Bibliotheca  
Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*, No. 1125.)

Klotz' first edition of the *B. C.* appeared just twenty-five years ago and held the field as the standard critical edition for ten years, until the publication in 1936 of the excellent Budé edition of Pierre Fabre. The possibility of making any great improvement on the none-too-well preserved text of this important historical document is slight, and criticism is restricted in the main to matters of detail. Klotz has done a careful, craftsmanlike piece of work, and the result is a definite improvement over his earlier edition. In evaluating this edition it will, however, be necessary to compare it not only with Klotz' earlier edition, but also with that of Fabre.

The volume is in the new Teubner format, which profits greatly by its similarity to that of the Budé series. The size of the page is now the same in the two great collections. This allows a wider margin for annotation—something for which the old Teubner format made no allowance—but the quality of the paper forbids the use of ink. The size of the type face used for the text is slightly smaller but definitely clearer and easier to read. The typography of the *apparatus criticus* has also been improved by the use of boldface for line numbers and *sigla* as well as by the use of vertical bars instead of spaces, a single bar at the end of groups of variants and a double bar at the end of the variants on each line of text. Page numbers have also been dropped to the bottom of the page, and book and section numbers put in their place at the top. Finally, the transformation of the page is completed by the addition in the upper margin of a running head which gives a brief summary of the contents of the page. Every one of these changes is an improvement for which readers will be truly grateful to both editor and publisher.

The edition, like its predecessor, is not based on an independent collation of the manuscripts but relies upon the reports of earlier editors. Much of the value of Fabre's edition lay in his independent collation, and Klotz has profited from this by reporting the readings of the Naples manuscript (N) from Fabre. While this manuscript had not been used for the earlier edition, little positive gain results from the report of its readings since, so far as I can discover, not a single change of text is based on the authority of N alone or in combination with the other manuscripts.

The description of the eight principal manuscripts used is brought into line with that of Fabre, which involves a redating in the case of S, T, U, and W (M in Fabre). Of the eight manuscripts, S, N, and L form one family ( $\sigma$ ), while the other five form a second ( $\beta$ ) which is divided in turn into two sub-families: W, U, R and T, V ( $\pi$ ). W, U, R are not given a family designation ( $\mu$  in Fabre), but it is now recognized that they are subject to an influence ( $y$ ) independent of the archetype. Klotz does not, however, follow Fabre in his explanation of certain  $\pi$  readings as resulting from contamination with  $\sigma$ , and in this he is in agreement with A. Bouvet in his edition of the *Bellum Africum* (Paris, 1949), p. xlvi. This is all stated very

briefly in the preface (pp. iv-vii), with reference to the somewhat fuller argument in the earlier edition, a procedure which is likely to prove an annoyance to users. On the manuscript division into two or three books one should now consult also J. Andrieu, "La division en livres et les mentions d'auteur dans le corpus Césarien," *Rev. Ét. Lat.*, XXVII (1949), pp. 138-49.

On the general condition of the text Klotz still maintains his position that the *B. C.* has come to us in an unfinished state and that it was not published by Caesar (pp. vii-xiv). In the earlier edition he marked with asterisks those passages which he regarded as having been left in less than finished form by Caesar. In this edition he defends his theory against the criticism of Karl Barwick ("Caesars Commentarii und das Corpus Caesarianum," *Philologus*, Suppl. XXXI, 2), unsuccessfully in the opinion of the present reviewer. It is a matter of opinion whether or not the combination of hasty writing on the part of Caesar and a poor manuscript tradition could have produced the condition in which we find the text at several spots such as II, 29, 3-4. At any rate Klotz admits the validity of Barwick's defense of a number of the impugned passages, and the asterisks have been withdrawn in the present edition from about half of the passages to which they were previously affixed.

In the last five pages of the preface (pp. xv-xix) Klotz collects instances of syntactical usage which deviate from the classical norm and uses them as evidence of haste of composition. Several of the instances are now received into the text although they had previously been rejected. This is not a case of special pleading, for the acceptance of these readings is legitimate in every case. It should, nevertheless, be observed that while these so-called vulgarisms may be the result of hasty writing, they do not prove that the work was not published by Caesar. In the case of those usages which may be paralleled from the *B. G.* they do not even prove hasty writing.

In the constitution of the text Klotz has judiciously followed Fabre in a majority of the passages where he has decided to deviate from his earlier judgment. I have noted about ninety changes from the text of the previous edition, and in some sixty of these instances the new text agrees with that of Fabre. This represents a higher degree of conservatism, for thirty of these changes involve a return to the authority of the manuscripts. Few call for any particular comment, but the acceptance of Constans' emendation at III, 32, 6 is hardly likely to meet with general approval. It is highly questionable whether *ut iī sortem fecerant* can mean "inasmuch as they had amassed capital." There is no contrast here between capital and interest, as there regularly is where *sors* has this technical sense. At III, 24, 2 Klotz prints *ut † veterani in portum*, but according to Fabre the manuscripts do not read *ut*. The men in question have just been described as *milites delecti*, and there is no reason why they should not be referred to as *veterani*.

A number of changes are purely orthographical. Single *i* is now properly preferred to double *i* in the genitive and locative singular of second declension nouns whose stems end in *i*, but *Dyrrachii* remains at III, 26, 2 although *Brundisi* is now read at III, 24, 2 and 87, 3. Similarly *Antoni* is read at III, 10, 5 and 34, 1 but *Antonii*

at 67, 5 without citation of authority in any of the three cases. The knotty problems of orthography are not satisfactorily solved. Klotz seems for the most part to prefer to standardize spelling although he does not make any general statement to that effect in the preface nor report manuscript authority in most cases. For example, *impetus* is usually read, but at III, 84, 4 *inpetum* appears. More disturbing are *acie* dative at III, 89, 3 followed by *aciei* dative at 89, 5; *Achillam* III, 109, 3 followed by *Achillan* 109, 5; *animum adverterunt* at I, 80, 3 and *animum adversa* at 80, 4, but *animadverso* at 81, 3. The restoration of the archetype is one goal, and standardization of orthography is another. A compromise is possible, but the reader should be apprised of the procedure adopted. Klotz appears to aim at a restoration of orthography acceptable for Caesar and Caesar's period, but it is hardly credible that Caesar, the author of the *De Analogia*, would, even in haste, vary his spelling of the commonest words within the space of a few lines of text. The restoration of *se aecum* from the reading *secum* at III, 73, 5 seems a misapplication of ingenuity when *aequus* is the spelling adopted everywhere else. The same might be said of *votaretur* for *notaretur* at I, 7, 2 in the face of *vetuit* at I, 41, 4 and III, 75, 1.

The punctuation of the text has also been thoroughly revised. All subordinate clauses and all items in series are now set off by commas. I have noted only one instance of emendatory punctuation. At III, 18, 4 f. *reductus existimabor' bello perfecto ab iis Caesar haec facta cognovit qui sermoni interfuerunt* is changed to *reductus existimabor bello perfecto' ab iis*, etc. This change removes a reference to facts learned after the war although the earlier reading appears to be supported by other references to facts learned after the war (III, 57, 5 and 60, 4). As part of Pompey's speech the words *bello perfecto* do not seem appropriate since what he is considering is not a conclusion of the war but a negotiated cessation of hostilities.

Two changes in Roman numerals appear to be typographical errors. At II, 18, 4 for CCXXX read CLXXX and at I, 30, 2 for IIII read III. A similar error has been carried over from the earlier edition. At III, 112, 2 Caesar briefly describes the Heptastadion, the mole which connected the Pharos with the city of Alexandria, and incidentally states its length in *passus*. In all other critical editions the numeral is DCCCC whereas Klotz gives DCCC without comment. Probably all that Caesar meant to say was that the length was slightly less than a mile (*mille passus*). Actually on the basis of Pliny's equivalence of 155 *passus* to a stade (*N. H.*, II, 23, 21) the Heptastadion should have been just a little over a mile (*mille passus*) in length, and that is the distance Ammianus Marcellinus gives as separating the Pharos from the city (XXII, 16, 10). I make this point because Klotz' text has been so widely used as to leave traces of its influence. For example, A. G. Peskett, in his Loeb edition, prints DCCC but translates "nine hundred," and P. Graniador (*La guerre d'Alexandrie* [Cairo, 1931], p. 47, n. 4) quotes Caesar to the effect that the length was 800 *passus*. So also at I, 38, 4 both of Klotz' editions have omitted the word *loci* between *ipsius* and *opportunitatem*.

A few other passages where no change has been made seem to call for some comment. At III, 95, 3 *industriose* is read with *σ* in preference to the *industrie* of *β*. This is the only instance of the word in the *B. C.* but in *B. G.*, VII, 60, 1 *industrie* is read without variant. Klotz still insists on emending *M. Acilio* to *M'. Acilio* (III, 15, 6) and *Caninus* to *M'. Acilius Caninus* (III, 39, 1) in spite of Fabre's note on the latter passage citing inscriptional evidence for the combination *M. Acilius Caninus*.

Most editors have felt it necessary to emend *latorum audacia* (I, 5, 3) because of the peculiar independent use of the noun *lator*. Klotz here reads *pauorum* and a large number of less probable emendations are recorded in the appendix to Meusel's *Lexicon*. DuPontet retained *latorum* as does also Fabre, but without defending it. Gronovius did attempt to defend the reading by punctuating (*latorum audacia!*), but of such an interpretation one can only observe that we are trying to read Caesar and not Florus. I believe that an adequate parallel is to be found in Cicero's *Pro Sestio*, 36, 77 where we read *improbitate latoris*.

In the comment on *illi <re> deliberata respondent* (I, 10, 2) the addition is attributed to Gruter whereas, according to Meusel, it should be attributed to Manutius, as in the earlier edition, and *illi deliberata <re> respondent* is due to Gruter. *B. G.*, IV, 9, 1 *re deliberata . . . reversuros* is cited in support of the reading adopted, but *B. G.*, VI, 12, 5 *imperfecta re redierit* might also be cited in support of Gruter's emendation, which would also seem to be more probable palaeographically.

Of recent critical comment on the *B. C.* one suggestion would have appeared too late to be considered by Klotz. E. Fränkel suggests (*J. R. S.*, XXXIX [1949], p. 152) that the words *quo praeter sacerdotes adire fas non est—quae Graeci adyta appellant*—should be deleted as a gloss, perhaps from Servius, *Aen.*, II, 115.

In final judgment of this edition it may be repeated that it is a careful and craftsmanlike piece of work, a distinct improvement over its predecessor. In its new format it is a welcome addition to the post-war Teubner series. Since it is in one volume, it is much more convenient to use than the two volume Budé edition. On intrinsic merit, however, the present reviewer feels that the Budé edition still has distinct superiority as a critical text in addition to its copious introduction, translation, explanatory notes, chronological table, and extensive biographical index.

LLOYD W. DALY.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

MOSES HADAS, editor and translator. Aristeas to Philoerates (Letter of Aristeas). New York, Harper and Brothers, for The Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning, 1951. Pp. vii + 233. \$1.00.

The enthusiastic acclaim which greeted the inception of this ambitious series, *Jewish Apocryphal Literature*, which Dropsie

College is publishing under the editorship of the eminent talmudist, Solomon Zeitlin, will surely not be lessened by the appearance of this volume, prepared by the secretary of the editorial board, Moses Hadas of Columbia. In accord with the general policy for the series, the critical text of the document (in this case Greek) is printed on the left-hand page with a fresh English translation on the right. At the bottom of these pages spreads is a running commentary on matters which appear of especial consequence to the translator. In addition there is a full-dress critical introduction—in this volume it runs to ninety pages. The Greek text which is printed is that of H. St. J. Thackeray, which appeared as an appendix to H. B. Swete's *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek* (Cambridge, 1902). Occasional significant variants and emendations to this text are printed at the bottom of each Greek page. The reader will find in the introduction and commentary an almost exhaustive survey and evaluation of the earlier work on this document which has aroused fully as much interest as it actually deserves.

The tone of the whole volume is scholarly in the best sense of that abused word. While the reader may not accept every conclusion of Dr. Hadas, he will most certainly be impressed by the uniformly sane and judicious appraisal, the exemplary sobriety and restraint with regard to matters often highlighted to an unwarranted prominence, and the readable quality of the translation. While no translator can ever hope to produce a translation which will duplicate in every detail what each reviewer would have made (or thinks that he would), the present translation, so far as I have checked it, appears not only accurate in high degree but free from the awkwardness which is so often a part of works clawed over into English. In conclusion, both the author and the sponsors may well be proud of this contribution to scholarship which should remain useful for many years.

The nature of *Aristeas to Philocrates* is too well known to require more than the briefest summary. In brief, it purports to be the report which Aristeas, a courtier at Alexandria in the days of Ptolemy Philadelphus, writes to his brother Philocrates regarding the recent translation of the Pentateuch from Hebrew into Greek. As his story runs, Demetrius of Phalerum, the king's librarian, draws the king's attention to the serious lack in the growing library. Ptolemy promptly accepts the suggestion to remedy it. At the behest of Aristeas he frees all Jewish slaves in his domain, as a proof of his great-hearted nature, and then sends Aristeas and

- Andreas to Eleazar, the Jewish high priest in Jerusalem, with a letter requesting the latter to send him a copy of the law, together with seventy-two competent scholars to translate it. The two messengers, laden with munificent gifts (described in the fullest detail), arrive in Jerusalem, see the sights of this utopia land, and return with the desired rolls and translators. Then follows a protracted period of banqueting in which all seventy-two translators prove their competence (and piety) by brilliant *ex tempore* answers to the king's studied questions in the best approved style of Greek symposia. At the conclusion of this period they are taken by Demetrius to the island of Pharos where the translation is made in the course of

seventy-two days. It is read to the Jewish people and subsequently to Ptolemy, and arouses universal approval.

In his introduction Hadas considers the various problems entailed. More than half the space is not improperly devoted to the question of the date of this writing. In consequence of a most meticulous examination of all the possible evidence he concludes that it was probably about 130 B. C. by a nameless Alexandrian Jew who was hellenized in all save religion, for the purpose of raising the credit of the local Jewish community. With this general conclusion there can be no intelligent difference of opinion. So far as the date suggested is concerned, I am less confident; apparently Hadas is led to it because of what seems to him a probable connection with the writings of Ben Sirach and his notion about the special concern which Aristeas had had. Since these are obviously very important in Hadas' eyes, they may be briefly considered.

That the purpose of the book was to "raise the credit of the Jewish community" can scarcely be questioned. That it was written by a Jew, not a gentile, and many years after the translation of the law into Greek, is also beyond intelligent question. But Hadas is convinced that while this was the case, nonetheless the author addressed himself primarily to the Jewish community, in part "to raise the credit of the Jewish community and its doctrines, *in its own sight and perhaps in the sight of the non-Jewish community*" (italics mine); in part to approve to said Jewish readers a new revision of the older Greek translation which had not proved satisfactory.

With regard to both of these points I am far from convinced. Hadas obviously feels that the lapse of a hundred years between the appearance of a translation into Greek of the Pentateuch and this imaginative chronicle of its occasion is not to be explained without other factors. Thus he argues that the well-known word of the prologue of Ben Sirach ("For things originally spoken in Hebrew have not the same force when they are translated into another tongue . . .") evidences a dissatisfaction with the existing translation and that it had acted as a spur to the production of a more satisfactory revision. Our writing, while purporting to tell of the *original* translation, is really an attempt to sell to Alexandrian Jewry the new and authoritative text. This view, which is substantially that of P. Kahle, appears to me most uncertain. At any rate, if accepted, it makes Hadas' date (130 B. C.) very early as the aftermath of a translation prompted by Ben Sirach (132 B. C.). Kahle had much more naturally favored a date nearly a half century later.

The other suggestion, namely, that the writer was directing his book to *Jewish* readers to heighten their self-esteem appears to me dubious. Hadas cites with approval an article by A. Tcherikover in which the latter had protested against the usual view (as he styles it, the "cliché repeated by virtually all scholars") that the Alexandrian Jewish literature was addressed to non-Jewish readers and was apologetic in nature. I can see nothing in this writing which supports the rival hypothesis. The so-called "cliché" appears to me entirely reasonable despite the fact that "virtually all scholars" support it. Rather it would appear to me probable that the real purpose of

the writer was to make an *apologia* for Judaism—its doctrines, practices, and scriptures—and that there is no scintilla of evidence for the assumed “revision.” The fact that many years had elapsed between the rendering of the law into Greek and the production of the present romance appears to me inconsequential. It is by no means the central note of the writing; rather it is simply an interesting yarn which serves as loose connective tissue for this whole characteristic attempt of Judaism to put its best foot forward and to approve itself in foreign eyes.

But be that as it may—and it must be insisted that unlike many champions Hadas by no means overrides his hobby; his restraint here, as throughout the volume, is both reassuring and refreshing—the volume is a notable triumph. A wealth of information is made available not only for the present writing and its influence in subsequent years but with regard to life and practice and literature in the years which saw its birth.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

---

JOSEPH KATZ. Plotinus' Search for the Good. New York, King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1950. Pp. xii + 106. \$2.50.

When we are born we are all placed in the so-called reality of the external world. During our childhood we pass through a stage during which we believe this reality to be the only truth: it is the stage of naive realism. The very day we begin to doubt this reality we also begin to reflect philosophically. The primary difference between the various philosophical systems may be said to result from the different solutions they offer concerning the problem of the nature and value of this reality. Though this problem is most important, it is not necessary for a philosopher to discuss it explicitly. Plotinus, for instance, is convinced that the right solution was found long ago by Plato, whose authority was his guiding principle all through his life. To him Plato and absolute truth are almost identical and his highest aim was to reintegrate his master's philosophy. In this reinterpretation, however, he made full use of postplatonic terminology and frequently underwent Peripatetic, Stoic, and even Epicurean influence.

Dr. Katz is right in opening his interesting and concise essay by a chapter dealing with the preparations in Greek philosophy and, especially, with the postplatonic features in Plotinus: “With the Stoics he regards *this* life as similar to a play for which man has not written the script but in which he may or may not perform his assigned role well. Epicurean consolations concerning the nothingness of death are his also” (p. 5). But while he as a Platonist never criticizes Plato, he is always aware of the gap between the postplatonic schools and himself. He is shocked by the hedonism of the Epicureans and by their maintaining that the world is governed

by chance. He combats the materialism of the Stoics and their notion of Pronoia. The Stoics are forced to dissimulate the evil in their deified world; in Plotinus' view the soul is always allowed to avoid the evil of the here below by returning into the transcendent realm.

Katz shows these and other similar or differing trends in Plotinus and the postplatonic philosophers in a way that is similar to A. H. Armstrong's in his book *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1940). (Katz seems to be ignorant of this important essay.) The main purpose, however, of the author is neither to contribute to the history of Greek philosophy nor to describe once more Plotinus' system, but to try to detect the philosopher's motives. According to him Plotinus' "flight to the Alone" is a flight from the necessities of social life, an assertion which holds good with Plato but can scarcely be said of a man who is absolutely disinterested in politics. I share the author's view that "it is rather the extinction of man which constitutes the apex of ascent," but I deny his statement that "it is in no sense the achievement of its (the soul's) human essence that he (Plotinus) has in mind" (p. 48). To Plotinus, on the highest level, the achievement of man and the extinction of man coincide.

Katz lacks a sense for Plotinus' paradoxical statements, otherwise he would not call him "not consistent" (p. 35), "somewhat unfair" (p. 70), nor would he speak of "falsely conceived analogies" (p. 38), "unsatisfactory solution" (p. 50), nor blame what he calls his "devices" (pp. 38, 51, 68). To Plotinus all realities (not only the soul, as the author asserts, p. 50) have two aspects, which Émile Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin* (Paris, 1928; another book passed over by Katz), calls "le problème religieux, celui de la destinée de l'âme, le moyen de la restaurer dans son état primitif, et le problème philosophique, celui de la structure et de l'explication rationnelle de la réalité" (p. 23). The philosophical view claims to separate the levels of reality, the religious view to bind them. Therefore there is no reason to be surprised that to Plotinus "the productivity of intelligible being and the One is compatible with immobility" (p. 38). The *quaestio vexata* of Plotinus' system is this: Why didn't the One remain in its loneliness? Why did the manifold come into existence? Greek philosophers since Parmenides had been haunted by this question. Of course, even Plotinus, being unable to answer by arguments, introduces metaphor as the only possibility of solving the riddle. To censure him for resorting to metaphor, as Katz seems to do (p. 38), would be the same as blaming him for being unable to draw a picture of the One.

HANS-RUDOLF SCHWYZER.

ZÜRICH (SWITZERLAND).

JULIEN REINACH. Gaius, *Institutes*. Texte établi et traduit. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1950. Pp. xxiv + 194. (Budé.)

Reinach<sup>1</sup> has produced a revised edition of the *Institutes* with a French translation (conveniently printed on the left-hand page, opposite the corresponding Latin text which is printed on the right-hand page) and an introduction giving brief information on the personality of Gaius, the character of his work, the history of its discovery and editions, and the principles followed by the present editor in establishing the text.

As regards the historical questions of the identity of Gaius and the nature of the little handbook known as his *Institutes*, Reinach has adopted two theories proposed by scholars of the past century: With Mommsen<sup>2</sup> he believes in Gaius' eastern homeland. The book he considers, slightly modifying a hypothesis advanced in 1869 by H. Dernburg,<sup>3</sup> as the published record of lectures delivered by Gaius in the years 160-162, each *commentarius* representing the course of one semester.<sup>4</sup> The first of these assumptions, as is well known, is looked upon by most Romanists with a great deal of skepticism, and Reinach's arguments can hardly be deemed convincing;<sup>5</sup> it is nevertheless, in my opinion, worth serious consideration.<sup>6</sup> The second assumption is highly doubtful in the light of the results of recent investigations, which, to be sure, were not yet available to Reinach. It will have to be entirely discarded, if the present reviewer is correct in suggesting that the *Institutes* as known to us was not composed by Gaius at all but a mere arrangement, which was made in the third century A. D. and was both an abridgment and an enlargement, through the incorporation of marginal glosses, of the Gaian original (another, somewhat later, and probably better

<sup>1</sup> Three reviews have so far become known to me: A. Berger in *Latomus*, X (1951), pp. 333-8; M. David and H. L. W. Nelson in *Tijdschr. voor Rechtsgeschiedenis*, XIX (1951), pp. 336-45; S. Solazzi in *Iura*, III (1952), pp. 341-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Jahrb. des Gemeinen Rechts*, III (1859), pp. 1 ff. (*Jur. Schriften*, II, pp. 26 ff.).

<sup>3</sup> "Die Institutionen des Gaius, ein Collegheft aus dem Jahre 161 n. C." in *Festschrift für Wächter* (Halle, 1869), pp. 55 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Reinach infers the exact date of 160-162 from the fact that II, 151a mentions *imperator Antoninus*, while II, 195 speaks of *divus Antoninus*; he concludes (as had been done before him) that this reflects lectures given before and after March 7, 161, the day of the death of Antoninus Pius (p. ix). II, 195, however, is no reliable witness, because the authenticity of the final part of this paragraph (*sed hodie rell.*) is extremely doubtful, as was first demonstrated by F. Kniep, *Der Rechtsgelehrte Gaius* (Jena, 1910), pp. 3 f., and has since been held by many scholars; cf. F. Schulz, *History of Roman Legal Science* (Oxford, 1946), p. 164, n. 1, with further literature listed, also H. Appleton, *Rev. Histor. de Droit*, 1929, p. 218. The reasons for questioning the authenticity of the passage are too strong to be brushed aside summarily, as does Reinach.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. David and Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 344 f.

<sup>6</sup> See n. 68 of my paper to be cited in the following note.

arrangement of the same original being the *Res Cottidiana*e).<sup>7</sup> But even if this view should be rejected as too radical, the fact remains that what we have is the outcome of a textual development which had continued into the third century, rather than a copy of Gaius' own publication.<sup>8</sup>

From the standpoint of the task which Reinach set for himself primarily, i. e. that of editing the text as it stands, these matters, it is true, are of minor importance. From his premise that the *commentarii* in their present form should be unqualifiedly attributed to Gaius himself, Reinach has acted wisely in not indulging in an exaggerated purism, such as has induced several critics to oversimplify the textual problem by aiming at a clear-cut separation of a supposedly classical text from what is held to be postclassical glosses.<sup>9</sup> It is nevertheless to be regretted that Reinach was not yet able to utilize Wieacker's forementioned paper, as well as other inquiries by the same author and by A. R. Bellinger.<sup>10</sup> Like all his predecessors, Reinach bases his text exclusively on the authority of the palimpsest of Verona,<sup>11</sup> with the sole exception of those few passages which occur in the more recently discovered fragments from Egypt.<sup>12</sup> The considerable amount of textual materials contained in the *Mosaicarum et Romanarum Legum Collatio* (16, 2) and in Justinian's *Institutes* and *Digest*, as well as in such secondary sources as the so-called *Tituli ex Corpore Ulpiani*, the Visigoth *Epitome*, and Theophilus' paraphrasis, he uses only as aids in proposing conjectures for the restoration of passages which are corrupt or illegible in the palimpsest. The studies just cited, however, have established that versions preserved in those sources represent independent transmissions, which can all be traced back to the *recensio* of the third century,<sup>13</sup> and which are of a value equal and sometimes even superior to that of the Veronensis.<sup>14</sup> The hope may be expressed that Reinach will pay due attention to these investigations, if and when a second edition of his work will have to be prepared.

The deplorable condition of the Veronese manuscript, which for by far the greater part of the *Institutes* is the only authority avail-

<sup>7</sup> See my paper: "Zur Geschichte des Gaiustextes" in *St. Arangio-Ruiz* (Naples, 1952), IV, pp. 171-96.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. F. Wieacker, "Vorbedingungen einer kritischen Gaiusausgabe" in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Diritto Romano e di Storia del Diritto, Verona, 27-28-29 Settembre 1948* (Milan, 1951), I, pp. 53-74, especially pp. 61, 74.

<sup>9</sup> The chief critics are listed by Schulz, *op. cit.*, p. 161, n. 8. For anticritical remarks see Schulz, pp. 161 f., also Wieacker, *op. cit.*, p. 58, *Festschr. F. Schulz* (see the following note), II, p. 142.

<sup>10</sup> Wieacker, "Oströmische Gaiusexemplare" in *Festschrift Fritz Schulz* (Weimar, 1951), II, pp. 101-44; Bellinger, "The Text of Gaius' *Institutes* and Justinian's *Corpus*" in *A. J. P.*, LXX (1949), pp. 394-403.

<sup>11</sup> As rendered in G. Studemund's *Gai Institutionum Commentarii Quattuor Codicis Veronensis Apographum* (1874).

<sup>12</sup> *P. Oxy.*, XVII, 2103; *P. S. I.*, XI, 1182.

<sup>13</sup> Wieacker, *Atti Verona*, I, pp. 59, 61; *Festschr. F. Schulz*, II, pp. 141 ff.

<sup>14</sup> See Wieacker, *Festschr. F. Schulz*, II, pp. 131 f.; also Bellinger, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

able, presents a serious challenge to the philological skill and the legal knowledge of an editor. It must be stated that Reinach has not always been fortunate in his efforts to improve the reading or to restore the text where the manuscript is defective. Berger has compiled a rather long list of unsatisfactory conjectures; most, if not all, of his criticisms are justified, and the reader may be referred to his list.<sup>15</sup> One more instance may be added here. The formula of liberation in the formulary for the *solutio per aes et libram* (III, 174) is restored by Reinach as follows: *ego me recte solvo liberoque hoc aere aeneaque libra*. Other editors read: *me eo nomine* (or *eo nomine me*) *a te solvo*, etc. The latter reading is obviously preferable. The words: *me recte solvo* are out of place; for whether or not the *solutio* was performed correctly could not depend on the debtor's saying that it was so. *Eo nomine*, on the other hand, is a typical phrase of legal Latin and needed here, because the debtor had to make it clear that his act referred to the obligation described in the preceding sentence of the ritual. Moreover, the common reading is supported by *eq* in *P. S. I.*, XI, 1182, line 130, and it actually fits best the letters: *commen<sup>16</sup>.cte*, which have been deciphered in V. Reinach seems to have been prompted by a desire to salvage the letters *cte*;<sup>17</sup> but in order to do so he sacrifices the letters *nmen*.

Reinach's handy edition will doubtless prove of value from the standpoint of classroom-reading of Gaius in French-speaking countries. The specialist, too, will occasionally be interested in his translation and in a few comments given in footnotes. As far as the establishment of the Latin text is concerned, however, this new edition cannot, in the main, be considered an improvement on the numerous editions already in existence. References to parallel legal sources and a little more diligence in quotations<sup>18</sup> would have been desirable.

HANS JULIUS WOLFF.

UNIVERSITY OF MAINZ.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 334 ff. Cf. also David and Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 340 ff.

<sup>16</sup> Thus Seckel and Kuebler in the Teubner edition. F. de Zulueta, *J. R. S.*, XXIV (1934), p. 174; *The Institutes of Gaius*, I (Oxford, 1946), p. 210, n. 7: *m̄commen.etc* (similarly, V. Arangio-Ruiz, *Bull. dell' Ist. di Dir. Rom.* "Vittorio Scialoja," XLII [1935], p. 606).

Reinach claims: *ēgnomēn.etc*. Other recent editions are not available to me.

<sup>17</sup> It is strange that Reinach himself renders the letters as: *ete* (see the preceding note). Or is this a misprint?

<sup>18</sup> Just a few examples: G. Beseler's *Beiträge zur Kritik der römischen Rechtsquellen* is cited as *Beiträge zur römischen Rechtsgeschichte* (p. XV, n. 2); *P. S. I.*, XI, 1182, commonly called *F*, becomes *F 1182*; for "Lawson, SZ. 62.109" (p. V, n. 2) read: "Lawson, SZ. 49.209" for "Levy (SZ 67.254)" read "Levy (SZ 54.267)" (p. 126, right-hand, note to III, 174). Fairness, however, requires me to quote the following words from Reinach's introduction (p. XVII): ". . . ce travail, qui, du fait de la guerre, de mon éloignement forcé de Paris et de ma déportation en Allemagne, a subi de nombreuses vicissitudes. . . ."

JEAN ZAFIROPULO. *Anaxagore de Clazomène: I, Le mythe grec traditionnel de Thalès à Platon; II, Théorie et fragments.* Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1948. Pp. 400.

JEAN ZAFIROPULO. *L'École Éléate: Parménide—Zénon—Mélisso.* Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1950. Pp. 304.

These two books present applications of a theory of the nature of early Greek philosophy which is set forth in the first part of the earlier volume. In this long introductory essay, Zafiropulo maintains that many of the characteristics of Greek philosophy can be explained only if we assume the existence of a "traditional myth," consciously preserved as a secret doctrine by an initiated few. This "myth" has its historical origin in the preservation of primitive forms of thought; perhaps it is basically little more than an articulation, on a more sophisticated level, of primitive animism (p. 223). According to the myth as Zafiropulo reconstructs it (pp. 87-98), reality exists on two levels, the material and the spiritual: the sensible world and the "world-soul." Every bit of spirit has the ability to materialize itself, and every bit of matter has its spiritual counterpart or soul, so that there is a constant interconnexion and interaction of the two realms (p. 112). This is more than a doctrine, the author thinks. It is a set of assumptions, a framework for the Greeks' view of life which we must grasp in order to comprehend their strange actions and attitudes: "si le Grec de l'époque classique nous paraît aujourd'hui tellement bizarre et incohérent, c'est qu'il ne dirigeait pas sa vie à l'aide de notre logique et de nos raisonnements" (p. 24). By this strangeness he means principally their attachment to religious ways of thought. Of "the Greek," he says, "nous le voyons partout mêler *notre* surnaturel à ses actes les plus familiers" (p. 18).

The Pythagoreans are the leaders in preserving and developing this tradition, and the exposition centers about them; but all the Greek philosophers down to Plato are members of the conspiracy, and in some sense or degree members of the Pythagorean sect. This includes even the Atomists, but exception is made of the Sophists, who introduced a new way of thinking, and share with Aristotle the dubious distinction of having started Greek thought on the downward path.

There is much in Zafiropulo's approach that is suggestive, though most of this had already been advanced by other writers. The emphasis on Greek philosophy's primitive background and its connexion with religion and mythology (as in the works of Cornford, Schuhl, and others) helps to explain, for example, the Pythagorean *acusmata* and the omnipresent "gods" of Thales. But as to Zafiropulo's original idea—the "traditional myth"—it is in the nature of things hard to establish, and his attempts at proof cannot be regarded as in any way persuasive. His documentation is very scanty, though it may at first appear fuller because of his habit of constant self-citation. The use of source materials often seems uncritical. Since he assumes that nearly every writer was a member of the "conspiracy," even sources like the plays of Euripides can be used to

document statements on Pythagoreanism; and since the traditional myth was conservatively maintained, a later writer like Plato can be used as evidence of its original form.

The studies of Anaxagoras and the Eleatics have some independent value, if read with caution, though these thinkers are regarded as strongly influenced by the traditional myth. It would scarcely be profitable to analyze these chapters in detail, but a few points may be mentioned.

In the section on Anaxagoras, Zafiropulo devotes most attention to the problems of the structure of matter, though he has chapters on cosmogony and living beings. He is probably right in seeing the qualities of fragment 4 as basically important—the moist and the dry, the warm and the cold, etc. However, he calls these "opposites"—traditional in Ionian cosmology—Pythagorean, and takes them as a link with the traditional myth. What is more, in Anaxagoras' phrase, *ἡ σύμμειξις πάντων χρημάτων, τοῦ τε διεροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ, κτλ.*, he takes *χρήματα* as a technical term, which can be understood in the same sense wherever it occurs (though the singular, *χρῆμα*, is not a technical term and means simply "thing"). The word *χρήματα* refers to the same kind of entity as the "primary substances" of the Ionians and is translated for some reason "fluides-qualité." These are condensations of the universal soul and therefore basically spiritual. The "seeds" of Anaxagoras (*σπέρματα*) are bits of these substances, each bearing a single quality. As might be expected, *νοῦς* means to Zafiropulo not mind but *esprit* (or *fluide-esprit*).

The *homoiomerē* are rejected as unhistorical because inconsistent with Anaxagoras' acceptance of infinite division; Zafiropulo mistakenly interprets them, along with Aristotle and Lucretius, as equivalent to atoms. Anaxagoras seems to have meant that a particle of matter may be homoeomeric in that it, and any of its divisions, contains all the various qualities in the same ratio. (See G. Vlastos, *Philos. Rev.*, LIV [1950], p. 54.)

In his treatment of Anaxagoras' terminology, Zafiropulo is guided by the two principles that we have the philosopher's exact words and that considering his attachment to the philosophy of the traditional myth his expression was doubtless often intentionally obscure (p. 350). Thus his language repays careful analysis, and one must not be surprised by "difficulty" in the interpretation; this was part of the author's plan. In the result, much is arbitrary, in spite of Zafiropulo's wish to avoid this, and because of the special meanings assigned to various words, the translation is scarcely comprehensible without constant reference to the discussion.

The second book, on the Eleatics, presents several differences from the first. The analysis is perhaps less original, and usually less dependent on the "traditional myth" idea. More account is taken of the work of other scholars; but the notes are full of inaccurate citations. The translation is careful and clear.

In general, Zafiropulo devotes more attention to logical than to metaphysical questions, and this leads to neglect of the denial of change which was of central importance in Eleatic thought. Zeno, for example, he supposes to be really saying something about language rather than trying to prove that motion does not exist.

There are many interesting and valuable passages, like the discussion of the meaning of the second part of Parmenides' poem, which is taken as a serious philosophical effort. It is also interpreted, however, as a symbolical representation of the truth for the benefit of initiates; here and elsewhere, "animism" introduces some confusion.

EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.

DEPAUW UNIVERSITY.

AELIUS PASOLI. *Acta Fratrum Arvalium Quae Post Annum MDCCCLXXIV Reperta Sunt.* Bologna, Cesare Zuffi, 1950. Pp. vii + 174. (*Università degli Studi di Bologna, Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Studi e Ricerche*, VII.)

This is not an epigraphical book in the usual sense, for the epigraphical texts in these pages are not texts edited by the author, who, if I am correct, did not consult the stones afresh, but are the up to now known but scattered texts gathered together in one volume. In other words, our book is a compilation. Its peculiar make-up will be described below. But first, a few introductory reminders of the history of the Arval records.

The first stones recording the ceremonies of the Arval College were discovered close to Rome in 1570, but not until 1795 were the *acta* collected and first published, as a group along with other inscriptions, by Gaetano Marini (*Atti e monumenti de' fratelli Arvali*). In 1874, after the excavation during several seasons (1867-1871) of the Vigna Ceccarelli near the Porta Portuensis, the site of the sacred grove and buildings of the priesthood, W. Henzen brought out the since then standard text of the *Acta* (*Acta fratrum Arvalium quae supersunt*), with introduction, text, commentary, indexes, and conspectus of the ritual. Its worn leather binding in many a university library is today a disintegrating symbol of the hey-day of the great founders of Latin Epigraphy. Henzen and Ch. Huelsen later published about thirty pages of new fragments and emendations in *C. I. L.* VI, iv, part 2 (nos. 32338-32398), and in 1933 M. Bang published another supplement in the same volume of the *Corpus*. This last seems not to have been mentioned in our book, where, however, supplementary material appearing in the *Notizie degli Scavi di Antichità* and in the *Bullettino della Commissione archeologica del Comune di Roma* are listed. "Quae omnia fragmenta," says the compiler, "ad Henzeni primarium opus addenda erant; id facere nos hic conati sumus." We have, consequently, a single book into which the *acta Henzeniana* (pub. 1874) and the *acta post-Henzeniana* have been gathered. This is a task which G. B. Pighi (see his foreword) had set for himself, but which he could not carry out in the difficult time of the last decade. He tells us that he turned the task of compilation over to his student, E. Pasoli, and recommends the book as a "libellum pro altera Henzeniani operis parte," and asks us not to give over hope that in better times a new *Corpus* of the *Acta*, with the records in order and with fuller

commentary, will be forthcoming. Indeed, since undertaking this review, I have been informed, and the reader will be glad to know, that the material for a completely new critical and annotated edition of the *Acta* has been gathered together in this country, and we may look forward to its eventual publication.

In this collection Pasoli retains the principal emendations of the editors of the scattered post-1874 fragments and has as footnotes selected quotations from their comments. Henzen's commentary has received revision and additions, though his arrangement and subject headings have been kept. In the case of certain fragments, however, the order has been revised, the fragments old and new given numbers on the principle of chronological sequence, and in addition, the fragments "aetatis plane incertae" have been segregated at the end and arranged alphabetically by initial letters of the inscriptions. Henzen did not number his fragments but made use of marginal dates. The dates in Pasoli's book are in the footnotes.

There are three main sections to the book, two of them primarily textual: Book I, with some modifications, as I shall explain later, contains the records of the Arval Brothers found or published after Henzen's classic edition of 1874; Book III, again with some modifications, has the *Acta* of Henzen's edition. Between the texts of the inscriptions in Book I and Book III is Book II: Supplements and Additions to Henzen's Commentary. This last covers roughly something like one-fourth of the space taken up by Henzen's original commentary, and it includes brief but useful introductory sections summarizing the rites, sections written to take the place of the naturally more abundant material in Henzen's pages.

And now for some detailed analysis of the construction and arrangement described in general terms above. While the purpose of this book is to present the *acta post-Henzeniana* (Book I: those Arval records *not* in Henzen's *Acta*), there are two sections of text, the second being Book III, a reproduction of the text in Henzen's *Acta*, with some textual revision and some revision of the date, and therefore of the order of the documents. The *acta* of the college as now assembled and published by Pasoli number 1-102; and separately (Part IV of Book I), the *fragmenta aetatis plane incertae*, 1-29. Of these the following in Book III (*Henzeniana*) are likewise listed or mentioned along with *post-Henzeniana* in Book I for comment, partial quotation for changes, or for the addition of new fragments to the *acta Henzeniana*: 4, 5, 7, 9, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26, 28, 30, 34, 36, 39, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 51, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 75a, 76, 77, 82, 85, 88, 92, 94; *frag. aet. plane incert.*, no. 26. While the inclusion of Book III does not eliminate the necessity of reference to the original Henzen, it provides convenient access to the earlier documents and will be of help, we repeat, to the scholar needing ready reference to the whole body of Arval records. But all of Henzen's original *Acta* (1874) are not in Book III. For where, as with no. 11, Pasoli found it necessary for textual reasons to place *in toto* among the *post-Henzeniana* (Book I) the rites in Henzen's original *Acta*, he has omitted this material from Book III. This makes for some confusion, and one wonders whether a way could not have been found to publish the *Henzeniana* and the *post-Henzeniana* together in consecutive order, at the same time distinguishing one from the other.

This limitation of the book was fully appreciated by the compiler. Our noting of it is therefore intended to help the user of the book rather than to complain of what the editor is only too well aware.

It would be irrelevant and impossible here to attempt any useful comment on points of epigraphy. The quickest way to get at changes of text, which one naturally expects to find in Book I, will be to consult the numbers cited above which occur in both Books of text (I and III). A few examples of changes in the text appearing in Book III, however, and in the order of the fragments, will warn the reader that here too, he must not look for exact reproduction of the old *acta Henzeniana: text*, end of 92 in Book III, *pr* of *pr[ona]* not in Henzen, p. CCXV, but the letters do appear in *C.I.L.*, VI, 32390 and in *Not. Scav.* (see Pasoli under no. 92 in Book I); no. 101, the difficult letters in the first line of this fragment in Henzen are not reproduced in Pasoli; *order*, in Henzen, Pasoli's no. 61 (*C.I.L.*, VI, 32375) immediately precedes Pasoli's no. 65 (*C.I.L.*, VI, 32378); Pasoli's no. 62 in H. is just before no. 66; likewise in Henzen, Pasoli's no. 81 follows his no. 72 and a couple of very short fragments of uncertain year—to be more specific, in Henzen, Pasoli's no. 72 is at the beginning of the reign of M. Aurelius, while in Pasoli it is at the end, coming just before the first set of *acta* under Commodus; again, the very short fragments of uncertain year just referred to are divided between nos. 63 (*C.I.L.*, VI, 32377) and 69 (*C.I.L.*, VI, 32380) in Pasoli (on p. 37 read *Act. Arv.*, p. clxxiv instead of cxlvii).

There is no formal bibliography. For bibliography we may look in two places: first, the *Index Fragmentorum Omnum*. This is brief and its reference is textual. It is contained in the list of fragments (the only place where all of the inscriptions are listed consecutively) given on pp. 4-7. It is to be supplemented with further material in the commentary on each text, where the bibliographical references are of the briefest and for these there is no referable list of abbreviations. I find no reference to the later *C.I.L.* pages on the *acta* in Bang's 1933 edition (VI, iv, nos. 37164-5, fragments found in the Forum and outside the Porta Portuensis, and notes on others) except for 37164, frag. a, which appears under Pasoli's no. 94. There is no index to match and supplement the *Index Nominum* and the *Index Rerum* of almost fifty pages in Henzen. For this and for other reasons we most assuredly still need Henzen; but at least for a superficial perusal it will be easier to read these documents from one volume without having to search through the scattered places now conveniently listed for us on pp. 4-7.

Finally, a word on the chronological limits of the *acta* in this compilation as against the limits established in the old and original Henzen. In accordance with the dating (proposed by E. Hula, *Arch.-Epigr. Mitt. Oesterr.*, 1892) accepted by Pasoli for his frag. 1 (a frag. not in Henzen's 1874 volume but published by him in the *Bull. dell'Inst.*, 1882), the first document of the college goes back beyond the fragment published as the earliest by Henzen, and though it is, like Henzen's first fragment, Augustan, the earliest record is then of the period of the recovery of the Parthian standards and a few years before the *Ludi Saeculares*, rather than of the end of

Augustus' life, if the dating accepted here is correct. Henzen placed this fragment under Tiberius in the year 28 A. D. At the other chronological limit of the records, a line and a half of inscription on stones containing records of earlier years and found in 1919, mentions a "magisterium" of a certain Rufus in the ninth consulship of Diocletian and the eighth of Maximian, but Pasoli has no illusions that the rites themselves were inscribed in the usual manner at this period—we have merely the mention of the office of *magister*. The year 241 A. D., then, remains the upper limit of the known *acta*. But the work goes on, and we know not what may yet turn up. For the discovery of new fragments in the Grotte Vaticane a few years ago (A. Ferrua, "Antichità Christiane: I Fratelli Arvali e i loro 'Atti,'" in *Civiltà Cattolica*, XCVII, 1 [1946], pp. 41-9; see also *Fast. Arch.*, I [1946], 1837, and, for further material, I, 1838 and IV [1949], 3634) is a warning to the scholar interested to add now notations of each new find to his copy of Pasoli pending the day when a completely new edition of all the *acta*, freshly edited and well provided with photographs, notes, and indexes, appears on the shelves of our libraries.

ALINE ABAECHERLI BOYCE.

THE AMERICAN NUMISMATIC SOCIETY.

---

ESTHER V. HANSEN. *The Attalids of Pergamon*. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell Univ. Press, 1947. Pp. xxxvi + 464. (*Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, XXIX.)

Ancient historians have not given the kingdom of Pergamon the attention that it deserves. Though not the greatest of the Hellenistic kingdoms, nor its dynasty the greatest of the Hellenistic dynasties, it remains perennially interesting for its role in the Greek world, in the development of Asia Minor, and in the growth of Roman power in the East, as well as for its own achievement in administration, learning, and art. Yet no Bouché-Leclerc has arisen to write its history on an adequate scale. The material for such a history is scattered through fragmentary and tantalizing literary sources, the volumes of the *Altertumer von Pergamon* and the excavation reports in the *Athenische Mitteilungen*. For important aspects of Pergamene development we turn to Rostovtzeff's *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*. Even the sound and relatively full description in Magie's *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (which was not yet available to Professor Hansen) is written as an introduction to the history of the later period. There exists an enormous periodical literature but no recent work of synthesis on Pergamon itself. This is the task the author has chosen: "to present within the compass of a single volume a picture of the Hellenistic city, details of which have been the subject of innumerable treatises." She has brought to her task the information gathered in years of patient research and good sense in its interpretation, and has produced a timely and useful book. In style and originality it is not the history of Pergamon we hope for, but the writer of that history will have to refer constantly to this work.

The first chapter is devoted to a description of the physical setting and the early history of Pergamon, the next four to the history of the dynasty from the formation of the principality of Philetaerus to the end of the kingdom with the death of Attalus III and the formation of the province of Asia. A series of chapters then passes in review the organization and administrative arrangements of the kingdom with due attention to its many disparate components, the building activities of the Attalids, the art of Pergamon, Attalid patronage of learning, and the cults of Pergamon including that of the deified kings. Two appendixes present discussions of the parentage and date of the birth of Attalus III, and the coin types of the Pergamene kingdom. There is a full bibliography at the beginning and a good index at the end of the volume.

The development of the Pergamene kingdom under the various members of the dynasty is presented accurately and justly. The author's favorable judgment of Attalus I is likely to commend itself (p. 65). It is true that his co-operation with the Aetolians and later with the Romans began the process which finally ended in the Roman conquest of the East, but in his time such a result could hardly have been foreseen. To him the problem of maintaining his dignity and independence must have been concerned far more with the aggressions of Philip V of Macedon and the secret alliance between Philip and Antiochus. Again, judgments on Eumenes II (p. 65, and a more favorable one on pp. 120 f.) have to remain relative. The great additions of territory and wealth, the basis of the great days of the dynasty, which Eumenes secured by the favor of Rome after the defeat of Antiochus at Magnesia did eventually lead toward vassalage to Rome. But in 188 Roman interest was most concerned with security and stability. Eumenes had given great service, and was probably rewarded without any intention to recall or annex his territory in the future. Another generation of Roman senators and the development of a new attitude toward the empire made the difference. The bequest of Attalus III was "a further recognition of the practical supremacy of Rome" (p. 140), but the full meaning of his action requires reference to the will of Ptolemy of Cyrene and to Massinissa's request for the presence of Scipio Aemilianus when the time came for him to make his final dispositions. The author omits citation of much of the primary evidence on the wars with Philip and Antiochus, which would at times have carried her far from Pergamon. I miss a reference to Walbank's *Philip V of Macedon* (Oxford, 1940).

The detailed survey of the complex organization of the Attalid kingdom is an essential and very useful part of the work. One important change now seems necessary. The author accepts the theory of Ramsay and Rostovtzeff that the estates of the great temples of Asia Minor were to a large extent appropriated and divided among colonists by the Hellenistic kings (see p. 167, on Aezani). In 1939 Jones expressed doubt because there remained so little evidence of originally large temple estates in western Asia Minor, and Aezani appeared to furnish the only reasonably sure example (*The Greek City*, pp. 309 f., note 58; cf. *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, p. 385, note 20), an example also of expropriation by the Seleucid

kings. An inscription found at Aezani by Iaeopi in 1937 (*Bull. d. Museo d. Impero Romano*, IX [1938], pp. 44-9, published 1939) reveals that the evidence from Aezani does not refer to the Seleucid kings at all, and that the kings in question, Attalus I and Prusias I, far from expropriating the land of the temple, made gifts of land to the temple and the town (see Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, II, pp. 1017 f., note 64).

The chapters on the buildings and the art of the Attalid kingdom are a mine of information, carefully arranged and described, yet some plans and photographs would have saved many pages of description and given the readers a more immediate impression of the material. The work is not free from minor errors of various kinds. On page 19, note 22, *SEG.* III 680 should be IV 680, and on page 20 for Jüng-Dag, read Jünd-Dág. On page 171 Calliupolis surely means Callipolis, and on page 191 Apollo's cognomen was Tarsenus rather than Tarsenius. References to *CIA.* should be replaced by *I.G.<sup>2</sup>*, and *CIG.*, when possible, by more recent collections, e. g. on page 95, note 78, by *I.G.R.P.*, III, 72. I doubt if the Attalids possessed a land corridor to Telmessus (p. 89) or to Tieium (p. 95; see now Magie, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 758-64, note 56), and on page 89, note 49, in the discussion of the eastern boundary of the Pergamene kingdom after 188 Holleaux's article on Livy, XXXVIII, 38, 4 (*R. E. G.*, XLIV [1931], pp. 304 ff.) should have been mentioned.

These are points of lesser importance. Professor Hansen has given us a useful and valuable work on a subject that demanded such a synthesis.

T. ROBERT S. BROUGHTON.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

---

WILLIAM BELL DINSMOOR. *The Architecture of Ancient Greece: An Account of its Historic Development.* Revised and Enlarged Edition based on the first part of *The Architecture of Greece and Rome* by William J. Anderson and R. Phené Spiers. London, B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1950. Pp. xxiv + 424; 250 illus. 30 s.

This latest edition of the *Architecture of Ancient Greece* by Professor Dinsmoor starts with a very complete listing of the early publications on Greece. The seven chapters that follow cover every period of Greek architecture from the Aegean Age in Chapter I through the Roman phase in Chapter VII. The rest of the book contains the necessary maps, tables of measurements, and up-to-date bibliography, a glossary of architectural terms, and a very useful index. The latter is broken into three sections, dealing separately with places, persons, and subjects.

This edition is probably the last that will be published in just this form. Originally it was conceived by Anderson and Spiers as a textbook for students of architecture, and served also as a reference book for the eclectic designer.

Now, however, the student of architecture no longer makes a detailed study of the monuments of any historical period and the designer is primarily interested in designing in terms of modern living with modern materials, many of which were completely unknown to the ancients. Furthermore, the teacher of architecture is now primarily interested in determining the social and economic climate that furnished the motivation for the architecture of any period and a minute description of each and every building is of only limited usefulness. Dinsmoor has satisfied the new requirements to some extent in his discussion of the origins of many of the architectural and structural forms. I liked particularly the way he brought out the standardization tendency of the Greeks on pp. 106-7, treating it very much as one would the modern techniques. The explanation on p. 123 of the development of the Ionic cities as the desire for display on the part of the tyrants also satisfies this new approach.

The treatment of the Minoan Palace is very complete. It might be worth the efforts of a botanist to attempt to determine whether the inverted position of the column has a botanical background. Did the inversion inhibit rot or was the spreading lower part of the trunk and the base of the root system structurally advantageous and perhaps the origin of the Doric capital?

In Chapter One on p. 28 the author starts the first of a long series of minute descriptions of buildings with no illustrative material whatsoever. I realize that it is impossible to furnish drawings for everything, but I do wonder how many non-architects are capable of visualizing tombs or temples without some such assistance. Might it not be better to cover fewer buildings with more diagrams?

The simple suggestion might be added to the explanation on p. 63 on the origin of the Ionic order that several flat stones, used originally to insulate the wooden column or post from the damp soil, gradually evolved into the Attic base.

Dinsmoor's great knowledge and experience is most noticeable when he differentiates between the correct and incorrect restorations of buildings. It is rather hard on those of us who have been misled, or, even worse, have been guilty of misleading our students in the past. He includes in a footnote a warning against the modern attempts to explain the derivation of the plan of the Parthenon. Perhaps this was not the place, but we cannot help but wish that he had gone into the subject more fully, thereby discouraging such futile essays.

The coverage of the architecture of the theater is most complete in every period. One wonders whether this is the author's hobby. He includes some very interesting material on the influence of the type of drama on the stage structure.

It is unfortunate that more material is not available on domestic architecture and city planning. It would have made a more balanced publication if the homes as well as the places of worship and amusement could have been covered. As it is, however, the author has

done a good job in covering the more important structures, and the reader will be greatly interested in the details as to the restoration.

John C. H. Ladd  
University of Michigan

The author does not neglect the Hellenistic and Roman periods, but includes an excellent discussion of the political influence on architecture in this period in Chapter VII. His account of the competition between the various orders leading to the decline of the Doric and the supremacy of the Corinthian makes good reading. He includes an interesting account of Hermogenes' codification of the Ionic.

I found myself in sharp disagreement with the author over the very last paragraph of the text. To my mind the Greek Revival was not a vital contribution to modern architecture but was the beginning of a movement that postponed its development for a century. Architects like Ledoux, practicing late in the 18th and early in the 19th century, were interested in materials and architectural forms that owed no allegiance to any period. But they were very much in the minority, and the Greek Revival was the first of a long series of revivals that saw everything from ancient Egypt through the Middle Ages copied with little understanding or appreciation of the culture that gave the world these monuments in their original form. Dinsmoor looks at architecture with the somewhat prejudiced eye of an archaeologist. That viewpoint makes this volume of great value to the classicist and antiquarian, since he is one of the few men living with the training and field experience to speak with authority on all the phases of classical architecture.

A. HENRY DETWEILER.

COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE,  
CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

---

ALLAN CHESTER JOHNSON. *Egypt and the Roman Empire*. Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1951. Pp. vii + 183. \$3.50.  
(*The Jerome Lectures*, Second Series.)

The uninitiated reader will find it difficult to make his way through this little but essentially technical book; the initiated will find it difficult to accept some of the principal conclusions presented.

The second series of Jerome Lectures was delivered by Professor Johnson in 1947 at the University of Michigan and the following year at the American Academy in Rome. The collective title under which they are now published is too broad, seeming to promise a history of Egypt under Roman rule. The subjects actually treated in the successive lectures are: I. Fiduciary Currency and Its Regulation; II. Inflation; III. Land Tenure; IV. Serfdom in Byzantine Egypt; V. Taxation in Byzantine Egypt; VI. The Administration of [Byzantine] Egypt. In the presentation of the material there is a chronic repetition of statements already made, which, though conceivably undistracting or even helpful in the oral presentation, were a constant irritant to this reader at least.

The views presented in these lectures are in keeping with (and in part repetitions of) those contained in Professor Johnson's recent

works, especially his and L. C. West's *Byzantine Egypt: Economic Studies* (Princeton, 1949). Here again we are offered the general conclusion, diametrically opposed to the commonly accepted view, that Byzantine Egypt, secure in its splendid isolation from the ills that beset the rest of the Empire, presented a picture of unprecedented prosperity, well-being, and efficient administration. And once again, it seems to me, we must reject this thesis as the product of special pleading (cf. especially pp. 123-31, and note the contradictions therein). Indeed the overall impression left by the book is that of a series of conjectures, inferences, and assumptions from lacunose and inconclusive data.

On the positive side may be noted that the book offers good summaries of the facts available for many of the problems treated, if one is careful to separate fact from interpretation and to reserve judgment on the latter. Pp. 75 ff., for example, give a brief account of the changes in the forms of land tenure in Byzantine Egypt. (But one of the leading characteristics—transfer of all categories of land to private ownership—is only noted; the reasons therefor remain unexplored.) Pp. 82 ff. are devoted to the attempts by the emperors of the fourth and fifth centuries to combat the spread of the patronage system and its twin concomitants, large estates and serfdom. Professor Johnson, attempting here too to reverse the *communis opinio*, postulates success for the imperial legislation; but it is at least as easy to postulate failure (cf. especially p. 105).

Convinced that the emperors succeeded in checking the *patrocinium* movement and observing the prominence and importance of the village unit in Byzantine Egypt, Professor Johnson tends to ignore or underestimate evidence on the development of patronage and large estates which he himself cites. A single example must suffice here. He quotes a letter sent by the villagers of Euhemeria some time in the fourth century, and concludes from it that "although the letter is addressed to Necho as patron, the dignified tone of the communication is clearly not that which one might expect from a serf to his lord. The relationship of the Euhemerians to Necho is certainly not serfdom" (pp. 94-5). But even if this is true of the Euhemerians, their letter contains evidence of more general import which Professor Johnson disregards. "Never in your father's lifetime nor in yours," write the villagers, "have we surrendered our persons to you. Since we do what is required of us annually, we yield ourselves to no one." The implication is, clearly, that peasants who could not meet their annual taxes and other obligations did commonly surrender themselves (and their land) to the protective custody of patrons. And this would appear to be, as has long been held, the way in which serfdom and large estates developed in Byzantine Egypt.

NAPHTALI LEWIS.

BROOKLYN COLLEGE.

DAVID M. ROBINSON. Excavations at Olynthus, Part XIII: Vases found in 1934 and 1938. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950. Pp. xix+463; frontispiece; 267 pls. \$25.00.

This volume is one of the latest in the series on Olynthus and concludes the publication of vases begun in part V. The vases found in 1934 and 1938 are of the same quality as those found in the earlier campaigns; they are not an interesting lot and their presentation leaves much to be desired. Over eleven hundred items are described and almost all illustrated, nearly as many as in the earlier volume. As will be seen from the outline of classification (pp. 437 ff.), the arrangement of pottery is highly arbitrary and somewhat inconvenient. Mixed in with the Olynthus finds are certain vases from Mecyberna, and several other plates (24, 25, 26, 29, and 46) illustrate vases not connected with Olynthus, except, as is claimed, through their subjects. It seems that no attempt has been made to sort the fragments, most of which appear lumped together under the convenient heading "miscellaneous fragments." The author tells us that during the war some sherds were mixed up and a few cards and records lost. This, of course, has increased the burden of the task, but for a final publication an extra effort might have made the volume more attractive and usable. As important and easy a distinction as that between the bell-krater and the calyx-krater has for the most part been ignored.

The plates have, on the whole, reproduced well, but the lay-out is astonishingly poor. No serious attempt has been made to poise the fragments properly, even when the horizontals and verticals should have made that task relatively simple. Several other fragments appear upside down.

The catalogue of vases proper is preceded by a long introduction which sums up the history of the excavation, the importance of vases in general and Olynthian ones in particular. The critics of previous volumes on Olynthus are rebuked, and favorable reviews are quoted at some length. The descriptions proper are full and are prefaced with attractive headings in which each shape is discussed. Of these smaller introductions, the essay on fish-plates will prove to be particularly valuable. In the catalogue the author raises a good many points that invite comments and corrections. I append a few.

No. 15. This vase belongs to a class of late Attic black figure that has nothing to do with the Antimenes Painter. The ornament under the handles is not "an elaborate palmette and vine motif," but the customary palmette and lotus configuration in its late, debased form.

No. 17. The reference to Haspels is out of place. On the group, see Beazley, *Some Attic Vases in the Cyprus Museum*, pp. 22-3.

No. 17 I, 6. The animal is a horse.

No. 17 I, 8. The *F. R.* reference is misleading.

No. 18. *For* Miss Richter *read* Eichler.

No. 26. The description and interpretation of this calyx-krater are based on a faulty reconstruction. I had drawn Professor Robinson's attention to this in a letter in 1947 (from which, as I now discover, one sentence has been incorporated in Robinson's text). For a

correct placing of the fragments, shift the lower half of the running female figure (pl. 33) to the other side of the vase (pl. 34, right). This gives the following picture: A, old man (Nereus?), running youth (Peleus?), pursuing a woman (Thetis?). B, Nike and warrior. Peleus wears leggings as on the stamnos by Hermonax in the Faina collection. On the published views I fail to find the part of the forearm of another figure, mentioned in the description, nor do I fully understand what is meant by the Euphronian cycle to which the author alludes in several places. The attribution to the Deepdene Painter has been accepted by Beazley (*Paralipomena*, p. 734). The krater can hardly have been painted before 479 B. C. as asserted on page 81, and the author himself speaks more guardedly in the opening paragraph of his description (p. 75).

No. 46 A, p. 97, line 11. *For fig. 114 read 14.*

No. 47. There is no "bald-headed man" on the reverse. The illustration shows that the figure is a youth: a fracture runs along his forehead, and a bit of the surface is missing.

No. 51. The double row of dots above "the egg and dot pattern" is not unique: cf. nos. 50, 51 A, and many more.

No. 51 A. What is Olynthian mica?

No. 82, p. 137. I fail to see what is meant by replica.

P. 139. *For D. Robertson read M. Robertson.*

No. 195 D. Hardly fourth century, rather early fifth.

No. 197 A. This fragment comes from a bell-krater.

No. 198 A. This is a fragment of a pelike. The scene is not necessarily "sculpturesque," and the style, in any event, is not that of the fifth century, but the fourth.

No. 203.5. This fragment comes from the same vase as the preceding, no. 203.2.

No. 476. Is the animal with certainty a horse?

No. 954. Surely this is the lid of a lebes gamikos.

In a catalogue like this, in which the finding places of the vases are constantly referred to, a plan of the site would have been extremely useful.

DIETRICH VON BOTHMER.

THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART.

HERBERT C. YOUTIE and JOHN G. WINTER, editors. Papyri and Ostraca from Karanis, Second Series. Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1951. Pp. xxii+266; 11 pls. \$12.50. (*Michigan Papyri*, Vol. VIII=University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series, Vol. L.)

When you see the name Youtie on an edition of papyrus you know certain things about the volume before looking between the covers. The transcriptions will be scrupulously accurate. The restorations will present only what is justifiable and not bravura displays of an

editor's knowledge of Greek. The translations will be clear and straightforward and will never attempt to gloze a crux or ambiguity in the original. The commentary will be complete and lucid and so rich in bibliography that often a note by Youtie provides an excellent springboard for further investigation of a problem. This latest edition in the Michigan series is no exception; the joint editors have fulfilled all our expectations.

The contents of the volume are more homogeneous than is usual with papyrus editions. There are two sections, the first consisting of 59 private letters edited by Youtie and Winter, the second of 140 ostraca edited by Youtie alone. The former are chiefly from the 2nd century of our era with a handful from the 3rd and 4th and one ascribed to the 5th; only four are exactly dated. The latter run from the 2nd B. C. to the 4th A. C., with the majority from the 3rd and 4th A. C. The letters provide their customary unique informal glimpses into the intimate life of the past. Joining them with the ostraca, although very likely done for mere convenience of publication, results in a most interesting combination. The two give us the opposite poles of life in Roman Egypt. The letters are from the ancient Pasha class, people who had use for stationery and the money to buy it. Their names are mostly Roman, a few Greek: Terentianus, Tiberianus, Julius Clemens, Sabinus, Valerianus. They write about their military service as officers and staff members, or about the problems they have in handling their estates. Their legal interests bring them to Alexandria, their business interests to Rome. When they sail down the Nile, they travel in the company of no less a personage than the prefect of Egypt. To turn from their letters to the ostraca is to enter a completely different world. Here we meet Abok the oil-maker, Didymus the donkey-driver, Bes the wine-seller. Here are receipts issued to Padueuis and Chaeremon for contributing given amounts of compulsory work on the dikes. Here are miscellaneous lists of all sorts testifying sadly to the burden of compulsory work and taxation shouldered by the non-ruling class. Occasionally the two worlds come together for us, as we read the letter of an anxious mother whose son, a hotheaded young soldier, killed his servant when he caught him stealing from the food packages that she had sent, or when a cocky young officer's letter expresses his relief at having to do nothing while the ranks spend every day at backbreaking labor cutting rock.

While none of the documents are spectacular, there is one group from the early second century that is unique and of great interest. This is a collection of six letters in Latin, five of which are from a young recruit, Terentianus, to his father, Tiberianus (467-471). Terentianus had joined the fleet at Alexandria (467) but—somewhat the reverse of things today—cannot wait until he gets out of the Navy and into a cohort (468). He knows that such a transfer is not easy: *hic autem sene (r. sine) aere nihil fiet neque epistulae commanditiae nihil valebunt nisi (r. nisi) si qui sibi aiutaverat* (468, 38-41) “around here you won't accomplish a thing without money and letters of recommendation won't be worth a thing unless a man helps himself along (sc. with money).” He finally made the transfer, for in a later letter (written this time in Greek) he signs as a

soldier of a legion (476). The language shows many of the signs of Vulgar Latin, such as the misuse of final *m* (e. g. *unu* for *unum* 468, 10, *culcitam* for *culcita* 468, 12) and initial *h* (e. g. *abes* for *habes* 468, 14 and n., *Hitalicum* 468, 57-8) or the use of such forms as *con* for *cum* (468, 12 and n.), *nese* and *nesi* for *nisi* (468, 35, 40), *sene* for *sine* (468, 38), *dicet* for *dicit* (471, 33 and n.), *posso* for *possum* (469, 15), and many others. The phraseology reflects Greek rather than Latin epistolary style (cf. the editors' remarks on p. 18); anyone familiar with Greek letters from Egypt will recognize immediately the original of such expressions as *ante omnia opto te bene valere* (468, 3), *rescribas de salutem tuam (sic; 468, 32)*, *saluta qui nos amant* (469, 21).

Many of the letters in the collection are to or from boys in the service. As is usually the case, only the scantiest references to larger events creep in. Just a corner of the curtain lifts when Terentianus mentions that the troops in Alexandria were engaged in putting down riots (477) which apparently grew so severe that he himself was wounded (478). Most often the writers are busy scribbling about the food or clothes they have sent or want sent. A young officer stationed at Bostra tells his mother about the lovely things the caravans bring that he can buy for her there (465). A recruit, newly arrived at Rome, writes to his mother that he has been assigned to Misenum and urges her not to worry; "I've come to a fine place," he assures her (491). These people write frequently. Terentianus, for example, explains to his father his not having sent off a letter for five days (478).

Instructive bits of information can be found throughout. One letter gives us the route taken by a businessman to Rome (501). He went overland (it must have been winter when the seas were closed) "through Syria, Asia and Achaea." Another (510) has a reference to plague at Alexandria. No. 511, a letter with some extremely interesting allusions to certain phases of worship of Serapis, has been previously published with full discussion by Youtie (*H. T. R.*, XLI [1948], pp. 9-29). One of the most common figures in the papyri from Egypt is the runaway, the man who, under the burden of taxes or debt or both, leaves his land and flees to the desert. No. 515 concerns a rather rare bird—a runaway who had returned and was ready to meet his obligations. No. 486 shows us some of the difficulties that had to be faced in getting the mails through. The writer apologizes for the fact that his last letter was not received: the carrier started out all right but apparently en route he got word that his wife wanted him home and her word was law.

The editing of private letters is one of the most difficult jobs a papyrologist can undertake. He is constantly confronted with random obscure allusions and, once past the stereotyped opening phrases, he has no parallel documents to help him in the decipherment. The transcribing of ostraca with their exasperatingly careless handwriting is no less difficult. The editors of this volume have done an exemplary job. Historian, linguist, and papyrologist will find here a mine of impeccably edited source material.

LIONEL CASSON.

LEONARDO FERRERO. *Poetica nuova in Lucilio. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia"* Editrice, 1949. Pp. viii + 193. (*Biblioteca di Cultura*, 31.)

Both the Epicureans and the neoteric poets have of recent years been much studied by Italian scholars. Drawing upon their work, Ferrero here attempts to show that Lucretius has much more in common with the neoterics than has been commonly supposed. One might expect this thesis to be difficult to demonstrate, since so little of the work of the neoteric school has been preserved, but Ferrero's definition of *neoterismo Romano* is wide enough to include practically all the intellectual activities of the late republic. He also increases the field of his evidence by taking into consideration those Augustan poets who show the influence of the Catullan group. When he finds that Lucretius has affinities with them, he attributes this to the influence of the Republican neoterics.

At the beginning of his book Ferrero states that he will limit himself to a discussion of the technical aspects of Lucretius' work, but actually one finds very little detailed treatment of such dry matters as style, vocabulary, or metrics. He goes far beyond this, into an interpretation of the intellectual and spiritual atmosphere of the period which is thoughtful and imaginative, and raises many interesting questions in the mind of the reader. The most original part of the book deals with the artistic principles which Ferrero believes Lucretius shared with the neoterics,—the ideals of brevity and of complete documentation, the combination of *utile* with *dulce*, strict attention to form, etc. He sees in Lucretius' work the effects of rhetorical training and many of the characteristics of the Atticists.

The weakness of this book lies not so much in its theses, but in the way in which they are presented and supported. The style is obscure, the sentences unnecessarily long and involved, full of elaborate parentheses. The discussion consists for the most part of generalizations, the application of which is not often enough made clear by specific references. When such references are made, one is often disturbed by the feeling that minor details are being overstressed or distorted, in order to support a theory. For instance, it hardly seems fair to take Lucretius' use of the Punic wars, to illustrate an historical event which was of no importance to those who were not yet born, as evidence that he had no sympathy with the annalistic epic which gave great prominence to the Punic wars. Occasionally Ferrero's tendency to depend on the work of modern authors leads him to careless or incorrect statements. In a discussion of Sallust, in which he follows Rostagni, he casts aside the latter's caution and assumes without qualification that the historian is identical with the author of the *Empedoclea* referred to by Cicero, adding an estimate of the poem for which the evidence is quite inadequate. In his very brief discussion of metrics he states that the neoteric predilection for spondaic hexameters is found in the work of Lucretius "che si presenta ricca di clausole spondaiche." This appears to be a misinterpretation of some remarks of Bignone's to which Ferrero gives a reference. In this connection it is surprising that there is no reference in the book to Merrill's studies of Lucretius, but neither is there any to Buchner or to Regenbogen.

These are minor points but they illustrate the chief defect in the book, a failure to give the reader confidence that Ferrero's ideas, interesting as they are, are based on a thorough knowledge of the ancient authors in question. Too often one has an uneasy feeling that Ferrero's theories have not been derived from a study of the texts, but applied to their interpretation.

AGNES KIRSOFF MICHELS.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

ANDRÉ BATAILLE. *Les inscriptions grecques du Temple de Hatshepsout à Deir el-Bahari.* Cairo, Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1951. Pp. xxxv + 161; xiv Plates. (*Publications de la Société Fouad I de Papyrologie: Textes et Documents*, X.)

In the winter of 1936-7 André Bataille, at the suggestion of Pierre Jouguet, copied the Greek graffiti and dipinti which are preserved on the walls of the Temple of Hatshepsut at Deir el-Bahari. In 1938 he revisited the temple and checked his readings. He wrote a *thèse complémentaire* under the excellent sponsorship, first of Paul Collart, then of M. Plassart, and it is now offered to the public in a beautifully printed volume equipped with facsimiles of all documents, many photographs, bibliography, concordance, and full indexes.

The inscriptions are not entirely but chiefly *proskynēmata* and mere names. In his clear introduction Bataille explains the situation somewhat as follows. Not long before 260 B. C. the cult of a healing god, Amenothes son of Hapu, was installed in the ruins of the Temple of Hatshepsut. More than a century later the sanctuary was completed and dedicated to a triad, Imhotep-Asclepius, his daughter Hygieia, and, by far the most important, Amenothes son of Hapu. The inscriptions continue through the second century after Christ, perhaps even longer.

In editing the texts Bataille has done very well indeed, because graffiti and dipinti are notoriously hard to decipher. The facsimiles, which represent a long and patient labor, give the reader an excellent control and constitute a palaeographically valuable collection.

The reviewer thinks that in Nos. 114 and 115 *μνήσθον* is not a patronymic but an imperative like *μνήσθητι*, and that the same imperative can probably be recognized in No. 130. In line 1 of No. 114 we do not have a single name but two names, *Φαῦς*, *Τωρεῖνα* (= Taurina). Read *όμοῦ* for *όμοί(ως)* in No. 156 and (with dots) *Νουμηρίου* for *Νευμηρίου* in No. 164.

No. 126 is painted by a man who does not distinguish omicron from omega well and is uncertain about the use of final nu. In line 2 there should be no punctuation: emend to 'Αθηνόδωρο<s>' and read *τασσαράρια* for *τασσαράριω*. Above line 2 the words *πρῖμα οὐεξιλατείων* (without the epsilon of which the editor has dubiously read some would-be vestige at the end), or with the very dubious epsilon the same words in the ablative, are an afterthought rather than a correction; they do not belong syntactically and should not be edited

as part of line 2. In line 3 punctuate after the words Συνέβη εὐχώμενοι. The next sentence seems to read, Παρακαλῶν τὸν ἄγαθὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἄμα καὶ τὸν εὑδόξον Ἀμενώθη καὶ τὴν θεὰν Υγίαν μεγίστην, ἀκούσαμε αὐτῶν τῇ συνεχιωτην νύκταν.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

---

GEORGES RADET. Alexandre le Grand. Paris, L'Artisan du Livre, 1950. Pp. 450.

Radet's biography of Alexander first appeared in 1931 and inevitably attracted considerable attention by its extreme reconstruction. Diodorus and Curtius were largely drawn upon to obtain the picture of a divine hero set into a poetical-religious frame. Now, unfortunately, the book has been reprinted, apparently from the same plates but with a few additions to the bibliography. The map, reflecting the text, brings Alexander to Jerusalem and in other respects is poor. In the Foreword W. Seston says that Radet, who died in 1941, had been convinced by further study of Alexander of the soundness of his position and had decided against changes. Having created an unhistorical and fantastic Alexander, a few changes here and there would certainly have been pointless. The first edition was reviewed by W. W. Tarn, *Classical Review*, XLVI (1932), pp. 16 f.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

---

JÉRÔME LABOURT. Saint Jérôme, *Lettres*, Tome II. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1951. Pp. 406 (1-192 with the same page-numbers on the Latin verso and the French recto). (Budé.)

The first volume of this series was reviewed in *A.J.P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 103-4, and now comes the second instalment, containing *Epp.* 23-52, with text and French translation, several pages of brief notes, and a couple of pages discussing the place at Rome in which Jerome resided in 382, which Labourt would find in the Campus Martius. Among the letters here included are twenty-two to his lady-friends Paula, Eustochium, Asella, and the blue-stockinged Marcella—"St. Jerome's Ladies' Bible Class," as the late G. F. Moore liked to describe them. To these inquirers he unfolded the meanings of Hebrew letters and words, mystical interpretations, and the meanings of obscure Old Testament passages. For Paula in

no. 33 he compares the literary productivity of the pagan scholar Varro with that of the Christian "Chalcenterus," Origen, giving us important bibliographies of each. (In that of Varro it should be noted in any *apparatus criticus*, however brief, that the reading *De sua Vita Libros III* is found in no MS, but is Ritschl's excellent emendation of *De Suavitate Libros III*.) Letters 35 and 36 contain difficult scriptural questions propounded to Jerome by Pope Damasus and Jerome's solutions, and, in general, the letters in this volume deal most often with exegetical matters, though personal details and practical advice to priests as well as elements of polemic—always dear to Jerome—are not wanting.

ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

### BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under Books RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Alexander (William Hardy). The Tacitean "non liquet" on Seneca. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1952. Pp. 269-386. (*Univ. of California Publ. in Classical Philology*, XIV, no. 8.)

Altevogt (Heinrich). Labor improbus. Eine Vergilstudie. Münster, Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1952. Pp. 52. DM. 2.50. (*Orbis Antiquus*, Heft 8.)

Banta (Frank G.). Abweichende spät- und vulgärlateinische Perfektbildungen. Freiburg in der Schweiz, Paulusdruckerei, 1952. Pp. xiii + 124. (*Inaugural-dissertation der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Bern.*)

Bardon (Henry). La littérature latine inconnue, Tome I: L'époque républicaine. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1952. Pp. 382. Fr. 1600.

Bennett (Emmett L., Jr.). A Minoan Linear B Index. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press; London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. xxiv + 120. \$2.00.

Bieler (Ludwig). Libri Epistolarum Sancti Patricii Episcopi, Part I: Introduction and Text. Dublin, Stationery Office, 1952. Pp. 150. 21 s. (*Irish Manuscripts Commission*.)

Blaiklock (E. M.). The Male Characters of Euripides. Wellington, New Zealand Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 267. 35 s.

Della Corte (Francesco). Da Sarsina a Roma. Ricerche Plautine. Genova, Pubblicazioni dell'istituto universitario di magistero, 1952. Pp. 345.

Della Corte (Francesco). Due studi Catulliani. Genova, Pubblicazioni dell'istituto universitario di magistero, 1952. Pp. 272.

DeVries (G. J.). Antisthenes Redivivus. Popper's Attack on Plato. Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 66.

Erkell (Harry). Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna. Lateinische Wortstudien. Göteborg, Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1952. Pp. 195. Kr. 14.

Gard (Donald H.). The Exegetical Method of the Greek Translator of the Book of Job. Philadelphia, Society of Biblical Literature, 1952. Pp. vi + 108. (*Journal of Biblical Literature*, Monograph Series, VIII.)

Grant (Michael). The Six Main Aes Coinages of Augustus. Controversial Studies. Edinburgh, University Press, 1953. Pp. 178; 20 pls. 25 s.

Halkin (Léon). *La supplication d'action de graces chez les romains*. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1953. Pp. 136. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège*, CXXVIII.)

Herrmann (Léon). Virgile, Bucoliques. Édition et traduction. Bruxelles, *Latomus, Revue d'Etudes Latines*, 1952. Pp. 68. (*Collection Latomus*, X.)

Herter (Hans). Platons Academie. Zweite Auflage. *Verlag Bonner Universitäts-Buchdruckerei*, 1952. Pp. 40.

Hill (H.). The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period. Oxford, *Basil Blackwell*, 1952. Pp. xii + 226. \$3.00.

Jacob (Walther) and Hanslik (Rudolph). Cassiodori-Epiphani His-toria Ecclesiastica Tripartita. Vindobonae, *Heilder-Pichler-Tempsky*, 1952. Pp. xii + 765. (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, LXXI.)

Lee (A. G.). P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoseon Liber I. Cambridge, *University Press*, 1953. Pp. viii + 162. \$1.50.

Lee (H. D. P.). Aristotle, *Meteorologica*. With an English Translation. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann Ltd.*, 1952. Pp. xxx + 433. \$3.00. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Momigliano (Arnaldo). George Grote and the Study of Greek History. An inaugural lecture delivered at University College, London, February 19, 1952. London, *H. K. Lewis and Co.*, 1952. Pp. 23. 4 s. 6 d.

Moule (C. F. D.). The Language of the New Testament. New York, *Cambridge Univ. Press*, 1952. Pp. 30. \$0.50.

Opstelten (J. C.). Sophocles and Greek Pessimism. Translated from the Dutch by J. A. Ross. Amsterdam, *North-Holland Publishing Co.*, 1952. Pp. 250. \$3.50.

Périanakis (Constantin Emm.). Les Sophistes et le Droit. Athènes, *Librairie Eleftheroudakis*, 1953. Pp. 68. Fr. 100.

Robinson (D. M.). A Hoard of Silver Coins from Carystus. New York, *The American Numismatic Society*, 1952. Pp. 62; 6 pls. \$3.00. (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, 124.)

Ruegg (Brother S. Dominic, F. S. C.). Sancti Aurelii Augustini De Utilitate Ieiunii. A Text with a Translation, Introduction and Commentary. Washington, D. C., *Catholic Univ. of America Press*, 1951. Pp. xviii + 134. \$1.50. (*Patristic Studies*, LXXXV.)

Sherk (R. K.). The Legates of Galatia from Augustus to Diocletian. Baltimore, *The Johns Hopkins Press*, 1951. Pp. 116. \$2.50. (*Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Series LXIX, no. 2.)

Stahl (William Harris). Ptolemy's Geography. A Select Bibliography. New York, *The New York Public Library*, 1953. Pp. 86. \$1.50.

Tuckey (T. G.). Plato's Charmides. New York, *Cambridge University Press*, 1951. Pp. xiii + 116. \$2.75. (*Cambridge Classical Studies*.)

Turyn (Alexander). Studies in the Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Sophocles. Urbana, *Univ. of Illinois Press*, 1952. Pp. xi + 217; 17 pls. \$5.00 (cloth \$6.00). (*Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, XXXVI, nos. 1-2.)

Ullman (B. L.). Colucii Salutati De Laboribus Herculis. Zürich, *Thesaurus Mundi (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Latinorum Mediae et Recen-tioris Aetatis)*, 1951. Vol. I: pp. 352; Vol. II: pp. 353-660. \$6.00. (U. S. Distributor: Philip C. Duschnes, New York.)

Walser (Gerold). Rom, das Reich und die fremden Völker in der Geschichtsschreibung der frühen Kaiserzeit. Studien zur Glaubwürdigkeit des Tacitus. Baden-Baden, *Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft*, 1951. Pp. 183.

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

---

VOL. LXXIV, 3

WHOLE No. 295

---

## ON THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN TAXATION IN THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, FROM THE FOURTH CENTURY TO THE FOURTH CRUSADE.

The present study will be concerned with some important matters relating to the agrarian history of Byzantium, with especial reference to the economic and social condition of those who tilled the soil, the internal security of the state, and the problem of military defense. We shall go from the fourth century to the beginning of the thirteenth, i. e. from the founding of Constantinople, on the site of the ancient city of Byzantium, to the fall of that "God-guarded" city to the Fourth Crusaders in 1204. This is, of course, the great period of Byzantine history. Our attention will be given to the taxes on land and their collection, to certain forms of land tenure, to some economic and social institutions arising therefrom, and to the struggles of the imperial government to protect small landowners against the rapacity of the rich and the oppression of the powerful. Professor Georg Ostrogorsky has recently made the categorical statement that "the course taken by Byzantine agrarian history provides at every stage the key to the understanding of the whole historical evolution of Byzantium: just as the power and the internal stability of the Byzantine Empire in its best days were based on sound agrarian conditions, so its downfall was in great measure determined by the less happy course of its subsequent

agrarian history.”<sup>1</sup> Our purpose here will be some further demonstration of the general decline exhibited throughout this “less happy course,” and we shall note also some ways in which, owing largely to this decline in Byzantine agrarian economy, the social organization of the Eastern Empire came to resemble that of western Europe, a development which helped prepare the way for the easy settlement of the Fourth Crusaders upon the new lands which they conquered in continental Greece and the Morea, where they founded states which were, in some cases, to endure for more than two centuries and a half.

Although we shall deal, by and large, with the Byzantine Empire as a whole, we shall omit Egypt, which is pretty much a subject by itself, and which was in any event lost to Byzantium at the beginning of the fifth decade of the seventh century;<sup>2</sup> within the Byzantine Empire itself, our focus will, occasionally, include no wider areas than Attica and Boeotia, because of their intrinsic interest, because of the representative character of certain Athenian ecclesiastical documents, and because the material from which this paper is being written was gathered for the purpose of a book, now rather long in the process of construction, on *Athens in the Middle Ages*.

In the history of the later Roman Empire few topics are more familiar to us, in a superficial way, than the general administrative reform of Diocletian (284-305); part of this reform was a reorganization of the taxes on the land and its cultivators. The details of his system remain obscure, and have proved a fertile field for scholarly discussion and controversy. For purposes of taxation, land was divided, throughout the Empire,

<sup>1</sup> Georg Ostrogorsky, “Agrarian Conditions in the Byzantine Empire in the Middle Ages,” in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, I (Cambridge, 1941), pp. 222-3. (I wish to thank my learned and ever generous friends, Professors Glanville Downey and Robert Lee Wolff, for several valuable suggestions in the preparation of this paper.)

<sup>2</sup> From the considerable literature on Roman imperial and early Byzantine Egypt we may notice here only the instructive pages by Angelo Segrè, “The Byzantine Colonate,” *Traditio*, V (1947), esp. pp. 119-28; H. I. Bell, *Egypt from Alexander the Great to the Arab Conquest: A Study in the Diffusion and Decay of Hellenism* (Oxford, 1948); A. C. Johnson and L. C. West, *Byzantine Egypt: Economic Studies* (Princeton, 1949); and A. C. Johnson, *Egypt and the Roman Empire* (Ann Arbor, 1951).

into classes, according to its size and the form of cultivation under which it was put. Units of so many *iugera* of sown land, of roughly equal productivity, were equated with so many *iugera* of vineyard or with so many olive trees on a given estate; the land was supposed to be reassessed every fifteen years (*indicaciones*); and an impost known as the *iugatio* was levied upon each unit of taxable land (*iugum*), itself a computation based apparently upon the capacity of a yoke of oxen to plow it. But the *iugatio* prescinded from the necessity of available labor, human and animal, to work the land, and an additional impost fell upon the cultivators (*capitatio humana et animalium*): two estates of more or less equal extent, under the same kind of cultivation, might pay the same *iugatio*, but if one suffered from a shortage, and the other possessed a more abundant supply, of labor, the latter would pay a higher *capitatio*, for its yield would normally be larger. The *iugatio* levied on land, however, and the *capitatio* on labor, since they were, so to speak, obverse and reverse of the same coin, and were collected together, tended to become a single tax, for land without labor was inevitably unproductive, a source neither of profit to its owner nor of revenue to the state. Administrative convenience suggested the close association, even identification, of the two taxes; proprietors, assessors, and tax-collectors would be allowed, and on occasion, conceivably, required, to strike a taxable average between the *iuga* and *capita* on an estate; and the units of the tax on land were thus sometimes called *capita*, and the *iugatio* was sometimes called *capitatio*, which has created confusion in the sources, in the minds of contemporaries, and in the accounts of modern historians. If the land was to be taxed, it must be worked; if *iugatio* and *capitatio* could not be kept apart administratively, land and labor could not be left to drift apart economically and socially; the peasant was fixed to the soil (in A. D. 332); and then each *iugum*, it was hoped, would possess its *caput*; and social immobility and hereditary occupational status became the fundamental characteristics of life and work in the later Roman and early Byzantine periods. The colonate had been created; the peasants had become serfs, "adscript to the glebe" (*ἐναπόγραφοι*); they remained "free," with the rights of free men before the law, but they had lost their

freedom to move from the land and from their occupation upon it.<sup>3</sup>

It was in the late third century, especially, as the population continued to decline, that the government forced landowners to accept as their own, and to pay the taxes on, state land which the imperial government found unprofitable to work (*adiectionem steriliūm*) ; such was the *epibolē* in origin;<sup>4</sup> and soon the abandoned lands of private owners were also added to adjoining estates, and the new owners were obliged to pay the taxes which their predecessors in such properties had been unable to meet. The large estates, the *latifundia*, grew ever larger; the government opposed their growth, but made it inevitable by exactions which drove the small cultivator to the wall. Famine and plague added to the general distress, and weakened or destroyed agricultural labor. The same situation obtained in Boeotia and Attica, presumably, as elsewhere in the Empire, and local

<sup>3</sup> See especially André Piganiol, *L'Impôt de capitation sous le bas-empire romain* (Chambéry, 1916), and *idem*, "La Capitation de Diocletien," *Revue historique*, CLXXVI (1935), pp. 9-10; F. Lot, *L'Impôt foncier et la capitation personnelle sous le bas-empire et à l'époque franque* (Bibl. de l'école des hautes études, Sciences historiques, fasc. 253 [Paris, 1928]), esp. pp. 40-64 (in the earlier portion of his book Lot gives a complete survey of older views on the meanings of *caput* and *iugum*, etc.); and cf. P. Charanis, "On the Social Structure of the Later Roman Empire," *Byzantion*, XVII (1944-1945), pp. 46-8.

The law of October, 332, which assumes the attachment of the *colonus* to his agricultural duties (*officia*) appears in the *Codex Theodosianus*, lib. V, tit. 17, 1; note also the numerous laws relating to the colonate in the *Codex Justinianus*, lib. XI, titt. 48 ff., 51-3 ff., 63-4. (The *Cod. Theod.* may now be read in *The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions*, trans. Clyde Pharr *et al.* [Princeton, 1952], lib. V, tit. 17, 1, appearing on p. 115.)

<sup>4</sup> Cf., however, John Danstrup, "The State and Landed Property in Byzantium," in *Classica et Mediaevalia: Revue danoise de philologie et d'histoire*, VIII (Copenhagen, 1946), pp. 242 ff. On the conversion of state land (*ager publicus*) into private property (*ager privatus*), for purposes of taxation, see A. Segrè, *Traditio*, V (1947), pp. 113-16. As for the Byzantine period, it should perhaps be observed, at this point, that the term "state land" has been commonly used in this paper to denote both the property of the state as such and the personal domain of the Emperor: although the domain of the state and the private property of the imperial family were separate "in principle, and technically for administrative purposes" (Ostrogorsky, *Cambr. Ec. History*, I, p. 212), the Emperor exercised complete control over both types of land and employed them both for the same purposes.

conditions, which have always made agriculture unrewarding in Greece, must often have caused the peasant's discomfort to mount into desperation. There was always a lack of manure for the fertilization of the fields. Excessive rains in the cold seasons chilled the soil, and, unless properly drained, were a serious obstacle to germination and growth; but, when the land had been drained, the summer drought came, and the solution of the former problem aggravated the severity of the second, for now adequate moisture was likely to be lacking. Constant plowing and pulverisation, however, impeded capillary action, and some moisture was retained in the soil, and without understanding the process, the Attic and Boeotian peasant survived on a precarious agriculture. In Attica the olive and the vine survived. The olive tree has long and searching roots which find water over a considerable area; if there is too much moisture, the olive tree "runs to wood"; and, like the later tobacco plant, is most satisfactory for human consumption if it is not too large and tough. In Greece, too, violent rains turned summer-dry rivers into torrents, which carried off, in futile haste and even fury, nutritive substances from the thin soil into the sea. Ever since the mountain sides had been stripped of their forests in antiquity the problem had been difficult and dangerous, and in Boeotia and Attica it remains so to this day.<sup>5</sup>

In an agrarian society the chief source of wealth is land, the productivity of which supports the state as well as most of its citizens. It is easily possible, of course, to underestimate the contributions of both commerce and industry to the economy of Byzantium. In Constantinople and Thessalonica, Thebes, Corinth, and elsewhere fine silk fabrics were produced for centuries; and so were brocades and jewelry; carved ivories and enamelled plates; glass- and bronze-ware; and ecclesiastical equipment of many kinds. The court and especially the church consumed such goods in vast quantities; but, for all this, the wealth which purchased these products was very largely of agrarian origin. It is true that commerce was a source of much revenue to the state, which imposed heavy duties both on imports and exports, and of no small profit to Byzantine merchants whose

<sup>5</sup> Cf., in general, the instructive chapter by C. E. Stevens, on "Agriculture and Rural Life in the Later Roman Empire," in the *Cambridge Economic History*, I.

ships plied the lucrative sea-lanes of the Aegean and even of the western Mediterranean. The Byzantine state was almost a corporative state; the late Benito Mussolini would have been pleased with it; important trade and industry were rigidly organized in guilds. Liberal historians of the nineteenth century were almost astonished by the strictness of this organization and control; the present-day historian seems to regard some such regimentation as the inevitable consequence of an extreme centralization of government. Be all this as it may, however, it was agriculture which employed the vast majority of the peoples of the Byzantine Empire in every generation of its history, although the towns, to be sure, never declined in the east as they did in western Europe, and urbanization always remained one of the more conspicuous features of Byzantine society from the fourth century until the end came in the fifteenth. It must also be remembered that the profits of commercial enterprise were often invested in land. The Byzantine Empire was centered in its capital on the Bosphorus, which lay at the crossroads of three continents; to this center the commerce of southern and eastern Europe, north Africa, and western Asia tended to gravitate. The situation of Byzantium was, however, as great a source of military danger as of commercial profit, for if traders naturally sought the roads and sea-routes to Byzantium, so too did hosts of invaders. Byzantium survived, because, in response to unceasing danger, it became militarized; this development came in the seventh century, as we shall note again very shortly; the new military state rested primarily upon its agriculture, not upon its commerce and industry. The Byzantine Empire paid the price of this centralization of its strength and intelligence within the walls of the capital, for if the latter were to fall the Empire would fall, just as France seems to fall with Paris. It was, therefore, above all necessary to secure the capital against the attacks of enemies; the provinces also had to be firmly bound to the capital, which looked to them for its food supply and for soldiers. The relation of the capital to the defense of the frontier had presented to the central government problems of predominant importance for generations before the founding of Constantinople on the site of the ancient Megarian city of Byzantium, by which name the new city was also known, and by which name the so-called later Roman Empire was itself to be called.

Apparently from the time of Alexander Severus (222-235) peasant soldiers had received from the state hereditary lands on the frontier (*agri limitanei*) in return for the military service whereby the frontier provinces were to be defended from barbarian attack. A novel of Theodosius II, issued in September of 443, confirmed the long-standing practice of military (and agricultural) service for the possession of these frontier holdings in the Balkans, Asia Minor, and in Egypt. The great invasions of the seventh century made necessary the militarization of the Byzantine state and provincial administration; the government now "applied the former frontier organization to the inland provinces."<sup>6</sup> Along the eastern frontiers, in the almost ceaseless defense and offense against the Moslem, a new *miles limitaneus* appears, who draws his name, like his western predecessor, from the frontier (*ἄκρα*), which he defends; this is the strong and independent *akrites* (*ἀκρίτης*), who defends the Moslem "marches" in Asia Minor with such prowess as to become the subject of a rich legend and to supply the materials for a popular epic on the tenth-century hero [Basil] Digenes Akrites, a Byzantine warrior whose anti-Moslem efforts can match those of the French Roland and the Castilian Cid.<sup>7</sup>

The century or so which lies between the successors of Justinian and those of Heraclius was an era of blood and iron, but it was also productive of the basic political and economic institutions upon which the Byzantine Empire stood until the eleventh century. It was a robust and brutal age, and historians are afflicted with a strange myopia who see in Byzantine civilization chiefly a picture of effete literati and abstruse theologians, intriguing courtiers and eunuchs, quarrelsome ecclesiastics, imperial libertines, and beautiful women in bridal shows; these things there were, and Byzantium has not always been fortunate in her modern interpreters; but there are other more important aspects of Byzantine civilization to which the serious historian

<sup>6</sup> See the *Leges Novellae ad Theodosianum pertinentes*, ed. Th. Mommsen and Paul M. Meyer (Berlin, 1905), Nov. XXIV, 4 (p. 63); retained in *Codex Iustinianoi*, lib. XI, tit. 60, art. 3; cf. Vasiliev, *Byzantium*, VIII, p. 588; *idem*, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, 1952), p. 567; and also Eugen Darkó, "La militarizzazione dell' Impero Bizantino," in *Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici*, V (Rome, 1939), pp. 90-1.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. A. A. Vasiliev, *Hist. Byz. Emp.*, I (1928), pp. 446-8; 2nd Engl. ed. (1952), p. 370.

gives his attention. The inroads of Slavs, Bulgars, and Avars in the north, of Persians and Arabs in the south, wiped out in the seventh century much of the latifundial system inherited by the Byzantine from the later Roman Empire. Some of these peoples, especially the Slavs, remained in the Empire, in continental Greece and perhaps in the Peloponnesus, and they were settled by the government in Asia Minor. The violence of the seventh century resulted in a great social and economic levelling, with the submergence of a number of great families, the reorganization of provincial administration (into the thematic system), the rebuilding of the army and navy, and the thoroughgoing militarization of the central government.

Perhaps the most astonishing single fact about the history of the seventh century is the replacement, in many parts of the Empire, of the great estates by small freeholds. All the great estates were not destroyed—far from it—nor did all peasants live henceforth on small freeholds; but it would be difficult to say which was the predominant tenure in a given theme, and this very fact is evidence of a profound social transformation. Great estates had been looted, cadastral records destroyed, and serfs had fled in the turmoil; when lands were resettled, a man's labor was more important than his origin, he had acquired freedom, and changes in taxation, provincial administration, and in the recruitment of the army moved the government to protect him in his new freedom and mobility. The head tax (the old *capitatio*) and the land tax (the old *iugatio*) were separated in the seventh century. In fact the head tax became, rather, a hearth tax ( $\tauὸ καπνικόν$ ), paid by all families, and since it had little or nothing to do with the land tax ( $\dot{\eta} συνωνῆ$ ), the government seems to have had little further interest in fixing the peasant on the land.<sup>8</sup> From the seventh century to the eleventh there appears to have been a largely free peasantry in the Byzantine Empire, a phenomenon which Paparrhigopoulos ascribed to an imaginary social revolution brought about by the Isaurians, to whom are attributed the ideas of a Joseph II of Austria, and the cause of which Uspenskii found in the influence

<sup>8</sup> See Georg Ostrogorsky, "Das Steuersystem im byzantinischen Altertum und Mittelalter," *Byzantion*, VI (1931), pp. 232 ff., but the problem is very complicated (cf. Franz Dölger, in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXXIV [1934], pp. 370-3).

of a mythical Slavonic *Volksrecht*; Constantinescu, however, has found the cause, or at least the chief manifestation of the cause, of this alleged disappearance of "serfdom on the glebe" in the Byzantine Empire in the fiscal reform which separated the land tax from the head tax, for the reason we have just noted.<sup>9</sup> In any event the sources, such as the Farmer's Law, which has been dated by some scholars in the first reign of Justinian II (685-695), but which Franz Dölger would put a little later, and the so-called *Treatise on Taxation*, which apparently dates from the time of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, contain abundant evidence of the mobility of the agricultural classes. From the seventh century on, soldiers were given military freeholds (*στρατιωτικὰ κτήματα* or *τόπια*), in return for their service, and the government protected them in their new estates; this was part of the new organization of the themes, and the barbarian mercenary, the employment of whom Synesius of Cyrene had feared and deprecated, henceforth rarely serves Byzantium, except, later on, as a palace guard. The state is served by soldiers grown, so to speak, on its own soil. The peasant freeholds and the military estates were dear to the hearts of the Emperors from the seventh century to the eleventh.<sup>10</sup> Let us turn our

<sup>9</sup> N. A. Constantinescu, "Réforme sociale ou réforme fiscale? Une hypothèse pour expliquer la disparition du servage de la glèbe dans l'empire byzantin," *Bulletin de la section historique de l'Académie Roumaine*, XI (1924), esp. pp. 101 ff.: "La propriété paye l'impôt foncier et le cultivateur sans propriété paye le kapnikon, impôt personnel . . . [p. 103]. Par ce fait, le fisc byzantin rompt sans fracas le lien de la glèbe et rend à tous les paysans, à l'exception des esclaves, la plénitude des droits civils" [p. 108]. Constantinescu's paper is very learned and instructive, but he has given altogether too categorical expression to his views. Cf. John Danstrup, in *Classica et Mediaevalia*, VIII, pp. 234-5, and the grave doubts to which Franz Dölger has given sweeping expression in his article, "Ist der Nomos Georgikos ein Gesetz des Kaisers Justinian II?" in the *Festschrift für Leopold Wenger: Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, XXXV (1945), *passim*, esp. pp. 21-8. (Dölger summarizes much of the older literature.)

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the interesting essays of Georg Ostrogorsky, "Die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklungsgrundlagen d. byzant. Reiches," in the *Vierteljahrsschrift f. Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XXII (1929), pp. 130-3, and Eugen Darkó, "La militarizzazione dell' Impero Bizantino," in *Studi Bizantini e Nocellnici*, V (1939), p. 96. Small military estates (called *oikonomiae* and even *pronoiae*, on which latter see *infra*)

attention, for a little while, to the Byzantine Farmer's Law and to the *Treatise on Taxation*.

The Farmer's Law (*Nόμος Γεωργικός*),<sup>11</sup> which has been assigned by G. Vernadsky and G. Ostrogorsky to the time of the Emperor Justinian II, was not designed as an agricultural code which should regulate the lives of all who tilled the soil; its purpose was much more specific; it is an official (or unofficial) compilation of practices and enactments intended solely to apply to the free village community (*τὸ χωρίον*), wherein lives "the peasant who works his own field" (*ὁ γεωργὸς ὁ ἐργαζόμενος τὸν ἴδιον ἀγρόν*).<sup>12</sup> It is not concerned with the large estates on which there were, of course, both serfs and slaves all through the Byzantine period.<sup>13</sup> Zachariae von Lingenthal and Ashburner were agreed "that the 'style of command' in the Farmer's Law suggests that it is not by a private hand but a work of legislative authority."<sup>14</sup>

The same view has been more recently expressed by both Vernadsky and Ostrogorsky, with whom Franz Dölger now takes issue. According to Dölger, the Farmer's Law is actually a private compilation, its contents having suggested its title *Nomos Georgikos*; it is based upon the *Corpus Iuris* of Justinian I and

were still numerous in the thirteenth century, apparently the result of attempted reconstruction of the military forces (see P. Charanis, "On the Social Structure and Economic Organization of the Byzantine Empire in the Thirteenth Century and Later," *Byzantinoslavica*, XII [1951], pp. 131-3, and G. Ostrogorsky, "Le Système de la *pronoia* à Byzance et en Serbie médiévale," in the *Actes du VI<sup>e</sup> Congrès international d'études byzantines*, I [Paris, 1950], pp. 182-4), but owing to the political decentralization of the Empire, from the earlier fourteenth century on, it became almost impossible to organize soldiers recruited from such estates for a campaign.

<sup>11</sup> A good text of the Farmer's Law, *Κεφάλαια νόμου γεωργικοῦ κατ' ἑκλογὴν ἐκ τοῦ Ιουστινιανοῦ βαβλίου*, as set up by Walter Ashburner, may be found in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXX (1910), pp. 97-108, together with a translation and commentary (*ibid.*, XXXII [1912], pp. 68-95). Cf. Geo. Vernadsky, "Sur les origines de la Loi agraire byzantine," *Byzantium*, II (1925), pp. 169-80; Ernst Stein, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXIX (1929), p. 355; and Ostrogorsky, *ibid.*, XXX (1929-1930), p. 396.

<sup>12</sup> *Nomos Georgikos*, art. 1, ed. Ashburner, *J. H. S.*, XXX, p. 97.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Ashburner, *J. H. S.*, XXXII, p. 77; Ostrogorsky, *Vierteljahrsschr. f. Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgesch.*, XX, pp. 11-12.

<sup>14</sup> Ashburner, *J. H. S.*, XXXII, p. 83.

upon the Greek *Paratitla* thereto, the *Paratitla* being later marginal glosses on and simplified summaries of the law (*griechische Randkommentare*). Since Dölger is not able to find, however, many very clear or precise parallels between the Farmer's Law and the *Corpus Iuris* (those he finds come largely from the *Digest*), he assumes that the Farmer's Law also contains in part peasants' customary law and a general statement of the commonly practiced punishments for its infraction. Since Dölger insists that the Farmer's Law is an unofficial text, compiled for the convenience of Byzantine jurists, he naturally assigns its promulgation to no particular Emperor, for it was not thus "promulgated"; he dates the Farmer's Law, however, between the beginning of the seventh century and the first quarter of the eighth, stating that it may have been put together during the reign of Leo III and Constantine V between 720 and 741.<sup>15</sup> It may be observed, however, that Dölger dates the Farmer's Law at pretty much the same time as Vernadsky and Ostrogorsky, although he disputes their precise assignment of the text to Justinian II, in whom he is unable to see a "Gesetzgeber." Whether "official" or "unofficial," the Farmer's Law, prepared as a practical manual for Byzantine jurists, doubtless had the force of law, and would be administered in the courts. The reader must recognize this fact, and in this fact lies the social significance of the Farmer's Law in any study of Byzantine agrarian history.

The Farmer's Law consists of eighty-five brief articles regulating the affairs of the free village community, which was itself a fiscal district (*ὑποταγὴ χωρίου*), upon which fell a general tax (*ριζα χωρίου*), which was the common responsibility and

<sup>15</sup> Franz Dölger, *Festschrift für Leopold Wenger*, pp. 33-4, 43 ff., and 48, where Dölger summarizes his views to the effect that "der Nomos Georgikos ist eine private, seinem Titel entsprechend auf der Grundlage des Corpus Iuris Justinians I. und seiner griechischen Paratitla beruhende, zum Teil aber auch bäuerliches Gewohnheitsrecht sowie üblich gewordene Strafmasse neu aufzeichnende Kompilation, entstanden zwischen dem Anfang des 7. und dem ersten Viertel des 8. Jahrhunderts, wobie die Annahme einer Entstehung unter der Regierung der Kaiser Leon III. und Konstantinos V. (720-741) nicht unwahrscheinlich ist." Cf. also Dölger, "Harmenopoulos u. der Nomos Georgikos," in the *Tόμος Κυνηγαντίου Αρμενοπούλου* (Faculty of Law, University of Thessalonike, 1951), p. 161.

burden of all who held property in the village community.<sup>16</sup> This Law was observed from the very late seventh or early eighth century until, conceivably, the early eleventh or even later. It deals with the maintenance of boundaries between farms; exchanges of property and disputes concerning ownership; leases, tenancy on shares of the produce, and hired labor; taxes (but only arts. 18-19); and matters involving cattle, oxen, and dogs; problems arising from theft, destruction of crops, vines, trees, and fences; trespasses on vineyards and figyards; burning of farmhouses; and a multiplicity of other crimes and misdemeanors likely to occur in an agricultural settlement. A free society is depicted in the Law, unlike that revealed, for example, in the Carolingian *Capitulare de villis* of a rather later era. Ashburner expressed the opinion, without appreciating, apparently, the historical background of the Law or the significance of his own observation, that almost one third of the Farmer's Law was "new legislation."<sup>17</sup> It does seem to have been "new," not caused, however, by the customs of new settlers, such as the Slavs,<sup>18</sup> but rather necessitated by the new conditions created by the inroads of Slavs, Bulgars, and Avars, Persians and Arabs, which wiped out, as we have noted, large numbers of the *latifundia* upon which serfdom had been, from the fourth century, almost the universal and certainly the characteristic form of agricultural labor everywhere in the Empire. The Farmer's Law illustrates in a general way the life of the Athenian peasant in the eighth and ninth centuries, although the specific application of the Law to Attica would involve the difficulty that the olive is nowhere mentioned in its numerous provisions.<sup>19</sup>

More comprehensive than the view given us by the Farmer's Law of the economic and social structure of the Byzantine Empire in the middle period of its history is that to be found in the instructive Byzantine *Treatise on Taxation*.<sup>20</sup> From the

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 22-3, 45-7.

<sup>17</sup> *J. H. S.*, XXXII, p. 84.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 12-13, cf. 43-4.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Ashburner, *J. H. S.*, XXXII, p. 71.

<sup>20</sup> The important "Byzantine Treatise of Taxation" was first published by Walter Ashburner, in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXXV (1915), pp. 76-84, and later made the basis of a valuable paper by Georg Ostrogorsky, "Die ländliche Steuergemeinde des byzantinischen

twenty-nine chapters of this brief tract much can be learned of the economic and administrative organization of Byzantine farming communities, including those in Boeotia and Attica. A multiplicity of taxes are listed and described in the *Treatise*, which Ostrogorsky, Dölger, and others have made the subject of fruitful studies. Free peasants are found to be settled in the Byzantine Empire, as in western and central Europe, in two main types of agricultural community, the "nucleated village" ( $\tauὸ χωρίον$ ), the *Dorf* or *Gemeindedorf*, and the separate farmsteads or hamlets (sing.  $\dot{\eta} κτῆσις$ ), *Weiler*, *Dorfsiedelung in Einzelhöfen*.<sup>21</sup> Not unlike the hamlets, although different in origin, were the private properties of those who preferred, sometimes for good reasons, to live on the outskirts of the city, town, or village or beyond its boundaries and quite without its territory. Here we find, thus isolated, both small freeholds ( $ἀγρίδια$ ), cultivated by the proprietor and his family, and the large estates ( $προάστεια$ ),<sup>22</sup> worked by slaves, serfs, and leaseholders, who received land on short-term leases for half the produce (they were called  $ἡμισιαται$ ), or on long-term leases, according to which, it would appear, they received nine tenths of the produce ( $μορτίται$ ), but in the latter case the leaseholders or  $μορτίται$  doubtless had certain services to perform for the landlord ( $χωροδότης$ ).<sup>23</sup> The village community, as a social and fiscal entity ( $τοῦ χωρίου κοινότης, ὁμάς, ἀνακοίνωσις, μετονοσία$ ),<sup>24</sup> possessed few rights and functions of self-government, for the ubiquitous Byzantine officialdom made all decisions and attended to almost all matters of local business. The tax inspector ( $ἐπόπτης$ ) assessed the land in the village community, which also formed commonly

Reiches im X. Jahrhundert," *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 1-108, with a German translation of the text, *Traktat über die Steuererhebung* (pp. 91-103).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 16-17, *et alibi*, and *idem*, "Agrarian Conditions in the Byzantine Empire in the Middle Ages," in *Cambr. Ec. Hist.*, I, pp. 198-9.

<sup>22</sup> On the  $ἀγρίδια$  and  $προάστεια$ , see Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 17-21, cf. 42-3, and text of the treatise on taxation in Ashburner, *J. H. S.*, XXXV (1915), pp. 77-8, 80-1 (pars. 3-5, 12-13).

<sup>23</sup> Ashburner, *J. H. S.*, XXXII, pp. 82-3; Ostrogorsky, in *Cambr. Ec. Hist.*, I, pp. 200-1.

<sup>24</sup> On these terms, which all describe the same thing, i. e. *die Gemeindeverfassung der Dorfsiedelungen*, see Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 15-16; cf. *idem*, *Cambr. Ec. Hist.*, I, pp. 201-2.

a tax district (*ἱπτοταγὴ χωρίου*), established the general or "root" tax to be paid by the community (*ρίζα χωρίου*), and apportioned his share of the tax to each member of the community (i.e. δημás, etc.).<sup>25</sup> The inspectors were imperial appointees, *ἐπόπται τῶν θεμάτων*, sent into the themes or provinces with responsibility for the detailed superintendence of tax-collection in the territory assigned to them; as a class the inspectors had a bad reputation, like the French intendants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who became known in their day as the "thirty tyrants." The tyranny and capriciousness of the high officials in the Byzantine financial service were notorious, and there are some almost classic complaints voiced in the letters of Michael Psellus, the Metropolitan Theophylact of Bulgaria, and the Metropolitan Michael Choniates of Athens.<sup>26</sup>

During the early Byzantine period the government had forced landowners to take over abandoned lands by holding them responsible, under the *epibolé*, as we have noted, for the taxes on such lands. If the landowners had thus to pay the land tax, they had best take the land also, and, if possible, put it under cultivation to minimize or avoid loss. The cultivation of the land itself was, of course, what the government wished in this early era of scarce labor and sadly diminished productivity. During the middle Byzantine period the system of responsibility for the taxes on abandoned land continued to fall on the unfortunate neighbor of the peasant who had fled, died without heirs, or had otherwise proved incapable of paying his taxes. The surtax was now called the *allelengyon*. The government, how-

<sup>25</sup> Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 22-3, 45-7, 71.

<sup>26</sup> Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 74, 75, 80-1 ff., 85. Cf. Matthias Wellnhofer, *Johannes Apokaukos* (diss. Munich, 1913), pp. 20-1. Michael Choniates complains to the Emperor Alexius III Angelus that Byzantine tax assessors surveyed land with measures so small as to check "the footprints of fleas" (Sp. P. Lampros, ed., *The Extant Works of Michael Acominatus Choniates* [in Greek] [2 vols., Athens, 1879-1880], I, p. 307). The present article contains only occasional references to the works of Michael Choniates, with which I have already dealt superficially in connection with conditions in Athens in the later twelfth century (*Speculum*, XIX [1944], pp. 179-207, and *ibid.*, XXI [1946], pp. 234-6). Michael's evidence concerning conditions in Attica, Boeotia, and the islands (from 1182 to 1204) will be discussed at some length in my history of *Athens in the Middle Ages*, which I expect to have ready for the press in about three years.

ever, was now chiefly interested in taxing, as a source of revenue, those whose own property was near an abandoned property, although here too the taxpayer would inevitably seek to cultivate the new lands which he was obliged to take over, and this had become an easier undertaking in the eighth and ninth centuries because of the increased availability of agricultural labor. The *allelengyon*, however, sometimes ruined the small peasant farmer upon whom it fell, for he might well be unable to pay the additional tax, and would most likely lack the capital to bring his unwillingly acquired lands under profitable cultivation (indeed, he may have acquired these lands because his predecessor had been unable to make them pay enough to meet his taxes), and so his sole solution of the difficult problem that faced him might be the abandonment of his own lands in order to escape the new burden which the government was forcing upon him. Still more land was thus vacated, with no one to pay the taxes. In this way much land was detached from the village community and removed from the tax registers since solvent landowners who could pay the required surtax or *allelengyon* were not to be found in the village; under such circumstances the government might not press for payment of the *allelengyon*; but the abandoned lands became state property, eventually to be sold or pledged, for the most part, to large landowners, both lay and ecclesiastical, who could often expect to secure their position and property by procuring from the Emperor an immunity or exemption from taxation.<sup>27</sup> The peasants dispossessed in this way, and in other ways, must have formed something of a landless, footloose population, some of whom became lessees of the lands of others, or turned to piracy, or simply wandered around the country. In Attica we have explicit evidence of the existence of such people, in the works of the Athenian Metropolitan Michael Choniates, who declares that "there has come

<sup>27</sup> On the *allelengyon*, mentioned in articles 12 and 14 of the *Treatise on Taxation* (in *J. H. S.*, XXXV, pp. 80, 81), see Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 3-4, 15, esp. 25-32, 35, 45, 74. By the time of the emperor Nicephorus I (802-811) the term *epibolé* had been more or less displaced by the term *allelengyon* (*V. S. W. G.*, XX, p. 29). However, cf. John Danstrup, in *Classica et Mediaevalia*, VIII, pp. 250 ff., on what he regards as the difference between *epibolé* (the enforced assumption of waste lands by neighbors) and the *allelengyon* (mutual liability by neighbors for another's taxes).

upon us a boorish people, beggarly in mind and in body, quick to wander off and seek their food now in one place, now in another, and thence to fly away again like migratory birds.”<sup>28</sup>

The emergence of a new Byzantine gentry, growing into a new landed aristocracy, is apparent before the beginning of the tenth century, and the issue is clearly drawn in a struggle between the magnates (the *dynatoi*) and the free village communities, most of which had come into being with the destruction of the great estates in the blood-and-iron era of the seventh century. The tenth-century Emperors vigorously supported the peasants in their freeholds in the village communities (*δμάδες* or *ἀνακοινώσεις τῶν χωρίων*) and the soldiers in their military estates (*στρατιωτικὰ τόπια*), for they had perceived that the structure of the Byzantine state and of society depended upon these two classes.<sup>29</sup> A novel of the Emperor Romanus I Lecapenus gives the classic statement of the reasons for the imperial protection of the small freeholders against lay and ecclesiastical lords who tended, by purchase or by force, to acquire their lands. “We do not make these laws from hatred and envy of those who are strong,” the Emperor says in 934, “but we declare them for love of the poor, for their protection, and for the common safety.”<sup>30</sup> High officials of the court, the army, the civil service, the provincial administration, and the church are “no longer to dare” to acquire the property of the poor (*penetes*) on any pretext or for any reason whatsoever, for the power of such persons has augmented the great suffering of the poor and inflicted heavy burdens upon them. Unless, in fact, the present law puts a stop to the many abuses that now exist, the Emperor foresees the destruction of the welfare of the state. “For the settlement of the many on the land provides most of the necessities of society; it is from them that the public taxes are collected, and the rendering of military service is required, and these things will be wanting if the common people go under [ἢ πάντως ἀπολέψει τοῦ πλήθους

<sup>28</sup> Mich. Chon., *Ep.* 8, 3 (Lampros, II, p. 12).

<sup>29</sup> Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 14-16; *ibid.*, XXII, pp. 132 ff., and cf. Ernst Stein, “Spätbyzant. Verfassungs- u. Wirtschaftsgesch.,” *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte*, II (1923-1926), pp. 7-9.

<sup>30</sup> Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus graeco-romanum*, pars III: *Novellae constitutiones* (Leipzig, 1857), coll. III, nov. V, p. 246; Franz Dölger, *Regesten d. Kaiserurkunden d. oström. Reiches*, I (1924), no. 628, pp. 77-8.

ἐκλελοιπότος].”<sup>31</sup> The Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus continued the struggle against the “powerful” in behalf of the “poor,” and the Emperor Basil II attempted, almost, the dissolution of the magnates with whom he had much trouble, and sought to recreate, as it were, the social conditions of the seventh and eighth centuries in which the free peasant had been safe in the proprietary right to his land and the soldier secure in the possession of his military estate. In the year 1002 Basil II obliged the magnates to pay the *allelengyon*, the tax on abandoned property, which, as we have seen, had hitherto fallen in

<sup>31</sup> Zachariae, *Jus graeco-romanum*, III, pp. 246-7. Cf. Georg Stadtmüller, “Oströmische Bauern- und Wehrpolitik,” *Neue Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft*, XIII (1937), pp. 428-30; Ostrogorsky, V. S. W. G., XXII, pp. 133-4; Charanis, *Byzantion*, XVII (1944-45), p. 52. There is a series of eleven important imperial “constitutions” promulgated in behalf of the threatened small proprietors in the tenth century. In April of 922 Romanus I Lecapenus gave various categories of small proprietors the right of prior purchase (*protimesis*) to the lands of their fellow peasants, as such lands were offered for sale, restricting under penalty the further acquisition of peasant holdings by the *dynatoi* (Zachariae, *J. G. R.*, III, coll. III, nov. II, pp. 234-41; Fr. Dölger, *Regesten d. Kaiserurkunden*, I [1924], no. 595, pp. 71-2, on which cf. Ostrogorsky, V. S. W. G., XX, pp. 32 ff., and *Cambr. Ec. Hist.*, I, p. 205). Famine and plague in the winter of 927-928, however, gave the *dynatoi* an opportunity, which they did not fail to take, to buy up cheaply much land from the harassed and frightened peasantry; this led to renewed imperial prohibitions in the law of September, 934, cited, *supra*, in the text (Zachariae, *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 242-52; Dölger, *Regesten*, I, no. 628), which excoriates the *dynatoi* as “like unto the plague or like unto gangrene” (Zach., *J. G. R.*, III, p. 247, lines 28-29). The large landowners had to be watched with unceasing vigilance. In March of 947 Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus legislated against the unlawful acquisition by the “powerful” of the lands of the “poor” in Asia Minor (Zachariae, *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 252-6; Dölger, *Regesten*, I, no. 656); another law of Constantine, of uncertain date, sought to protect the integrity of the military estates, on which the army and the Aegean fleet depended so much (Zach., *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 261-6; Dölger, *Regesten*, I, no. 673, pp. 83-5); and still other laws were issued by Constantine and by his son Romanus II to protect the lands of the small peasant proprietors, and to protect the small military estates also, against the ever unrequited desires of the *dynatoi* to add to their now great landed possessions (Zach., *J. G. R.*, III, coll. III, nos. XIV-XVI, pp. 281-7). According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus’ law of March, 947, when lands of the *dynatoi* came up for sale, the small proprietors were to enjoy the prior right of purchase, but in 967 Nicephorus II Phocas abrogated this law, which had given the peasant, with his smaller com-

the village communities upon the unfortunate neighbors of the peasant who had given up the struggle with the adversities of farming and of dealing with rapacious tax-collectors. Now the powerful were to pay this tax (or the accumulated arrears thereof), instead of the poor, but they were not to take over the land for which they paid the tax.<sup>32</sup> The large landowners eventually won, however, and there was probably as much desperation as legal severity behind the measures of Basil II. In

petitive strength, a conceivable chance against the large landowner, and established an alleged equality between small and large proprietors in their rights to the acquisition of land (Zach., *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 296-9; Dölger, *Regesten*, I, no. 712). Nicephorus Phocas did, of course, maintain the soldiers' estates, but since the minimum holding of this type was now increased from a value of four pounds of gold to twelve, the effect must have been to create a country gentry, so to speak, a class of military squires (Zach., *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 299-300; Dölger, *Regesten*, I, no. 721), and we may assume that the small military peasant proprietor would generally fail to hold his own. By a sort of statute of mortmain Nicephorus Phocas in 964 forbade the establishment of new monasteries, hostels, and homes for the aged, in connection with which he also forbade any further acquisitions of land by churches and monasteries (Zach., *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 292-6; Dölger, *Regesten*, I, no. 699; Charanis, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, no. IV, pp. 56-8); Nicephorus urged, however, the restoration and maintenance, through gifts of money, of some of the many penurious monasteries already in existence. This law, which may not have been enforced after Nicephorus, was formally rescinded by Basil II in 988, at the intercession of "the pious monks and many others" (Zach., *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 303-4; Dölger, *Regesten*, I, no. 772). In 996 Basil II reestablished, with much vigor, the prohibitions of Romanus Lecapenus against the further acquisition of peasant lands by the *dynatoi* (Zach., *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 308 ff.; Dölger, *Regesten*, I, no. 783, p. 100); he also impeded the bishops in their unceasing attempts to secure more lands in the free village communities, lands which were sometimes granted to lay lords as "benefices" (*charistikia*). But in the long run the efforts of Basil proved of no avail; ultimate victory lay with the large landowners, and therewith came the feudalization of the Byzantine Empire. See the illuminating article by Erik Bach, "Les Lois agraires byzantines du X<sup>e</sup> siècle," in *Classica et mediaevalia: Revue danoise de philologie et d'histoire*, V (Copenhagen, 1942), pp. 70-91, and cf. John Danstrup, *ibid.*, VIII (1946), pp. 236-7. I have not yet seen J. de Malafosse, "Les Lois agraires à l'époque byzantine: Tradition et exégèse," *Recueil de l'Académie de Législation*, XXIX (1949), 75 pp., cited by F[ranz] D[ö]lger, *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XLIII (1950), p. 245.

<sup>32</sup> Geo. Cedrenus, II, 456, and John Zonaras, III, 561, on which texts see John Danstrup, *Classica et Mediaevalia*, VIII (1946), pp. 256-62.

any event, the *allelengyon*, which had weighed so heavily upon the peasantry for generations, was soon abolished, for the most part, now that it fell upon the magnates: legislation against it was promulgated by the Emperor Romanus III Argyrus (1028-1034), who in this as in other matters gave way before the magnates.<sup>33</sup> The *dynatoi* had won; the peasant had been defeated; the fears of Romanus Lecapenus were realized; the Emperor's control of the state was henceforth to be hampered; the strength of the central administration was quickly diminished; and the disaster of Manzikert was inevitably being prepared for.

The great landowners, especially the ecclesiastical landowners, escaped much taxation and governmental control by securing imperial letters of exemption therefrom; such were the immunities from taxation and from various other *corvées* granted by Constantine IX Monomachus to the Nea Moné on the island of Chios and by Alexius I Comnenus to the Monastery of St. John on the island of Patmos.<sup>34</sup> The Byzantine immunity was commonly known as the *exkoussieia* (*ἐξκουσσεία*), i. e. the Latin *excusatio*, and although its derivation directly from the Roman imperial *immunitas* may be disputed, its operation as an economic and social force was attended in the Byzantine Empire by the same legal consequences as the immunity in the later Roman Empire. Since imperial officials were by and large restricted from entering the immunity to collect taxes or to do justice, public authority inevitably passed into private hands, i. e. into the hands of the immunist and his retainers. The advantages accruing from grants of immunity may have helped cause that era of monastic well-being and prosperity, in the later ninth and earlier tenth centuries, which followed upon

<sup>33</sup> Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 3-4, 15, 32. Contrary to the view most commonly held, the *allelengyon* did not entirely disappear in 1028 (John Danstrup, *Classica et Mediaevalia*, VIII [1946], pp. 259-60). Furthermore, the *epibolé*, so closely related to the *allelengyon*, probably survived even into the 14th century (cf. Germaine Rouillard, "L'Epibolé au temps d'Alexis I Comnène," *Byzantion*, X [1935], pp. 81-9, and Franz Dölger, *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XXXVI [1936], pp. 157-61), and not only the *epibolé* but also the *protimesis* (the right of a neighbor to the prior purchase of property up for sale, on which see, *supra*, note 31) survived into a late period (see P. Charanis, *Byzantinostslavica*, XII [1951], pp. 123-4).

<sup>34</sup> Zachariae von Lingenthal, *J. G. R.*, III, pp. 370-1; Miklosich and Müller, *Acta et diplomata*, VI, 45.

the conclusion of the second iconoclastic period. In any event the Byzantine ecclesiastical immunity can be subjected to the full light of historical investigation only from the middle of the eleventh century when the documents attesting its widespread existence become rather numerous. Many grants of immunity were made during the period of governmental decentralization which followed the death of Basil II in 1025, and they continued to be made throughout the period of Comnenian rule (1081-1185). The century of unbroken, even if often disputed, succession of one member of the Comnenian house by another has given a certain appearance of strength and solidity to this period which more than one recent historian has come to regard as specious.

It must be remembered that, if the Byzantine Empire was the heir and successor of the later Roman Empire, we are dealing, *ipso facto*, with the heritage of the Theodosians, not of the Antonines. Quite apart from the growing danger from the west, which several times threatened the Byzantine capital in those great marauding expeditions called Crusades, there were certain practices or institutions within Byzantine society itself which were disruptive of good order and detrimental to the interests of the central government. The chief of these was probably the immunity, an inheritance from the distant past, but attention must also be called to the practice of granting fiefs, which were called *pronoiai*, to great lords in return for military and other service, as the Empire became increasingly feudalized in the course of the later eleventh and twelfth centuries, and to the institution of patronage, known in Greek as *prostasia*, which in some respects suggests the western practice of commendation. Both this patronage and the Byzantine fief seem to be, in their remote origins, part of the medieval Greek heritage from the Roman imperial past.<sup>35</sup> The immunity, the fief, patronage,

<sup>35</sup> The economic and social organization of the later Roman Empire had also been, in the Theodosian era, especially characterized by these three institutions: 1) the granting of immunity, or exemption, from certain taxes and obligations commonly owing to the state (*immunitas, excusatio*); 2) the widespread granting and holding of land by "precarious tenure," the *precarium* (later *precaria*, in the west, and *beneficium*, with which compare the Byzantine *charistikion*; and, finally, *feudum*, with which compare the Byzantine *pronoia*); and 3) the system of patronage (*patrocinium*), which seems to survive to some extent in the later western *commendatio* and the Byzantine *prostasia*. On the

these were corrosive elements in the substance of society in the later eleventh and twelfth centuries. Their operation had been impeded, and their effects obscured, by that long period of strong central administration which had lasted, whatever its vicissitudes of fortune, from the Emperor Heraclius to Basil II, but thereafter they had been able to do their work, and decomposition proceeded rapidly.

Byzantine society also knew another kind of fief, or rather benefice, called in Greek the *charistikion*, which was of much importance in the medieval history of Athens, as well as of other communities in the Empire. The *charistikion* was a benefice (*beneficium*); its holder was a *charistikarios* or beneficiary (*beneficiarius*).<sup>36</sup> In the beginning, it could have been, just possibly, a later adaptation of the Roman imperial practice of granting land in return for certain services, although when the documents become numerous enough to enable economic historians to study the institution in some detail, the term *charistikion* applies solely to grants of monastic land, the *charistikarios*, or beneficiary of such a grant, being bound to support the monks, keep up the buildings, and provide for religious and other services, the excess revenue being his own income, which explains his interest in acquiring the *charistikion*. *Charistikia* were invented and widely granted by the first iconoclasts, especially by Constantine V Copronymus, according to the Patriarch John V of Antioch, who composed a tract, at the close of the eleventh century, "on monastic discipline and the danger of immunity (*eukousseia*) from the Roman Empire to the high middle ages, both in the east and the west, see G. Ferrari dalle Spade, "Immunità ecclesiastiche nel diritto romano," in the *Atti R. Istit. Veneto di Scien., Lett. ed Arti, Cl. di Sc. mor. e Lett.*, XCIX (1939-40), pp. 103-248.

<sup>36</sup> John Danstrup, "The State and Landed Property in Byzantium to c. 1250," in *Classica et Mediaevalia*, VIII, p. 232, equates the Byzantine *charistikarios* with the western *advocatus*. (The *charistikion*, however, was revocable, as we shall see, by the Holy Synod in Constantinople.) On the *charistikion* see in general the brilliant study of Emilio Herman, "Ricerche sulle istituzioni monastiche byzantine: Typika, ktetorika, caristicari, e monastici 'liberi,'" in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, VI (1940), esp. pp. 297, 316-47, 372-5, who observes (p. 316): "Diversi sono i nomi dati nelle fonti a questi beneficiari, ma il più comune è quello di *caristicari*." Cf. Waldemar Nissen, *Die Diataxis d. Michael Attaliates von 1077* (Jena, 1894), described by Herman, p. 295, as a "breve ma accurata dissertazione."

granting monasteries to laymen.”<sup>37</sup> The *charistikion* was granted, in theory, to a layman in order that the latter might improve, for the benefit of his own soul, the monastic property which he thus took over. It seems likely, however, that the *charistikion* grew up within the Church itself, even before the iconoclastic period, possibly as a means of securing the services of certain laymen, who, like the western *advocatus* (*avoué*) or *vicedominus* (*vidame*), might be useful to the Church, especially for protection against foreign invaders or local marauders. The need for protection was notorious, at least from the eleventh century on. Piracy and brigandage were rewarding occupations for those who possessed so little hope or so much hardihood that the normal routines of life would not suffice.

Churches and monasteries were especially vulnerable to attack, and in time of trouble the strong arm of some local *archon* was better to lean upon than the pastoral staff. *Charistikarioi* owed protection, at least, to the monks dwelling in the monastic properties in their charge. According to John of Antioch, however, “if men were to allege that monasteries are thus granted for their own well being and long continuance, those monasteries immediately cry out in loud remonstrance which have been ruined by their *charistikarioi*, and there are no few of these, as well as those which have been converted by their holders into regular estates [ $\pi\rho\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\alpha$ ]. We do not know whether a single monastery can be found which has been restored and reestablished by its *charistikarios*.<sup>38</sup> A good deal of evidence, which need not detain us here, could be adduced to support both John of Antioch’s contentions and the indignation with which he enunciated them. A law (*prostaxis*) of Alexius I Comnenus, issued in December of the fifth indiction (i. e. 1082, 1097, or 1112), confirmed the patriarchal right of supervision over all monasteries, of whatsoever category, and required that those

<sup>37</sup> Ioann. Antioch., *De disciplina monastica et de monasteriis laicis non tradendis*, 6-7 (P. G., 132, cols. 1128 BC), and esp. cap. 8 (1129 B). There is a recent summary of some material relating to the *charistikion* in Peter Charanis, “Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire,” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, no. IV (1948), pp. 72-81.

<sup>38</sup> Ioann. Antioch., *De monasteriis laicis non tradendis*, 13 (P. G., 132, cols. 1136 D-1137 A). The *proasteia* ( $\pi\rho\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\alpha$ ) were ecclesiastical estates held by laymen on a less costly and exacting tenure than the *charistikia*: monks need not be supported, for example, on the *proasteia*.

who held monasteries as grants should not allow them to suffer any diminution of value.<sup>39</sup> The *charistikion*, however, must have served its purpose, for it possessed many defenders within the Church itself.

Although the *charistikion* had been annulled as an institution by the Patriarch Sisinnius II (996-998), and although some founders of monasteries in the eleventh and twelfth centuries provided in their deeds of gift that their foundations should not pass into the hands of *charistikarioi*, the Patriarch Sergius II in 1016 defended and reestablished the *charistikion*.<sup>40</sup> In his opinion it served worthwhile purposes. The Patriarch Alexius of Studium (1025-1043) presided over local synods in Constantinople in November of 1027 and in January of 1028, in which the whole practice of granting monasteries as *charistikia* was again considered in detail. While the customary abuses were again singled out for correction, the merits of the *charistikion* as such were sufficient in the eyes of the assembled fathers to earn their approbation, provided any grant in question had been made with proper patriarchal and other ecclesiastical authorization, and provided the Church retained ultimate control over the monastery: moreover, when episcopal and other churches were found to be impoverished, *charistikia* dependent upon them were to be revoked by the Holy Synod, so that such properties might be available for the support of the churches.<sup>41</sup> This was a sensible

<sup>39</sup> *Prostaxis*, cited by Theodore Balsamon, *In can. xix Conc. VII Oecumen.*, in *P. G.*, 137, cols. 984 C-985; Rhalles and Potles, Σύνταγμα, II, p. 634; lines 21 ff.; J. and P. Zepos, *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, I, pp. 346-8; summary of the document in Franz Dölger, *Regesten d. Kaiserurkunden d. oströmischen Reiches*, pt. 2 (Munich and Berlin, 1925), no. 1076, pp. 25-6. The document is dated December of the fifth Indiction, which corresponds to the years 1082, 1097, and 1112 (cf. Adr. Cappelli, *Cronologia e Calendario perpetuo* [Milan, 1906], pp. 65-6), and so I do not know why Dölger, *loc. cit.*, has dated the document in 1081-1096-1111. In any event this document appears to belong to the year 1097 (cf. E. Herman, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, VI [1940], p. 324, n.).

<sup>40</sup> Balsamon, *In can. xiii Conc. VII Oecumen.*, in *P. G.*, 137, cols. 956-957; Rhalles and Potles, II, pp. 613-14, doc. dated May of the fourteenth Indiction, i.e. 1016 (Cappelli, *Cronologia*, p. 63); V. Grumel, *Les Actes des Patriarches*, I, fasc. 2 (1936), no. 821, p. 242.

<sup>41</sup> V. Grumel, *Les Actes des Patriarches*, I, fasc. 2, no. 833, pp. 248-9, and no. 835, secs. 12 ff., p. 251; texts in Rhalles and Potles, V, pp. 20 ff., 30-2, and *P. G.*, 119, cols. 837-44, 828-37. Cf. Ferdinand Chalandon,

decision, and it was not disputed by another synod which investigated the problem of the *charistikia*, at the behest of the Metropolitan of Cyzicus, in 1071, under the Patriarch John VIII Xiphilinus; it was again declared that grants of *charistikia* should be revoked when any alteration in the character of the tenure was to be feared, or when such grants deprived the mother church of needed revenue, but the institution, when serving its intended purpose, was apparently quite proper.<sup>42</sup> The twelfth-century canonist Theodore Balsamon also defended the *charistikion*, that "useful custom of our blessed fathers," which had been improperly condemned and discontinued by the Patriarch Sisinnius II (996-998), and subsequently attacked by the Patriarch John V of Antioch, to whose views Balsamon took strong exception.<sup>43</sup>

We may now turn to one of the most detailed and valuable documents which we have illustrating control by the Holy Synod of monasteries and other ecclesiastical properties granted as *charistikia* to the lay lessees known as *charistikarioi*. This document concerns the Church of Athens, which, as we shall see, had its full share of trouble with *charistikarioi*.

On 20 April, 1089, a synod in Constantinople, consisting of ten high ecclesiastics and some patriarchal officials (*despotikoi archontes*), under the Patriarch Nicholas III Grammaticus (1084-1111), acted upon a petition presented to it by the Athenian Metropolitan Nicetas III. Nicetas' predecessor, the Metropolitan John V Blachernites (d. 1086), had badly managed the affairs of the Athenian Church, and Nicetas now inquired of the holy synod whether numerous acts of John need be enforced that were "contrary to the laws, the divine canons, and even to ecclesiastical custom." The new Metropolitan of Athens asserted that the same synodal decrees should be applied to those who held the suburban estates (*προάστεια*) of the Church,

*Essai sur le règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène (1081-1118)* (Paris, 1900), pp. 282 ff., and E. Herman, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, VI (1940), pp. 320-1.

<sup>42</sup> Th. I. Uspenskii, *Izv. russk. Arkh. Institut. v Kpole* (for full reference see, *infra*, note 44), V (1900), p. 23.

<sup>43</sup> Balsamon, *In can. xiii Conc. VII Oecumen.*, in *P. G.*, 137, cols. 956-7, esp. 956 C and 957 B; Rhalles and Potles, II, pp. 613-14; V. Grumel, *Les Actes des Patriarches*, I, fasc. 2, no. 809, pp. 236-7.

and other properties also, as were applied to that class of lessees who were not bound to pay rent (*χαριστικάριοι*), for the damage which they did to the interests of the Church was the same. It was decided that those who held monasteries and chapels (*μοναστήρια καὶ εὐκτήρια*) without maintaining therein monks, to tend to the divine service and to care for the property, were to be dispossessed, unless the Metropolitan himself wished to keep them, for a year or two, on condition that they should have monks in residence, take care of them properly, and make amends for any diminution in value the properties might have suffered during their tenancy. Likewise, those who held properties of the Church, acquired as donations (*κατὰ δωρεάν*) were to be dispossessed, for the alienation of church property is forbidden, except in an exchange which is to the advantage of the Church, and while such property can be leased, this too is permissible only when the Church receives a proper rent. Those who had received, as leaseholds (*τίτλῳ ἐκληγτορικῷ ή μισθωτικῷ*), lands, vineyards, mills, or the like, were to return them immediately if they held them on a twenty-year lease that had already been renewed (*ἡ ἐκληψις ἐπὶ δις κ'*), or on a lease of twenty-nine years' duration; but if the lease extended to twenty or twenty-seven years, attention was to be paid to this: if the lessees had worked the properties advantageously and if they had been paying a proper rent, they were to be left in possession, provided they continued to pay rent commensurate with the value of the property they held; but if those holding properties could not produce a written lease, they were to be removed therefrom, according to the law, without compensation for any improvements they might claim to have made. Nevertheless, if the lessees had dealt with the Church neither sharply nor deceptively, and if the improvements they had made exceeded in value the loss which their retention of the land had caused the Church, justice required that they should receive the difference.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> These synodal decisions of 20 April, 1089, concerning the lands and properties of the Church of Athens, are quoted in a document of decisions of 10 February, 1164, first published by Th. I. Uspenskii, "Mneniâ i postanovleniâ konstantinopolskikh pomestnykh soborov XI. i XII. vv. o razdache sherkovnykh imushchestv (kharistikarii)" ["Opinions and Decisions of the Synods of Constantinople, dealing with Land, in the XIth and XIIth Centuries, concerning the Disposition of Ecclesiastical Properties"], in the *Izv. russk. Arkh. Instit. v Kpolse*

The Metropolitan Nicetas next took up the question of the lands and properties owned by the Church in the vicinity of Athens, and hence called ἐνθύρια, "things at the gates," many of which *enthuria* were then occupied, according to Nicetas, by some of the residents of the city of Athens and by other persons as well (ὡς πολλὰ παρ' ἐνίων οἰκητόρων τοῦ κάστρου καὶ λουπῶν προσώπων κατέχονται). The synod decided that, if the properties of which Nicetas spoke were really *enthuria*, they were to be returned to the Metropolitan Church of Athens with the coming harvest of the twelfth indiction (1089), for if the twelfth canon of the Second Council of Nicaea (A. D. 787) ordered the restoration to churches of productive, self-maintaining properties, called αὐτούργια,<sup>45</sup> as indispensable to the welfare of the churches, so should the *enthuria*, being at the very gates, as it were, be held by the Church alone, as necessary for her maintenance and not that of any other person. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Nicetas claimed that in the region of Decelea, where the Athenian Church possessed "no few vineyards," lessees of such properties had rendered a tenth part of the wine produced to the Church as her share, but the Metropolitan John had leased all these places in Decelea for a few pieces of gold. The synod decided that the tithe of wine should be paid, as formerly, to the Church of Athens, and if the present lessees refused to pay

[the *Izvestiâ of the Russ. Arch. Institute in Constantinople*], V (Odessa, 1900), pp. 32-41, and for my text, above, see pp. 32-6; there is a summary of the document in V. Grumel, *Les Actes des Patriarches*, I, fasc. 3 (1947), no. 952, pp. 46-8; and it has been dealt with by Georg Stadtmüller, *Michael Choniates, Metrop. von Athen*, in *Orientalia Christiana*, XXXIII-2 (1934), pp. 149-52. On the granting of ecclesiastical properties by bishops to laymen in Italy in the tenth and eleventh centuries, which produced problems not unlike those being faced by the Athenian and other Byzantine churches in the eleventh century, see Catherine E. Boyd, *Tithes and Parishes in Medieval Italy* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1952), *passim*, esp. pp. 92-102, where, for example, "in 1006 we find the bishop of Novara leasing for twenty-nine years half the lands of the parish of Anzola in return for a money rent" (*ibid.*, p. 99). Such leases of ecclesiastical lands, *livellario nomine*, were regularly made for a period not exceeding twenty-nine years (Boyd, *op. cit.*, p. 70). The connection between Byzantine and Italian land law was, of course, very close. Cf. also Franz Dölger, "Die Frage d. Grundeigentums in Byzanz," *Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences*, V (1933), p. 7.

<sup>45</sup> On *autourgia*, cf. Balsamon, *In can. xiii Conc. VII Oecumen.*, in *P. G.*, 137, cols. 952 CD-953 A.

the tithe, they were to be dispossessed, but to receive compensation, in accord with the decision already reached, for the improvements which they might have made. The same provisions were laid down for the management of other Athenian properties—vineyards, arable lands, buildings, and mills—in the region of Thebes, and wherever the Athenian Church possessed immovable goods. The Metropolitan Nicetas also called the attention of the synod to the fact that monasteries belonging to the Athenian Church were in the hands of “certain lay persons of influence and of bishops too” ( $\tauὰ παρά τινων δυνατῶν προσώπων λαϊκῶν τε καὶ ἐπισκόπων κατεχόμενα μοναστήρια$ ), who held them as “donations,” but that these should now revert to the Church, in accordance with a synodal decree of the Patriarch Alexius of Studium (1025-1043), to the effect that bishoprics which are prosperous, and possess monasteries given to them by their Metropolitans, should return these monasteries to the metropolitan sees if the latter are in need.<sup>46</sup> Here the synod replied that a copy of the Patriarch Alexius’ decree would be sent to the judge of the theme of Hellas and the Peloponnesus ( $\delta\thetaεματικὸς δικαστής$ ),<sup>47</sup> so that such monasteries might be returned to the Church of Athens as she should be repossessed of, under this provision, just as obtained with regard to properties classified as *autourgia*. Finally, with the consideration of some other matters in which the Metropolitans of Crete and Mitylene had an interest, as well as the energetic Nicetas of Athens, and which involved an appeal to the Emperor, the synod concluded its session, and the patriarchal notary who recorded the minutes of the meeting had produced a document of much importance in the medieval history of Athens.<sup>48</sup>

From the synodal decrees of 20 April, 1089, we perceive that the growing strength of the great landowners in Attica and Boeotia, the *dynatoi*, was derived in part, at least, from their acquisition of monasteries and other properties belonging to

<sup>46</sup> V. Grumel, *Les Actes des Patriarches*, I, fasc. 2 (1936), no. 833, sec. 5, p. 249, doc. dated November of 1027. See, *supra* n. 39.

<sup>47</sup> By the date of the present document (1089), Hellas and the Peloponnesus, originally two separate themes, had been combined to form a single theme under a praetor resident at Thebes (cf. Stadtmüller, *Michael Choniates*, in *Orientalia Christiana*, XXXIII-2, p. 144).

<sup>48</sup> Uspenskii, *Izv. russk. Arkh. Inst. v Kpole*, V (1900), pp. 36-41; Grumel, *Les Actes des Patriarches*, I, fasc. 3 (1947), no. 952, p. 47.

the Church of Athens, and that the Metropolitan John had actually assisted their ambition by freely giving up monasteries to them, as well as to some of his suffragan bishops, who may not have been much easier to handle. The result was a decline in monastic life and organization, for the new proprietors, especially the lay magnates, did not concern themselves unduly about the monks, whom they were, of course, under a solemn obligation to maintain; but whom we have seen abandoning the monasteries, with a consequent neglect of the divine service and a failure to preserve the goods of the Church. But the Metropolitan John had dispatched the other properties of the Church with even greater magnanimity than his bestowal of monasteries upon improper recipients. He had almost given away various estates of the Church, either for no rent or for a rent too small, and even lands and properties close to Athens itself, the *enthuria*, which were particularly necessary to the Metropolitan and his cathedral staff, to help maintain the city churches, charities, perhaps a school, and the like. The *enthuria*, the synod decided, were to be administered directly by the Church. If the synodal decisions of 1089 were actually enforced, the economic conditions of the Athenian Church should have been much improved, for the Metropolitan laid claim to extensive properties. Besides the *enthuria*, especially valuable because of their close proximity to the city and the cathedral, there were other properties, which, when once developed, required no further expenditure of capital to maintain them—and called, therefore, *autourgia*, or “self-working”—such as salt works, vineyards, olive groves, pastures, mills, brick- and tile-works, and the like, which must have produced a good profit, in money and in kind, for the Metropolitan, the canons, churches, and charities. The vineyards in the region of Decelea, and the lands and properties in and around Thebes, were of particular value, and their administration by the Metropolitan John had apparently been particularly poor. Perhaps Nicetas did something to rectify the conditions of which he complained to the synod, but he could not impede the growth of the large estates nor moderate the ambition of their powerful owners. Three quarters of a century later, on 10 February, 1164, a holy synod, presided over by the Patriarch Lucas Chrysoberges (1157-1169/70), was asked by the Metropolitan Michael of Heraclea whether the leasing of

the valuable properties known as *enthuria* and *autourgia* had to be maintained through twice the period of the twenty-seven years, already forbidden in 1089; to the Metropolitan Michael the practice of leasing these properties seemed too old and well established to forbid any longer; the Patriarch and the synod declared invalid leases of ecclesiastical properties of more than twenty-seven years, as well as certain transferable leases; but they did not seek to condemn out of hand the custom of leasing the *enthuria* and the *autourgia*.<sup>49</sup> "The exposition of the canon law was also obliged to adjust itself to the irresistible economic development."<sup>50</sup>

By the eleventh and twelfth centuries certain of the political and economic institutions of the western kingdoms and of the Byzantine Empire had come to possess, externally at least, some important similarities, and recent scholarship has shown that the Greek world into which the Latin Crusaders brought their concepts of fief and vassalage, manor and serfdom, was a world well prepared to understand importations from the west which were not so novel to the Greeks as some older historians had thought. The Latin and Greek worlds were not too far apart to understand each other, or, sometimes, deliberately to misunderstand each other. As the position of the western kings gradually increased in strength, and they slowly became aware, under clerical tutelage, of some of the implications of the charismatic authority they possessed, the position of the Byzantine Emperor was growing more and more precarious, even if he abated no whit the ceremonial pretensions of his God-given *basileia*. Several great Byzantine families were becoming threats to the Emperor, not merely because of their chances of attaining to the imperial throne on the roulette of armed revolution—which had made the successful Leo the Armenian an Emperor and the unsuccessful Thomas the Slavonian a criminal, and so on—

<sup>49</sup> Uspenskii, *Izv. russk. Arkh. Inst. v Kpole*, V (1900), pp. 30-2, 41-2; Grumel, *Les Actes des Patriarches*, I, fasc. 3 (1947), no. 1055, p. 117; Ioannes Oudot, ed., *Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani Acta Selecta* (Sacra Congregazione per la Chiesa Orientale: *Codificazione Canonica Orientale: Fonti*, ser. II, fasc. III), I (Vatican Press, 1941), doc. IV, pp. 30-3.

<sup>50</sup> Stadtmüller, *Michael Choniates*, in *Orient. Christiana*, XXXIII-2 (1934), p. 152.

but also because of the vast holdings these families possessed, putting them in rather the same relation to the Emperor as the heads of the houses of Flanders and Champagne, for examples, stood to the King of France. In the generation preceding the year 1204 the power of the Byzantine Emperor had been rapidly diminishing; the power of the western monarchs, especially the King of France, had been increasing. Feudalism had arisen in western Europe out of chaos, in the absence of strong central government; feudalism grew, in the eleventh century, in the Byzantine Empire, as the Emperor ceased to be strong; various magnates now began to usurp, especially on the periphery of the Empire, public functions and services which the state was obliged to relinquish from weakness. Feudalism is the negation of the concept of the state; it means the assumption of public authority by private individuals; it means the end of any distinction between public and private law; it replaces the relationship between subject and sovereign, between citizen and state, by an infinity of private contracts and bargains designed to produce security and a livelihood for persons both high and low. The west was now recovering from the social disintegration which had grown out of the breakdown of the Carolingian Empire, and so feudalism was ceasing to be either necessary or possible; the eastern Empire was experiencing the failure which its western counterpart had known some three and a half centuries before. Nicetas Choniates says that, during the two decades of the disastrous rule of the Angeli (1185-1204), "there were those who revolted in one place or another, again and again, and it is not possible to say how many times this happened"—*ἄλλοι ἀλλοτε πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὄσακις εἰπεῖν, ἐπανέστησαν.*<sup>51</sup> Thus, feudalism, long delayed, made its inevitable appearance in the Byzantine world. As the west was increasing in power, the east was failing; at the time of the First and Second Crusades, east and west may appear more or less in equipoise; but the Fourth Crusade revealed how far the process of corrosion had gone in the Byzantine state.

The absorption of the small estates by the great landowners had undermined the strength of Byzantium. The small peasant freeholds had been an abundant source of revenue to the govern-

<sup>51</sup> Nic. Chon., *De Isaacio Angelo*, III, 2 (Bonn, p. 553).

ment; the military estates had supported the imperial soldiery, native armies with their roots in Byzantine soil. The victory of the great landowners had been the defeat of the Byzantine central administration which had aided the Emperors in their opposition to the continued growth of the large estates; once highly organized, a beautifully functioning machine, this administration had seldom failed the Empire from the time of Heraclius to that of Basil II. It had known when to make peace and when to fight, but now it had been irreparably damaged. In August of 1071 a mercenary army had gone down at Manzikert, and had pulled the Emperor down with it.<sup>52</sup> Earlier in the same year Bari had fallen to Robert Guiscard, who now extinguished the last embers of Byzantine authority in Italy, and began his attacks upon the Empire. A decade later, in 1081, Alexius I Comnenus came to the imperial throne, a great landowner, and the champion of the military aristocracy in Asia Minor; relying for support upon the magnates who had assisted his rise to the purple, he abandoned for a time the imperial opposition, generations old, to the magnates' own social and economic aggrandizement; Alexius ceased to supply any effective protection to the small free peasant in his proprietary rights to the land he cultivated; the imperial government, until the end of the vigorous reign of Basil II Bulgaroctonus (976-1025), had commonly resisted, as we have seen, the magnates' encroachment upon the small freeholds of the peasantry, upon which a large burden of taxation had fallen, and from which most of the army had been recruited.<sup>53</sup> In the middle of the eleventh century, in the reign of the weak Constantine IX Monomachus (1042-1054), comes what appears to be the first clear reference to the *pronoia*, the

<sup>52</sup> See Claude Cahen, "La Campagne de Mantzikert," *Byzantion*, IX (1934), pp. 628-42, and on the now polyglot armies of Byzantium, cf. Ferdinand Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène (1081-1118)* (Paris, 1900), pp. 75-7 and the learned notes by H. Grégoire and R. de Keyser, in *Byzantion*, XIV (1939), pp. 280-3.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Georg Ostrogorsky, "Die Entwicklungsgrundlagen d. byzant. Reiches," V. S. W. G., XXII (1929), pp. 136-8; Vasiliev, *Byzantion*, VIII (1933), pp. 601 ff. (Alexius I was obliged, after he was safely established on the throne, to oppose the large landowners, and the last member of his dynasty, Andronicus I [1183-1185] took vigorous measures against them.) Cf. G. Stadtmüller, *Neue Jahrb. f. deutsche Wissenschaft*, XIII (1937), pp. 431-3.

Byzantine fief, as a grant of land or of some other source of income by the Emperor, in return for military service.<sup>54</sup> The institution is probably older than this. The *pronoia* becomes an almost predominant aspect of Byzantine social organization from the close of the eleventh century.<sup>55</sup> The magnates, *dynatoi*, now secured for themselves ever larger estates by marriage and by purchase, as well as by various forms of peaceful and violent usurpation. With the decline of efficiency in the central government it was no longer possible to prevent this growth of *latifundia*, although it is true that some efforts were made to do so; however, the Emperor himself often quickened the process of concentrating larger holdings in fewer hands by grants of *pronoiai*. Holders of *pronoiai* rendered military service, and other kinds of service, to the Emperor in accordance with the size and conditions of their grant. In this way, increasingly, were the military forces of the Empire supplied—and also, of course, by mercenaries—and the magnates tended to acquire some of the functions of local government, the inevitable consequence of feudalism. These were probably necessary developments in view of the decline in the state's ability to collect taxes and so pay for the performance of public services. The holders of imperial *pronoiai* acquired large numbers of dependents: the peasants on an estate granted as a *pronoia* were the tenants (*paroikoi*) of the magnate thus enfeoffed (the *pronoetes*). The *paroikoi* paid for the parcels of land they held in rent and by their work on the lord's demesne; they might not be legally, as in the Roman and early Byzantine colonate, "adscript to the

<sup>54</sup> The earliest Byzantine reference to the *pronoia* as such seems to come under the Emperor Constantine IX Monomachus (1042-1054), for which see John Skylitzes, *Excerpta*, in Geo. Cedrenus, *Hist. compendium* (Bonn, II, p. 645, lines 1-2); also in John Zonaras, *Epit.*, XVIII, 5, 9 (Bonn, III, p. 670); and cf. Michael Attaliates, *Hist.* (Bonn, p. 200, line 22). Cf. Franz Dölger, in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXVI (1926), pp. 105-9, and E. Herman, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, VI (1940), pp. 373-4, n.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XXII, p. 139; *idem*, *Cambr. Ec. Hist.*, I, pp. 215-16; and Darkó, *Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici*, V (1939), pp. 96-7. For details see also Ostrogorsky's recent studies on "Le Système de la *pronoia*," in the *Actes du VI<sup>e</sup> Congrès international d'études byzantines*, I, pp. 181-9, and especially *Das Pronoia System: Beitrag z. Gesch. d. Feudalismus in Byzanz u. d. südslawischen Ländern* [in Serbian with German summary] (Belgrade, 1951).

glebe," but it was doubtless easy for the lord to secure the full payment of such money and labor as his tenants owed him, and the distinction between western serfs, of so many grades and different conditions, and the *paroikoi* on these Byzantine estates would be more often of ultimate legal than of more immediate social significance. The *allelengyon* ( $\alpha\lambda\lambda\eta\lambda\epsilon\gamma\gamma\nu\sigma$ ) had been abolished in the time of the Emperor Romanus III Argyrus (1028-1034), as we have noted, and an important source of revenue, once paid by the small freeholders, was lost to the treasury. It was an ill-conceived tax, and Byzantium was better off without it. The taxes were already being farmed out, always a costly and wasteful device, and almost invariably the hallmark of an inefficient government.<sup>56</sup> The very measures which were meant to secure the collection of taxes and to provide for the defense of the state operated actually to loosen still further the bonds of society and to diminish the confidence of all classes in the strength of the central government and in the good faith of its provincial administrators. Finally, like his predecessor Nicephorus III Botaniates (1078-1081), the Emperor Alexius I debased the coinage, and encouraged an *Inflationspolitik*, with its inevitable concomitants of high prices and shortages of goods.<sup>57</sup>

The Byzantine *pronoiai*, or "fiefs," were held directly of the

<sup>56</sup> Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 66-7 (note). As for the attachment of the Byzantine *paroikos* to the soil, it should be observed that according to a much-discussed law of the Emperor Anastasius (491-518), a summary of which appears in the *Codex Justinianus*, lib. XI, tit. 48 [47], 19, the peasant who occupied a piece of land for thirty years became a *colonus* ( $\mu\iota\sigma\theta\omega\tau\sigma$ ), and so could neither leave nor be evicted from the land thereafter, a provision of the law which we find still in force in the thirteenth century (cf. Charanis, *Byzantinoslavica*, XII, pp. 135-9).

<sup>57</sup> Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, pp. 66, 69-70, and Stein, *Mitteilungen zur osman. Gesch.*, II (1923-1926), p. 11. Alexius I debased the gold *nomisma*, previously worth 12 silver *miliarisia*, to one-third of its value (i. e. 4 *mil.*), insisting upon the payment of obligations to the state in money of full weight. The following table of the most important Byzantine coinage values may be useful (from Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XX, p. 63):

1 gold pound == 72 *nomismata*

1 *nomisma* == 12 *miliarisia* == 24 *keratia* == 288 *follis*

1 *miliarision* == 2 *keratia* == 24 *folleis*

1 *keration* == 12 *folleis*.

Emperor. They were revocable at the death of the holder, but tended to become hereditary in the fourteenth century. They were not regranted, as in western subinfeudation, but they possessed much in common with the western fief; commonly grants of land, the chief source of wealth in this society, the *pronoiai* might also consist in grants of certain tolls, fishing rights, salt works, and the like. The Crusader felt at home in the Byzantine Empire. The Emperor Manuel Comnenus had granted a *pronoia* near Thessalonica to the family of Montferrat, probably to Nerio of Montferrat when he married the Emperor's daughter, and a quarter of a century later his brother Boniface, on the Fourth Crusade, referred to it as his *feudum*. This is the classic equation of the *pronoia* with the western *feudum*, but in late Byzantine documents the *pronoia* is actually called a "fief" (*φεῦδα*), and the *pronoetes* has become a "liege and knight" (*λίξιος καὶ καβαλλάριος*).<sup>58</sup>

Under the weak dynasty of the Angeloi (1185-1204), feudalism, with some rather strong ecclesiastical elements, became almost the predominant fact in the political and social organization of the Byzantine Empire. Andronicus I Comnenus had tried, in his brief reign (1183-1185), to halt the final absorption of small freeholds by the large landowners. His efforts were futile; it was now too late; the era of the Fourth Crusade was soon to come. The Byzantine practice of patronage (*prostasia*), not wholly unlike western commendation; the grants of immunity from financial and judicial responsibilities to the state (*exkousseiai*), made to ecclesiastical, especially monastic, and even to lay landowners; and the lay use of ecclesiastical properties (the

<sup>58</sup> Miklosich and Müller, *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi*, IV, 81 (doc. of the year 1251), *et alibi*. Cf. Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XXXII, p. 139; *idem*, *Cambr. Eccl. Hist.*, I, p. 216; Vasiliev, *Byzantium*, VIII, pp. 591, 601; John Danstrup, "The State and Landed Property in Byzantium," in *Classica et Mediaevalia*, VIII, p. 229; D. A. Zakythinos, *Crise monétaire et crise économique à Byzance du XIII<sup>e</sup> au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Athens, 1948), p. 52. Although grants were made establishing full proprietary ownership in the grantee in earlier Byzantine times, and so were heritable, it is only from the time of Michael VIII Palaeologus (1259-1282) that such grants became numerous; from the early fourteenth century on the heritability of *pronoiai*, "fiefs," is common (cf. Ostrogorsky, *Actes du VI<sup>e</sup> Congrès international d'études byzantines*, I, pp. 186-7, and Charanis, *Byzantinoslavica*, XII, pp. 104-6, *et passim*).

*charistikia*) were all institutions in which parallelisms between east and west either existed or could be assumed for the purposes of practical procedure in the year 1204.<sup>59</sup> The Fourth Crusaders thus found the land of Greece almost as well prepared for the implantation of their feudal institutions as its mountainous terrain proved to be suited to the construction of their feudal castles.

KENNETH M. SETTON.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

<sup>59</sup> A. A. Vasiliev, "On the Question of Byzantine Feudalism," *Byzantium*, VIII (1933), pp. 587, 589-95; Ostrogorsky, *V. S. W. G.*, XXII, pp. 139-40.

## *DISCOLOR AURA.*

### REFLECTIONS ON THE GOLDEN BOUGH.

Vergil's golden bough is one of the crucial images of the *Aeneid*. In it the poet catches up plot and hero into one of those knots of meaning which unify the poem. The importance of the bough is universally allowed; its significance is not. The depth and multiplicity of meaning which it provides have served too often to lead away from the image, and the poem, instead of toward them. Commentators have followed the threads of reference rather than the threads of suggestion. What they have found relates to the more or less distant environment of the *Aeneid*, to tradition, belief, and ritual, which must be considered in the interpretation of the poem, but which cannot constitute that interpretation, or even begin it. The oak-spirit and the King of the Wood, the mistletoe and the Queen of the Dead are all impressive concepts. But if the "real meaning" of the golden bough lies in these or near them, then Vergil must be considered an artist after the fashion of the late David Belasco, who painted the back of his stage sets as well as the front. What is actually happening on the stage or in the poem we may suspect to be illusory or subsidiary; the real action may be taking place in the carefully prepared but invisible recesses of the scene, approachable only by those who have a pass backstage. This is not Vergil's method, and least of all could it be his at this point in the development of the *Aeneid*.

The Sixth Book is the center of the poem, symbolically as well as literally. The journey to Italy is over; the war has not yet begun. It is the still point between the two fields of action postulated for the hero in the first words of the poem, between the predominantly individual experience of the man, and the predominantly social experience of arms. In this pause, the destiny which frames the hero in both his worlds, as son and as city-ancestor, is supernaturally consummated. But to encounter both father and race, past and future, is an experience of terror, in fact of death. It can only take place in another world whose perceptions envelop, confuse, and sometimes deny the validity

of the life-experience on earth. The underworld and all the images that go with it are demanded by the necessities of the poem. They are neither intruded upon Vergil by convention nor lightly used by him for mystification and "atmosphere." Every passage in the book is a new and integral perception of what has gone before, and an ineluctable framing of what is to come. There is no place here for tricks of staging, for external matter half-hidden, in one scholar's phrase, by "a haze of poetry." It is not only possible, but necessary, to view the golden bough as part of the *Aeneid*'s structure, to evolve its meaning primarily from its context and from what Vergil says about it, not from what we know or he may have known about its origins.

*Sic fatur lacrimans.* The Fifth Book passes instantly into the Sixth, from Aeneas' words to the tears which accompany them. No other passage from book to book in the *Aeneid* provides so little pause.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the earlier books Aeneas has been prepared to confront the underworld; now he is almost hurried to the encounter. After a moment's pause before the Daedalian doors of the temple at Cumae, the prologue begins. Spatially it has an elaborate development in the penetration of one recess after another.<sup>2</sup> The hero passes from chamber to chamber, to

<sup>1</sup> Servius' account of the passage indicates Vergil's method of connecting the two books. See E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro: Aeneis Buch VI* (3rd ed., Leipzig and Berlin, 1934), pp. 110-11.

<sup>2</sup> The theories of W. F. Jackson Knight, *Cumaean Gates* (Oxford, 1936), and of R. W. Cruttwell, *Virgil's Mind at Work* (London, 1946), concerning the symbolism of the temple doors need attention here. Knight's work was not available to me (except indirectly through reviews), but both authors apparently see a symbolic reference to the rites of initiation and the tortuous passage to the underworld in the labyrinth carved by Daedalus upon the doors. This view seems particularly appropriate to the formal ritual pattern and to the progress from level to level which forms the rest of the prologue. Unfortunately I feel that the labyrinth image is not intrinsically important to Vergil. It is one of a series which passes in quick review the whole Cretan episode; it bears no more weight than Pasiphae or the Minotaur and considerably less than Icarus. The enormous breadth of parallels adduced by Knight and Cruttwell may possibly convince one of an archetypal image working below Vergil's consciousness, but Vergil's mind at work is not necessarily at work upon his poetry. Their interpretation is cabalistic, not symbolic; it involves too many secret keys to be applicable as criticism.

the temple, the Sibyl's cave, the grove of the bough, and finally the underworld itself. His progress is cast by Vergil into the rhythmic structure of ritual. It opens with a sacrifice to Apollo, and proceeds to the two prayers of Aeneas, which are answered in turn by the priestess as god and the priestess as mortal. Both exchanges are balanced again by the two tasks which they impose upon Aeneas, the finding of the bough and the burial of Misenus. The great sacrifice to the gods of the dead closes the prologue as it began, and hastens the hero into the kingdom of Dis.

The prologue-rite, like others, conveys meaning beyond and through its formal structure. The movement, words, and action of Aeneas not only bring him from the doors of Daedalus to the jaws of hell, but convey him from one level of existence to another. Objectively he passes from life to death, subjectively from the impotent and chaotic perceptions of mortality to a power over himself and the world which barely falls short of being ultimate knowledge as well. The book opens with Aeneas' futile and ignorant lament for Palinurus; at the end of the prologue he has come to command, at least temporarily, his own fate, both social and personal. Within the frame of ritual, Aeneas' experience of the past and his will for the future, "memory and desire," meet and are unified. For the first time in the poem there is a total realization of the central character. It is this inner progress which is really necessary for the mysterious journey.

An external agent, the Sibyl, guides the hero throughout. Far more than any person so far introduced in the poem, even Aeneas himself, she would be to the Roman a figure of history and authenticity. With the coming of Aeneas to Italy the heroic world, Greek and Trojan, begins to be absorbed into the Roman-historical sphere, and this process continues throughout the latter half of the poem. The Sibyl is the first agent and representative of the change. But she is more than a type of Roman religious authority; Vergil portrays her as a personality, after a popular tradition which is far wider than Rome. Like the witch-concealed divinity familiar in folk-tale, in fact like the mysterious woman who bargained the Sibylline books away to Tarquin, she accosts the hero abruptly, even abusively, but proves his helper and guide:

non hoc ista sibi tempus spectacula poscit.

Equipped with the pragmatic folk-wisdom of such figures, as well as with the prestige of Rome, she acts as foil to Aeneas, historical against heroic, social against individual, and consequently "real" and skeptical in the face of the inner experience of the hero.

She demands his prayers, and he asks first for his people—*Latio considere Teucros*. This is the collective destiny, to be followed in the second prayer by individual experience, relations, and will. They are not to remain as *Teucri*, however. After a cento of reminiscences from the previous wanderings, with a suggestion of divine responsibility for his erratic course as well as for his safety, Aeneas asks for an end (62) :

hac Troiana tenuis fuerit fortuna secuta.

The society of the heroic past must be wholly removed, for Troy survives only as a curse that drives him on. He prays for a consummation of that death announced by Panthus in the Second Book (325-6) :

fuiimus Troes, fuit Ilium et ingens  
gloria Teucrorum,

using the same utterance of finality (VI, 64-5) :

dique deaeque omnes, quibus obstitit Ilium et ingens  
gloria Dardaniae....

For the new birth of his people, new temples and new oracles are vowed. Aeneas speaks here as the leader, the fore-shadow of Augustus. But he is answered with the agony of the Roman Sibyl, and finally with the mouth of the god. His journey will end as it began, in the convulsion of war. Only on the other side of that cycle is peace and *salus*.

Of course this answer is not enough, for us or for the poet. It is a crisis in that peculiar dualism which is the essence of the *Aeneid*. Vergil spares us no hindsight throughout; Rome and the ancestor-hero of Rome are brought forth at every turn in the proper attitudes of piety and consummation. But opposed to these axioms of success is a complex series of incongruities in speech, character, and action, which are fully as important to the structure of the poem. It seems that the poet has no intention of fulfilling the comfortable expectations which he himself creates. The story of the *Aeneid* is a continual evasion of necessities.

The chain of history is already forged. Success is foreordained. But its nature, and the struggle which achieves it, are not, and this indeterminate quality presses continually upon the accepted order of things, forcing it into new and strange aspects. We are compelled to ask whether Aeneas is really achieving anything, whether Rome is really the crown of his destiny. At this point in the poem the incongruity between fact and attitude, history and the individual, emerges in the plainest manner. Now of all times the destiny which lies beyond peace and *salus* demands expression, and does not receive it. It is not only the narrative which creates this impression—a request for settlement and a new society is answered with a prophecy of war—but the undercurrent of images reinforces the denial. Upon the conclusive and orderly phrases of Aeneas' speech, the prophetic certainty of the Palatine temple and the Sibylline priests, follow the animal frenzy and ominous obscurity of the Sibyl. The result of the contrast is an acute tension between the poet-observer and the hero, between the historical order which is the fact and frame of our existence, and the individual who struggles painfully and fallibly toward its realization.

Relief follows, but again not in the expected pattern. The second prayer of Aeneas and its consequences bring him to a fulfilment, and eventually to the revelation which we demand. But the route is devious; the corporate destiny lies deeper than the Sibyl's cave, and before it is uncovered the individual soul must be prepared. This inner attainment is the function of his second request to the Sibyl. Significantly, before he makes it, she becomes again the human *vates*, instead of the mouthpiece of the god (102):

ut primum cessit furor et rabida ora quierunt.

He puts aside the *horrida bella* which he as leader of his people must direct and suffer (105-6):

omnia praecepi, atque animo mecum ante peregi.  
unum oro—

and his prayer is not for further revelation of some divine purpose which lies behind them. Instead (108-9):

ire ad conspectum cari genitoris et ora  
contingat.

He asks for and at the same time reveals a completion of his own nature. *Pius Aeneas*, until now, has been another of those apparent norms of the poem which are formally insisted upon and substantially evaded. Aeneas has been dutifully subordinate to his father while alive—and continually frustrated in knowledge and action by this pious position. In Troy it is the vision of doom and terror, *dirae facies*, which is given to him; Anchises and Iulus, the generations on either side of him are vouchsafed the divine signs of safety (the flame) and hope (the shooting star). His father's panic loses him Creusa; his father's misreading of the oracle leads him to the false home in Crete. In all this the son of course says nothing of blame, or, more important, of love; he merely follows and suffers. It is Vergil's presentation of the relationship which creates the tension, and quietly corrodes the traditional formalities of *pietas*. The poet comes closest to being explicit, through the mouth of Aeneas, in the central episode of the Third Book. After meeting Helenus and Andromache, Aeneas, privately speaking to his seer-cousin, shows himself for once pragmatic and hopeful (III, 362-8) :

fare age (namque omnis cursum mihi prospera dixit  
religio et cuncti suaserunt numine divi  
Italianam petere et terras temptare repostas  
.....) quae prima pericula vito?  
quidve sequens tantos possim superare labores?

But after the colloquy Anchises and Iulus reenter the scene. His divinely certified family closes in upon him, receives further encouragement for the future, and Aeneas sinks to the contrary mood of despair (III, 493-6) :

vivite felices, quibus est fortuna peracta  
iam sua; nos alia ex aliis in fata vocamur.  
vobis parta quies, nullum maris aequor arandum  
arva neque Ausoniae semper cedentia retro  
quaerenda.

Nothing that Helenus has said would change Italy from a land hidden but accessible to the obedient hero, to a phantom receding before his search. The alteration is subjective, and by it Vergil associates Anchises with a feeling of futility and oppression. Aeneas is the fate-driven man; but in the presence of his family

he realizes that it is not his own fate which is driving him. After death, in the Fourth Book, Anchises continues to oppress his son. Throughout the idyll at Carthage, not once, like Mercury, but every night (351-3) :

me patris Anchisae, quotiens uementibus umbris  
nox operit terras, quotiens astra ignea surgunt,  
admonet in somnis et turbida terret imago.

Here, then, in the Sixth Book, *pietas* is still ambiguous at best. Anchises' shade has already commanded Aeneas to descend to the lower world, and we can expect no more than the dutiful response. But to respond so at this point and in these words connotes much more than duty:

ire ad conspectum cari genitoris et ora.

The vision of Anchises is substituted for the vision of Rome. Expression and cadence recall the first mention of his father in the Second Book: impelled by the blood of Priam and the fires of Troy (560) :

subiit cari genitoris imago.

This first rush of love and anxiety, the reaction of the natural unfated man, is at last fulfilled here. The intervening frustrations, springing from the double pressures of fate and parental authority, are erased. Anchises in Aeneas' eyes is no longer *sancte parens*, the dominant and divine old man, but helpless and pitiable, his journey viewed here for the first time in purely human terms (112-14) :

ille meum comitatus iter maria omnia mecum  
atque omnis pelagique minas caelique ferebat  
invalidus, viris ultra sortemque senectae.

The revelation of destiny follows, not because he asks for it, but because by this act of the personal will he has shown himself worthy.

This is not a complete resolution (there is none in the *Aeneid*) : the tension between knowledge and ignorance, history and the individual, is not so easily discharged. But Aeneas' speech, catching up together the levels of his experience, gives him a power found nowhere else in the poem. His particular

excellence, the heroism of obligation, reaches its summit here, in the act of going down to death.

The Sibyl's second reply, like the first, runs counter to the tone of Aeneas' request. She speaks here above all as the folk-seer, the primitive skeptic who finds reality only in the tangible, the apparent world. She says little of Anchises, and observes the inner consummation of Aeneas with a cold eye, seeing only, from the outside, the antithesis of life and death which he presents. Her speech parodies, somewhat cruelly, the solemn words of the hero. He has addressed her as the guardian of hell's gate, which indeed she is (106-9) :

quando hic inferni ianua regis  
dicitur.....  
.....doceas iter et sacra ostia pandas.

But she answers, with an intentional misunderstanding which is almost mockery, that the gates of hell are not guarded at all (126-7) :

facilis descensus Averno:  
noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis.

Anyone may die; there is no need to ask her for permission. But to pass through the kingdom of death and still remain alive, that is a fearful task even for those who boast of their divine descent. She forces us and the hero to recognize the enormity of his request. His *κατάβασις* is not to be an Odyssean adventure, but an equivalent performance of the real death-journey.

Later in her speech, the paradox is put as sharply as possible (133-5) :

quod si tantus amor menti, si tanta cupido est  
bis Stygios innare lacus, bis nigra videre  
Tartara. . .

The first line recognizes the subjective experience of Aeneas. *Amor* is the transcendent condition of *pietas* at which he has finally arrived. By one of Vergil's continual echoes, the phrase immediately recalls *sed si tantus amor* in the Second Book. The connection is deep and illuminating. This is another yielding of the self to share with another an extraordinary and terrible experience. In the earlier book Dido was to share with Aeneas the disaster of his city, the death of his race. Here Aeneas is to

share with Anchises an end even beyond this, the death of the individual.

But the object of *amor* which the Sibyl perceives is neither the one stated by Aeneas (the union with Anchises), nor the enlargement of personality implied by this line. She emphasizes the cold and fearful fact of death, not the attitude which leads Aeneas to accept the experience. The two crossings of the Styx come of course from the *Odyssey* (XII, 21-2): Vergil's line, though, is more concrete, and significantly different in its position. Circe speaks thus to Odysseus and his crew *after* they return from the underworld. They realize their action in retrospect. Here Aeneas must know that his mission will be the death-journey *before* he undertakes it. It is the immediate condition of his love and life.

The Sibyl, always the folk-wise observer, gives this union of opposites no encouragement. The line which follows expresses a curious contempt (135):

et insano iuvat indulgere labori.

The verbs suggest laxness and pleasure; joined with *insano* the phrase makes of Aeneas' request something almost indecent, to the Sibyl's pragmatism, and certainly unnatural. It is *amor* perverted. If it is to succeed, there must be a sign.

So, suddenly, we come upon the golden bough (136-48; 200-11):

latet arbore opaca  
aureus et foliis et lento vimine ramus,  
Iunoni infernae dictus sacer; hunc tegit omnis  
lucus et obscuris claudunt convallibus umbrae.  
sed non ante datur telluris opera subire  
auricomos quam qui decerpserit arbore fetus.  
hoc sibi pulchra suum ferri Proserpina munus  
instituit. primo avulso non deficit alter  
aureus, et simili frondescit virga metallo.  
ergo alte vestiga oculis et rite repertum  
carpe manu; namque ipse volens facilisque sequetur,  
si te fata vocant; aliter non viribus ullis  
vincere nec duro poteris convellere ferro.

\* \* \*

inde ubi venere ad fauces grave olentis Averni,  
tollunt se celeres liquidumque per aera lapsae

sedibus optatis geminae super arbore sidunt,  
 discolor unde auri per ramos aura refusit.  
 quale solet silvis brumali frigore viscum  
 fronde virere nova, quod non sua seminat arbos,  
 et croceo fetu teretis circumdare truncos,  
 talis erat species auri frondentis opaca  
 ilice, sic leni crepitabat brattea vento.  
 corripit Aeneas extemplo avidusque refringit  
 cunctantem, et vatis portat sub tecta Sibyllae.

Within the frame which I have tried to outline, we approach this extraordinary image. Clearly, there is in it an element of the external. Vergil reached beyond the world of his poem for a fact or belief or tradition which existed independent of his own imagination. Despite many conjectures it appears equally clear that we shall never trace down the referent in specific terms. Servius suggested the rites of Proserpina, and interjected that famous *publica opinio* about the grove of Nemi which was to lead Frazer forth on his massive pursuit of the tree-spirit and the sacrificial king. Heyne suggested, among other origins, the golden apples of Juno and the Hesperides, the pomegranate of Proserpina, the branch of the suppliant, the *aurea virga* of Mercury as psychagogue, and the Golden Fleece.<sup>3</sup> Conington thought of the mysteries of Isis.<sup>4</sup> Frazer ended with the derivation of the bough from folk beliefs concerning the properties of the mistletoe.<sup>5</sup> Norden too approached the image through the mistletoe simile, but added the concept of the bough of myrtle or olive brought as a gift to the goddess Prosperina/Kore and as a symbol of life and rebirth in the mystery rituals.<sup>6</sup>

The diversity of conclusions does not result from any lack of diligence. No amount of searching, in literature or anthropology, will ever arrive at a single incontrovertible "answer," and this does not greatly matter. For whatever lies behind the bough-image lies also behind and outside the *Aeneid*. The golden bough of the *Aeneid* means exactly what Vergil, in his enormously

<sup>3</sup> C. G. Heyne and G. P. E. Wagner, edd., *Publius Vergilius Maro* (4th ed., Leipzig, 1833), II, pp. 1014-15.

<sup>4</sup> J. Conington, ed., *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (London, 1884), II, p. 426.

<sup>5</sup> J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, Part VII, *Balder the Beautiful* (3rd ed., London, 1913), II, pp. 279-303.

<sup>6</sup> Norden, *Aeneis VI*,<sup>a</sup> pp. 163-75.

complex and allusive way, says that it means, no less and no more; in other words, it means what it is in the poem. None of the conjectures, therefore, which relate ultimately to the circumstances of the poem, and of the poet, should be entertained until the internal progress, the organic coherence of Vergil's imagination, has been examined. The point is universal. The creative product is never a logical and predictable result of its environment. The necessities and sequences of poetry are its own; if they are considered as fully explicable in terms of external statement—historical, philosophical, religious, or critical—poetry is destroyed. Because this image has received such a vast burden of attention from this external point of view, it is one of the critical points at which the nature of poetry must be maintained.

The poet has presented life and death, both as opposites, in the wisdom of the Sibyl, and as union, in the will of Aeneas. The human actors have reached the impasse of inner experience and outward observation, two irreconcilable aspects of reality. The golden bough is the necessary and external sign demanded to resolve the antinomy, and bears a fundamental relation to it. Let us take, for the present, the bough in its simplest aspect as a thing of gold. It grows in a dense tree, like the mistletoe, on an oak. It exists on a living thing, the last outpost in fact of the live world before the stinking jaws of Death. But the bough is made of gold—therefore it is not itself alive. It does have the semblance of a living branch; it grows leaves—*frondescit*—but always *simili metallo*. This flowering is denied the accustomed tissues of the kingdom of life. When the breeze catches the bough, *crepitabat brattea vento*. The line obviously represents sound, and by no stretch of the auditory imagination could it be the sound or motion of any living thing. The gold takes its meaning from the tree on which it grows, and the essential purpose of the image, resolving symbolically the conflict between Aeneas and the Sibyl, is to create a contrast between living and dead which is at the same time a vital union. The idea is grandly developed again by Aeneas (195-6) :

derigit in lucos ubi pinguem dives opacat  
ramus humum.

The epithets both signify wealth, but one connotes the abundance of the life-giving earth, while the other casts upon it the shadow

of a different splendor. This too, the sense of alien things in union, is the first significance of the mistletoe simile, and the contrasts in the simile itself, winter and growth, tree and parasite, emphasize the division.

Aeneas, in fulfilling his own life, must pass into death. He is not merely to see the underworld, but to undergo an analogue, dangerously close to reality, of his ultimate death-journey. The Sibyl, essential and external seer, observes this paradox with some disbelief. Life-in-death contravenes the natural order of mortality. If Aeneas' will is to become the exceptional reality, a sign of success is demanded. That sign is the golden bough; death-in-life. The magic is allopathic; the two strange unions complement each other and together complete an invulnerable circle which transcends nature. The bough becomes a guarantee both of Aeneas' ability to enter the underworld and of his protection while passing through it. Not only Aeneas and the bough, then, but his action upon the bough and the consequent journey are reciprocal symbols. As he plucks the bough from the tree, death from life, so he departs from the underworld unharmed, life from death.

The bough appears again at the crossing of the Styx (405-10), where the contrast of living and dead is most explicitly marked and the anomalous position of Aeneas is challenged (by Charon's recognition of a live soul, by the boat sinking under his weight). Finally he leaves the *munus* at the palace of Dis and Proserpina (628-36). This is the center of the triple scheme of the underworld. First Aeneas encounters the traditional Hades, then the vision of hell and heaven, Tartarus and Elysium, and finally the prophetic cycle of the souls and ages. Between the two elements of the central vision is the palace of the infernal king and queen, and the end of the bough's journey. It is no longer needed; the dangerous death-passage is ended (through the hopelessness of Aeneas' own mortal experience, through the eternity of evil), and the journey into life, indeed to something beyond life, is about to begin. *Largior hic aether*; Elysium is a different world.

The essence of the golden bough is the contrast between its lifeless nature and its organic environment. But we cannot stop here. Obviously the image of gold must express other relevant associations; otherwise lead or iron or stone would have done

equally well. These are not, however, the associations which have generally been conjectured for it—those of Pindar, for instance, for whom gold is a constantly recurrent symbol of glory and power.<sup>7</sup> We look in vain in Vergil's lines for an unequivocal expression of brilliance, glory, or life as inherent in the golden bough. Rather, the first words give the key: *latet arbore opaca*. The bough is hidden by tree and forest; the hero cannot find it without supernatural guidance. Once it is plucked it is hidden again in the garments of the Sibyl (406). It enables Aeneas to descend to the "hidden places of the earth." This is not like the worked gold which is displayed as the emblem of wealth and splendor, but rather suggests the rare metal which must be sought in the depths of darkness and the earth. The *aureus ramus* is a secret, symbolically buried as well as lifeless. It belongs physically below the earth, in the dead world, and so is a peculiarly appropriate *munus* for the queen of that world, the consort of Dis/Πλούτων who is lord of the riches under the earth.<sup>8</sup> In fact, the bough is not so much given to Proserpina as returned to her. When the Sibyl carries it down to Hades, it is recognized by Charon as something *longo post tempore visum*. I suggest that this does not refer to any previous heroic journey with the bough,<sup>9</sup> but rather to the fact that it *belongs* in Charon's

<sup>7</sup> So Norden, *ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>8</sup> As a matter of fact, it seems to be more familiar to Vergil's Italy than to Greece. The realm of Hades/Pluto to Greek writers was generally a place of gloom and cheerlessness, and his wealth was rather the agricultural bounty which is sent up from underground than mineral riches, *θησαυρός*. One of the few exceptions is the *χρυσόρροντον . . . Πλούτωνος πόταμον* in Aeschylus, *Prom.*, 805-6. It is in the Roman writers, perhaps following Etruscan traditions, that we find the second element emphasized; in Naevius' epitaph, for instance (66 Morel):

itaque postquam est Orci traditus thesauro,

and in the *Iphigenia in Aulis* of Ennius, without parallel in Euripides' Greek (fr. IX Ribbeck):

Acheronta obibo, ubi Mortis thesauri obiacent.

<sup>9</sup> Norden, following Heyne, first thought of an Orphic *κατάβασις*, then changed his mind (*Aeneis VI*,<sup>8</sup> p. 170). The earlier explanation, though wrong, is considerably better than his final one, which supposes that Charon had to recognize the bough because the Sibyl had said *ramum hunc . . . adgnoscas*. This sort of extrapolation of a poet's characters into reality is hardly a serious comment. Why did the Sibyl have to say *adgnoscas*?

world underground. Its existence in the upper air is considered here to be temporary and unnatural.

The only suggestion of shining or brightness develops at the moment of the bough's discovery, and it is presented in a curious and baffling expression (204) :

discolor unde auri per ramos aura refusit.

The brightness is *discolor*, not pure light, but rather another and strange color in the dark and green of the wood. *Aura* is even stranger. Vergil is playing of course on the sound of *aurum*, but this cannot be the whole explanation. Normally the word has no visual sense;<sup>10</sup> it means a quality of the atmosphere, an emanation, an "air." The poet may have been thinking of *superasque evadere ad auras* in the Sibyl's speech above (128); if so, the *aura* of the bough would again connote the underworld, and would be truly *discolor* to the living green of the tree. In any case, if Vergil is trying to describe the brilliance of gold, this is a strangely hesitant and unsatisfactory way to do it. Of course he is not. The hidden thing is found, but in revealing itself it maintains a secret and enigmatic quality. It appears to the hero's eye; it is his to gather. But even at the moment of action and success Vergil is unwilling to give himself up to one perception alone. Everything implies its opposite; the bough is seen, but by some faculty which is not exactly visual. Aeneas plucks it, but not with the necessary ease (210-11) :

<sup>10</sup> I do not find *aura* so used before Vergil, although the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* proposes two examples. Varro, *Men.*, 139, *simul ac languido corpori solis calidior visa est aura* of course refers to heat and the sense of touch. Similarly Lucretius, IV, 251-3:

et quanto plus aeris ante agitatur  
et nostros oculos pertergit longior aura,  
tum procul esse magis res quaeque remota videtur,

is talking about the mechanics of seeing rather than sight itself. For him, it breaks down into tactile sensations, for which *aura* is appropriate. In fact, it exactly equals *aera* in v. 247 above. The *Thesaurus* also appeals to Callimachus, *Hymn. Dian.*, 117, φάεος δένεντας αὐτημόν. But αὐτημόν from Homer down means particularly a breath of fire and means exactly that here. Φάεος is substituted for πυρός, and has no primary visual meaning. After Vergil, Lactantius, *Phoen.*, 44, is apparently the first to use *aura* in exactly this sense: *emicuit liminis aura levis*.

avidusque refringit  
cunctantem.

Another antithesis is already beginning to take form.

The significance of the bough as death, or rather as the tension between life and death in a single unit of being, does not exhaust the image. It certainly does not preclude the traditional interpretations, but at this point requires them, and determines their application to the poem. The studies of Norden and Frazer have explored the wide importance of vegetation as related in primitive thought to life and death, and the survival in ritual or quasi-ritual procedures of these modes of thinking.<sup>11</sup> In relation to the grave and the underworld, vegetation universally appears to have the significance and the power of life. It is impossible to transfer this significance summarily to Vergil's bough, which is not vegetation, and whose symbolism is far too complex to represent life alone. But the investigators, although they have misinterpreted the image as a whole, have uncovered one point at least of supreme importance to the pattern which I have attempted to trace.

Vergil compares the bough to the mistletoe (205-8) :

quale solet silvis brumali frigore viscum  
fronde virere nova, quod non sua seminat arbos,  
et croceo fetu teretis circumdare truncos,  
talis erat species . . .

We have already seen how the contrasts of color, texture, and growth between mistletoe and oak reinforce those between bough and tree. But the mistletoe, as Norden and Frazer point out, also possesses, in popular and mythical thought, extraordinary qualities of magic and sometimes of divinity. The simile then forms an overt point of contact, at which power is released from that deep reservoir of primitive belief and practice lying behind Vergil's image. Norden remarks of the mistletoe that it seems to have a double aspect, as a power of fertility, protection, and life, and as a power of death. It can heal disease and avert demons, but can also kill the tree on which it grows. Loki opens the doors of hell with a sprig of mistletoe, and kills

<sup>11</sup> Norden, *Aeneis VI*,<sup>3</sup> pp. 164-8; compare Frazer's discussion of the mistletoe and the "external soul"; *Balder the Beautiful*,<sup>3</sup> II, pp. 76-278.

Baldur with the same. "Death and life in mythical thought are not always opposites, but can form a single unity." <sup>12</sup> This is crucial. When an object has enough magical power to represent life, in a sense to *be* life, this power can be expressed and used negatively as well, to cause death, to *be* death. The power of life and death is a single reality. The golden bough, generically as vegetation-magic and specifically as assimilated to the mistletoe, has such a power. Like the lesser oppositions of color, texture, alienness, the primary paradox of life/death, immanent in the healing and parasitic plant, reinforces the created image of the poet. Again I do not mean that Vergil simply took over some primitive "idea" and proceeded to put it into verse. It seems rather doubtful that in such cases there is anything which can be called an idea, a formulation of phenomena, already existing in the folk mind. We may make abstractions like the one above which cover observed beliefs or customs, and the poet may draw his paradox from the same source, but both are products of a "sophisticated state of language and feeling." <sup>13</sup> It was Vergil who perceived or felt an ambiguity underlying the whole mass of observance, belief, and legend concerned with the relation of the vegetative power to life and death, and expressed it through his own imagery. The mistletoe-simile is the dark and environmental aspect of his meaning, connecting it with the secracies of the primitive mind. But the union of life and death implied by the simile could not have the same power—could not, in fact, convey its meaning at all—if the same meaning had not already been presented by the primary and immediate image of the gold, hidden and lifeless in the living tree. One mode of thought enlarges the other, and works the whole into a complex and sinister unity.

Interlocked with the task of the bough and obviously parallel to it is the mission to find and bury Misenus (149-83; 212-35). The two signs complete and guarantee the two requests of the

<sup>12</sup> Norden, *Aeneis VI*,<sup>a</sup> p. 166. He discards this paradoxical unity in his interpretation, however, for the *progress* of nature from death to life, which is a different matter.

<sup>13</sup> W. Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (2nd ed., New Directions, 1947), p. 195. His discussion of the union of opposites in a single word is extremely valuable.

hero. As the first answers Aeneas' personal will, so the other follows upon his prayer for his people's settlement. Misenus is not for Vergil merely an awkward doublet of Palinurus. Each does correspond partially to Elpenor in the *Odyssey*, the fore-runner who goes down to the shades in advance of the hero. But beyond this each episode has something to express peculiar to itself and organic to the poem. The resolution in Misenus' case is relatively simple. He has been the trumpeter of Hector and Aeneas, giving the signal for the battles of the past. Vergil used him thus deliberately, to make him the embodiment of the *Troiana fortuna*, the unfortunate destiny of the race, for whose end Aeneas has prayed. Like Troy, he is dead but not buried and in that state pollutes the whole company of *Aeneadae*. Once he is laid to his final rest, they are made *casti* at last, free from the curse of the dead city, and can participate vicariously with their leader in the journey of purification and rebirth to a new land.

Underneath its stoical surface the *Aeneid* is a web of anti-thetic symbols, of tensions and oppositions never finally resolved. The golden bough is one of the most critical and complex events in this internal structure. For Aeneas it is a symbol of power to match and complete his own. But the completion is produced on the level of magic, of the wonderful conjunction of external things. It is the Sibyl as folk-woman who demands it, makes it possible, and limits it to this sphere. The bough then is a testament of power, but not of resolution. As in the prayer for settlement, the poet has brought his other self, the hero, to a point of expression which demands revelation, and again the sign which is given does not answer the demand.

Aeneas in praying to see his father has come as close as may be to a divine sensibility, to an ultimate inclusiveness and reconciliation with experience. He realizes in himself at last the inner meaning of that Tree of Life to which he is compared in the Fourth Book (441-6) :

ipsa haeret scopolis, et quantum vertice ad auras  
aetherias, tantum radice in Tartara tendit.

The whole simile, of which this is the conclusion, compares Aeneas' stubbornness in the face of Dido's passion and Anna's

pleading to that of an oak wrenched but still undestroyed by the winds.<sup>14</sup> In the context of the Fourth Book, the image seems rather too large for its setting. Aeneas is obeying the *fatum*, but there is not yet an adequate reason why in doing so he should encompass both hell and heaven. Vergil has suddenly passed beyond the immediate comparison and into a prophetic insight of something far deeper in the significance of Aeneas, which is not to be made plain until the descent to the underworld in the Sixth Book. The quest for the bough recalls images of tree, heaven, and hell in a pattern which completes the likeness. Aeneas is led to the bough by twin doves, creatures of the air and messengers of his divine mother. As they approach the goal (201-3) :

inde ubi venere ad fauces grave olentis Averni,  
tollunt se celeres liquidumque per aera lapsae  
sedibus optatis geminae super arbore sidunt.

There is a symbolic upward movement here, both in the connotation of the birds and in their action. But the flight of the birds is not only a reaching to heaven; it is also an escape from hell. The tree is rooted in the jaws of Avernus, and the breath of the place is deadly (239-41) :

quam super haud ullae poterant impune volantes  
tendere iter pennis: talis sese halitus atris  
faucibus effundens supera ad convexa ferebat.

---

<sup>14</sup> The image comes directly from the *Georgics*, II, 291. There it refers to the *aulaculus*, and is part of a practical discussion of how trees should be planted. The passage continues:

ergo non hiemes illam, non flabra neque imbres  
convellunt. . . .

One could reason from this that the isolation of the image in the Fourth Book simply derives from the fact that it is copied. Storm and immobility suggest the tree-image from the *Georgics*, and the tree-image brings along heaven and hell as superfluous baggage. In spite of this I should like to argue for relevance. The image which joins tree with stress has a peculiar internal importance in the *Aeneid*. The vision of Troy overthrown by the gods in the Second Book culminates in the simile of the tree cut down by human hands. In the Fourth Book the man of Troy stands against a human storm. Certainly the *quantum vertice ad auras aetherias* takes on a relevant meaning in this context, and the whole sense is completed by the association with Aeneas, bough, and tree in the Sixth Book.

The doves can lead him to the tree which is in this case his magical counterpart, but no further. The creatures of heaven cannot enter hell. Only the hero himself, like the tree which carries both bough and doves, can unite the two in thought and actuality, the realms of his mother and of his father, *amor* and death.

In doing so, he strains the nature of mortality. Such a mode of experience is possible only beyond the bounds of the normal human faculties. When a sign is given to guarantee this inner experience, one must expect it to have a similarly transcendent quality, passing beyond the contrasts of nature to an ultimate harmony. The bough does not possess this quality. Like Aeneas himself, in the Sibyl's skeptical view, it is unnatural, embodying the contrasts of nature, rather than supernatural, transcending them. The scene of its finding is pure magical prescription. No words are spoken; everything is action and movement in a ritual silence. The rite is effective and the hero receives his power, but not the knowledge of what that power should mean. At the summit of his experience Aeneas looks for a sign, and finds it to be but a mirror-image of himself, life-in-death confronting death-in-life.<sup>15</sup> The *amor* which impels him to pass living into death receives no answer. This deeper antithesis of success in action/frustration in knowledge is the central and fundamental significance of the golden bough. Certainly it is this which effects that curious distortion of the language at the moment of the bough's discovery. *Discolor aura*: not the light of revelation, but the dubious and shifting colors of the magic forest.<sup>16</sup>

The golden bough is a moment in a larger progress. The relation which it expresses between the hero and the world is one which is repeated at various levels and in various forms throughout the poem. Aeneas is continually arriving at a kind of order,

<sup>15</sup> The mirror-image of the bough even has a quality of distortion and mockery; the dead parent/living child relationship, the substance of Aeneas' fulfilment, is reflected and inverted in it too, but like the mistletoe the bough is something *quod non sua seminat arbos*.

<sup>16</sup> See M. Bodkin, *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry* (London, 1934), pp. 129-36. I am deeply indebted to Miss Bodkin's discussion of the bough. She is concerned, however, with seeking a universal archetype of the imagination which will include not only the bough but Dante's angel at the gates of Dis, and so tends to ignore some aspects of Vergil's own context.

a limited state of grace, and as continually finding that this is not the whole condition of his destiny. Always he must go on to more knowledge and suffering. The actual excludes consummation.

His world in Troy is that of the epic hero, and he is ready to fulfill the last demands of this heroism. In the last night of the city, the gods have departed from their worshippers : *λίπεν δέ εἰ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων*. The hopeless struggle, however, must still remain as the hero's necessity (II, 351-3) :

excessere omnes, aris adytisque relictis  
di quibus imperium hoc steterat; sucurritis urbi  
incensae: moriamur et in media arma ruamus.

He expects his heroism to be futile; he does not expect it to be falsely construed. For he will see that the gods have not departed. They are still there, laboring at the destruction of their city. His vision of them at once denies him epic heroism and sends him forth in search of another means through which order may be found.

In Rome he attempts the opposite, the pastoral construction of the world, taking on the humility and communion of the Arcadian kingdom (VIII, 364-5) :

aude, hospes, contemnere opes et te quoque dignum  
finge deo.

But his assumption of the mantle of Hercules plunges this same kingdom into war, kills its heir, and destroys the *aurea aetas* to which he has just been admitted. Even before the event he realizes that this effort at order is not the end (VIII, 520-2) :

vix ea fatus erat, defixique ora tenebant  
Aeneas Anchisiades et fidus Achates  
multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant.

The end of the poem brings no finality of knowledge. The Fury, for all her terror, is the angel of Jupiter, bringing the decision and the peace Aeneas has looked for so long. But he is blind to her, and sees only, in his private rage, the belt of Pallas. Dido's curse is already coming true, in a sense deeper than its original intention (IV, 618-19) :

nec, cum se sub leges pacis iniquae  
tradiderit, regno aut optata luce fruatur.

Aeneas never fully possesses either the light or the kingdom that is ordained for him. Clearly the kingdom—Rome or Lavinium—is a historical fact, and Aeneas' failure to realize it is evolved circumstantially from the myth. It is far stranger, and more moving, that he never fully possesses that divine order of which he is the literal and symbolic carrier. Vergil seeks justification for Aeneas, not only by time, as Ancestor of the City, but in experience, as the individual who is driven by forces and looks for a personal fulfilment outside and beyond himself. The justification is never found. This failure is what we have already taken to be the central thread of the *Aeneid*, and the episodes quoted above, above all that of the bough, lie very close to it. The *Aeneid* is an attack on the part of the indeterminate, the various and fallible nature of man, upon the necessities both of history and of fate. The attack begins by assuming conquest; it ends by implying defeat and destruction. Man does not fit in history. Neither the hero nor the poet ever comes to terms with the ends which are so easily postulated and so desperately sought throughout the poem.

The *Aeneid* is a work in limbo. Vergil had left behind the satisfactory order informing his previous work—*fortunatus et ille*. He was in passage to the end of his own life-journey, never to be achieved;

felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.

The world of the *Aeneid* lies between the two, and hints at failure of the capacity to go further. 'The causes of things are never to be known with the same ecstatic certainty as Lucretius'. Neither causes nor things are the same, in Vergil's world. They are revealed, not deduced, and conceal themselves again in the act of revelation. In the Fourth Canto of the *Inferno* Dante has his master say of the sphere which he inhabits for eternity:

semo perduti, e sol di tanto offesi  
che senza speme vivemo in disio.

At the center of Vergil's poem, the golden bough, in all its density of suggestion, is the primary symbol of this splendid despair.

ROBERT A. BROOKS.

ARISTOTLE, *RHETORIC*, III, 16, 11 (1417b12-20).

Ἐν δὲ δημηγορίᾳ ἡκιστα διήγησίς ἔστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγεῖται· ἀλλ’ ἐάν περ διήγησις ἥ, τῶν γενομένων ἔσται, ἵν’ ἀναμηνοθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βουλεύσωνται περὶ τῶν ὑστερον. ἡ διαβάλλοντες, ἡ ἐπαινοῦντες. ἀλλὰ τότε, οὐ τὸ τοῦ συμβούλου ποιεῖ ἔργον. ἀν δ’ ἥ ἄπιστον, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι τε καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθύς, καὶ διατάπτειν οἷς βούλονται· οἶον, ἡ Ἰοκάστη ἡ Καρκίνου ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι αἱὲ ὑπισχνεῖται πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν νιόν, καὶ ὁ Ἀιμων ὁ Σοφοκλέous.

(Ed. Cope)<sup>1</sup>

Vet. Trans. Si autem sit incredibile, spondere et tamen dicere mox, et vadiare quibus volunt; velut Iocasta Calkini in oidipode semper spondet, sciscitans quaerentis filium. et Annon Sophoclei.

(Ed. Spengel)

(διατάπτειν vix invenisse videtur: an διαιτᾶσθαι vel διαιτηταῖς?

[Roemer])

The problem here discussed appears to be that of lending artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative. So at least it seems to have been constantly understood since the time of the Anonymous scholiast, who explains

<sup>1</sup> References:

Editions: L. Spengel (Leipzig, 1867); E. M. Cope (Cambridge, 1877); A. Roemer (Leipzig, 1885); J. H. Freese (London, 1926).

Translations: A. Riccoboni (Acad. Reg. Bor., Berlin, 1831); J. E. C. Welldon (London, 1886); R. C. Jebb, ed. J. E. Sandys (Cambridge, 1909); W. Rhys Roberts (Oxford, 1924); Lane Cooper (New York, 1932).

Commentaries: *Anonymi in artem rhetoricae commentarii*, ed. H. Rabe (Acad. Reg. Bor., Berlin, 1896); *Petri Victorii in tres libros Aristotelis de arte dicendi commentarii* (Florence, 1548); *M. Antonii Maioragii in tres libros Aristotelis de arte rhetoricae explanationes* (Venice, 1571); E. M. Cope, *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London, 1867).

Of these, Spengel's notes do not touch the problem; those of Victorius are little help. He paraphrases: "Si quod praedicas incredibile fuerit, polliceri debes, et causam te illico totius rei redditum esse, et te etiam stare velle iudicio eorum, quorum ipsis visum fuerit; ipsorumque arbitrio rem permissurum." See Cope, *Introduction*, p. 354, for criticism of this.

the reference in these terms : *εὰν δὲ γῆ ἄπιστον τὸ δημηγούμενον*. This assumption seems to underlie the English translations, however variously they interpret the subsequent advice.

Cope, Welldon, and Freese understand Aristotle to mean that the speaker, if his story be unconvincing, should promise to add an explanation immediately, and should set it forth to the satisfaction of the audience, or should submit it to the judgment of any whom the hearers approve. Welldon notes that the sentence "is hardly intelligible as it stands"; Cope struggles with it, but thinks "there is most likely some latent corruption." Roberts, following Jebb, prefers, "you must guarantee its truth and at once offer an explanation, and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected (*or possibly*, and then arrange your reasons systematically for those who demand them)." "He must make himself responsible for the fact," says Jebb, and "Iokasta . . . goes on giving her word," reminding us irresistibly of the lady that protested too much. Cooper follows much the same line.

Yet it is conceivable, considering the disjointed nature of the passage, that Aristotle may mean "if the proposed course of action does not carry conviction." The *ἄπιστον* (for which "incredible," a favorite word with the translators, is less satisfactory than Roberts' "hard to believe") may lie in the advice offered. That would fit well with the context of *δημηγορία* and reference to the future would make excellent sense of *ὑπισχνεῖσθαι*. It may be noted that Riccoboni's translation, *si vero fide careat, polliceri oportet*, etc., preserves the uncertainty of reference. We might then take Aristotle to mean that if the advice offered is not persuasive, the speaker should say, "Take my word for it, this will happen, because . . ." and proceed to marshal his examples as required. The technique could easily be exemplified from the *Philippics* of Demosthenes and Cicero. It is less easy, however, to make this interpretation conform to the examples Aristotle uses. Little though we can know of Carcinus' Jocasta, it seems clear that the unconvincing element in her speech lay not in advice, but in the narration of the past. In the reference to Haemon, on the other hand, if it is actually relevant, the unpersuasive element may be found as much in the advice Haemon offers his father, as in the interpretation of his own conduct.

If, however, as is generally supposed, the problem lies in the

handling of unconvincing narrative material, both lines of interpretation found in the English translators offer difficulties. Textually, Cope's interpretation requires the omission of  $\tau\epsilon$ , and the equation of the present infinitive  $\lambda\acute{e}y\epsilon\nu$  with a future infinitive. Jebb's requires a very strained sense of  $\iota\pi\iota\chi\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha$ , for which his note on the passage offers no corroboration. In both,  $\delta\iota\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\nu$  presents serious difficulties, as the notes of Cope and Jebb on the passage both point out. As for the meaning, though neither interpretation is completely incredible, both have a touch of  $\tau\omega\epsilon\eta\theta\epsilon s$ , and the techniques suggested seem in fact more likely to arouse than to dispel mistrust. The "promise" or "guarantee" must be important, since it is repeated as a keyword in the Jocasta reference. But why promise? Why not give the explanation immediately, as in 1417 a 28:  $\grave{\alpha}\nu\ \delta'\ \grave{\alpha}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\tilde{\nu}$   $\tilde{\eta},\ \tau\otimes\tau\epsilon\ \tau\grave{\eta}\iota\pi\alpha\iota\alpha\tilde{\nu}\ \grave{\epsilon}\pi\iota\lambda\acute{e}y\epsilon\nu$ . And "guarantee" is out of place in this order and this situation. There is a place for it, as 1417 a 34-35 shows: it is to be used when no explanation is available:  $\grave{\epsilon}\alpha\tilde{\nu}\ \delta\epsilon\ \mu\eta\ \grave{\epsilon}\chi\eta\tilde{\nu}\ \alpha\iota\alpha\iota\alpha\tilde{\nu},\ \grave{\alpha}\ll\alpha^{\circ}\ \grave{\sigma}\tau\iota\ \grave{o}\nu\kappa\ \grave{\alpha}\gamma\iota\alpha\iota\tilde{\nu}\ \grave{\alpha}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\lambda\acute{e}\alpha\tilde{\nu}$ ,  $\grave{\alpha}\ll\alpha^{\circ}\ \phi\vee\tilde{\nu}\ \tau\alpha\iota\alpha\tilde{\nu}\ \alpha\iota\alpha\iota\alpha\tilde{\nu}$ .

Neither the reference to Carcinus' Jocasta nor to Sophocles' Haemon is much help. Some light may be thrown on the meaning by an actual example of successful presentation of an unconvincing narrative. Maioragius aptly instances Cicero's practice in the *Pro Caelio*. The example is not strictly  $\grave{\epsilon}\nu\ \grave{\delta}\eta\mu\gamma\gamma\alpha\tilde{\nu}\alpha$ , but neither is Aristotle's example from Carcinus' *Oedipus*. We may note particularly 3, 7-8, where Cicero says, in substance, "The other side of the story has been accepted for eight years . . . but I intend to prove . . . if I may offer a detailed account . . . much might be said in preparation . . . I shall get down to business at once . . . but first I must briefly review. . . ." So he begins his story, not with an immediate explanation, but with *A. Caelius Avitus fuit, pater huiusc, iudices, . . .* The same device is repeated at intervals throughout the narrative, for example in 6, 17-18; 10, 30; 14, 42.

Here the technique is not to give an explanation *immediately* of the unconvincing parts or aspects of a narrative, but rather to build up to them, and found them on, or shelter them in, a multitude of indubitable and admitted details. That is to say,  $\delta\acute{a}\tau\alpha\acute{e}\tilde{\nu}$  is here of the utmost importance. Precisely this technique is indicated if in the passage under question we read:

$\grave{\alpha}$ ν δ' ἡ ἄπιστον, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι τε αἰεὶ τι  $\grave{\alpha}$ ν λέγειν εὐθὺς, καὶ διατάττειν ὡς βούλονται where  $\grave{\alpha}$ ν λέγειν represents λέγοιμ<sup>2</sup>  $\grave{\alpha}$ ν, as in the beginning of Polymestor's exculpatory speech in Euripides' *Hecuba* (1132); ὑπισχνεῖσθαι has its normal use with the present infinitive, "profess to be doing something," and διατάττειν is parallel to ὑπισχνεῖσθαι. The sense will then be: "If the story is unconvincing, speakers should always profess their readiness to deal with the difficulty immediately, and should arrange the presentation to suit themselves."

Consideration of the situation envisaged supports Jebb's  $\omega$ s as against either interpretation of the manuscripts' *ols*, but the sense requires that βούλονται be referred to the speakers, rather than to the listeners, as it is in the *Anonymus*. The main outline of the story will as a rule be known to the listeners, cf. 1415 b 34, περὶ οὗ ἵσταται, but in a version unsuited to the speaker's purposes. Whatever meaning may be assigned to ὑπισχνεῖσθαι, it is clear that Carcinus' Jocasta is trying to tell the story in her own way, and to elude the questioner's attempts to have it told "with what details" or "in what order" he wishes. Aristotle cannot mean that an artful speaker will allow his order of presentation to be dictated to him by an audience that does not accept his version of events, rather than by his own intentions and the principles of art. The syntax is loose, but no looser than the interjection of ἡ διαβάλλοντες ἡ ἐπανοῦντες above, whose echo may suffice to justify the ascription of βούλονται to the speakers.

Furthermore, this reading fits in with the *αἰεὶ* ὑπισχνεῖται of Carcinus' Jocasta. It may be suggested that the reading *αἰεὶ* τι  $\grave{\alpha}$ ν was corrupted into καὶ *αἰτίαν* by the natural affinity of τέ and καὶ, and by the memory of the *αἰτίαν* with ἐπιλέγειν after  $\grave{\alpha}$ ν δ' ἄπιστον ἡ only a few lines above, which memory may likewise account for the puzzling reference to Haemon. Aristotle certainly knew what Haemon said, as the reference in 1418 b 32 shows, and it was hardly a διήγησις in any sense applicable to the *Rheticic*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Lane Cooper, in a carefully reasoned article that has the special merit of keeping steadily in mind both the deliberate and the narrative aspects of the problem, *A. J. P.*, L (1929), pp. 170-80, discusses (a) the reading διατάττειν *ols* βούλονται, (b) the reference to Haemon, (c) the reference to Carcinus' *Oedipus*.

(a) He investigates the advantages of reading *ola* (W. F. McDonald)

In the Jocasta example, our ignorance of Carcinus' treatment compels us to depend on conjecture. If the text is sound, perhaps we should take it to mean, "when she was questioned by the man who was looking for *his son*." Polybus, for example, in that version, might not be dead, but might have found out the reason for Oedipus' flight from Corinth, and be anxious to find and reassure him. If the reference is to *her son*, the text would be improved by a suggestion of A. W. Gomme, that *τοῦ* may be an error for *αὐτοῦ*. As it stands, the reference is uncharacteristically vague. Aristotle may quote loosely, but where he mentions a conversation between two people he customarily identifies them (cf. 15, 2; 15, 8; 17, 16; 18, 1; 18, 2; 18, 6). If he wrote here *πνθανόμενον αὐτοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν νιόν*, "when he was questioning her in the course of his search for her son," the situation might be not totally unlike that of Sophocles' play.

for *ols*; and if *ὑπισχνεῖσθαι* is to be taken as "guarantee," the emendation is a manifest improvement. *βούλονται* he takes as referring, "by general consent" to "the persons whom the speaker (more strictly the giver of advice) addresses." Unfortunately he does not explore the other possibility of which he is clearly aware.

(b) He investigates Haemon's speeches in the *Antigone*, in search of a passage that might be relevant here, and finds it particularly in 690-700. The thing that will strike Creon as incredible, he thinks, is that the people should question Creon's decision. "Haemon rightly thinks that his father is unprepared for the story. So he vouches for it, and promptly gives the reason why it is credible, so promptly indeed that the reason and the incredible thing are given together." This is very acute, and much more satisfactory than any of the other identifications attempted; yet it is so far from obvious, that one might fairly have expected such a reference to be illustrated by a quotation, as is the earlier and less abstruse reference to *Antigone*, 1417 a 28 ff. The identification is closely bound up with the translation of *ὑπισχνεῖσθαι* as "vouch for."

(c) In Carcinus' *Oedipus*, he envisages a situation like that in the *Oedipus Rex* of Sophocles, in which the hero is not "seeking" or "looking for" Jocasta's son, but "trying to find out about" him, "investigating the question what became of her son."

These explanations, however, ingenious as they are, share with those of Jebb, Roberts, and Freese the disadvantage of straining the sense of *ὑπισχνεῖσθαι* and weakening that of *διατάρτευν*; in addition, with *ζητοῦντος* in the sense proposed, one would have expected a preposition. The strongest point is the proposed identification of the Haemon reference: this, however, is both more subtle than one would have expected, and is valid only for the questionable translation of *ὑπισχνεῖσθαι* as "vouch for."

Oedipus, we may conjecture, became curious about the fate of Jocasta's son, regarded, perhaps, as a possible rival for the throne of Thebes; she repeatedly professed her readiness to tell him, but kept saying, "first I must tell you about. . . ." Those who knew the play would have no more difficulty in connecting the *αὐτοῦ* with the Oedipus mentioned immediately before in the play's title, and in identifying *τὸν γιόν* as Jocasta's son, than we should have in understanding who was meant by "the child" in a reference to Sophocles' *Oedipus*.

L. A. MACKAY.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

### A NON-LATIN ITALIC AND CORNISH PARALLEL?

That the 3d plur. pres. act. of the verb in I-E is formed from the bare stem-form of the pres. act. part. without any pluralising force seems quite possible, if not, indeed, highly probable (cf. Brugmann, *Vgl. Gram. der idg. Spr.*,<sup>2</sup> II, i, p. 455, iii, pp. 592, 594; Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, I, p. 658; Leumann-Hofmann, *Lat. Gram.*,<sup>5</sup> p. 303), especially if, as may well have been the case, one here has a survival of a very primitive stage before inflexion or in which the plur. had not yet evolved (cf. Gray, *Foundations of Language*, pp. 153-4, 179, 182); and at least quasi-analogues appear to occur outside the I-E family of languages (Gray, *Introd. to Sem. Comp. Linguistics*, pp. 91-2).

Pres. act. part. nom. sing.: I-E \*bhére/onts-, \*bhérntis-, Skt. bhárant-, bhárat- (cf. dadhaín̄s carum), Hit. atan̄z (i. e. \*atants) "eaten" (diathesis!), Gk. φέρων, φέροντ- (Cretan nom. sing. καταθέτες, Argive ποιησαντες = Attic καταθέτις, ποιησάς), Lat. ferēns, ferent-, Umb. zeřef (-f < -nss < -nts; Brugmann, I, p. 374) "sitting," Got. frijonds, frijond- "friend," Lit. vežq̄s, vežant- "carrying," Gallo-Lat. \*Mogons, \*Mogont-, \*Nōdens, \*Nōdens, \*Nūdens, -ont-, -ent-, Gaul. Carant-us, etc., OIr. car(a)e < \*qārans "friend" (plur. cara(i)t < \*qārantes), Welsh car (plur. ceraint), Corn. car (Late Corn. plur. keranz), Bret. kar (plur. kerent) (Pedersen, *Vgl. Gramm. der kelt. Spr.*, II, p. 104).

3d plur. pres. ind. act.: I-E \*bhére/onts-i, \*bhérntis-i, Skt. bhárati, dákhati, Hit. janzi (i. e. \*jantsi) "they make," Arm. beren, Dor. φέροντι, Arcad. ποιεντι, Att. διδόσαι (with -āσι < \*-av̄ti

or *\*-avtos*, like φέρουσι [i. e. -ōsi; cf. Schwyzer, I, p. 287], possibly even in the Mod. Gk. type of θέλοντ(ε) “θέλοντ” with -ont < *\*-onts* [Gray, *Lang.* III, p. 83]), OLat. *tremonti*, *cosentiont*, Lat. *tremunt*, Osc. *stahínt* “stant,” Umb. *sent* “sunt,” Got. *bairand*, ORuss. *berqti*, Gaul. *dugionti-io* “who serve,” Archaic OIr. *tuesmot* “who pour,” OIr. *berit* < *\*bhéronti* (Thurneysen, *Gramm. of OIr.*, p. 361), OWelsh *nertheint* “armant,” Mid. Welsh *carant* “they love,” Mid. Breton *queront* < *\*-nt(s)* (Leumann-Hofmann, p. 305; Pedersen, II, p. 344).

The 3d plur. impf. ind. act. also comes into consideration here. Formally it was distinguished from the pres. by the omission of the final *-i* of the pres. and by the occasional prefixing of an augment: I-E *\*(é)bhere/onts*, *\*(é)bhernts*, Skt. *ábharam* (*abharams tatah*), *ákurvata* (mid.), Arm. *berein*, Gk. *ἔφερον*, Lat. *ferēbant*, OIr. *-berat*, Mid. Welsh *cerynt*, Mid. Bret. *carent*, OCS. *mogq* “they can.”

In Cornish and the minor Italic dialects, as well as in Osc.-Umb., outside the pres. ind., but nowhere in Lat., the secondary ending *-ns* < *\*-nts* has been carried throughout: Corn. *kerons*, *kerans*, *care(n)s* (pres., perf., impv.), Paelig. *coisatens* “cavarunt,” Marruc. *amatens* “amaverunt,” Volsc. *sistiations* “sterunt” (perfs.), Osc. *fufans* “erant” (impf.), *deicans* “dicant” (subj.), *prūfattens* “probaverunt” (perf.), Umb. *dirsa(n)s* “dent” (subj.).

The same phenomenon appears in Corn. nouns. Here belong *abranc* “supercilium”: Lat. *frōns*, *frontis* < *\*fronts*; *dans* (Welsh, Bret. *dant*) “tooth”: Lat. *dēns*, *dentis* < *\*dents*; *gwyns* (Welsh *gwynt*, Bret. *gwent*) “wind”: Got. *winds*; *oli-phans* “elephant” < Lat. *elephās*, *elephantis* < *\*elephants*; *ugens*, *ugans* “twenty” < *\*yī-k̑nts-*: Bret. *ugent* < *\*yī-k̑mt-* (Pedersen, II, p. 129). Analogical are *argans* “silver” (Gaul. *Argentoratum* “Strasbourg,” Mid. Bret. *argant*): Lat. *argentum*; *cans* “hundred” (Welsh, Bret. *cant*): Lat. *centum*; *cans* “with” (OWelsh *cant*): Gk. *kará* < *\*k̑mt-*; *kyns* “first”: Gaul. *Cintugnātus* “first-born” (Pedersen, I, pp. 137, 500).

We seem to have, then, a close parallel, whether inherited or merely coincidental, between Cornish and Italic, outside Lat. and the Osc.-Umb. pres. ind.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

NEW YORK CITY.

## REVIEWS.

FELIX JACOBY. Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Dritter Teil. Geschichte von Staedten und Voelkern (Horographie und Ethnographie), B: Autoren ueber einzelne Staedte (Laender), Nr. 297-607. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1950. Pp. 8\* + 779.

FELIX JACOBY. Atthis. The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949. Pp. vii + 431. 35s.

### I

More than a century has passed since Carl Müller completed the *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (4 vols., Paris, 1841-51; he edited also Ctesias in Dindorf's Didot edition of Herodotus [Paris, 1844], and the *Scriptorum de rebus Alexandri Magni fragmenta* in his own edition of Arrian [Paris, 1846]), a work which for its time was an outstanding achievement. But when half a century later Felix Jacoby conceived the plan of a new collection, there could be no doubt about the timeliness of this initiative. For the older work was neither complete in authors or fragments, nor were the texts presented in accordance with the standards, textritical and otherwise, which classical scholarship had meanwhile attained. In addition, the fragments of the Greek historians, by the very nature of their preservation, are badly in need of interpretation, far beyond the meagre notes which accompanied Müller's texts and which, by the beginning of this century, historical and philological research had hopelessly put out of date. In his monographs *Apollodors Chronik (Philologische Untersuchungen, XVI [1902])* and *Das Marmor Parium* (Berlin, 1904) and in the masterly presentation of his program "Ueber die Entwicklung der griechischen Historiographie und den Plan einer neuen Sammlung der griechischen Historikerfragmente," *Klio* IX (1909), pp. 80-123, Jacoby demonstrated that no one could be found more eminently equipped to undertake this enormous task which seemed to transcend the strength of one individual.

In spite of the first World War which interrupted Jacoby for a number of years in the midst of his extensive preparations, the first part of *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, containing the Genealogists and Mythographers, appeared in 1923; it was followed 1926-1930 by part II in four volumes, containing the writers on Periods (Universal Histories, Hellenica, Special Histories, Memoirs, and Chronographies). The work was received with enthusiasm from all quarters. Methodological precision and a fine feeling for literary qualities and forms are here combined with profound historical knowledge and insight in a blending of rare perfection.

The grave political disturbances of the thirties which culminated in the second World War also severely curbed Jacoby's activities, until an invitation by Christ Church enabled him to continue in

Oxford his work on the third and most voluminous part of the collection which deals with Local Historiography. The text of the third part is divided into three sections, namely III A: Authors on various cities and countries, that is authors who could not be listed under any specific place, like Alexander Polyhistor who wrote about more than a dozen different countries. It contains only 35 authors (nos. 262-296), but among them such important figures as Charon of Lampsacus, Hecataeus of Abdera, the poet Rhianus of Bene, Alexander Polyhistor and King Juba of Mauretania. It was published by Brill in Leiden in 1940 (cf. my review *C. W.*, XXXVII [1934-4], pp. 215-16). A voluminous commentary (III a) appeared in 1943 to which even more than to the previous ones Bidez's words could be applied (*Revue belge de philologie*, V [1926], p. 1059): "Ce commentaire est d'une abondance où l'on trouve infinité plus que le titre de l'ouvrage ne promettait." Jacoby, in treating Rhianus, e. g., gives a detailed and most suggestive analysis of the historical introduction to the fourth book of Pausanias on Messenia and the Aristomenes problem.

Volume III B (Authors on individual Greek cities and states) appeared in 1950. The arrangement is geographical. Under 78 headings, in alphabetic order, the fragments of 311 authors are published here (nos. 297-607).

Volume III C (Ethnographers), which, I am happy to report, is all but completed, is organized on the same lines as III B. It contains the fragments of 249 authors (nos. 608-856), e. g., more than fifty historians on Egypt (among them Manetho), the writers on Assyria-Babylonia-Persia (including Berossos and Ctesias), India (with Megasthenes), Lydia (with Xanthus), Phoenicia (with Philo of Byblus), Rome, etc. In both volumes the anonymous tradition, never collected before, about cities and countries has been assembled with as much care as judiciousness; that is, in addition to all quotations of the type *οἱ τὰς Ἀτθίδας συγγράψατες*, a generous selection of passages obviously derived from the works of local historians. More than twenty numbers of III B are dedicated to this purpose. Thus one finds under each city or country everything that remains of the historical tradition pertaining to it, surely the most sensible and practical system of presenting the fragments of the local historians and ethnographers.<sup>1</sup> As III B and C together will contain 560 authors and groups of anonymous quotations, nearly half of all Greek historians known to us are involved. No better vindication of Jacoby's method of arrangement could be devised than these two volumes. In fact, it would be hard if not impossible to imagine how a commentary could effectively be written on the authors dealt with in III B and C if they were arranged otherwise, e. g., alphabetically, in the way in which 138 authors found in III B had been published by Müller—without a commentary—in *F. H. G.*, IV under the heading "Scriptores aetatis incertae." To end this discussion

<sup>1</sup> A comparison with *F. H. G.* will be instructive: Of the 54 authors published by Jacoby under Athens (nos. 323a-375), 8 are found in *F. H. G.*, I; 7 in *F. H. G.*, II; 4 in *F. H. G.*, III; 18 in *F. H. G.*, IV; 1 in *Script. Alex. Magni*; 16 are new.

about arrangement, it should be pointed out that Jacoby has added to this volume an index of all authors so far published in *F. Gr. Hist.*

The wealth of the contents of III B is such as to defy even cursory description. Needless to say all the features which distinguished the earlier volumes recur in this most recent one, such as separation of fragments with book-titles from those which lack it (a comparison between Jacoby's treatment of Ion of Chius [no. 392] and the corresponding portions of A. v. Blumenthal's *Ion von Chios* [Stuttgart-Berlin, 1939] will show better than many words the soundness of this principle). Numerous are the additions to *F. H. G.*, of fragments as well as of authors. Apart from the most welcome innovation of anonymous quotations already mentioned ("Kollektivzitate"), there are over 75 authors not contained in *F. H. G.* Writers of historical epics like Lyceas of Argos (no. 312), Hegesinus (no. 331), Panyassis of Halicarnassus (no. 440), Xenophanes (no. 450), Eumelus and Diodorus of Corinth (no. 451-2), Semonides of Amorgus (no. 534), and Mimnermus (no. 578) have been justly included.

Numerous authors had been overlooked by Müller. Others have become known in the last century through inscriptions or papyri. The most spectacular discovery of an epigraphical nature (in this volume) is undoubtedly the Anagraphe of Lindus (no. 532), a document in which, besides eight historians otherwise known, fourteen local historians are mentioned who occur nowhere else (nos. 509-10, 516-20, 522, 524-5, 528-31). Local patriotism plays an important rôle in most of the epigraphical sources: for instance, historians are honored by a community for having written historical works about them: cf. nos. 400, 466, 483, 540, 540a. This evidence, incidentally, serves to confirm the tradition about a decree by the Athenians in honor of Clidemus, the first Athenian writer of an *Attthis* (323 T 2; cf. *Attthis*, p. 75). Particularly interesting is the use of local historians in deciding international conflicts of which the most famous example remains *Inschriften von Priene* 37 (38); cf. *F. Gr. Hist.* 491 F 1 where, besides Theopompus, two historians of Ephesus, one of Miletus, and four of Samos, are quoted. One of them, Uliades of Samos (no. 538) is not otherwise known; for Creophylus of Ephesus we have two quotations from literature, one of which is newly added by Jacoby (417 F 3).

Very gratifying is also the new material which papyri have brought to this volume. Especially important are the fragments which illuminate Callimachus' indebtedness to local historiography, like the two new quotations from Hagias' and Dercylus' *Argolika* (305 F 4 and 8) or the story of Acontius and Cydippe taken by Callimachus according to his own words from Xenomedes of Ceus (442 F 1); cf., in addition, 323 F 13 (Clidemus) and 577 F 10. From the Didymus papyrus come not less than sixteen fragments of Androtion (324 F 30; 53), Demon (327 F 7), Philochorus (328 F 55 b; 56 b; 144-6; 149 a; 151; 155; 157; 159-162). Noteworthy, furthermore, the new fragment of Nicocrates' *On Boeotia* (376 F 1) which Campbell Bonner first had published in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXII (1941), pp. 26-35; *P. Berol.* 11 632 published by Jacoby in the ap-

pendix on Rhodes (533 F 2) (on the siege of Rhodes by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 304/3 B. C.); and *P. Oxy.* 1365 (on the origin of tyranny in Sicyon) which had previously been printed in II A as 105 F 2, with Jacoby voicing in the commentary the strong suspicion that the author was Ephorus, and which is repeated in the appendix to Sicyon (551 F 1 b).

The two Sicilian papyri *P. Oxy.* 665 (fragment of a table of contents of a book on Sicilian history) and *P. S. I.*, XII, 2 (1950), no. 1283 appear, cautiously, in the appendix to Sicily as 577 F 1 and 2. The latter, first published by G. Coppola, *Riv. di filol. cl.*, n. s. VIII (1930), pp. 449 ff., is printed with V. Bartoletti's greatly improved readings. Like Bartoletti and Jacoby, I am still inclined to consider Philistus as the most likely candidate for the authorship of this highly detailed account of Athenian operations in Southern Italy and Sicily during the winter of 427/6 (the doubts of R. Laqueur, *R.-E.*, XIX, 2 (1938), col. 2417, *s. v.* Philistos, are not convincing).

It may be mentioned here in passing that Bartoletti has the great merit of having recently published previously unknown fragments of two other historical works. One group of them comes from the *Hellenica* of Oxyrhynchus (*P. S. I.*, XIII, 1 [1949], no. 1304) and gives new information about events of the years 410-7 which by their striking agreement with the parallel account in Diodorus XIII now definitely prove that Ephorus, Diodorus' source, depended on the historian of Oxyrhynchus for the years succeeding the period covered by Thucydides. Moreover, Thucydides' name is mentioned in Fr. A col. II 31 (p. 72) under circumstances which make it clear that the *Hellenica* of Oxyrhynchus is a continuation of Thucydides' work. The reference is a new and powerful—though hardly necessary—argument against the identification of the *Hellenica* with Ephorus or Androtion (cf. F. Jacoby, "The Authorship of the *Hellenica* of Oxyrhynchus [with an appendix by P. Maas, containing the newly published fragments]," *C. Q.*, XLIV [1950], pp. 1-11, who mainly argues against Cratippus, and my discussion of the problem, previous to the discovery of the new fragments, *H. S. C. P.*, Suppl. I [1940], pp. 302-41).

The other papyrus (*P. S. I.*, XII, 2 [1950], no. 1284) contains an account of the battle fought in 321 B. C. near the Hellespont between Craterus and Eumenes. Preserved are col. 82 and the left part of col. 83 of the volume. It is a curious coincidence that this fragment also is closely related to Diodorus (XVIII, 31-2). Bartoletti tentatively suggested as author Hieronymus of Cardia, admittedly Diodorus' source in books XVIII-XX; Jacoby (*ibid.*, p. 15, n. 2 of the reprint) thought of the possibility of a work essentially based on Hieronymus, and III B, p. 743, proposed to insert it under no. 155. In a brief, but brilliantly convincing communication ("Ein neues Arrianfragment," *Gött. Nachr.*, Philol.-hist. Kl., 1950, 3, pp. 23-7) Kurt Latte demonstrated that the papyrus is a fragment of Arrian's History of the Diadochs (book VIII?), which, as was well known, depended, like Diodorus, on Hieronymus of Cardia (cf. *F. Gr. Hist.*, II D, p. 553, 40 ff.). The new fragment will have to be inserted after *F. Gr. Hist.* 156 F 10.

Volume III B has, as it were, two centers of gravity: Athens and Sicily. With 202 and 148 pages, respectively, they significantly occupy nearly half of the book. The Athenian material is divided into seven sections. At the beginning, naturally, stand the historians of Athens, the Athidographers, in chronological order. Readers will be grateful to Jacoby for his reprinting under no. 323a the fragments of Hellanicus' *Atthis*, already edited under no. 4. Very helpful is also the device of referring to the fragments not assigned to a book at the point where they would belong chronologically in the cases of Hellanicus (no. 323a), Androtion (no. 324), and Philochorus (no. 328). Among the other sections, C, entitled "Teilgeschichten," we might perhaps say "Historical Monographs on Athenian Subjects," may be singled out, where one finds, e. g., Idomeneus of Lampsacus' treatise on the Demagogues of Athens, so well known from Plutarch's biographies (no. 338), a work which is wisely dealt with under "Athens" rather than in part IV under "Biography." In section E "State and Society" are included four authors on the ἀξόνες of Solon—among them the great Didymus (no. 340) who was altogether omitted by Müller—, Craterus' collection of decrees (no. 342), conveniently inserted here rather than in part IV, and the monographs on the *hetaerae* of Athens (nos. 347-50) which were not represented at all in the older collection. Section F "Religion and Cult" starts with the fragments of *exegetica* (in addition to Clidemus, no. 323 F 14). The edition of the remnants of Lysimachides' work on Athenian months (no. 366) comprises in an appendix the passages in Harpocration which are undoubtedly derived from this treatise. The last section, G, "Periegetisches," contains in particular the fragments of the writings of Diodorus (no. 372) and Heliodorus (no. 373), whereas Polemon is reserved to part IV.

The big chapter on Sicily is dominated by Philistus (no. 556), Plato's famous opponent at the court of Syracuse, and by Timaeus (no. 566). Both authors figure prominently in ancient critical literature, Philistus for his style in which he deliberately followed the model of Thucydides, Timaeus as an object of Polybius' not always fair polemic. All this material is clearly assembled in the Testimonia part for the two historians. The arrangement of the fragments of Timaeus in *F. H. G.*, I particularly lacked lucidity and J. Geffcken's reconstruction of a portion of his work (*Timaios' Geographie des Westens [Philologische Untersuchungen, XIII (1892)]*) is in this respect not helpful either. It will be a pleasure to work with this new edition of Timaeus, and this may be said in general, and most emphatically, of the whole volume.

## II

Perhaps no earlier volume of this collection was so much in need of a commentary as volume III B, the more so as Jacoby's unprecedented and ingenious presentation of local historical writing in geographical arrangement opened up new possibilities of interpretation, which any other procedure would have blocked. This commentary fortunately is written. It consists of three parts. The commentary to nos. 297-322 and 335-607, by necessity voluminous, is ready for printing. The Athidographers (nos. 323a-334), owing to

their unique importance for our knowledge of Classical Athens, have been provided with an especially detailed commentary in two volumes, entitled *The Ancient Historians of Athens. A Commentary*.

The thoroughness with which Jacoby had investigated the problems of Greek, and particularly Athenian, local historiography, led him to set forth in a separate volume his conclusions about the origin and nature of the Greek local chronicle, with special application to Athens. Everywhere in *Atthis. The Local Chronicles of Athens* Jacoby's unique mastery of all phases and aspects of Greek Historiography is visible. Thus his book, apart from being an independent work, fulfils the double function of serving as an introduction both to the commentary on the Attidographers and to Greek Local Historiography in general.

In the first two of the three sections into which the book is divided, entitled "The Atthis" and "Attidography," respectively, Jacoby deals with the origin, the political character, form, and contents of the Chronicles of Athens; the third is devoted to the sources of the *Atthis*. He takes his starting point from the famous thesis of Wilamowitz of a pre-literary chronicle kept by the exegetes of Athens. According to this thesis, developed in analogy to the keeping of a chronicle of Rome by the *pontifices*, this pre-literary chronicle was published about 380 B. C. and formed the basis of all later chronicles of Athens. Proposed in 1893 in his book *Aristoteles und Athen* (I, pp. 280-8), Wilamowitz' theory had so far remained virtually unchallenged. It is his pupil Jacoby's merit to have definitively disproved it by means of a painstaking, truly admirable investigation of all problems connected with the exegetes of Athens.<sup>2</sup>

The second section of Jacoby's book begins with a chapter on the political character of the *Atthis*, a phenomenon which is substantiated by many facts and seems to me undisputable. Of course, the individual Attidographers reveal different political prejudices: Cleidemus seems to have been a democrat (p. 75), Androton a conservative (pp. 74; 123; 293, n. 22; cf. on Androton's handling of the *seisachtheia* J. H. Thiel in his excellent review of Jacoby's book, *Museum*, LV [1950], p. 70), Phanodemus a follower of Lycurgus (p. 78). An especially significant treatment has been given to the form of the *Attides* (pp. 86-99). Also in this respect the *Atthis* of Hellanicus, the importance of which is emphasized throughout the whole volume, was epoch-making. It was he who created the annalistic arrangement of the city chronicle which "remained authoritative for all *Attides* of the fourth and third centuries" (p. 89). Here Jacoby has some remarks worth remembering about the naive realism which is incapable of seeing beyond a positive individual piece of evidence and frequently passes nowadays as "higher criticism" (p. 90). In the chapter on "The Contents of the *Attides*" Jacoby

<sup>2</sup> The traditional conception of the exegetes of Athens and their origin has been contested by James H. Oliver in his book *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* (Baltimore, 1950), which appeared shortly after Jacoby's *Atthis*. Since limitations of space have prevented me from discussing this matter in this review, I shall publish my views in a separate article in a later issue of this Journal.

investigates such problems as the differences between local chronicles and other branches of historical literature, like *Politeiai* on the one hand, and Grand History on the other (the Attidographers were not antiquaries; cf. p. 125); or the relation between the mythical (pre-Solonian) and historical times in the various *Attides*.

The "scientific" factor in the *Attis*, as evidenced by the historicization of the mythical—that is pre-Solonian—time, has been given well deserved prominence, by presenting (pp. 135-41) as a test case the narrative of Theseus' expedition to Crete in Hellanicus, Clidemus, Demon, and Philochorus, which, in spite of the agreement in the general methodical approach, reveals far reaching and characteristic differences for each individual writer. Their decided interest in antiquities does not exist for its own sake, but is accounted for, to a considerable extent, by the desire to explain "old institutions lasting into the time of the writers" (p. 141). The method of explanation is aetiology which "simply states that they (i. e. the individual institutions and customs) originated each from a single event which sometimes was 'historical' by accident" (p. 143).

The style of the Attidographers is plain, a characteristic of the whole branch of local historiography. This attitude accounts, as Jacoby rightly suggests (p. 147), for the early loss of these works.

The last section on the sources of the *Attis* is of paramount importance not only for the understanding of the Attic chronicle, but for the whole question of the sources of Athenian history in the sixth and fifth centuries, the central problem being: whence did Hellanicus, the first Attidographer, get his material, and what material could he get at the end of the fifth century (p. 151). Any résumé would only spoil the masterful presentation of Jacoby's test case, the tradition about the Pisistratids (pp. 152-68). He rightly insists that Herodotus "is the creator of this section of Attic history" (p. 331, n. 5) and investigates then with most interesting results the pertinent accounts of Herodotus, Aristotle, Thucydides, and Clidemus (*F. Gr. Hist.* 323 F 15). The latter three all depend on Herodotus, but supplement him with additional information taken from the *Attis*, in Aristotle's case perhaps Androton, in Thucydides'—Jacoby's demonstration seems to me most suggestive—Hellanicus. Jacoby is justly emphatic on the subject of oral tradition as the source for Herodotus' history of Athens (pp. 165-8; cf. *Klio*, IX [1909], p. 111).

His remarks about the archons' list as an element of the tradition are of course strongly influenced by the remains of the archons' list from the Agora (published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, VIII [1939], pp. 59 ff.), which was set up more than twenty years before the publication of the *Attis* of Hellanicus who undoubtedly made use of it.

In the following chapter ("The Alleged Pre-Literary Chronicles") the origin of the *Attides* is discussed in the larger context of local historiography in general, with special reference to the *Ωποι* of Ionia, where the literary local chronicle undoubtedly had its beginning, probably in Samos (p. 183). Here also Jacoby comes to the conclusion that lists of eponymous officials, not pre-literary chronicles, precede the published *Ωποι* which were not yet used by Hero-

dots. He depends for Ionia, too, on oral information (pp. 178-85). An analysis of the tradition about Cylon and the chronology of the Pisistratids stands to show that this tradition does not derive from a pre-literary chronicle or from a contemporary annotated archons' list (pp. 185-96).

In the course of refuting Wilamowitz' theory that Local Historiography is the earliest branch of Greek historiography, Jacoby has given us the most beautiful pages of his book (pp. 199-202), a pithy, most impressive account of the development of Greek historical writing, slightly revising, as the result of forty years' experience, his views of 1909 (cf. p. 382, n. 10). In this development, Local History does not stand at the beginning, but at the end; it is the latest of the four main branches of historiography.

From this basis Jacoby proceeds to a scrutiny of the alleged essentially documentary character of the chronicles of Athens and states that an *Atthis* was not, like, e.g., Craterus' Collection of Decrees, a collection of documents, although it must be admitted that the Atticographers, and especially Androtion, made increasing use of them for their accounts of the fifth and fourth centuries. Wilamowitz' thesis that not only the first historical part of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*—as generally agreed—but also the second systematic part, the description of the existing constitution of Athens, depends on the *Atthis*, is rejected. On the contrary, this survey was based on the material which had been collected by Aristotle and his pupils in the archives in Athens and elsewhere for the descriptive portions of the *Politeiae* as well as for Theophrastus' systematic treatise, the *Nomoi* (pp. 210-1; cf. Bloch, *H. S. C. P.*, Suppl. I [1940], pp. 355-76).

Jacoby's *Atthis* has blazed a path through a wilderness; it has done away with prejudices and wrong theories, which have remained unchallenged for decades, with such thoroughness that there is justified hope that they will never rise again. But far from being satisfied with tearing down what was unsound, he has given us a well founded and at the same time brilliant account of a most important branch of Greek Historiography which hitherto had been nearly inaccessible.

### III

It may perhaps be allowed to conclude with a brief report about the future plans regarding *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Printing of the Supplement, *The Ancient Historians of Athens. A Commentary*, in two volumes, one volume text, one volume notes (cf. p. 293 *supra*), started in the fall of 1952. It is hoped that the printing of the commentary to the other authors in III B (III b, also in two volumes) may follow immediately the production of the Supplement. Vol. III C, the text of the Ethnographers, will be next.

As the commentary to the Ethnographers (III c) is not yet written, it has been decided, in the interest of the public, to go on with preparing the text of part IV (Aristotle and the Peripatos; Antiquarian Literature; Biography), presumably in one volume. In the meantime, Professor Friedrich Gisinger of the University of Freiburg i. Br. has been working on part V (The Fragments of the

Greek Geographers). It will contain such important authors as Eratosthenes, Agatharchides (for other writings of theirs cf. *F. Gr. Hist.* 241 and 86), Demetrius of Scopis, Artemidorus of Ephesus. Gisinger, well known for his book *Die Erdbeschreibung des Eudoxos von Knidos, Stoicheia*, VI (Leipzig-Berlin, 1921), has very successfully taken care of the geographers in *R.-E.* (cf., e.g., his articles "Skylax," "Skymnos," "Pomponius Mela").

The work will be brought to a preliminary conclusion with part VI which will consist of three sections: 1) the edition of the remnants of Greek theory on history and 2) of the fragments of authors who could not be assigned to any previous part, and 3) the indices which will be very detailed and take into special consideration the legitimate interests of occasional users who are not specialists in the field of Greek Historiography. Whether it will be necessary to restrict these indices to the text volumes of the work, or whether it may be possible to include, at least to a certain extent, the commentary volumes which will then be published (I-III b, including the Supplement) cannot be decided now.

The final task will then be to write the commentaries to vol. III C, to parts IV and V (the commentary to V is of course reserved to Professor Gisinger), and to the authors published in part VI.

Two World Wars and many other tribulations have not been able to prevent Felix Jacoby from achieving one of the greatest and most useful accomplishments of classical and historical scholarship in this century. Let us hope that his work will be completed in not too distant a future.

HERBERT BLOCH.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

---

FRANÇOIS LASSEUR. *Les Épodes d'Archiloque*. Paris, Société d'Édition, "Les Belles Lettres," 1950. Pp. 332.

Given the fragmentary preservation of Greek and Latin literature, students of the Classics always owe a great debt to scholars who enlarge our knowledge by reading, interpreting and criticising fragments and reconstructing lost literary works. Lasserre undertakes in his book to reconstruct the epodes of Archilochus and to gain a clear idea not only of the single poems but also of the character and the composition of the book of the epodes as a whole. He is equipped for this purpose with a complete mastery of all the fundamental tools of philological research such as textual criticism,<sup>1</sup> paleo-

<sup>1</sup> An extremely convincing result of sound and conservative textual criticism is the restitution of Fr. 34 Bergk to an epode consisting of dactylic tetrameter, ithyphallic and catalectic iambic trimeter by mere elimination of the usual conjectural supplement *<μοι>* and the consequent attribution of the fragment to a merely iambic poem (p. 142). Another example of sound conservatism in textual criticism is the retention of *κυκλώσαι* in Fr. 92 b D instead of the conjectural *κύκλωσον*; the consequence is the attribution of this fragment to the prayer of the fox instead of an ironical speech of the eagle and, therefore, a completely new understanding of the fragment, based on an interpretation of the

graphical insight and intuition, metrical knowledge,<sup>2</sup> the art of minute interpretation,<sup>3</sup> and an insight into the importance of text history.

Careful interpretation led Lasserre to the following preliminary assumptions: a) the book of epodes was the most famous work of Archilochus and was, in fact, almost the only work of the poet which was read and quoted directly throughout antiquity, at least until the 2nd century of this era. Quotations of elegies, trimeters, tetrameters, on the other hand, originate in lexicographical and grammatical works of the times of Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus, in Stoic anthologies, historians or collectors of curiosities of all kinds (pp. 14 ff.). The methodological consequence of this assumption for Lasserre's purpose is that many an iambic may be considered as a fragment of the epodes, and, therefore, be used for their reconstruction. b) The five epodic meters as described by metrical authors in a certain order follow one another in the same order in Archilochus' book (p. 19). The methodological consequence for Lasserre's purpose is that the main outline of the composition of Archilochus' book may be considered as known. c) Horace gave his book of epodes the same metrical order as Archilochus' book had. In the second part of his book Horace follows not only the meter of his models but also their purpose very closely. The methodological consequence of this assumption is that the principal source for reconstructing Archilochus' epodes—especially the second half of the book—are Horace's epodes (p. 22). d) The epodes which were not imitated by Horace contained a fable. We know these fables by the collections of Aesop's fables. The consequence: Aesop's fables might be used as sources for the reconstruction of Archilochus' epodes.

The results for Archilochus' book of epodes are remarkable and well worth careful consideration: a) Archilochus himself collected his epodes and put them together in a certain order to form a book; this very order has been preserved in all the subsequent editions. b) The order of this book was chronological. c) The biography of Archilochus is, therefore, well known in so far as it can be gathered from the epodes in their chronological order. d) The invention of the different meters of epodes is explained logically and simply by the chronological order of the poems (pp. 24 ff.).

It is clear that the reconstruction both of the single epodes and of the book as a whole must necessarily remain hypothetical in a very large degree since it is erected on a very small base: the fragments are scanty, most of them short and insignificant, and often consist of not more than one or two words.

---

passage of the philosopher Atticus who quotes this passage from Archilochus. Here Lasserre's interpretation is corroborated by the reading of Plut., *Garrul.* 10, and *Amat.* 3 (p. 41). The correction of *ἀμφιετηρίζομένας* into *ἀμφιετίζομένας* in Cratinus, *Archilochoi*, Fr. 2, Demianczuk, and the logical restitution of this fragment to Archilochus (with Reitzenstein and against Wilamowitz; p. 166) are clear.

<sup>2</sup> E. g., his treatment of Fr. 138 Bergk, pp. 88 f.

<sup>3</sup> A very good and learned piece of work is, e. g., the interpretation of the fable of the fox and the eagle as narrated by Archilochus, Fr. 89 (pp. 38 ff.).

As an example of Lasserre's method we choose what he calls the 3rd and 4th epode, which he reconstructs in his fourth chapter (pp. 77 f.). In this case the evidence is extremely poor. Lasserre puts together 19 fragments for both of these poems. Of these fragments only two exceed one verse in length by a few words (one of them from a papyrus supplemented very arbitrarily); four give just one verse; seven only a part of a verse; and six a single word. It seems hard to find a sense at all in these miserable scraps and even impossible to combine them into the whole of two different poems. Lasserre's method is based on a *petitio principii*. Bergk had already guessed that his fragment 131 (96 D)<sup>4</sup> belonged to a passage where a fable had been narrated; and he assumed either the one which we know as Aesop No. 180 Halm (The Camel) or Aesop No. 183 Halm (The Elephant and the Camel) or, finally, the one we know as Babrius 95—Aesop 200 Chambry (The Lion, the Fox, and the Hart). Lasserre takes the third of these suggestions for granted and is convinced that Archilochus told in his "3rd epode" the fable of the Sick Lion, the Fox, and the Hart. Under this assumption—and it is nothing but an assumption—the versions of this fable in Babrius (95) and Aesop (200 Chambry) give him the frame for the reconstruction of the main part of Archilochus' epode. But even granted this assumption, his identification and grouping of the different fragments are unbelievably weak. In the fable the fox goes to bring the hart into the cave of the lion. Now there is an iambic trimeter of Archilochus (Fr. 46 D): *μετέρχομαι σε σύμβολον ποιεύμενος*. This trimeter must be quoted—as Lasserre asserts (p. 79)—from the words the fox spoke, in Archilochus' poem, to the hart in order to persuade him to visit the sick lion. No verbal similarity between the text of the fables and the fragment of Archilochus corroborates his assumption. *<αἷμα> μυδαλέον* (Fr. 183 Bergk) must be said of the wounded ear of the hart. *Πτώσσουσαν ὥστε πέρδικα* (Fr. 98) belongs—in Lasserre's opinion (p. 83)—to the passage where the fox wanted to persuade the hart to make a second visit.<sup>5</sup> Fr. 96 D belonged to the speech of the fox describing the hart's cowardice. Fr. 97 D, *Πάρελθε, γενναῖος γὰρ εἰς* was said by the fox in order to persuade the hart.<sup>6</sup> Fr. 99 must, then, belong to an oath the fox took. The very mutilated *P. Oxy.*, 211 e is restored by Lasserre only in order to yield a description of the hart's second visit to the cave of the lion. Archilochus—in Lasserre's opinion—in this poem not only told the fable but wanted this fable to be understood as an

<sup>4</sup> Only his fragment 131, and not his fragment 183 as well, as Lasserre says (p. 78).

<sup>5</sup> Lasserre does not make it clear whether he thinks the words were spoken by the fox objecting to the cowardliness of the hart, or to the hart's blaming the fox for his behaviour.

<sup>6</sup> A very slight similarity exists here between the text of Babrius and the fragment of Archilochus:

Babr. 81: 'Αλλ' ἐλθέ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἵσθι γενναῖα

Arch.: πάρελθε, γενναῖος γὰρ εἰς.

But it should be mentioned that even this slight similarity is further diminished by the different use of the adjective: *γενναῖος* in Arch., *γενναῖα* in Babr.

allusion to the behaviour of his former fiancée, Neobule. Therefore Fr. 138 Bergk, *ἴνας δὲ μεδέωντι ἀπέθησεν*, has to fit into this last part of the poem.

The situation is even worse with regard to the so-called 4th epode. Here Lasserre establishes the frame for his reconstruction by assuming that Lucilius in the first satire of his thirtieth book (970 ff. Marx) followed very closely the 4th epode of Archilochus. Unfortunately we possess only fragments of Lucilius' poems and, therefore, have first to reconstruct the first satire of the thirtieth book to use it as a means of reconstructing Archilochus. In the reconstruction of Lucilius, Lasserre follows Marx without any reservation (p. 89), ignoring later work done on Lucilius. A glance at the literature concerning Lucilius would have shown him that the fragments of the thirtieth book could be interpreted in a way very different from that of Marx. No one dealing with Lucilius should ignore such an important book as Mario Puelma-Piwonka's *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt, 1949), which was published in the very year preceding the publication of Lasserre's book. On pages 156 f. Puelma gives a very lucid analysis of the thirtieth book of Lucilius and a full account of the bibliographical material; perhaps, however, Lasserre's book was already in print when Puelma's work was published, so that it was too late to use it. Lucilius somewhere told the fable of the Sick Lion and the Fox (980 M); Lasserre is convinced that this same fable had been told in Archilochus' 4th epode. Therefore Fr. 137 Bergk, *φθειροὶ μοχθίζοντα*, has to belong to the description of the sick lion, even if there is no hint of this feature in the Latin fragments. Fr. 100 D, with its very uncertain text, must be spoken by the lion, asking the fox to come near him. The single word *φλύος* (Arch., Fr. 197 Bergk) has to fit into this context only because in Babrius, 103, 13 ff. the lion asks the fox to entertain him by his chattering. In Lucilius the fable was told in order to describe the behaviour of an unfaithful wife. And because Lucilius had the verse (991) *enplocamo digitis, discerniculumque capillo*, the one word *διαβεβοστρυχωμένον* (Fr. 162 Bergk) must be taken from the same context in the Archilochean epode—even without any verbal similarity between the Latin and the Greek fragment. Lucilius described a woman, whose husband is absent, as she runs around here and there in town and thus comes nearer and nearer to unfaithfulness (992-994 M). There is no direct evidence at all that Archilochus had done the same. Only an epigram of Dioscurides (*Anth. Pal.*, VII, 351) makes a very vague allusion to Archilochus and Lyecambes' daughters. Without bothering about the very general and vague character of this epigram—which only proves that Dioscurides remembered Archilochus' quarrel with Lyecambes and his objections to his former fiancée (he even speaks of daughters in the plural)—Lasserre takes it as sufficient testimony that Archilochus objected in this very poem to Neobule's running around in the streets of Paros (p. 94). And as to the final object of her ways and visits: the adespoton 8 D must be taken into this context: she visited the old Xanthus—in Lasserre's opinion evidently a match-maker similar to the old one in Herodas' first mimiamb. But the climax of this argumentation has still to be reached. Lasserre finds another reader and imitator of just this poem of Archilochus: Catullus in his 58th poem (pp. 98 f.). Is not Catullus' *in quadriviis*

*et angiportis* (line 4) an exact repetition of *ἐν ἀγναις* in Dioseurides' epigram and, therefore, surely taken from Archilochus' 4th epode? And, furthermore, Archilochus had said somewhere *παντ' ἄνδρ' ἀποσκολύπτει* (Fr. 124 Bergk). Is not Catullus' *glubit* (58, 5) in exact correspondence to this *ἀποσκολύπτει*? Let us, therefore, assume as certain that Fr. 124 Bergk was a quotation from this very context of this very 4th epode! In reality we know that the verb *ἀποσκολύπτειν* was used not only by Archilochus but also by Sophocles (Fr. 423 P); it could have been used, furthermore, in every passage of similar meaning in every erotic text in the whole of Greek antiquity, and it is only due to the fragmentary preservation of Greek literature that we do not know of more than two passages where it was actually used. Consequently Catullus could have written his *glubit* either remembering the verb *ἀποσκολύπτειν* from hundreds of passages, or independently. There is no proof at all of "Catullus as another reader of Archilochus' 4th epode," as Lasserre puts it.

In the case of the so-called 3rd and 4th epode of Archilochus the situation in regard to the material at our disposal is so hopeless that an attempt at reconstruction was almost necessarily doomed to fail: the fragments are completely insignificant and we do not possess a later text which depends beyond doubt on the lost poems we want to reconstruct. But the evidence should be better for those poems which Horace followed closely as his models. We choose as an example Horace's 13th epode, the model of which was, as Lasserre believes, the 11th epode of Archilochus.

What induces Lasserre to assume that an epode of Archilochus was the model of the 13th epode of Horace? Archilochus, Fr. 100 D—if read without conjectural change as it is written in the *Gramm. Hamb.*, and interpreted rightly—proves not only that Archilochus used the same meter, but is also of a remarkable similarity in situation and expression to Horace's poem (pp. 204 ff.).<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately no convincing confirmations for the hypothesis that Horace's model was this Archilochean poem exist. The fact that Archilochus somewhere mentioned wine of Naxos (Fr. 151 Bergk) and Horace, too, speaks of an extraordinary sort of wine (line 6) in the 13th epode (p. 208) is certainly no proof at all. Furthermore in the commonplace expression, Archilochus, Fr. 8 (quoted by Stobaeus without the name of the poet), which Lasserre takes as the model for Horace, lines 7 f. (pp. 208 f.), the dissimilarities seem to be greater than the similarities; neither that Fr. 8 belonged to this epode, nor that this epode was Horace's model is, therefore, proved. Between Horace, 8-10 and Archilochus, Fr. 106 (p. 210) there is not the slightest similarity in the expression of an idea so often used in lyric poetry. Other evidence produced by Lasserre is even weaker: that somewhere in Archilochus (Fr. 169 Bergk) an oracle of Apollo was mentioned does not prove by any means that the poem in question was the "11th epode" and that Horace borrowed the motive of a prophecy (9 ff.) from this passage (Lasserre, pp. 215 ff.).

Whereas for the "3rd and 4th epode" the almost complete lack

<sup>7</sup> The interpretation of this fragment is one of the real merits of Lasserre's book.

of evidence seems to be responsible for the impossibility of reconstruction, in the case of the "13th epode" Lasserre has not made the full and right use of the material at hand. Better methods of proving that Text A was the source or the model of Text B, and, consequently, of reconstructing Text A—if lost—with the help of Text B have to be used. What Lasserre does is a somewhat old-fashioned game: he states similarities between Archilochus and Horace, and concludes that Archilochus has been the source of Horace. Now, even if the similarities were much closer and much more convincing than they really are, they would prove only that Archilochus *could* have been the source of Horace, not that he really *was* the source. Neglect of this fundamental logical fact discredits the whole method of establishing the relation of source and imitation between two texts merely on the ground of similarities in subject-matter or in expression. What ought to be done in the case of "Archilochus epode 11" is this: it is found that Archilochus used the same epodic meter as Horace in his 13th epode; therefore, the possibility must be reckoned with, under the circumstances perhaps even the probability, that an epode of Archilochus was the model of Horace's 13th epode. And from this point on the research should be concentrated on the text of Horace: if Horace adapted a poem of Archilochus for his own purposes, his text should still show signs of this adaptation. A poem completely adequate and suitable to express Archilochus' thought and emotion in a certain situation could not express equally well 600 years later Horace's thoughts and emotions in another—though, perhaps, somewhat similar—situation of life. Discrepancies, weak points must be discernible in the structure of the later poem. Careful analysis of Horace's 13th epode would have to detect these traces of the poem's source. Put together, these remnants would add up to the skeleton of a complete whole, to the skeleton of Horace's model. So the analysis of Horace's epode would have a double result: a) it would show clearly what Horace owed to his model and in how far he transformed this model, and b) it would show what was Horace's very own in his poem. With regard to Horace's source, only if the model, as reconstructed with the help of its traces in Horace, coincides with what we know from other evidence of the "11th epode" of Archilochus, is it proved that his "11th epode" was really the source of Horace's 13th. And only after this has been established might similarities in expression or thought be used as additional evidence. The method of research to be applied in this case is fundamentally the same as the method used in every analysis aimed at discovering and reconstructing sources of a text.<sup>8</sup> I do not know, indeed I doubt, that an analysis

<sup>8</sup> These methods of research were first applied and developed in analysing such concise and stable literary forms as Greek tragedies. It was Zieliński's merit to show that the tragedies we still possess are full of remnants—Zieliński calls them "loci rudimentales"—of their lost models (Th. Zieliński, *Tragodumenon Libri III* [Krakau, 1925], Chapter I). I have tried, in several of my publications, to make full use of Zieliński's findings in order to develop a reliable method both of analysing given texts and of determining and reconstructing their sources.

of Horace's epode 13 would have given enough evidence for reconstruction of its Archilochean source. But the fact that Lasserre did not even attempt it makes his results and assumptions unconvincing.<sup>9</sup>

We chose Lasserre's reconstruction of Archilochus' epodes 3, 4, and 11 only as examples of his method and the reliability of his results. His whole book and all its parts have the same merits and are subject to the same objections. We owe Lasserre thanks for a serious attempt at a reconstruction of Archilochus' epodes, for very careful interpretation of the single fragments, for many readjustments in the text and the understanding of these fragments. His reconstructions, however, of the single poems and of the whole book of epodes have failed, owing to the scarcity of the material and to the neglect of an analytical method of research as described above. The conclusions concerning Archilochus' biography drawn from these reconstructions are, therefore, completely unprovable.

FRANZ STOESSL.

UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA.

Hérodote, *Histoires*, Livre VII. Texte établi et traduit par PH.-E. LEGRAND. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1951. Pp. 240. (*Collection Budé*.)

In this edition of Book VII Legrand is much less conservative than Hude. Besides offering some new conjectures of his own he admits a number of old conjectures which have not generally found favour, and some readers will certainly think he is too ready to find fault with the existing text and too strict in his expectation of grammatical uniformity and orthodoxy from Herodotus. It is a pity that he has not always enough space to explain his innovations either in his critical apparatus or in his note "ad versionem gallicam."

He often agrees with earlier editors that a word or phrase has been lost and makes some additions to the list of suspected lacunae. In 25, 2 he accepts Stein's *πλεῖστον* <*σίτον*>, an easy but perhaps not really necessary addition; and if the word is to be inserted, it should be put in the previous sentence; palaeographically the easiest place would be as the last word in the sentence *πανταχόθεν* <*σίτον*>. *τὸν δὲ ὅν πλεῖστον*. In 109, 2, not content with Stein's <*Θασίων*> he reads *ἰών* <*Θασίων*>, which is more difficult Greek and no easier from

<sup>9</sup> It is clear that in analysing a poem like Horace, Ep. 13 the first step would have to be the establishment of as exact a chronology as possible. Lasserre contents himself with quoting and following Olivier, *Les Epodes d'Horace* (Lausanne-Paris, 1917), p. 140, on this question. But wherever the problem of the chronology of Horace's epodes arises, such a careful study as R. Latsch, *Die Chronologie der Sätiere und Epoden des Horaz auf entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Grundlage* (Diss. Würzburg, 1936) should be consulted.

a palaeographical point of view. In 139, 5 he reads *τοῦτο <έλόμενοι>*, repeating the word from the previous line, rather than follow Cobet in deleting *τοῦτο*; but the anaphora does not seem in place. In 116 he is probably right in preferring Stein's lacuna after *ἀκούων* to Hude's attempt to emend the word (he does not mention his conjecture *ἀνυσθεντεν*). In 153, 1 he is rightly dissatisfied with *οἰκήτωρ ὁ ἐν Γέλῃ*. Reiske's deletion of *ὁ* is not an adequate cure and he thinks something may be lost, perhaps *γενόμενος*. So also in 154, 1 he finds Reiske's deletion of *ὅς* after *Παταίκου* an inadequate cure and thinks (with Stein) that some further description of Aenesidemus, son of Pataecus, has dropped out. The same view is expressed by Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* (Oxford, 1948), p. 378, n. 3. In 197, 2, where Hude gives no hint of dissatisfaction with the text, he thinks with good reason that the sentence cannot stand as it is and suspects a lacuna after *πρυτανῆς*. He follows Stein in marking a lacuna after *ἔόντων* in 212, 1 and after *συμμίσγοντες ἔξω τῶν στεινῶν* in 223, 3. Hude in his apparatus does not mention Stein's suggestion in either place, but proposes to read *συμμισγόντων* in 223.

Legrand is often tempted by an easy emendation in passages where the traditional text presents a slight but not insurmountable difficulty. In 233, 1 he adopts Reiske's *ἔδοσαν <ἄν>*, which Hude does not even mention. In 132 Herodotus says that the Thebans *did* give earth and water; so even if they did not in fact make their formal submission until later, Herodotus apparently thought they had done so. Furthermore the emended reading is dramatically most inappropriate. What are we to imagine these men shouting as they rushed forward to surrender? Could they have hoped to save their lives in the heat of battle by pleading what they would have done under different circumstances?

In 6, 3 Legrand accepts Krueger's future optative *ἀφανιούσθω* instead of *ἀφανιζούσθω*; and in 49, 2 he emends *κομίζεαι* to *κομίσεαι*, an exceedingly awkward form; neither change is really necessary. In 33, in the traditional text, we read of a headland *'Αβύδῳ καταντίον* *ἐνθα . . . ἐπὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦ Ἀρίφρονος στρατηγοῦ Ἀθηναίων Ἀρταϊκτην* *ἀνδρα Πέρσην λαβόντες . . . πρὸς σανίδα διεπασσάλευσαν*. Legrand accepts Krueger's *'Αβύδου*, because elsewhere in Herodotus the genitive is found with *καταντίον*, and Stein's *Ἀθηναῖοι*, which gives a definite subject for the verb instead of leaving the reader to infer it from *στρατηγοῦ Ἀθηναίων*. There is much to be said for leaving the text alone here, as Hude does. And his change of *φέρει τά* to *φέρουσα* in 5, 3 is a thoroughly arbitrary emendation. On the other hand he is certainly right in reading *εἰπε ἄρα τάδε* in 17, 1, so as to explain the occurrence of *ἄρα* in ABC, and *κιτάρις* in 90 (an improvement on De Pauw's *κιτάριας*) for the *κιθᾶνας* of the codices.

In 180 he breaks away from the traditional text *διαδέξιον ποιέμενοι τὸν εἴλον τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρῶτον καὶ κάλλιστον*, reading *εἴναι* instead of *καὶ*, "considérant comme de bon augure que le premier des Grecs qu'ils avaient pris fût très beau." The traditional text with all its difficulties is better than this; the accusative and infinitive construc-

tion is scarcely possible here, unless *τοῦτον* is inserted as subject of the infinitive. In 205, 2 he proposes to read *τῶν κατεστεῶτων Τριγκοσίων* instead of *τοὺς κατεστεῶτας Τριγκοσίους*, a drastic cure, but he is probably right to insist on the difficulty of the traditional text: "Si Léonidas avait pris pour l'accompagner le corps des Trois Cents en bloc, il n'aurait pas eu à chercher en dehors pour compléter sa troupe de 300 hommes." He is also quite right to suspect *τῆς Θρηίκης* in 185, 2, where he points out that a local name is called for, perhaps *Οἰταίνης*. The sentence at the end of 228, explaining who was responsible for the *epigrammata* at Thermopylae, was suspected by Krueger, and Legrand suggests that it should be recast as follows: 'Επιγράμμασι μέν νν καὶ στήλαις Ἀμφικτύονές εἰσι οἱ ἐπικοσμήσαντες, ἔξω ἡ τὸ τοῦ μάντιος ἐπίγραμα Σιμωνίδης . . . ὁ ἐπιγράψας. He is also dissatisfied with the last sentence in 237. In the text he follows Krueger, *κακολογίης* [πέρι] *τῆς ἐς Δημάρητον*, but he proposes *κακηγορίης τῆς περὶ Δημαρήτον*. Unfortunately he does not explain how these changes in the text might have taken place.

As compared with these emendations we must notice his preference for the reading of the codices where other editors have been dissatisfied. In 41, 2 he keeps the reading *διέλειπέ τε*, where most editors accept Schweighäuser's *διελέλειπτο*; he argues that *ὁ δυμός* can be the subject of this verb, but this is very difficult Greek. He also refuses to change the apparently misplaced *τε* in 44. In 124 he rejects Vossius' *Ἐχείδωρον*, which is generally accepted, on the ground that the evidence for this form is late, and prefers to keep *Χείδωρον* as a native name for the river, regarding the other form as a later Greek rationalization.

For chapters 166-73 there are two papyrus fragments, of which only the first had been published before Hude's third edition, *P. Oxy.*, 1375 and 2098 (now re-edited by Paap, *Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava*, IV [1948]). Legrand follows the papyrus in restoring *ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ* in 167, 1 (omitted by DRSV and bracketed by Hude). He does not note that Hude, following Abicht, also bracketed *ἔθνετο καὶ* in the same section; these words are in the papyrus and Legrand restores them to the text without indicating that previous editors had suspected them. In 167, 2 he follows Stein in bracketing *ὡς Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Συρκόσιοι*, which was omitted in PDRSV. *P. Oxy.*, 1375 breaks off before reaching this point, but one may well believe that it included these words, as it supports the Florentine readings consistently. In 170, 2 he fails to note that *P. Oxy.*, 2098 supports the reading of the majority of the codices *Μεσσαπίους*, and that its editors plausibly restore [*τὰς δ]*η in 170, 3 instead of the incorrect *ἀς δή*; and he reports it as reading *καταλέιπτο* in 170, 4, although in fact it supports the reading of D, *κατελέιπτο*. He might also have made it clear that it probably gave the correct reading in 172, 3 (Paap restores *βοηθέειν* [*δὲ οὐ βουλό*] *μεν[οι]*).

The French translation, though generally excellent, seems definitely at fault in two places. In 102, 1 Demaratus is made to say to Xerxes: "Puisque tu ordonnes de parler en toute sincérité, de dire ce qui ne saurait exposer personne à être par la suite convaincu par

toi de mensonge" (*ταῦτα λέγοντα τὰ μὴ ψευδόμενός τις ὑστερον ὑπὸ σέο ἀλώσεται*). Legrand explains "personne" in a note: "C'est à dire toute personne qui, n'ayant pas comme lui à se plaindre des Lacédémoniens, pourrait être soupçonnée, quand elle ferait leur éloge, de partialité." This tortuous reasoning is neither convincing nor necessary. Demaratus, in using the indefinite pronoun "someone" simply means himself: "Since you want the truth from me and you don't want to discover afterwards that a fellow has been lying." The logic of such an expression is that the speaker identifies himself with anyone else in a similar position, as a man might say to his wife: "You wouldn't want your husband (or: a husband of yours) to tell you a lie."

In 172, 1 editors have generally printed: Θεσσαλοὶ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀναγκαῖης τὸ πρῶτον ἐμῆδισαν, ὡς διέδεξαν, ὅτι οὐ σφι ἤνδανε τὰ οἱ Ἀλευάδαι ἐμηχανῶντο: "their initial act of medism was forced on them, as they made clear, because they did not approve of the intrigues of the Aleuadae." A similar use of ὡς διέδεξαν can be found in VIII 3, 2; but Legrand drops the second comma and translates: "montrant bien que les machinations des Aleuades n'étaient pas pour leur plaisir." It is perhaps sufficient criticism to say that a clause with ὡς is by no means the same as a participle; and the actions of the Thessalians, as described in the following sentence, show not their opposition to the Aleuadae, but their unwillingness to medize. The traditional translation, therefore, must be preferred (Legrand's interpretation will be found in Rawlinson, but not in Godley).

There are four essays in this volume: on the decision of Xerxes as told in 1-18; on his preparations and his march as far as Tempe (19-130); on the Greek story, as told in 131-178; and finally on the story of Thermopylae and Artemisium, which covers the narrative as far as VIII, 26. The three main questions which Legrand consistently sets himself in these essays are: "How and why has Herodotus selected and organized his material; what are his sources; and how accurate is his narrative?" He argues that Xerxes' conversations with Mardonius and Artabanus, apart from the dream and the rhetorical detail of the speeches, are founded on genuine Persian information about a conflict of views between these men. He shows how in the narrative of Xerxes' march incidents are chosen and presented in such a way as to emphasize the king's despotic arrogance; that the only digressions not directly related to this theme are the geographical details; and that they earn their place in the text because Herodotus is telling the story of a march. He argues convincingly that Herodotus took most of his information from oral sources, making no attempt to rationalize their accounts when they allowed prejudice or even pure fantasy to obscure historical details. In fact, Legrand provides in these essays a firm basis on which the thoughtful reader can build more detailed critical studies; it is one of the great merits of this edition that he has always performed this task admirably.

His brief explanatory notes provide useful and shrewd commentary, though one could sometimes wish that he were more generous in giving references and bibliography. For example, in commenting on Gelon's remark that "the spring has been taken out of

the year" (162, 1), he says that if this saying has been borrowed from a funeral oration of Pericles it is much less apt as used by Gelon; but he does not give the references to Aristotle (*Rhet.*, I, 7; III, 10) where we are told that Pericles used these words. Some of Legrand's original suggestions may be mentioned briefly here. He thinks that the visit of Xerxes to Tempe was probably not a pleasure excursion, but a military reconnaissance which made him decide against using this route; that Herodotus, in timing his visit after his decision to use the "upper route" through Thessaly, probably reversed the actual order of events. As for this upper route, which according to Herodotus was unknown to the Greeks when they first went up to Thessaly (173, 4), it is suggested that they thought it impassable for a large army and took fright only when they learned Xerxes was actually building a road along it (cf. 131). In discussing the statement of Herodotus (severely criticized by Plutarch) that the Thebans remained at Thermopylae against their will and that Leonidas retained them as hostages (222), he tries to discover what actually happened; Leonidas may have felt that their presence tied the hands of Thebes; but the Thebans, who were too numerous to be retained against their will, must have had a reason of their own for staying—perhaps in order that their country might still have the benefit of the doubt when the Greek world came to pass judgment on its conduct.

This volume is an important and stimulating contribution to Herodotean scholarship. The misprints, though more numerous than they should be, will not cause the reader serious inconvenience. For reference purposes the text would be easier to use if the numbers of sections were given within the chapters; but it is rather late to make this complaint now, when seven volumes out of nine have appeared.

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

---

E. DEMOUGEOT. De l'unité à la division de l'Empire Romain, 395-410. Essai sur le gouvernement impérial. Paris, Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1951. Pp. xvi + 618; 1 plate. \$5.30.

This closely reasoned and well documented study aims at the solution of two problems: the cause of the rift between East and West that occurred within the period 395-410, and an evaluation of the personality and policy of Stilicho. The two problems, Demougeot argues, are in reality but one. What made the latent tension between the two halves of the Empire acute and permanent was the Germanic invasions 407-410, which culminated in Alaric's sack of Rome. These same invasions brought about the fall of Stilicho, whose unionist policy failed because neither he nor his political enemies were able to foresee them or to understand them as part of the vast migration of peoples then under way.

On the morrow of Theodosius' death, East Rome and West Rome were still generally felt to be the two halves of one and the same

Empire. Either half, to be sure, had its own problems, resulting from different religious, social, economic, and military conditions. Yet there was still one law; it only had to face different obstacles (p. 88). After 410, an East that is virtually intact turns away from a West that lies in ruins. Whereas in the West general poverty fosters feudalism, and the emperors yield their place to Germanic kings, Constantinople sees the rise of absolute monarchy; and eastern Caesopapism is in sharp contrast to the ascent of the Church of Rome. When, in 438, the Theodosian Code was promulgated for the whole *orbis* the official copy sent to the Roman senate was duly acknowledged but remained a dead letter as it no longer applied to western conditions.

Against this general background the author invites us to see the fateful events of 395-410. When Theodosius divided the Empire between his two sons he did not mean to introduce a permanent partition. On the contrary, the unity of the Empire was emphasized in the person of Stilicho, who, whilst regent only for the *pars occidentis*, had been appointed executor of the late emperor's testament, and, as Demougeot plausibly argues, tutor of both princes during their minority; besides, he was commander-in-chief of all the imperial armies, both Eastern and Western (pp. 99-104). Although his political position in the East was purely moral, it would have been easy for him, with the army at his command, to unite the whole Empire under his regency, or even to make himself emperor. Yet, in spite of hostile allegations, there is no evidence to suggest that he ever aspired to the throne; he even resisted for a long time the temptation to extend his regency to the East by force of arms. This seems all the more surprising as his entire policy aimed at maintaining the union of the two *partes*. The key to this puzzle Demougeot finds in Stilicho's personality (pp. 139-42). This thoroughly romanized scion of "barbarian" nobility fell a victim to his belief in his adopted civilization. With the "old-timers" among the senatorial nobility of his day he shared the illusion that the late Empire was still the Rome of a distant past. They, however, were Romans by birth, he merely by education. This "man of goodwill but without either imagination or initiative" could not conceive of a Rome other than the traditional picture of her rhetors and historians. This Rome he was to preserve, not to impose himself on her. Moreover, he bore an unbounded loyalty to the house of Theodosius, to whom he owed all that he was. For this loyalty he paid with a daily decrease of his power, and ultimately with his life. It was loyalty to Arcadius that prevented him from armed intervention in 395, against Rufinus, and again in 400, against the tyranny of Gainas after the fall of Eutropius; when he let Alaric escape from Pholoe in 397 he probably did so in order to spare Arcadius, who, through his minister Eutropius, had opened secret negotiations with the Visigoth king (pp. 171 f.). Yet all the time Stilicho hoped for an opportunity of settling the affairs of the East as its lawful protector. His scrupulous loyalty, however, spoiled his chance. When he was eventually forced to act he not only had to face a strong anti-teutonic policy at the Byzantine court, headed by Anthemius, but also found his own sovereign, Honorius, turned

nationalist and "anti-barbarian," and ever less willing to listen to his "barbarian" mentor. By some tragic irony, an *entente*, if only temporary, of East and West was brought about just then, but in a spirit that put Stilicho out of action. His failure to cope with the double threat of the usurper Constantine III and the new tide of Germanic invasions sealed his fate.

Stilicho's dealings with the German invaders of Italy are overshadowed by the indifference, and even hostility, of the East on the one hand, and the general blindness (his own included) to the extent and true nature of the Germanic problem on the other. It was impossible to defend the Empire against a simultaneous attack on several fronts. Even local attacks on a large scale could be repulsed only by a concentration of forces. Now eastern "anti-barbarianism," growing as it did from 400 A.D., tended to keep aloof from the affairs of a "barbarized" West. In order to meet the invasions of Alaric in 402-3 and of Radagais in 405, Stilicho, left to his own resources, had to strip the Rhine frontier of most of its defenders, and thus exposed it to the disaster of New Year's night 407. It was this refusal of military collaboration on the part of the eastern government that made Stilicho realize that the break had become inevitable; proof of his changed attitude is his alliance with Alaric against Constantinople and his preparations for an eastern war. This alliance, however, made him suspect at the court of Ravenna, where during the recent invasions an anti-teutonic party had come to power. This party grew steadily in strength as Stilicho's influence was on the wane. Honorius was completely won over. Under the double threat of 407, the war with Constantinople had to be abandoned. Even so, there could be no question of fighting the Vandals and Constantine at the same time. Once more Silicho, an ever loyal servant of his master, decided to fight the usurper rather than the barbarians. This proved to be the ruin of the West as well as his own. According to Demougeot's persuasive analysis of the evidence (pp. 425-7), Stilicho went with open eyes into the trap that was laid for him because his sole alternative would have been to become a rebel, and thus to unleash civil war and invite another invasion of Italy by either Constantine or Alaric. If his end was meant as a deliberate sacrifice, however, it was in vain. Honorius recognized Constantine as his colleague, and stuck obstinately to his anti-German policy until the exasperated Alaric, reluctantly, decided to storm Rome.

To the superficial observer it might thus appear that Stilicho's failure as a politician (at least after 400) and his increasing difficulties in defending the West against external enemies worked towards the bitter end in a vicious circle. Such readers are warned by Demougeot (pp. 488 f.) that the interplay of these factors merely accelerated a course of events that seemed inevitable. The Roman Empire had long reached the limits of its capacity. Its frontiers could resist unruly neighbours, but not wave after wave of peoples in quest of new homes. The military victories of Stilicho at Pollentia, Verona, and Fiesole did not save Rome because they were neither exploited strategically nor could they have the result of stemming the tide of migrations (p. 276). The deep-rooted causes

of this failure are merely hinted at: the condition of the imperial army, and the imagined self-sufficiency of Greco-Roman civilization.

The Roman army, having been mercenary for centuries, with the Roman element ever decreasing, was then largely composed of Germans. This semi-barbarian army not only weighed heavily on the population but was also felt as a permanent threat. Yet this same army, then as always, was the sole power on which monarchy could rely. It was for dynastic reasons that Theodosius made his generalissimo the trustee of his house and realm.

Could the imperial army have stood the test of a large-scale foreign war? It was, to begin with, limited in numbers—a limit imposed not only by state finances, but also by economic and social factors, and by political considerations. So far, the Empire had never had to fight a power that threatened its very existence. Now it had to face such a threat, all the more dangerous because of its amorphous nature, and this at a moment when the discord of East and West made Rome particularly vulnerable. If Stilicho did not follow up his successes the reason can only have been that he was short of troops. However, even a flawless strategy would have made little difference in the end because it would always have been devised merely for stopping raids, not for diverting an avalanche. No Roman ever realized that all the invasions of Northerners, from the Cimbri to the Vandals, were phases of one great movement, which ought to be tackled as a whole. Had this been done, the Empire, with all its shortcomings, might have become the nucleus of an organized resistance to the ultimate cause of the upheaval, the migration of the Huns. Greco-Roman civilization, however, was typically mediterranean, walled in, spiritually as well as physically, by the great mountain-ranges. Parthia, India, China did not impress themselves on the Roman mind as entities of their own; even less so would the barbarians of the North. Not even their need of land was taken quite seriously. The half-hearted methods of absorption either by the army (as *foederati*) or by the countryside (as *coloni*) proved insufficient and to some extent dangerous; besides, they caused an antiteutonic reaction. This reaction, logically, turned in the first place against the German element in the army; in the East this led to a regular purge. The alternative of a citizen army, however, offered by nationalist circles, was purely imaginary; the days of the militia were gone with the city state. What proved a failure in the East was impossible in the West; it worked havoc at the first try-out. It was the good luck of the East that, under renewed pressure of the Huns, the peoples of the Danube region and of Central Europe moved westward; thus Eastern politicians, pardonably, might believe that Alaric's raid of the Peloponnes or the revolt of Tribigild were isolated events. For the West the same error was disastrous. The loss of the western half was the price which the Empire had to pay for identifying itself with the world (p. 568).

The well-written text is copiously annotated. Demougeot has a wide command not only of the primary sources, historical, literary, religious, legal, but also of modern literature concerning her period. It is regrettable that in a work of this nature the sources are quoted

mostly in translation. *Cui bono?* At the end of the book there is a good selective bibliography, and indexes; one misses a chronological survey. Some misprints have been corrected on a loose sheet of *Errata*, but not all; uncorrected are, *inter alia*, the wrong date 398 (for 388) on p. 175, line 10, and "Alt-Open" (for "Alt-Ofen"), i. e. Aquineum, on p. 378.

No one will expect that in a book like this the treatment of every detail should be exhaustive. I offer some remarks made at random from my special fields of research. In the two notes on Aetheria (more correctly Egeria), p. 122, n. 16, and 125, n. 37, the review of H. Pétré's edition by Christine Mohrmann, *Vigiliae Christianae*, IV (1950), pp. 119-23, might have been mentioned, in particular Professor Mohrmann's endorsement, on linguistic grounds, of the early date of Egeria's pilgrimage—in opposition to the late dating of most linguists (including, quite recently, L. Spitzer, *Comparative Literature* [1949], p. 250). Note 189 on p. 387 should be recast in the light of T. F. O'Rahilly's *Early Irish History and Mythology* (Dublin, 1946). Nath Í, who died *ca.* 445 (not *ca.* 425), was never high king of Ireland, but merely king of Connacht (O'Rahilly, pp. 211-15). In note 233, p. 553, where Demougeot speaks of the dechristianization of Northern Britain, she might have mentioned St. Patrick's reference to the "apostate Piets" (*Epist.*, II, 15).

Such minor imperfections, however, do not detract from the value of this most promising first book.

LUDWIG BIELER.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

YALE CLASSICAL STUDIES, XII, edited for the Department of Classics by ALFRED R. BELLINGER and HARRY M. HUBBELL. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 265.

H. N. Porter's work on "The Early Greek Hexameter" (pp. 1-63) is extraordinarily clear, considering the appalling complexity of the subject. Perhaps, however, in such a study (not a "science," p. 8, *al.*) even clarity is a danger. It has been remarked of the pursuit of Economics that if it's difficult, it's bad enough; but if it's easy, it's impossible. Yet Porter appears to come off well and his supplementation of Fraenkel's *cola* demonstration (see especially p. 24, n. 49) is very important indeed. A few points may be noted: on p. 36 Porter condemns the principle of anomaly: "To castigate rare metrical usages, and sometimes to amend them away, using as a canon the poet's more common practices, is to blind ourselves to some of the most remarkable possibilities of the hexameter form." He then proceeds to a brilliant discussion of "three rare variations." But he has himself told us, and told us truly (p. 13), that such a line as

ἀνδρα πολύτροπον ἔννεπε, Μοῦσά, μοι, ὃς μάλα πολλά

is impossible. "In no case," he says, "in any poet does a word end in position 6 unless it is preceded by the B caesura." (You will

have to dig out his terminology, which is not difficult, for yourselves.) This holds good for both Greek and Latin hexameters (if we except Ennius); but the explanation may have seemed so obvious that it was passed over in silence. The reason for this state of affairs is that the third foot cannot be self-contained (*ἐνεπει*): this is a fundamental fact which may go beyond a matter of simple *cola* and suggest that our pursuit of ancient metrics is by no means at an end. Whether the third foot does or does not have a *caesura* is, perhaps, secondary in importance (see, e. g. Verg., *Aen.*, III, 549) to the fact that it cannot be self-contained. But if such a monstrosity crops up in the papyri or has escaped the editors of *Manetho*, say, is it going to be emended or expelled? There are degrees of anomaly and the worst of them is credulity—not, one must hasten to add, a visible defect of Porter's, who is now on the threshold of definitive work in the thorniest and most perplexing of subjects. To a layman like myself even this preliminary essay seems to be sound and impressive. Last, let me signalise his rectitude in controverting one of the worst judgments of E. G. O'Neill, Jr. (p. 49).

S. G. P. Small (pp. 67-145) publishes an exhaustive article on Marcus Argentarius, followed by a text and commentary (though one would feel happier if he had collated the Planudean material for himself, as he has the Palatine). Every reasonable means of identifying and dating the elusive poet is attacked and found wanting, though when Small says (p. 97) that "as far as internal evidence is concerned" the epigrams "might have been written at almost any time between the third century B. C. and the age of Justinian," he forgets the indications of *A. P.*, V, 105 and IX, 286 which he has clearly stated on p. 68. There is also a minute examination of metre, vocabulary, style, and characteristics. Unfortunately a number of details call for comment:

*A. P.*, V, 16, 5: no attention is paid to Desrousseaux's correction which even Maas (*Gnomon*, VII, p. 577) approves; one might also suggest *ἢ δὲ ἐπιπέμψω*.

V, 63, 1: for the possibilities of the pun see not only *A. J. P.*, LXVII, p. 150, but also Herwerden, *Mnem.*,<sup>2</sup> II, p. 306; Pezopoulos, *Byz. neugr. Jahrb.*, VIII, p. 177.

V, 104, 3-4: surely these lines should be printed as a question.

V, 113, 2: Headlam, *C. R.*, VI, p. 270, refuted Mackail's correction. Vs. 1 means "you fell in love." Vs 6: to the parallels add Favorinus, *De exil.*, col. 16, 40.

V, 116, 2: Small does not feel Waltz' compunction about the adjective. Vs. 4: the sense is not so remarkable as Small (pp. 83, 117) seems to think: see the passages cited by Gow on Theoer., I, 85.

V, 118, 1: the acc. is not at all odd "bei den Verben des Atmens und Riechens" (Kuchner-Gerth, II, 1, p. 309). If that will cover the text, keep it; otherwise read *στρεψεις*.

V, 127, 1: the technical sense of *πείρας* is explained by Headlam, *J. P.*, XXVI, p. 95. Vs. 5 I do not understand: Jacobs' corrections (see also *Jahresber.*, CCXXX, p. 149) would help; or Pezopoulos

(*loc. cit.*), though more elaborate, may be right. At any rate the latter adds a brilliant pun in Marcus' best (or worst) manner. Vs. 6: see also Menander, *Epitrep.*, 67, 100.

VI, 201, 2: *οὐλον* looks plausible enough, but that is all the more reason why Meineke's conjecture (*Philol.*, XIV, p. 33) should at least be mentioned.

VI, 246: not all of Philodemus' poems have a "highly individual style"; but in what Small aptly calls "the pleasant chaos of the Greek Anthology" it will as yet do no good to suggest Antiphilus as author. Vs. 6: Small does not explain the adjective. Stadtmueller's conjecture, adopted by Paton, seems the very thing (cf. Nonn., D., XLVIII, 307). Vs. 7: Small does not suggest why the particle is common in prayers (Denniston, p. 16).

VI, 333, 3-4: I am not the only one who has failed to understand these strange lines. The lamp is called *ἄναξ* because it may turn out to be like Apollo; it is hung on a tripod. At this point one must say firmly that all editors should be compelled to translate every comma that they print: it is the first and most important step to a commentary (cf. *A. J. P.*, XXIII, p. 345; Mazon, *Gnomon*, XXIII, p. 301). If "new conjectures, extorted by the task" (Housman, *Manil.*, V, p. xxiv) appear, so much the better. An attempt, at least, to understand consecutively will have been made.

VII, 364: cf. Wilamowitz, *Hellen. Dicht.*, I, p. 110.

VII, 374, 7: read *ναύτης* if *δρόπον* can stand alone with *ναυτικόν* understood from both parts of the line: "not even so, sailor that I was, did I abandon my course," but merely changed from one ship to another.

VII, 384, 5: It seems unnatural to take the "light pitcher" in any other way than as a Danaid receptacle. Read then, perhaps

*εἴπε τάδ', εἰ Μίνων σφήλαι· φέρε κάλπιν ἐλαφρῆν.*

"She said, trying to deceive Minos, 'Give me a light pitcher'" (cf. Lumb, *Notes on the Gk. Anth.*, p. 41).

VII, 403, 6: Herwerden, *Mnem.*, XXVIII, p. 37.

IX, 161: there is a delightful translation by Walter Leaf in *C.R.*, XXXII, p. 47. Something is still to be said for Bothe's conjecture in vs. 3, which gives point to "my hands" in vs. 1.

IX, 221, 6: Herwerden, *Mnem.*, II<sup>2</sup>, p. 332.

IX, 246, 5: correxit Bothius. Suppose the MS had happened to read the genitive in IX, 554, 5, would it have been retained?

X, 4, 5-6: for the more important references see Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds*<sup>2</sup>, p. 316.

XI, 28, 4: Gow on *Theocr.*, 8, 55.

XVI, 241, 6: what are Plato and Aristotle doing in this obscenity?

Things are greatly improved when M. G. Goggin (pp. 149-201) presents an elaborate and painstaking analysis of "Rhythm in the Prose of Favorinus." Complexity and the certainty of telling results are both increased by the use of a "formula by which the

significance of . . . variants can be determined" and "the degree of possibility that they may have occurred by chance can be fixed." It would be rash for a novice to pretend to grasp such a formula, but Miss Goggin's manner of handling her material is convincing; and she is surely definitive on her subject, adducing additional arguments that favor Favorinus' authorship of *De Fortuna*, II (Or. 64 in the corpus of Dio).

Are de Groot's methods the best available? Miss Goggin believes so, and she is admirably equipped to judge. But it may be humbly submitted that all do not yet agree without reservations: see Ammon, *B.P.W.*, 1920, pp. 217 ff., 241 ff.; Bock, *Jahresber.*, CLXXXVII, p. 239; Kalinka, *ibid.*, CCLVI, p. 49; Sandbach, *C.Q.*, XXXIII, p. 194, and de Groot himself, p. 98, among others. Yet even so, with Miss Goggin's new formula to exclude chance, it does not seem likely that her work will be superseded or undone. Here is a first rate contribution to a very intricate subject, executed in a manner at once honest and objective.

C. W. Mendell (pp. 205-26) discusses "The Influence of the Epyllion on the *Aeneid*." After a brief and not quite satisfactory bow to Walter Allen's work (*T.A.P.A.*, LXXI, pp. 1 ff.), it becomes clear that the subject of the paper is really the influence of Cat. 64 on the composition of various portions of the *Aeneid*, so that the attack by implication on Allen might possibly have been omitted. One section, that on the structure of *Aen.* IX, is particularly interesting. The relative incompleteness of the book is stressed (pp. 214, 220) and it is suggested that the form will be improved if 459-472 be allowed to follow 502. "It is not impossible that both passages" (459-472, 473-502) "were written out to be later incorporated in the book and that the editors reversed Vergil's contemplated order."

There are many signs that IX has been tampered with; here it will be sufficient to mention a few interpolations in the first part of the book. We know from the fact that Quintilian VIII, 2, 14 had already *Aen.*, I, 109 in his text (*R.M.*, LXXXIV, p. 223) that interpolations were well underway in the first century after Vergil's death. Here are a handful in IX: 85, 151, 363, 550 (and of course 29, 121, 529, though one will hardly lay stress on this). Consider also 174-5, which seem inconsistent (*omnis* is the usual jargon) with 226 ff. and are perhaps merely a reworking of 161 (*muros*) and 164 (*vices*), leaving *quod cuique tuendum est* without meaning.

One may hope that it can no longer be said that "Today the majority of scholars accept much of the *Vergilian Appendix*" (p. 214) in view, e. g., of *R.M.*, XCIII, pp. 289 ff. (and for the *Culex* see especially *Gnomon*, IV, pp. 577 ff. with its masterly application of Leo's arguments).

M. E. Taylor ("The Development of the Quod Clause," pp. 229-49) produces a smooth sequence without mentioning any of the relevant literature, or indeed any literature at all. Finally, A. R. Bellinger ("Greek Coins from the Yale Numismatic Collection, II," pp. 253-65) continues his excellent work from *Yale Stud.*, XI, pp. 307 ff. in the sound and informative manner we have come to expect from him.

DOMENICO BRAGA. *Catullo e i poeti greci*. Messina-Firenze, Casa Editrice G. D'Anna, 1950. Pp. 274. (*Biblioteca di Cultura Contemporanea*, XXX.)

This study does not aim at arranging in tidy, parallel columns all the passages from Greek poetry which may possibly have influenced Catullus, directly or indirectly. Whoever wishes to pursue such a limited goal need only consult Lafaye, the standard commentaries on Catullus, and the excellent German dissertations of this century on this subject (most of which are listed in *H. S. C. P.*, LX [1951], pp. 131-6). Rather, in the case of this book one need have no concern over

How index-learning turns no student pale,  
Yet holds the eel of science by the tail.

For this is an interpretative study which proposes, like Professor Havelock's *The Lyric Genius of Catullus* from a different approach, to unbare and then assess the veritable *anima Catulliana*. The author feels—and this is the purpose of his book—that the time is now ripe for soberly evaluating the Latin poet's originality by examining his adaptation of motives and stylistic techniques of his Greek predecessors. Now, he believes, we should be able to avoid the Scylla of *la reazione romantica* of the last century and the Charybdis of *l'estatica ammirazione della corrente umanistica*, and thus solidly establish Catullus' spiritual independence.

With Braga's thesis—that Catullus is most original when he makes the fullest use of tradition—we all, I suppose, are in agreement. This work, then, is the direct heir of, and indeed would have been impossible without, the masterly investigations of such scholars as Wilamowitz, Reitzenstein, Weinreich, and Hezel.

The chief Greek authors treated are Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Archiloachus, Sappho, the tragedians, Callimachus, Apollonius Rhodius, and the epigrammatists of the *Anthology*, with a natural emphasis on Sappho and Callimachus.

To begin with general criticisms, the book might well have had an initial chapter devoted to a brief, concise enumeration of the outstanding characteristics of Callimachus, Theocritus, Apollonius, and the epigrams of Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic times. Thus the somewhat nebulous term "Alexandrian" could have been avoided, and the reader could see in what respects Catullus now and then is quite unlike, say, Callimachus or Theocritus (as in the simplicity, lack of over-elaboration, and disproportions of No. 64) or in what respects he imitates a Hellenistic writer (as here and there in the tantalizing No. 68 he is indeed Callimachean, or in his frequent dependence upon epigrams in the *Anthology* as "starting points"). Such a chapter, if detailed and down-to-earth, would have obviated much later verbiage.

Then, too, if one is to try to get at *la potenza del genio romano* from such an approach, native elements ought not to have been neglected, whether it be a matter of reckoning with Ennius (as is probably the case in No. 64, *pace* T. Frank, "The Mutual Borrowings of Catullus and Lucretius and What They Imply," *C. P.*,

XXVIII [1933], pp. 249-56) or with the Italian love of mimicry and abuse, and of realism and concreteness, or with the innate sound-effects of the Latin language.

Also, in this delicate process of subtractions, Braga surely should have treated, on the positive side, such fundamentally Catullan items as his use of images (whence drawn, used in what quantity, and of what emotional setting; see J. Svennung, *Catulls Bildersprache*, I [*Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift*, 1945: 3]) and his handling of words (see J. Van Gelder, *De Woordherhaling bij Catullus* [Den Haag, 1933]).

Lastly, in the matter of the form and nature of the epigram and the short lyric, and their gradual merging, dogmatism is dangerous. Account should have been taken of Reitzenstein's refusal to consider metre as an important matter in the case of the Catullan epigram, as well as of Wilamowitz' judgment that when Catullus set out to write a short poem, he did not check to see whether the subject and handling traditionally demanded this or that metre. In short, it should have been frankly admitted that we know very little indeed about the history of the little lyric from the fourth to the first century B. C.

To turn now to a few specific items, Homeric influence in No. 64 (pp. 8-14) has already been much better (and more fully) treated by Wheeler, whose *Catullus and the Traditions of Ancient Poetry* (see chap. V) is never cited nor apparently used. As to whether the stream-simile in No. 68, 57-62 refers to the poet's tears or to the relief Allius gave, Braga is probably right in preferring the first, but not in holding that Catullus is here "trasportato dalla vivida fantasia" (p. 12); nothing, I believe, could be a more conscious (and incidentally unsuccessful) piece of "Alexandrian" imitation (as was shown by A. Tartara, *Animadversiones* [Roma, 1882, p. 36]). As for Hesiodic influence on No. 64 (pp. 14-17), we might have been reminded that Hesiod, according to Tzetzes, wrote a work on the same subject. Further, a comparison with the disjunctive Hesiodic style (the result perhaps of compilation?) might not have been fruitless. With the statement (p. 16) that Catullus' pessimism is more profound than Hesiod's, I find agreement difficult; the ending of No. 64 seems to me conventional (cf. No. 63, 91-3), and anyway Catullan pessimism worked within a totally different ambit. Braga makes an heroic essay to show that the *Parcae*-song is an attempt to imitate Pindar (pp. 17-21), but the arguments only remind me of "I told you butter wouldn't suit the works!" It may not be safe to hold with Wilkinson, *Horace and His Lyric Poetry*, p. 89, that "Horace is the first Roman whom we know to have studied Pindar," but at least, to my mind, the spirit and technical elements of the *Parcae*-song much sooner suggest the influences of Sappho, Euripides (*I. A.*, 1036 ff.), and Theocritus. The chapter on Archilochus (pp. 23-44) is well done, especially in its emphasis upon the temperamental affinity between the two poets. But Braga here and later (chap. VIII) maintains that "I modelli classici fornivano a Catullo un'invettiva impetuosa e violenta, a carattere soggettivo e con accuse personali; i modelli ellenistici una invettiva tipica, fatta di caricature umoristiche, di satire impersonali, di vivaci stoc-

cate" (p. 23). This may be so. Horace in his *Parios ego primus iambos / ostendi Latio* (*Epist.*, I, 19, 23-4) is probably referring only to the form of the couplet. But all the same, when it comes to practical classification, one may not feel that it is at all easy, nor useful either, to draw such scholastic lines. Many a Catullan attack would rather seem to be a complex blend of Archilocean, Hellenistic, and Italian elements, as might be expected from the poet's temperament, training, and background. The chapter on Sappho is excellent—perhaps the best in the book—especially in the section on No. 51 (pp. 48-55) with its sensible, Italian refusal to consider whether the poetess sings of love or of jealousy, "quando l'uno apporta fatalmente anche l'altra." In the section on Aeschylus, caution might perhaps suggest that we consider more seriously possible influences from the early Latin tragedians. As for the lack of understanding of Sophocles at Rome, I disagree, in part at least, in the case of Horace (cf. *C.*, I, 3 and 37, and III, 5). Incidentally, we may hope that Professor Whitman in his *Sophocles* has now exploded the myth of that poet as *un artista sereno*. For those who, like myself, are interested in structural patterns in Catullus, Braga has traced in Nos. 6, 55, and 80 an interesting sequence of "fact," "doubt," and "deduction" (in dealing with *L'innamorato che tace*, pp. 130 ff.) back to the Hellenistic epigram; cf. also Horace, *C.*, I, 8. On the section on *L'eros paidikós* (pp. 136 ff.), perhaps two comments are in order: the *molliculi* of No. 16, 8 does not refer to Juventius but to Lesbia (cf. No. 16, 12 with No. 5, 7); the purely conventional character of the Juventius poems is still no more definitely proven than that of Horace's on Ligurinus. The lengthy discussion of the *Attis* (pp. 145-54) and the questioning of Wilamowitz' views (cf. *A.J.P.*, LXVIII [1947], pp. 394 ff.) seem to this reviewer sound, but on the question of Callimachean *μέλη* (p. 147), see Pfeiffer, *Call.*, p. 216. Anent the statement that "nessuno ha saputo dare una descrizione della natura così armonicamente intonata alle diverse situazioni di spirito dei personaggi" (said of the *Attis*, p. 153), cf. *Iliad*, XXIII, 212-32 and Soph., *Ajax*, 21, 217, 258, 660, and 672, and A. S. Pease, "Notes on the Pathetic Fallacy in Latin Poetry," *C. J.*, XXII (1927), pp. 645-57. *Sed satis superque.*

While this book is not epochal in Catullan studies (since it is so largely dependent upon various monographic studies of the past fifty years), the synthesis which it presents, often accompanied by original interpretations, is both interesting and valuable, written in a sound knowledge and—something of a rarity in the case of Catullus—in a good taste. As such, it is a useful supplement, or perhaps antidote, to many of the views of Lafaye.

J. P. ELDER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

C. H. ROBERTS, editor. *The Antinoopolis Papyri, Part I.* London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1950. Pp. xii + 119; 2 plates. 25s. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, Vol. XXVIII.)

This volume is the first in a new series, which will contain the papyri found by John Johnson at Antinoopolis during the winter of 1913-14. A few texts discovered in these excavations have already been published separately, the most notable perhaps being one of the *Two Theocritus Papyri*, edited by Hunt and Johnson in 1930. The present volume continues the numbering of H. J. M. Milne, *Greek Shorthand Manuals*, 1934, and hence begins with no. 7. The 44 papyri which were selected for publication in it are said to be representative of the entire collection, "with the reservation that what may be styled professional texts (e.g. medical and legal) are under-represented . . . while the unpublished documents are on the whole later in date." As a consequence of their representative character, the various classes of texts published here have little in common except provenance and present problems of the most diverse and specialized character. An editor could hardly have a wider competence than Mr. Roberts, but he has very wisely consulted a large number of experts, especially in dealing with the theological and literary papyri. In the notes, e.g., to one short fragment from the New Comedy (no. 15) there are recorded suggestions made by Fraenkel, Maas, Pfeiffer, and Webster.

The volume begins with theological fragments from papyrus (nos. 7-9) or parchment codices (nos. 10-14). No. 7, two small pieces from the same leaf of a psalter, is notable chiefly for its "delicate and rounded" literary hand and early date (middle of the second century). The numerous and more substantial fragments in no. 8 are from a third century codex which contained *Proverbs*, *Wisdom of Solomon*, *Ecclesiasticus*, and possibly other books. The *Proverbs* fragments, as Roberts demonstrates, have a very considerable importance for the history of the text. They contain many readings which are either unique or not found in the LXX, and, secondly, show a tendency to agree with N-V. No. 9, part of a leaf again of *Proverbs* (third century), is of less interest, though it also tends to agree with N-V. The text of *Ezekiel* in no. 10 (fourth century) appears to be related to that of the Scheide *Ezekiel*. It would be interesting to know as regards all four fragments whether they come from a Christian or Jewish source. The editor does not consider the question, though eminently qualified to give an authoritative opinion. However, the codex form and the abbreviations in nos. 7, 9, and 10 may point to a Christian origin; for the criteria and for the remarkably slight evidences of early Christianity in Egypt see H. I. Bell, *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, XXXVII (1944), pp. 185-204. The existence of the Hebrew fragments, nos. 47-50, may be noted in this connection.

The remaining theological fragments are no. 11: *St. Matthew's Gospel*, with a unique reading at xxvi, 75 (fourth century); no. 12: *II John*, the greater part of the epistle with several independent readings (third century); no. 13: *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, a finely written sheet of unusual quality and the fifth example of the Greek

text of this popular work to have been found in Egypt (fourth century); and no. 14: a Latin fragment which has since been identified as part of *Esther*, iv in the *versio antiquissima*; see J. Moreau, *La Nouvelle Clio*, III (1951), p. 398. The order of recto and verso should be reversed.

There are eight new classical fragments, the hands of which range from the late second to the fifth century. Perhaps the most interesting is no. 15, a page of a New Comedy codex. On the recto there is a recognition scene; on the verso, the beginning of a new act or play. An insert notes that another leaf of the same codex has been published by Schubart in his *Griechische Literarische Papyri*, no. 23. Very little remains of the next three pieces: no. 16, another comic fragment; no. 17, hexameter poems, the recto dealing probably with Telamon and Teucer, the verso with the rivalry between the Sirens and Muses; and no. 18, a text of unknown genre but clearly referring to the Eleusinian mysteries. No. 19 seems to be from an epitome, perhaps the author's own, of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *A.R.* (the episode of Coriolanus). The scholia on Callimachus, *Hymns*, no. 20, were included by Pfeiffer in his recent edition of that author. No. 21 is a sillybos having the tantalizing inscription Πίνδαρος ὄλος (third century). The recto of a Latin legal fragment, no. 22, has been identified by Prof. de Zulueta as treating of the edict *quod falso (?) tute* (*Dig.*, XXIII, 6) and as being possibly a passage of Ulpian, *Ad Edictum*, XII.

The fragments of extant classical authors (nos. 23-30) vary in size and importance. Nevertheless, together with the group just summarized, they give a striking impression of the great variety of literary works circulating in Antinoopolis during the late Empire and early Byzantine period. No. 23 is a leaf of the *Medea*, containing short scholia and a new reading in line 839 (*μετρίοις* instead of *μετρίας*). The fragments of the *Bacchae*, no. 24, have already been used in Dodds' edition of the play. No. 25, a leaf from Thucydides, VIII, contains several new readings (third century); a collation was furnished Powell for his revision of the O. C. T. Thucydides. No. 26, fragments of Xenophon, *Symposium*, has a two-fold interest: the hand, the closest parallel to which is found in the Herodotus fragments from Dura; and the format, the first example in Egypt of a Greek literary work written on a parchment roll. Both circumstances, Roberts concludes quite reasonably, suggest that the roll may have been imported from outside Egypt. No. 27, a complete leaf of *De Corona* (secs. 49-56, third century) is carefully studied for its bearing on the text tradition. Another parchment leaf, no. 28, contains on one side the end of Hippocrates, *Prognostic*; on the other the beginning of the *Aphorisms*. The text (third century) is remarkable for its poor orthography and numerous errors. No. 29 is in format the most impressive of the entire group. It is a fragmentary papyrus page which contained the end of *Georgic* II and the beginning of *Georgic* III (fourth century). There are a few brief scholia, and the third book is preceded by what appears to be an *argumentum*. The complete page measured at least 41 x 27.5 cm., with only 25 lines to the page. Red ink was used for the *explicit* of *Georgic* II and the first three lines of *Georgic* III. Roberts observes

that "this is the first fragment of the *Georgics* to have been found in Egypt." It might be noted, however, that the first two lines of *Georgic* IV are repeated six times as a writing exercise in *P. Tebt.*, 686. The last literary papyrus, no. 30, is a parchment scrap, containing a few lines from *Aeneid*, XII.

Sixteen Roman and Byzantine documents are published (nos. 31-46). The official documents begin with no. 31, a letter from the curator of Antinoopolis to a cosmete, reminding him to serve a monthly term of office (A. D. 347); and no. 32, a fragmentary return of *patrimonalia* (A. D. 339). No. 33 is an official account of expenditure, probably drawn up by the provincial treasurer, which covers Ptolemais and presumably Antinoopolis (A. D. 346?). The editor's remark on the *ἐπαρχος* in line 7 is not quite clear: "hardly a prefect, who would not be referred to in so cavalier a fashion, but a military officer," with a reference to a *praepositus limitis Philarum* cited by Maspero, *Organisation militaire*. Roberts' conclusion that the official was not *praefectus Aegypti* is quite reasonable, but instead of comparing him with a sixth century *praepositus*, it is simpler to assume that he was an auxiliary officer, perhaps a *praefectus alae* like his well-known contemporary, Flavius Abinnaeus.

The next three documents are no. 34, a court memorandum (first half of fourth century); no. 35, parts of two petitions to an otherwise unknown prefect, Flavius Fortunius, the first of which contains remnants of eight lines in Latin, possibly a citation of another official's decision (late third century); and no. 36, a petition to a curator of Antinoopolis, showing the influence of the Chancery hand (A. D. 326?).

No. 37 is a sworn declaration by two citizens of Alexandria regarding the registration fee of their son (A. D. 209-10). A few details require comment. The lacuna at the beginning of line 2, which follows *τῶν τὸ η* (*έρος*) at the end of line 1, must almost certainly have contained the names of Septimius and Caracalla, and the date thus obtained, A. D. 200-201, should be included in index III, on p. 111. Any alternative, e. g. the eighth year of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (A. D. 168-169) would be rather early for the father's ephèbate. For *τῶν* date *ἔφηβενκότων* as part of identifications, see e. g. *P. Ryl.*, 101; *P. Tebt.*, 316; *P. Oxy.*, 477. There seems to be an error of some kind in *συμμορίας ρύθ*, which follows (line 2). In the absence of a photograph one may conjecture that the figure was *ρλθ*; that in *P. Tebt.*, 316 is *ρλγ*. Further, line 3 presumably began with the name of the *συμμοριάρχης*, not immediately with *καὶ Ἰσιδώρα*. The fragmentary condition of the text and the absence of exact parallels make the purpose of the declaration obscure. Roberts suggests that "the parents, both Alexandrians, are removing to Alexandria with an infant son and are required to make a sworn statement that the child's birth has already been registered elsewhere." But one would assume that a child of Alexandrian parents would himself have been registered in Alexandria at birth, in order to protect his citizenship and political status and to maintain his rights in private law. The parents may have been seeking to establish the fact as a basis for immunities and privileges at Antinoopolis or wherever they happened to be. This is essen-

tially the situation in *P. Oxy.*, 477 and, presumably, *P. S. I.*, 464; cf. also A. E. R. Boak, *J. E. A.*, XIII (1927), p. 154.

No. 38, a sworn declaration by a guild of silversmiths stating the price per pound of cast and worked silver, has a particular interest because of the probable connection with Diocletian's edict *de maximis pretiis* (A. D. 301). No. 39 is a receipt for repayment by an exactor for requisitioned goods (A. D. 324). In no. 40, a widow receives a receipt for the *vestis militaris* (early fourth century). Is it possible that Isidora in no. 39 was the widow, as well as the sister of the late Silvanus?

No. 41, a fragmentary Latin military register, consists of names and consular dates in rustic capitals, with a few cursive annotations. The consulships (A. D. 206 and 207) are dates of enlistment. There is really little reason to think that it may be part of a *pridianum*. Lists of names such as this might be found in records of many kinds. The fact that *M. Aurelius* several times precedes *nomina* suggests that the text may date after the *Constitutio Antoniniana*; cf. *Yale Classical Studies*, XI (1950), p. 198, n. 123. *P. Mich.*, 429 and 447 were edited by J. E. Dunlap, not by H. A. Sanders (addenda, p. 107).

There are fewer private documents: no. 42, an acknowledgment of indebtedness (*datio in solutum*) or sale in advance involving wine (A. D. 542); no. 43, a letter from husband to wife (late third to fourth century); no. 44, a letter concerning textiles (late fourth to fifth century); no. 45, a brief note, perhaps to a steward of a large estate (sixth century); and no. 46, a building account (fourth century).

The volume concludes with four Hebrew fragments, nos. 47-50, which are edited by W. D. McHardy. The first three are from *I Kings*, *II Kings*, and *Job*; the last is not decipherable. The fragments cannot be dated.

In format and in editorial practice the volume corresponds to its predecessors in the *Graeco-Roman Memoirs*. Perhaps the only indication that it is published in a difficult period is the fact that there are only two plates. No one would question the editor's choice of the pieces to be illustrated. But possibly it might have been better to have selected the recto of no. 15 rather than the verso, since there are several lines on it for whose restoration a photograph might be useful.

Needless to say, the work of the editor is of the highest order. The present volume is all one would expect it to be from his many other contributions and is in keeping with the great tradition established for the *Memoirs* by Grenfell and Hunt. No higher praise could be given.

J. F. GILLIAM.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

SIR JOHN DAVIDSON BEAZLEY. *The Development of Attic Black-figure.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press; London, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. xiv + 127; 49 pls. \$6.50. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XXIV.)

In the summer of 1928 J. D. Beazley delivered a lecture before the British Academy. The text of this lecture, together with some lists of vases and a few illustrations, was published under the title *Attic Black-figure: A Sketch*, and this small volume has served ever since both as an authoritative and delightfully written introduction to black-figure vase-painting and as a work of reference for specialists.

The present book is in a way a successor to the *Sketch*, but much enlarged and brought up to date. Here we have the text of eight lectures, delivered at the University of California in the winter of 1948-9, in which the development of Attic black-figure is traced from its origins in the Geometric and Proto-Attic styles, through its great period in the sixth century B. C. and its long survival into Hellenistic times on Panathenaic amphorae. The emphasis throughout is on vase-painters, and each successive period is illustrated by the works of the principal artists active at the time. Other topics are by no means neglected, however. There is constant reference to the vases themselves and particularly to the development of the various shapes. The subjects portrayed on the vases lead the author to many interesting comments on mythology and ancient life. Chronological questions are not treated in detail, and the author continues his wise policy of avoiding hair-splitting chronological distinctions; yet the general course of development is clearly outlined, and there are enough absolute dates to chart the way. There are no lists of vases by the various painters, these being reserved for a separate book, *Attic Black-figure Vase-painters*, which, we are told in the preface, is well advanced.

The illustrations, some of them from photographs by Lady Beazley, are on collotype plates at the end of the book. They are generally of good quality and adequate size. About 80 vases and fragments are shown, some in several views, a generous selection. The choice is superlative. We have here not the standard string of pots that one is apt to find in handbooks, although old friends are by no means lacking. A number of pieces are published here for the first time, something quite unusual in a general work on vase painting. Others which had been published in obscure journals or with inadequate photographs are now made readily accessible by their publication here. Many of the old friends are seen in new views or details. Of this wealth of new or almost new material we may mention the important early Panathenaic amphora in Florence, assigned to Lydos, a fragmentary amphora in Basel by the same painter, a charming fragment by Kleitias in Moscow, a fragment by Exekias in Lund, and new details of the Nearchos kantharos and the dinos No. 606 from the Acropolis. We are also given tantalizing glimpses of a newly acquired krater by Lydos in the British Museum and of a curious late cup by the Amasis painter in Boston. Those interested in the transition from the Geometric to the Proto-Attic

style will welcome the pictures of the ovoid krater in the Earl of Elgin's collection, published here for the first time. One complaint only: the pictures of the Leyden hydria by the Antimenes painter are taken from a bad angle and are marred by huge glaring highlights. The vase, with its delightful scenes from the life of the palaestra, is justly popular; will its custodians in Leyden not favor us soon with new pictures?

A few comments on points of detail follow.

Pages 7-8; the Menelaos stand from Aegina in Berlin. The letter forms and dialect of the inscription on this stand have been identified as Aeginetan by Miss L. H. Jeffery (*J. H. S.*, LXIX [1949], p. 26). This does not necessarily mean that the vase is a local Aeginetan product. In fact it seems quite clear that no painted pottery was being made in Aegina at this time, there being no suitable beds of non-porous clay available. This has recently been reaffirmed by Wilhelm Kraiker (*Aigina, Die Vasen des 10. bis 7. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* [Berlin, 1951], especially pp. 11-12 and 20) and is borne out by the amount and variety of the imports. Yet we may well ask whether Aeginetans did not have some part in the manufacture of the pottery made in various centers for export to their island, particularly the nearer centers such as Athens and Corinth. If we assume that Aeginetans either owned or were employed in the shop in Attica that made the Menelaos stand, it would sufficiently account for both the Aeginetan inscription and for the fact that so many products of this shop have been found in Aegina.

On page 18, in discussing the Sophilos dinos from the Acropolis, the author writes: "The position of the Nysai, as the painter calls them, is uncertain: the heads of three women remain, two side by side, the third full-face and playing the flute: they would seem to correspond to the Muses who accompany the chariots on the François vase and who sang at the wedding; but the name Nysai, which in the plural occurs here only, points to these being attendants of Dionysos." Could it be that Sophilos really meant to write *ΜΟΥΣΑΙ* not *ΝΥΣΑΙ*? He was a poor speller as is shown, for example, by the inscriptions cited on page 19. *Nu* for *mu* is an easy slip. *Upsilon* for *omicron upsilon* is perhaps less easy to justify, but there are examples of this very same mistake on two ostraka with the name Boutalion (*ca. 485 B. C.*; Agora Excavations, Athens, unpublished). We may assume the same thing in a recently published archaic Attic inscription on which the name *Βύλος* appears where we would expect *Βοῦλος* (*Hesperia*, XVII [1948], pp. 141-2). I will treat this point more fully when I publish the Boutalion ostraka in *Hesperia*. The proposed emendation would allow us to interpret the figures as Muses, which is what we should expect them to be, and at the same time would rid us of a difficult word, a sort of *ἄναξ λεγόμενον* in that this is the only instance of its use in the plural.

Page 44, line 9. The footnote reference should be 19, not 21.

Page 67: on the technique of the Munich Exekias cup. Miss Richter has recently re-examined this cup and reports that the coral-red was clearly applied *after* the black-figured decoration and the black gaze of the rim: see *B. S. A.*, XLVI (1951), p. 148.

In Plate 43, 1 we look in vain for the rock referred to on page 86. Could it be on the other side of the vase which is not illustrated?

Pages 90-1: the early Panathenaic amphora in Florence. This important vase, adequately illustrated here for the first time, is attributed "in all probability" to Lydos by comparison with that painter's Berlin oinochoe, F 1732. The same comparison was made many years ago by Milani who discusses the Florence vase briefly without illustrating it and says that the quadriga resembles that of the oinochoe Berlin F 1732 so closely that it might be said to have been drawn by the same hand (*Museo Italiano di Antichità Classica*, III [1890], pp. 210-11).

Page 107, note 43, line 2. The word "in" should not be italicized, the reference being to an article in the periodical *Archaeology*.

The references to the Burges amphora (p. 116, note 2) might have included *Cambridge Ancient History*, Volume of Plates, I, p. 287, where the best published photographs of the figured panels are to be found. There is an excellent detail of the Athena head in an article by Ashmole in *Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress . . . held in London . . . 1936*, edited by J. Allan, H. Mattingly and E. S. G. Robinson (London, 1938), Plate III, 10.

The above points are of course very small ones and in no way affect the quality of the book as a whole. It is excellent, and we are grateful for a connected account of Attic black-figure from the pen of the acknowledged master of the field. We look forward to the volume of lists which will at long last put the study of black-figure on an equal footing with red-figure.

EUGENE VANDERPOOL.

AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL  
STUDIES, ATHENS.

PETER GOESSLER. Wilhelm Dörpfeld. Ein Leben in Dienst der Antike. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1951. Pp. 255; 19 illus. DM. 15.60.

The author is a specialist in Greek and German prehistory. Born in 1872, he retired for political reasons in 1934 from his offices as Director of Museums and Curator of Antiquities in Stuttgart. He was a devoted pupil and friend of Dörpfeld (1853-1940). Goessler spent many months with Dörpfeld on the island of Leucas, from 1903 (p. 134) until the death of the venerated master, believing with him that they lived in Ithaca, the kingdom of the Homeric Odysseus. When Dörpfeld's eyesight failed, Goessler helped him to bring his last books to press: *Alt-Olympia* (1935) and *Alt-Athen* (I [1937], II [1939]). This collaboration with the great man led to an admiration which included acceptance of some of the theories rejected by most other scholars. This book, however, does not emphasize these theories; they are not neglected, but neither are they recommended or criticized. Goessler has done this in a big manuscript which he plans to leave with the German Archaeological Institute.

This readable book is written from a high ethical viewpoint. It

has excellent illustrations, mostly from unpublished photographs found among Dörpfeld's legacy. They show the scholar himself, his audiences in different Greek sites: Leucas, Olympia, Troy, Athens. A plan of Achaeian Greece (fig. 18) and a letter with the sketch of Oropos, in the clear and harmonious handwriting of Dörpfeld (fig. 19), are welcome additions. The index of names (pp. 251-5) comprises many renowned persons.

The main goal of Goessler was to work out the great personality and many-sided scholarship of Dörpfeld. The material, therefore, is not arranged according to subject matter, but in chronological sequence in ten chapters: 1. Background, 2. Childhood, 3. Training as an Architect, 4. Excavations in Olympia (1887-1881), 5. Travels (1881), 6. Architect of the German Archaeological Institute in Athens (1882-1885), 7. Second Secretary of the Institute (1886-1887), 8. Work with Schliemann (1881-1890), 9. First Secretary of the German Institute (1887-1912), 10. Retirement (1912-1940).

The last chapter is the longest (pp. 161-249), the one before the last, the second longest (pp. 84-160). This shows the fruitfulness of Dörpfeld's mature years. The earlier chapters, however, deal with the most important discoveries and achievements of the great architect, particularly the investigations, model excavations and descriptions of the buildings in Olympia and on the Acropolis in Athens, where he helped the Greek excavators in his unselfish way. His sober weighing of evidence and his careful excavating, layer by layer, had a great and valuable influence on Schliemann, the romantic treasure hunter, whom he assisted in Troy and Tiryns. On the other hand he accepted from Schliemann his belief in Homer's poems as a historical source. (See Schliemann, *Troja* [1890]; Schuchhardt, *Schliemanns Ausgrabungen*<sup>2</sup> [1891]; Dörpfeld, *Troja* [1903].)

Another great achievement of Dörpfeld is the fundamental statement that the classical Greek theater did not have a stage. This new theory was first presented by him in 1884 and elaborated in his great book written with Reisch: *Das griechische Theater* (1896). This book is still a standard work, despite his regrettable refusal to recognize the earliest stage in the Hellenistic form, rightly described by Vitruvius. All later books on the theater, by Fiechter, Bulle, and this reviewer are, for their architectural and classical parts, dependent on Dörpfeld. In 1922 this reviewer received kind encouragement from the great man when he recommended her book, *Denkmäler zum Theaterwesen*, to her publisher for acceptance. He had planned a new edition of his book, but never found the time to do it. Goessler publishes (pp. 101-4) the Introduction to such a new edition, written in 1921—that is, twenty-five years after his theater book. In this he regrets that the reviewer, whom he quotes, and other scholars believe the now so well-known Hellenistic theater to be the one described by Vitruvius with a high stage, while he himself believes that Vitruvius speaks of the Graeco-Roman theater, that is, Greek theaters remodelled in the Roman fashion. This reviewer is convinced that all these Graeco-Roman theaters are later than Vitruvius, and that the high Hellenistic stage is the oldest and therefore understandably still imperfect stage. For the classical period, however, Dörpfeld is absolutely correct, and such presentations as that

of Aristophanes' *Frogs*, which Dörpfeld saw in 1895 in Epidaurus (p. 108), and many others in ancient orchestras bear out his theory of the stageless play in the classical period.

Dörpfeld's later years were even fuller than the earlier ones with the most diverse activities. His many lectures in Athens developed more and more into lecture tours which took him not only to Olympia and the other sites in the Peloponnese, to the islands of Corfu, Leucas-Ithaca, Crete, to Troy and Southern Italy, but in 1896 even to the United States. Here he lectured for six weeks at the most outstanding eastern universities. Shortly before this trip, the American S. J. Barrows dedicated his book, *The Isles and Shrines of Greece* (1893), to Dörpfeld with the words: "who in bringing to light the hidden treasures of the (old) world, has won the gratitude and admiration of the new" (p. 109).

The "Homerie question" more and more held Dorpfeld's interest. He spent as much time as he could on the isle of Leucas in the home which the last German Emperor had given him. When, after World War I, he had to sell it, it was given back to him by his generous American friend, Mrs. Leslie Edith Kosmopoulos (pp. 180 f.). Dörpfeld tried with all possible means to prove that Leucas was the Homeric Ithaca (pp. 115 ff.). Another theory which is not accepted by most archeologists is the Oriental, not Cretan, origin of the Mycenaean civilization; and another, that the geometric "Dipylon" art was contemporary with, or even preceded, the Mycenaean art. The primitive geometric art he rightly considered autochthonic, but it is by no means identical with the highly developed later Athenian geometric ware.

Dörpfeld excavated in Pergamon each fall for twelve years, 1900-1912 (pp. 145-50), following up his campaigns with good reports by himself and his collaborators in the *A. M.* His last paper on Pergamon (*A. M.*, 1928, pp. 117 ff.) deals with Strabo and the coast of Pergamon. Here he investigated, as was his practice, monumental together with literary tradition. He always tried to prove the literary tradition to be right with the help of topographical and archaeological investigations on the spot.

In 1907 Dörpfeld found three important beehive tombs in Triphylia, and with them he believed he had discovered the Homeric Pylos of Nestor (pp. 152-4). Blegen, however, later found a Mycenaean palace and an archive with clay tablets in another site (*A. J. A.*, 1939, pp. 336 ff.). In the same year Dörpfeld guided the excavations at Tiryns, which were continued by his successor, Karo. Karo dedicated his *Führer durch Tiryns* (1934) to Dörpfeld. In 1911-1914 Dörpfeld led the excavations of the archaic temple of Corfu, which were financed by the last German Emperor (pp. 158, 161-4). Wilhelm II became an admirer and pupil of Dörpfeld, and Dörpfeld remained loyal to his "Patron" (Gönner), as he called him on a postal card written in 1922 from Doorn to the reviewer. The Emperor called Dörpfeld his true friend and teacher in his last tribute on a wreath at Dörpfeld's funeral (p. 246).

In 1914, shortly before the outbreak of World War I, Dörpfeld wrote an article praising the work of North American archaeologists in Greece, at Argos, Sicyon, Corinth, Crete, Cyrene, Sardes, Nippur, and on the Acropolis (p. 169). The war prevented its publication.

Goessler emphasizes in all parts of his book the wonderful character of Dörpfeld: true piety, pure harmony, inner noble dignity radiated from him like a fluidum affecting his surroundings (p. 109). Among his students were not only great German scholars like Wilamowitz (pp. 91 f.) and Diels (p. 132), but many well known American, French, British, Italian, and Greek scholars. He was, however, helpful and patient even with young and inexperienced, inquisitive scholars, like this reviewer. She met him first in 1909 at one of his courses for fellows of the Institute in Pergamon. He took special care of the first female fellow who otherwise might have suffered from the distrust of the younger male members of the group.

Among these young fellows was Gerhart Rodenwaldt, who later, as president of the German Archaeological Institute, on the occasion of Dörpfeld's seventieth birthday, gave perhaps the best characterization of the man and his work, in an address and a speech quoted by Goessler (pp. 187 f.). After enumerating the works in Olympia, Hissarlik, Tiryns, Athens, Pergamon, Leucas, Coreyra, he calls him "an example for young scholars, giving information and helpful advice generously, many-sided inspiration, even where he compelled opposition, cheerful in deeds and conflicts, and unforgettable to anyone who has been fortunate enough to look into his shining eyes." "There is no classical scholar in the whole world who is not immediately your pupil. There is no field of our science, in which clarifying rays have not fallen as a result of your researches. If the effect of the content of your research could still be surpassed, it would be through the ethos of a scholar striving unceasingly for truth, which charms all your students and forces them into your influence. Wherever you stand in the battle for the passing on of new ideas, you lead the adversary, through the warmth of your struggle for knowledge, to a height where all strive together" (translation by the reviewer).

MARGARETE BIEBER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

---

A. ERNOUT and A. MEILLET. *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine: histoire des mots.* Troisième édition, revue, corrigée et augmentée d'un index. Paris, Klincksieck, 1951. Pp. xxiv + 1385.

Latinists are peculiarly fortunate in having at their disposal two etymological dictionaries, both of the highest quality, but so different in plan that they supplement rather than duplicate one another. The greater part of Walde's *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, the chief repository of etymological comparison between Latin and its sister-languages, has already appeared in its third edition, as revised by J. B. Hofmann. The dictionary of Meillet and Ernout, of which the first edition appeared in 1932 and the second in 1939, has also now appeared in its third edition. In this outstandingly excellent work the emphasis is on the history of the words and word-families within Latin itself. There is no funda-

mental change in plan or doctrine between the third and the earlier editions. At the end of each heading the etymology considered most probable is given, but there is little discussion of rejected views, and often it is frankly admitted that a word has no etymology of which we can be reasonably certain. But these remarks are not intended to create the impression that the book has not been thoroughly revised; an examination of it will soon show that the innovations briefly outlined on pages xix-xx have been carried out in detail in the body of the work. These innovations include in part the addition of words in Celtic and Germanic languages borrowed from Latin.

Ernout has made generous use of publications which have appeared during the decade since 1939, or at least too late to be utilized in preparing the second edition. A list of such works, in addition to those mentioned in the bibliography, would include Axelson's *Unpoetische Wörter* (Lund, 1945; cited p. 913 under *plörō*, 974 under *quamquam*, 1164 under *suāvis*); H. Pedersen, *Hittitisch und die anderen indo-europäischen Sprachen* (Copenhagen, 1938; cited p. 833 under *ōs*); Westrup, *Formes antiques du mariage dans l'ancien droit romain* (Copenhagen, 1943; cited p. 633 under *überī*). Benveniste's *Origine de la formation des noms en indo-européen*, which appeared in 1935 and was cited several times in the second edition, has been further used in the preparation of the third. References to journal literature are of course too numerous even to mention here.

A number of new Hittite and Tocharian etyma have been introduced: Hitt. *daššuš* p. 303 under *dēnsus*, *ešhaš* p. 359 under *erūs*, *pát* p. 576 under *ipse*, *maklant-* p. 669 under *macer*, *mēlur* p. 714 under *mētior*, *hekur-* p. 811 under *ocris*, *ariya-* p. 832 under *ōrō*, *aš* and *iššaš* p. 833 under *ōs*, *huwant-* p. 1275 under *ventus*; Toch. *klautso* p. 230 under *clueō*, *luksanu* p. 666 under *lūc-/lūc-*. Some words of Greek origin not included in the earlier editions have been added, although naturally there is no clear criterion by which to determine whether a foreign word was sufficiently naturalized to deserve inclusion in a Latin etymological dictionary. The IE etyma of Greek loans like *ancora* < ἄγκυρα, *āēr* < ἀήρ, *hōra* < ὥρα are not given, but the absence of such etyma is perhaps more keenly felt in the case of Celtic words, whose origin is less likely to be already known to classical philologists: the connection of *gaesum* with Irish *gae*, OHG *gēr*, Gk. *xaῖος*, Skt. *hēṣah*, is indeed pointed out, but we have no such data for *alauda*, *carrus*, *essedum*.

The addition of words borrowed from Latin by Celtic and Germanic languages is another matter. Such borrowings have been added to the Romance forms already cited in the earlier editions. The Celtic material is based on the works of Loth, Vendryes, and Pedersen, and the Germanic on that of Kluge.

The brief remarks on scattered points of detail which make up the remainder of this review mostly pertain to matters in which the third edition differs from the two earlier editions. Ed. 3 gives for *inula* an earlier attestation (Lucr.) than edd. 1 and 2 (Hor., Plin.). *arferia* is brought into connection with Umb. *ařfertur* in ed. 3. For *cacula* Etruscan origin is suggested. On pp. 146-7, 148,

it is suggested that *cadō* and *caedō* are in some way connected: although they do not show an ablaut-correspondence, I believe the idea worth investigating in view of the suppletive relationship and the possible parallel in *laedō: lassus*. The article on *cista* has been considerably enlarged and includes loans in Celtic, Germanic, and even Finnish. On *crocodilus* the article is longer than in ed. 2, while ed. 1 did not list the word at all. The articles on *deus*, *dīus* have undergone extremely little revision, and Grace Sturtevant Hopkins' dissertation, *Indo-European "deiws and Related Words* (Philadelphia, 1932), seems not to have been taken into account. For *elementum* Etruscan origin is suggested. Under *grātūlōr*, p. 502, *grātulābundus* is added to the derivatives previously listed, and on p. 520 *co-*, *prō-*, *subhērēs* are added to the derivatives of *hērēs*. For *industria* the revision is thorough, and there is now no reference to Hesych. δεύκει· φροντίζει, while the popular etymology connecting *industrius* with *struere* is treated with some favor. The articles on *Lupercus*, *lupus*, *lūstrum* have been considerably expanded. For *mare* the idea of connection with Skt. *maryādā* is no longer maintained. The article on *paelex* is much expanded, and, on the basis of Avestan and Irish etyma, borrowing of Hebrew *pīlegeš* before the breaking-up of IE unity is suggested (after Niedermann, *Vox Rom.*, 1940, p. 186). For both *Palātūm* and *palātūm* derivation from Etr. *falad* 'sky' is suggested. The articles on *papāver* and 2. *pūbēs* are considerably expanded; so also on *religiō*, but whereas edd. 1 and 2 preferred connection with *religāre* to Cicero's (*N.D.*, II, 28, 72) connection with *religere*, ed. 3 is more uncertain. The article on *sulpur* has been expanded. For *torqueō* connection with *τρέπω* is suggested, as also in ed. 2; the Latin form must be an iterative of the same type as *mordeō*, *tondeō*, related to *τρέπω* as *spondeō*: σπένδω. For *vehemēns* he suggests here and in ed. 2 the presence of the suffix *-mēns*, corresponding to Indo-Iranian *-mant-*. His mention of *prehendō* in this connection as possibly graphic for *prendō* is curious, since he does not so treat it in the article under the heading *praehendō*. *vēscus*, which in the earlier editions was treated briefly under *vescor*, now has a half-page article.

Errors, which are not particularly numerous in view of the nature of the work, include the following: on p. xxii the date of the second edition of Buck's *Oscan-Umbrian Grammar* should read 1928 instead of 1938. On p. 55 under *anās* the citation r. *ūtva* is apparently meant for s. *ūtva*. On p. 70 under *apis* read *italo-celtique* for *indo-celtique*; the error is carried over from ed. 2. On p. 85 at the beginning of the article on *arō* read *puis plus* for *plus plus*. On p. 108 under *austērus*, in place of *avec Séneque et Pline* read *avant Séneque et Pline*. *buttubatta* in this and in the second edition is out of alphabetical order. On p. 260 the article by Thurneysen mentioned under *coruscus* is in *G. G. A.*, 1907, p. 806. On p. 356, bottom, for *īkkos* read *īkkos*. On p. 512, fifteen lines from the bottom, for *tur-ēti* read *tur-ēti*. On p. 580, under *ita*, the Skt. form cited as *ita* should be *iti*. On p. 677 under *malum* the Saturnian verse cited as *dabant Metelli malum Naevio poetae* should be rearranged to read *dabant malum Metelli Naevio poetae*: important, since this is the stock example of the verse-form; ed. 1 had the correct reading. On p.

1093, at the end of the article on *serpō*, for *εἰρπυσα* read *εἴρπυσα*. On p. 1141, middle, for Lucrece, 6, 557, read 6, 537. On p. 1154, bottom, for *ἔστηκα . . . ἔσταμεν* read *ἔστηκα . . . ἔσταμεν*. On p. 1298, bottom, for *nevadidēti* read *nenaividēti*, and on p. 1299, eighteen lines from the top, for *vǔdova* read *vǐdova*.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

---

BRUNO SNELL. *Der Aufbau der Sprache*. Hamburg, Claassen Verlag, 1952. Pp. 221. 14.50 M.

Classical philologists, even the philosophers among them, have a curious aversion to any understanding of the stuff of which both literature and philosophy are made. Snell appears to be the exception. True, the brilliant exploits of nineteenth century "Sprachwissenschaft" were in historical and comparative exploration, and left older philosophical speculation untouched. But the half-century just ended has had much to say, both new and stimulating, some of it likely to be accepted as true, about that major mundane mystery, language. Structural analysis, the logical syntax of language that is largely the work of the Vienna circle, Bertrand Russell's speculations about language in his *Human Knowledge*, the discoveries made by Elliot-Smith on the evolution of the human brain and the part which it played in the evolution of language itself, above all the mathematical theory of communication—none of this appears in Snell's book, which has a Rip van Winkle flavor about it. There are occasional allusions to Karl Buehler's *Sprachtheorie* (now nearly twenty years old), and to some other psychological theorizing. But critical work such as Holloway's *Language and Intelligence*, which makes mincemeat of behaviorism, or the collection of *Essays on Logic and Language* edited by Flew, both published in 1951, represent new schools of thought which appear not to have touched Classical scholars. Modern "information theory" has thrown a flood of light on the nature and operation of linguistic symbolism—the process of encoding and decoding whereby the "idea" is matched (this is a neural and cerebral function) with the overt symbol or word (itself a muscular affair) is seen to be most intimately concerned with the preservation of equilibrium that has been put by Shannon and Mandelbrot into mathematical terms.

Accordingly the analysis of discourse, poetic (to which Snell's chapter 11 is devoted, epic, lyric, and dramatic) or philosophic (Snell, chapter 12) is likely within a decade or two to be put on a very different footing from Snell's traditional treatment—good, careful, and thoughtful so far as it goes, with here and there an acute and original observation, but none of it epoch-making. The same criticisms must be brought against his discussion of speech-sounds, the word and sentence, word-classes and inflexions, semantic shifts and the like, all of which is trite in substance, if renewed now and again by novelty in illustration.

But if Snell is at his best in literary criticism (pp. 186 ff.), still it remains subjective, as it must if it follows the traditional lines, along which with most philologists it degenerates into a mere empty exchange of opinions. The new knowledge tends to show that what gives a piece of writing freshness and character is the demand, almost the disturbance, which it makes in coding—it gives, as we say, to think. It also tends to show that continuity derives from a sequence of nervous impulses, which we know to be discrete—just as in successive exposures of cinematographic representations. If the discrete elements in the sequence are disjointed or trite interest flags, the pro-presentation (to substitute that term for Buehler's "re-presentation") is flat, there is no stimulus. Trouble arises, even on a linguistic level, if incongruent patterns are superimposed one upon another. That is why James Joyce's writing is vexatious; only a wilful reader will attempt to cope with its wilfulness, and wilfulness is a mark of bad character, on a literary level, as well as in other walks of life.

It is sheer guesswork, and poor guesswork at that, to suppose (p. 12) that simple linguistic forms are historically older, or original; indeed two pages below (14) Snell himself seems to repudiate that suggestion. Nor (pp. 18, 22) is any light whatever to be thrown on human verbal communication by noises made by animals. The factor of convention is wholly lacking—dogs do not bark in German in Germany, and in French in France. Snell uses (p. 40) the technical term "phoneme," but I doubt whether he understands what it involves. Many linguists now attach greater importance to "allophones"—speech is certainly not perceived as a sequence of such brief events as phonemes. As for utterances like *ksch!* used to scare poultry out of the garden (p. 41, cf. *sch* p. 53, or English *shoo*), these are strictly extra-linguistic. I do not see how *m* and *n* can be scientifically called "zentripetal, als ich-bezogen," or *p-b*, *t-d* "als du-bezogen, und demonstrativ," a notion apparently borrowed from Cassirer, who wrote, among some good things, a lot of nonsense about language, which he little understood. The very question of priority of noun, verb, or adjective (p. 59) is idle, and not deserving of serious consideration. Then, what (p. 66) is a sentence? It is, in any given utterance, a maximum syntactic construct. This definition, which is what I teach my students, has never been bettered; Carnap's assertion that any sentence may be prolonged by the addition of the words "and the moon is round" is a philosopher's trivial quibble, not sustained by usage or analysis. It is distressing, therefore, to find repeated once more (p. 77) the false statement that the heart of a sentence consists in subject and predicate: a sentence is not necessarily a matter of logical predication at all.

The three persons of grammar (*πρόσωπα*) indicate relative position in the drama of life, exactly as on the stage. Etymologically the personal pronouns are demonstrative—here, there, over yonder (even off stage). There is no drama, but only an *ego*-narrative, or a dialogue, with fewer than three; three serve all the needs of discourse, more are not necessary.

On p. 209 Snell seems to regard *βίος* and *βιώς* as homonyms; this

is not so, for accent is a phoneme too, albeit suprasegmental. A real problem is the decoding of spoken *right*, *wright*, and *write*, of *rank* "series" and *rank* "offensive," to give examples from English. This is a matter of linguistic determinacy, which can be calculated. On p. 220 for *Apperçu* read *Aperçu*.

JOSHUA WHATMOUGH.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

---

T. B. L. WEBSTER. *Greek Terracottas*. The King Penguin Books, 1950. Pp. 36; 54 pls.

This is another of the books in the Penguin series on Greek things. The author is the well-known Professor Webster of Manchester who combines an unusual knowledge of both literature and art as shown by his books and articles. Here, too, he gives a most attractive and readable but scholarly account of Greek terracottas from the seventh century through Hellenistic times. It is the best treatment of the subject in twenty-four pages and the many illustrations are excellent and representative. He compares the terracottas with Homer, Callinus, Hipponax, Sappho, Alcaeus, Aeschylus, Pindar, Plato, Aristophanes, and especially Menander. Perhaps there is an undue number of actors (some eight, 26-33) exclusive of two masks in Boston. It is said that "this is the first book in English for the last fifty years to deal with Greek terracottas." How about C. A. Hutton's *Greek Terracotta Statuettes*, 1899; M. B. Huish, *Greek Terra-cotta Statuettes*, 1900; H. B. Walters, *Catalogue of Terracottas in the British Museum*, 1903; and my two volumes on the *Terracottas of Olynthus* (*Excavations at Olynthus*, IV and VII; vol. XIV, 1952, also deals with terracottas); also Miss Burr (Mrs. Homer Thompson), *Terra-Cottas from Myrina*, 1934. It is surprising that as great a scholar as Webster, a friend with whom I have had much correspondence, does not know the Olynthus publications. Evidently Miss Bieber has told him something about Olynthus, for on p. 22 he speaks of replicas of two terracotta actors found at Olynthus and on p. 35, he dates nos. 27-33 before 348 B. C., whereas Miss Bieber dated them up to 312 B. C. I am pleased that he accepts my dating without having read *Olynthus* X, pp. 6-7, n. 31. At least five (not two) of the actor types occur at Olynthus. Miss Bieber accepts my dating in *C. W.*, XXXV (1941), p. 64.

But this is a charming book by one of England's greatest classical scholars. Let me quote his conclusion: "The history of terracotta statuettes is therefore part of the history of sculpture. The artist also has to make his living and his statuettes must suit the various purposes for which the buyer can use them; they are cheap and the buyer is the ordinary citizen; terracottas therefore tell a good deal about the ordinary Greek at various times, what he thought about the gods, what he thought about death, what things he thought pleasant to look at, and what amusing. They are also works of art. They are not unique in the sense that a cup by Euphronius or a poem by Sappho is unique, because they could be produced in large numbers from moulds, but the moulds were made by good, and some-

times very good, artists and the statuettes were finished and painted so that they became alive and exciting. The best of those that have survived retain their immediate and direct appeal today."

DAVID M. ROBINSON.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI.

---

C. H. V. SUTHERLAND. *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, 31 B. C.-A. D. 68. London, Methuen, 1951. Pp. xi + 220; 17 collotype plates. 21 s.

The only thing that really needs to be said about this book is that everyone interested in the period ought to read it. The author is making available to historians a class of evidence that they can hardly be expected to cope with without guidance because its bulk is so very large. Dr. Sutherland is the best of guides because to a sound historical sense and an intimate acquaintance with the coinage he adds an ability to write English so good that reading the book is as much a pleasure as it is a profit. I have no intention of summarizing it; it needs neither explanation nor supplement. It may be remarked, however, that the appendices, written for the numismatist rather than for the general reader, will be heartily welcomed by specialists. Not the least of their merits is in reminding us how much is still conjectural in what we are accustomed to think of as a well-known period.

ALFRED R. BELLINGER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

---

#### BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Actes du premier Congrès de la Fédération internationale des Associations d'Études Classiques à Paris, 28 Août—2 Septembre 1950. Ouvrage publié sous les auspices de la Fédération internationale des Associations d'Études Classiques et honoré, sur la recommandation du Conseil International de la Philosophie et des Sciences Humaines, d'une subvention de l'UNESCO. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1951. Pp. 405.

Atzert (C.) and Ax (W.). M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia, Fasc. 48. De Officiis (3rd ed.). De Virtutibus (2nd ed.). Leipzig, Teubner, 1949. Pp. xlvi + 189. \$3.07. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*.)

Bérard (Jean), Goube (Henri), Langumier (René). Homère, Odyssée, Chants I, V-VII, IX-XII, XIV, XXI-XXIII. Paris, *Hachette*, 1952. Pp. iii + 476; 3 maps; 42 figs. (*Classiques Hachette*.)

Bousquet (Jean). Fouilles de Delphes, tome II: Topographie et architecture. Le trésor de Cyrène. Paris, *E. de Boccard*, 1952. Pp. 112; folio of LI plates. (*École français d'Athènes*.)

Campbell (Alistair), ed. Frithegodi Monachi Breuiloquium Vitae Beati Wilfredi et Wulfstani Cantoris Narratio Metrica de Sancto Swithuno. Zürich, *Thesaurus Mundi*, 1950 (?). Pp. 183. \$3.00.

Castorina (Emanuele). L'atticismo nell'evoluzione del pensiero di Cicerone. Catania, *Cav. Niccolò Giannotta*, 1952. Pp. 302.

Chrimes (K. M. T.). Ancient Sparta. A Re-examination of the Evidence. New York, *Philosophical Library*; Great Britain, *Aberdeen Univ. Press*, 1952. Pp. xv + 527; 10 pls. \$8.75.

Cloché (Paul). Thébes de Béotie, des origines à la conquête romaine. *Publications de Facultés Universitaires de Namur*, 1952. Pp. 289. 150 fr. belges. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres*, Fasc. 13.)

Cooper (Charles Gordon). An Introduction to the Latin Hexameter. Melbourne, *Macmillan and Co., Ltd.*, 1952. Pp. x + 70. 7 s. 6 d.

Cottrell (Leonard). The Lost Pharaohs. The Romance of Egyptian Archaeology. New York, *Philosophical Library*, 1951. Pp. 256; 51 pls. \$6.00.

Crane (R. S.), ed. Critics and Criticism: Ancient and Modern. Chicago, *Univ. of Chicago Press*, 1952. Pp. 647. \$6.00.

Croon (Joh. H.). The Herdsman of the Dead. Studies on some Cults, Myths and Legends of the Ancient Greek Colonization-area. Utrecht, *Boekhandel H. de Vroede*, 1950. Pp. 112.

Crosby (H. Lamar). Dio Chrysostom, Vol. V: Discourses LXI-LXXX. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann Ltd.*, 1951. Pp. 341 + fragments, letters, testimony, and index. \$3.00. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

David (M.) and van Groningen (B. A.). Papyrological Primer, Third Edition. Leyden, *E. J. Brill*, 1952. Pp. x + 179; 6 facsimiles; 2 maps. 14.75 guilders.

Davis (Simon). Race-Relations in Ancient Egypt: Greek, Egyptian, Hebrew, Roman. New York, *Philosophical Library*, 1952. Pp. xiii + 176. \$4.50.

Diehl (Ernst). Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, Fasc. 3: Iamborum Scriptores. Editio Tertia. Leipzig, *Taubner*, 1952. Pp. vi + 162. 5.60 DM.

Diller (Aubrey). The Tradition of the Minor Greek Geographers. *American Philological Association* (to be ordered through Lancaster Press, Inc., Lancaster, Pa. and B. H. Blackwell, Ltd., Oxford), 1952. Pp. x + 200; 3 pls.; 1 map. \$5.00. (*Philological Monographs*, No. XIV.)

Diringer (David). The Alphabet: A Key to the History of Mankind. Second and Revised Edition. New York, *Philosophical Library*, 1951. Pp. 607. \$12.00.

Dornseiff (Franz). Verschmähtes zu Vergil, Horaz und Properz. Berlin, *Akademie-Verlag*, 1951. Pp. 108. 11.50 DM. (*Berichte über die Verhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Phil.-hist. Klasse*, Band 97, Heft 6.)

Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Number Five. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1950. Pp. ix + 279. \$7.50.

Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Number Six. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1951. Pp. 251. \$7.50.

Ehrenberg (Victor). The People of Aristophanes. A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1951. Pp. xx + 417; 19 pls. \$5.00.

Ernout (Alfred) and Thomas (François). Syntaxe Latine. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1951. Pp. xvi + 416. (*Nouvelle Collection à l'Usage des Classes*, XXXVIII.)

Excavations (The) at Dura Europos. Preliminary Report of the Ninth Season of Work, 1935-36, Part III: The Palace of the *Dux Ripae* and the Dolicheneum. New Haven, *Yale Univ. Press*; London, *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press*, 1952. Pp. xvi + 134; 24 pls.; 11 text figs. \$5.00.

Galiano (Manuel Fernandez). Pseudo-Jenofonte, La Republica de los Atenienses. Texto, traducción y notas. Introducción de Manuel Cardenal de Iracheta. Madrid, *Instituto de Estudios Políticos*, 1951. Pp. xvi + 20 (Greek facing Spanish).

Gonda (J.). Ancient-Indian ojas, Latin \*augos and the Indo-European nouns in -cs-/os. Utrecht, N.V.A. Ossthoek's Uitgevers Mij, 1952. Pp. 83.

Gordon (Arthur E.). Quintus Veranius Consul A.D. 49. A study based upon his recently identified sepulchral inscription. Berkeley and Los Angeles, *Univ. of California Press*, 1952. Pp. viii + 231-352; pls. 7-13. \$1.75. (*Univ. of California Publ. in Classical Archaeology*, II, no. 5.)

Granero (E. Ignacio). Aristoteles, El arte de la retórica, Tomo I. Texto griego y traducción con notas y comentarios. Mendoza, 1951. Pp. 201. (*Universidad nacional de Cuyo, Facultad de filosofía y letras, Instituto de lenguas y literaturas clásicas*.)

Grant (Michael). Ancient History. London, *Methuen and Co., Ltd.*, 1952. Pp. 247. 7 s. 6 d. (*Home Study Books*, 15.)

Grant (Robert M.). Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought. Amsterdam, *North-Holland Publishing Company*, 1952. Pp. viii + 293: frontispiece. \$4.50.

Güngerich (Rudolph). Die Küstenbeschreibung in der griechischen Literatur. Münster, *Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung*, 1950. Pp. 32; map. (*Orbis Antiquus*, Heft 4.)

Haas (Hans). Cornelius Tacitus, Germania. Text und Namenverzeichnis. Einleitung von Karl Meister, mit einer Karte von Germanien um die Wende des 1-2 Jh. n. Ch. von Richard von Kienle. Heidelberg, F. H. Kerle Verlag, 1952. Pp. 64. 1.80 DM. (*Heidelberger Texte, Lateinische Reihe*, 23.)

Handford (S.A.). Caesar, Gallic War, Books II and III. London, *Methuen and Co., Ltd.*, 1952. Pp. ix + 107; 1 illus.; 2 maps. 5 s. 6 d.; 4 s. 6 d. without vocabulary.

Hansson (Nils). Textkritisches zu Juvencus, mit vollständigem Index Verborum. Lund, G. W. K. Gleerup, 1950. Pp. 169.

Herbig (Reinhard). Zur Bedeutung von Etruskisch Fler-. Heidelberg, Carl Winter, *Universitätsverlag*, 1950. Pp. 31; 5 pls. 4.80 DM. (*Sitzb. der Heidelberger Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1950, Abh. 1.)

Herrmann (Léon). L'âge d'argent doré. Paris, *Presses Universitaires de France*, 1951. Pp. 169. 700 fr. (*Université Libre de Bruxelles, Travaux de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres*.)

Hoeg (Carsten) and Zuntz (Günther). Prophetologium, Fasc. 3: Lectiones Hebdomadarum 3<sup>ae</sup> et 4<sup>ae</sup> Quadragesimae. Hauniae, Einar Munksgaards Forlag, 1952. (*Union Académique Internationale, Monumenta Musicae Byzantinae, Lectionaria*, Vol. I.)

Hohl (Ernst). Die Siegesfeiern des Tiberius und das Datum der Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald. Berlin, *Akademie Verlag*, 1952. Pp. 24. (*Sitzb. der deutschen Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, Klasse für Gesellschaftswissenschaften, 1952, No. 1.)

Hohl (Ernst). Um Arminius. Biographie oder Legende? Berlin, *Akademie-Verlag*, 1951. Pp. 27. (*Sitzb. der deutschen Akad. der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, Klasse für Gesellschaftswissenschaften, 1951, No. 1.)

Hope (Richard). Aristotle's Metaphysics newly translated as a postscript to natural science with an analytical index of technical terms. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1952. Pp. xviii + 394. \$5.00.

Irigoin (Jean). Histoire du texte de Pindare. Paris, *Librairie O. Klincksieck*, 1952. Pp. xiv + 465. 1800 fr. (*Études et Commentaires*, XIII.)

Irvine (A. L.). *Tacitus, Histories, Books I and II.* London, *Methuen and Co., Ltd.*, 1952. Pp. vi + 196; 3 maps. 8 s.; 7 s. 6 d. without vocabulary.

Jones (A. H. M.). *The Athens of Demosthenes. An Inaugural Lecture delivered in Cambridge on 23 January 1952.* New York, *Cambridge Univ. Press*, 1952. Pp. 29. \$0.50.

Jones (W. H. S.). *Pliny, Natural History, Vol. VI: Books XX-XXIII.* Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann, Ltd.*, 1951. Pp. xxv + 531. \$3.00. (*Loeb Classical Library.*)

Kasten (H.) and Reis (P.). *M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia, Fasc. 19: Oratio Pro Sulla* (2nd ed.), *Oratio Pro Archia Poeta* (2nd ed.). Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1949. Pp. x + 62. \$1.00. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana.*)

Kirby (Thomas A.) and Woolf (Henry Bosley), eds. *Philologica: The Malone Anniversary Studies.* Baltimore, *The Johns Hopkins Press*, 1950. Pp. 382. \$7.50.

Klingner (Fridericus). *Q. Horati Flacci Opera*, 2nd ed. Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1950. Pp. xxii + 378. \$3.75. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana.*)

Lacombrade (Christian). *Le discours sur la royauté de Synésios de Cyrène à l'empereur Arcadios.* Traduction nouvelle avec introduction, notes et commentaire. Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres,"* 1951. Pp. 157. 500 fr.

Lacombrade (Christian). *Synésios de Cyrène, Hellène et Chrétien.* Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres,"* 1951. Pp. 318. 1200 fr.

Lammert (Fr.). *Claudii Ptolemaei Opera Quae Exstant Omnia*, Vol. III, 2: *De Iudicandi Facultate et Animi Principatu. Pseudo-Ptolemaei Fructus sive Centiloquium* (ed. AE. Boer). Accedunt indices verborum totius voluminis. Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1952. Pp. xvi + 120. 6 DM. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana.*)

Lejeune (Michel). *La posición del latín en el dominio indo-europeo.* Traducción y prólogo de Carlos Alberto Ronchi March. Buenos Aires, *Imprenta y casa editora "Coni,"* 1949. Pp. xi + 63. (*Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de filosofía y letras, Instituto de filología, sección clásica, Serie B, Vol. III.*)

Lenchantin de Gubernatis (Maximus). *Cornelii Taciti De Vita Iulii Agricolae Liber.* Turin, *G. B. Paravia & Co.*, 1949. Pp. xxxii + 46. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum.*)

Lenkeith (Nancy). *Dante and the Legend of Rome.* London, *The Warburg Institute, Univ. of London*, 1952. Pp. x + 184; 2 pls. 25 s. (*Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Supplement II.*)

McKinlay (Arthur Patch). *Aratoris Subdiaconi De Actibus Apostolorum.* Viena, *Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky*, 1951. Pp. lxiv + 363. (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, LXXII.)

Maddalena (Antonio). *Thucydidis Historiarum Liber Primus, Tomus III.* Testo critico e commento con traduzione e indici. Firenze, *La Nuova Italia Editrice*, 1952. Pp. 179.

Manni (Eugenio). *Introduzione allo studio della storia greca e romana.* Palumbo, 1952. Pp. 238.

Manni (Eugenio). *Trebellio Pollione. Le vite di Valeriano e di Gallieno.* Palumbo, 1951. Pp. 74.

Marache (René). *La critique littéraire de langue latine et le développement du gout archaïsant au II<sup>e</sup> siècle de notre ère.* Rennes, *Plihon Editcur*, 1952. Pp. 359.

Meissner (Bernhard). *Mythisches und Rationales in der Psychologie der euripideischen Tragödie.* Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der philosophischen Fakultät der Georg-August-Universität zu Göttingen, Göttingen, 1951. Pp. vii + 179.

Nilsson (Martin P.). *Opuscula Selecta, linguis anglica, francogallica, germanica conscripta*, Vol. II. Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1952. Pp. viii + 457-1083. (*Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Athen. Acta Instituti Atheniensis Regni Sueciae*, II: 2.)

Nilsson (Nils-Ola). *Metrische Stildifferenzen in den Satiren des Horaz*. Uppsala, Almqvist und Wiksell's Boktryckeri AB, 1952. Pp. viii + 220. 18 Kr. (*Studia Latina Hormiensia*, I.)

Parsons (Edward Alexander). *The Alexandrian Library, Glory of the Hellenic World. Its Rise, Antiquities, and Destinations*. Amsterdam, London, New York, *The Elsevier Press*, 1952. Pp. xii + 468; frontispiece, plates, 2 maps. \$7.50.

Perosa (Alessandro). *Michaelis Marulli Carmina*. Zürich, *Thesaurus Mundi*, 1952. Pp. xliv + 261. \$3.00.

Perrochat (Paul). *Pétrone, Le Festin de Trimalcion. Commentaire exégétique et critique*. Deuxième édition revue et corrigée. Paris, *Presses Universitaires de France*, 1952. Pp. xxii + 147. 700 fr. (*Université de Grenoble, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres*.)

Pistorius (Philippus Villiers). *Plotinus and Neoplatonism. An introductory Study*. Cambridge, *Bowes and Bowes*, 1952. Pp. 175. 21 s.

Pohlenz (M.). *Plutarchi Moralia*, Vol. VI, fasc. 2. Leipzig, Teubner, 1952. Pp. xii + 224. 9 DM. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*.)

Polacco (Luigi). *Tuscanicae Dispositiones: Problemi di architettura dell'Italia protoromana*. Padua, *Casa Editrice Antonio Milani*, 1952. Pp. 158. 1500 lire. (*Università di Padova, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia*, XXVII.)

Pralle (Ludwig). *Die Wiederentdeckung des Tacitus*. Fulda, *Verlag Parzeller and Co.*, 1952. Pp. 108. (*Quellen und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Diözese Fulda*, XVII.)

Rackham (H.). *Pliny, Natural History*, Vol. IX: *Libri XXXIII-XXXV*. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann, Ltd.*, 1952. Pp. viii + 421. \$3.00. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Raeder (Hans). *Platoniske Stadier*. København, *I Kommission hos Ejnar Munksgaard*, 1950. Pp. 29. 2.00 Dann. fr. (*Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Filosofiske Meddelelser*, Bind II, Nr. 5.)

Raucq (E.). *Bijdrage tot de Studie van de Morphologie van het Indo-Europeanisch Verbum*. Bruges, *Uitgeverij "De Tempel"*, 1947. Pp. 199.

Reynolds (J. M.) and Perkins (J. B. Ward) in collaboration with Salvatore Aurigemma, Renato Bartoccini, Giacomo Caputo, Richard Goodchild, Pietro Romanelli. *The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania*. Rome, *The British School at Rome*, 1952. Pp. vii + 286; 11 pls.; 9 maps; 17 text figs. £3.

Sherman (Charles L.). *Diodorus of Sicily. With an English Translation*. Vol. VII: Books XV. 20-XVI. 65. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann, Ltd.*, 1952. Pp. 431; 2 maps. \$3.00. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Smith (H. R. W.). *Problems Historical and Numismatic in the Reign of Augustus*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, *Univ. of California Press*, 1951. Pp. x + 133-230; 6 pls.; 2 text figs. \$1.00. (*Univ. of California Publ. in Classical Archaeology*, II, no. 4.)

Thylander (Hilding). *Inscriptions du Port d'Ostie*. Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1951-52. Pp. xxiv + 568; CXXV pls.; VI plans. (*Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom, Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, IV, 1 and 2.)

Tomsin (Alfred). *Étude sur le Commentaire Virgilien d'Aemilius Asper*. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1952. Pp. 160. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège*, CXXV.)



# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

---

VOL. LXXIV, 4

WHOLE No. 296

---

## *ISONOMIA.*

### I.

That *Isonomia* preceded *Demokratia* as the common name for popular government is reasonably clear from the Debate on Constitutions in Herodotus, III, 80 ff.<sup>1</sup> The form of government here named *Isonomia* is "the rule of the masses"<sup>2</sup> in contrast to both tyranny and oligarchy; it is identified in the most positive way by the characteristic devices of the democratic constitution: election by lot, the audit of public officials, the power of the assembly to discuss and decide all questions of public policy.<sup>3</sup> The omission of the word, *Demokratia*, in this context can hardly be accidental. For the debate goes on for several paragraphs, and if Herodotus, or his source,<sup>4</sup> had known the word at this time, we would expect some use of it<sup>5</sup> such as we

<sup>1</sup> The same conclusion from this text is reached by J. A. O. Larsen, "Cleisthenes and the Development of the Theory of Democracy at Athens," in *Essays in Political Theory, presented to G. H. Sabine* (Ithaca, 1948), pp. 1 ff. My great debt to this paper will be evident from the sequel, though I cannot agree with it in every detail. See also Debrunner, "Demokratia," in *Festschrift für E. Tièche* (Bern, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

<sup>2</sup> III, 80, 6, πλῆθος ἄρχον [= δῆμος κρατέων]; cf. 81, 1, ἐς τὸ πλῆθος . . . φέρειν τὸ κράτος.

<sup>3</sup> III, 80, 6.

<sup>4</sup> I concede the possibility that Herodotus was drawing on an earlier source (cf. Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 4), but attach no particular importance to it. If true, this would obviously strengthen my argument as to the early currency of *Isonomia* as a name for democracy.

<sup>5</sup> And not only in the speeches, but also in the narrative sequel at III, 83, 1, where *Isonomia* has no ornamental function but simply serves

find in later portions of the *History* of Herodotus.<sup>6</sup> The only ground on which this argument could be overruled would be some evidence that *Demokratia* was already in common use by the time of Herodotus' Debate on Constitutions or that of his source. This Ehrenberg thinks he can supply from the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus.<sup>7</sup> His splendid analysis of this neglected source of democratic ideology certainly establishes the fact that the *idea* expressed by *Demokratia* was perfectly clear to Aeschylus and his audience; it is exactly rendered in such phrases as "the people who rule the state" (*τὸ δάμιον τὸ πτόλιν κρατύνει*) and "the people's ruling hand" (*δῆμον κρατοῦσα χείρ*) which, as Ehrenberg illuminatingly puts it, can mean nothing else but "*ὁ δῆμος κρατῶν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ*, that is to say, that the show of hands is the expression of the people's rule, of *Demokratia*".<sup>8</sup>

as the writer's name for the form of government espoused by Otanes. I might add that I believe (with Liddell-Scott-Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*) that *demos* may mean the democratic form of government, and (with J. E. Powell, *Lexicon to Herodotus*) that instances of this sense occur in this debate. Larsen (*op. cit.*, p. 6, n. 16) argues that at 81, 3; 82, 1; 82, 5 *demos* means "the people as the ruling body" and, therefore, cannot mean this form of government. That this disjunction is inadmissible seems to me clear from the use of *κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου* as equivalent to *κατάλυσις τῆς δημοκρατίας* in official texts. *ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου* occurs in the Bouleutic Oath (*ap.* Demosth., XXIV, 144), introduced "five years after this [the Cleisthenean] order" (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 2), probably in 501/0 (von Fritz and Kapp, *ad loc.*, in their translation with notes of this work [New York, 1950]). *Per contra*, the law ("of Solon," but obviously liberally re-drafted) enacted in 410 reads *ἔάν τις τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταλύῃ* (*ap.* Andoc., I, 96). I suggest that in this Debate Herodotus is in the position of the drafters of the early democratic legislation, who had to use the concrete *demos* for the idea which would be more formally expressed by *Demokratia*, once the latter became current. Herodotus generally uses *μοναρχίη* (or *τυραννίς*) as the name of monarchy; but at least once (82, 1) he makes the concrete *μοναρχος* express the abstract idea, paralleling the usage of *demos* for *Demokratia*.

<sup>6</sup> *δημοκρατέεσθαι*, *δημοκρατία* at VI, 43, 3; *δημοκρατίην* at VI, 131, 1. For the earlier date of the "Persian History" see especially J. E. Powell, *The History of Herodotus* (Cambridge, 1939).

<sup>7</sup> "Origins of Democracy," *Historia*, I (1950), pp. 515 ff. (I shall refer hereafter to this paper by the abbreviation "OD"). My debt to all of Ehrenberg's work is very great and no less so at the very points where, as will appear, I have disagreed with him; the ideas expressed throughout this paper have been sharpened by his careful and imaginative analysis of the evidence.

<sup>8</sup> OD, p. 522.

But it is one thing to have a phrase for an idea, quite another to have a word which compresses the whole phrase into a single, abstract noun that stands as the proper name of democracy; the evidence which is quite enough to establish the former could hardly justify Ehrenberg's inference that "it is almost certain" that the word, *Demokratia*, was "not unknown" to Aeschylus at this time.

Now the words *isonomous*, *Isonomia* occur respectively in two well-known texts, both earlier than the Debate in Herodotus or its source: the Song of Harmodius<sup>9</sup> and Alcmaeon, fragment 4.<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately, the political meaning of the word which is so gloriously plain in Herodotus is by no means explicit in these texts, and must be reconstructed. Here we surely may proceed by extrapolation from Herodotus, for it is extremely unlikely that a word which proclaims democracy so belligerently in Herodotus could be telling a radically different story a few years, or, at the most, decades earlier. What then shall we make of Ehrenberg's view that in both of these early texts *Isonomia* is an "aristocratic conception," and means the "equality of noblemen, as contrasted with lack of equality expressed in the rule of one man"?<sup>11</sup>

The gravest objection to this view is stated by Ehrenberg himself when he remarks that "it remains [on his theory] something of a puzzle how the aristocratic *Isonomia* could so quickly become the watchword of democracy."<sup>12</sup> Only definite evidence to the

<sup>9</sup> "Scolia anonyma," nos. 10 and 13 in Diehl, II, pp. 184 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (6th edition, Berlin, 1951-52). All subsequent citations of pre-Socratic fragments refer to this work.

<sup>11</sup> *Aspects of the Ancient World* (Oxford, 1946), p. 89. See also his article, *Isonomia*, in *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, cols. 293 ff.

<sup>12</sup> OD, *loc. cit.* The solution he offers for this "puzzle" is that Cleisthenes used to his own radically different purpose "the ideas and the slogans which had dominated the actual liberation" (p. 534). This surely begs the real problem. If *Isonomia* had meant only a year or two before "equality of noblemen" it would be fantastically inept to express the spirit of a new order whose immediate enemies were precisely those who did believe in "equality of noblemen," and whose basic innovations were designed to break the power of the nobles. No amount of cleverness in the art of pouring new wine into old vessels could overcome this flagrant contradiction. To explain the difficulty Ehrenberg would have to argue that Cleisthenes was trying to conciliate the

contrary could overrule its antecedent improbability. But an examination of the texts yields no such evidence whatever.

Consider the first quatrain in our surviving text of the Song of Harmodius :

In a myrtle bough I'll carry my sword,  
Like Harmodius and Aristogeiton,  
When they slew the tyrant,  
And made Athens *isonomous*.

What could be the meaning of *isonomous* here? Let us canvass all the possibilities. Is it being used as

- (i) a neutral term which simply means liberation from tyrannic rule, without any positive specification of the sort of government that followed; or
- (ii) a term which does describe the ensuing régime, but thinks of it only as the reinstatement of the pre-Peisistratid constitution; or finally
- (iii) a term which celebrates the new Cleisthenean order?

Now (i) is so unlikely that no one has sponsored it, to my knowledge. A word so rich in meaning could hardly be just a colorless variant for ἐλευθέρους.<sup>12a</sup> But if this were its actual sense here, it would offer no positive ground for taking this to be "equality of noblemen," since on this hypothesis it means no more than liberation from tyranny. (ii) I think no less unlikely,<sup>13</sup> for we have not a scrap of evidence that the pre-Peisi-

nobles, which Ehrenberg rightly denies; and if, *per impossibile*, this had been his real aim, he would have reverted to the Solonian *Eunomia*, which, however inadequate to express the spirit of his own constitution, would still be immeasurably closer to it than "equality of noblemen."

<sup>12a</sup> Larsen (*op. cit.*, pp. 6-10) stresses the opposition to tyranny both in this and other contexts; but I do not understand him to mean that either in the skolion or any other important text *Isonomia* is merely the contradictory of tyranny.

<sup>13</sup> *Contra*, F. Jacoby, whose view I shall consider directly. Ehrenberg's own view would have to come under this heading, for it assumes that the *skolion* was composed "in the years after 514" when "there was no difference of aims between the Alcmaeonids and the other nobles" (OD, p. 531). Now 514 will not do as the *terminus post quem*; the *skolion* envisages the liberation of Athens as an accomplished fact, and could only have been composed after the expulsion of Hippias at 510, thus forcing Ehrenberg to narrow its dating to the years between 510 and 508. But is there any reason to think of those years as a

stratid order was termed *Isonomia*. As Ehrenberg himself has stressed, Solon's own word for the general spirit of his reforms was not *Isonomia*, but *Eunomia*;<sup>14</sup> one would therefore expect that only a radical departure from the Solonian constitution would prompt the use of the new word. But even if we suppose that (ii) is right, "equality of noblemen" would still be utterly inept as a description of the pre-Peisistratid *status quo*. The Solonian order, where civic rights were apportioned in accordance with income in brutal disregard of birth, could scarcely be thought of as "equality of noblemen"; still less could the modification which followed the deposing of Damasias, where the eupatrids were limited by law to five archonships, three and two others being reserved for non-eupatrid land-owners and artisans respectively.<sup>15</sup>

(iii) is by all odds the most likely hypothesis. The use of *Isonomia*, trivial on the first hypothesis, unaccountable on the second, is not only accountable but profoundly significant as the expression of the spirit of the Cleisthenean reforms, whose combined effect had been, in Aristotle's phrase, to "give the state to the masses."<sup>16</sup> The only serious objection I can think of to this view would issue from Jacoby's assumption that the *skolion* expresses an anti-Cleisthenean sentiment. But this assumption

political honeymoon between Cleisthenes and Isagoras, with "no difference of aims" between them other than opposition to tyranny? As Ehrenberg himself remarks (p. 540) Cleisthenes must have had a political programme and made it "widely known" before the second intervention by Cleomenes, else the popular party would not have recalled him and turned to him as its natural leader when it defeated Cleomenes and ousted Isagoras. Is it reasonable to think of so radical a programme as a last-minute concoction, rather than the final expression of a long-standing opposition between the general orientation of Cleisthenes and Isagoras, the friend of Sparta? Even apart from this objection, Ehrenberg's case ties him down to an excessively narrow dating of the *skolion*, for which I cannot conceive any argument other than that this date, and this alone, could support the sense of "equality of noblemen" for *isonomous*, which, of course, is arguing in a circle. The reference of the *skolion* to Hipparchus as "the tyrant" argues for a later date than the years immediately following the time when Hippias was the real tyrant and the decisive struggle had to be fought against him.

<sup>14</sup> OD. pp. 534-5; cf. *Aspects of the Ancient World*, pp. 84-5.

<sup>15</sup> Arist., *Ath. Pol.*, 13, 2.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, 20, 1. For Cleisthenes as the real founder of Athenian democracy see both Larsen, *op. cit.*, and Ehrenberg in OD.

strikes me as wholly gratuitous.<sup>17</sup> The *skolion's* statement that Harmodius and Aristogeiton "made Athens *isonomous*" surely cannot be pressed to mean "they, and not the Alcmaeonids, made Athens *isonomous*." This is a drinking-song, not a codicil in a legal document, nor the verdict of a historian.<sup>18</sup> I can see no reason at all why the partisans of Cleisthenes should not glorify the tyrannicides in just these words (and also sponsor their heroization) without prejudicing in the least the Alcmaeonid services in "making Athens *isonomous*."<sup>19</sup> Nor need we

<sup>17</sup> I say this with profound respect for the greatest living master of Greek historiography. But after going through the lengthy and vigorous exposition of his view (*Aththis* [Oxford, 1949], pp. 158 ff. and notes, especially notes 52-54 at pp. 339-40), I find only two definite arguments for the view that the *skolion* is anti-Alcmaeonid: that it ascribes the ending of the Peisistratid tyranny (i) not to the Alcmaeonids but to Harmodius and Aristogeiton who (ii) "belonged to one of the great clans . . . , with which Cleisthenes fell out immediately after the expulsion of Hippias" (p. 339, n. 53). (i) I proceed to discuss directly in the text above and in the following note. In the case of (ii) no evidence is offered to support the "falling out" of Cleisthenes with the Gephyraioi; Herodotus, V, 72, 1 (followed by Arist., *Ath. Pol.*, 20, 3) gives 700 (noble) families on the side of Cleisthenes, 300 on that of Isagoras; how does Jacoby know that the Gephyraioi were with the minority led by Isagoras, who had been "a friend of the tyrants" (Arist., *ibid.*, and cf. B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, VIII [1939], p. 62) ?

<sup>18</sup> Though to those who took it as history—a later generation that had no first-hand knowledge of what had happened—it could be misleading, and Herodotus may have had just this *skolion* (along with other vehicles of the legend) in mind when he wrote more than two generations after the event, "in my judgment it was they [the Alcmaeonids], much more than Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who liberated Athens" (VI, 123). Those who had lived through the liberation would not have needed this correction. As for Thucydides, his correction of the legend (I, 20, 2; VI, 54 ff.) is greatly exercised over the eclipse of the real tyrant, Hippias. But it does not seem intent on vindicating the Alcmaeonid contribution, which it would surely have been if (as Jacoby holds, pp. 159 ff.) so momentous a historical fact had been suppressed in an "official" version in Hellanicus; had this been the case, Thucydides would surely have given more effort to putting the facts straight than the casual phrase that Hippias was "deposed in the fourth year [after the murder of Hipparchus] by the Spartans and the Alcmaeonid exiles" (VI, 59, 4; cf. VI, 53, 3, where the Alcmaeonids are not mentioned at all, and the Spartans seem to be the only liberators).

<sup>19</sup> Bowra (*Greek Lyric Poetry* [Oxford, 1936], pp. 413 ff.) seems to me to make the same mistake as Jacoby in his interpretation of the

suppose that this tribute to the tyrannicides was without practical political use. None of the many discussions of this topic has taken account of its possible connection with a fact that we know from Aristotle: that after Isagoras and his friends had been expelled and the new constitution had been promulgated, the kin of the exiled Hippias, Hipparchus, son of Charmus (archon at 496/5), was strong enough in Athens to present a grave threat to the new régime, and that Cleisthenes created the ostracism to get rid of him.<sup>20</sup> In such a conflict as this the Alcmaeonids would have every reason to work the story of the tyrannicides for all it was worth, and this may well have been both the time of the heroization and the date of the composition of the *skolion*, whose words are not retrospective in tone, but voice a fighting mood directed against a present enemy.<sup>21</sup> The

*skolion*, though his conclusion is the very opposite of Jacoby's: "They [the Alcmaeonids] justified themselves [sc. against the charge of collaborating with Sparta in the struggle against Hippias] by falsifying history. They put it about that the real destroyers of tyranny were not the Spartans, nor even the Alcmaeonids, but a pair of blameless young heroes," etc. (p. 415). I submit that (a) the "not . . . nor" clauses in the last sentence have no support in the text, and (b) even if the *skolion* were meant to "falsify" history, it could not fool the generation that had witnessed the actual events. To meet (b) Bowra would have to date the *skolion* much later than he seems willing to do. Certainly the Alcmaeonids would feel much better about sharing the credit for the liberation with the Athenian tyrannicides than with the Spartan army; the less said about Cleomenes in this connection, the better it would be for them; but this is quite another matter from saying that in this *skolion* they are "falsifying history."

<sup>20</sup> *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 3-4, which would be further strengthened if, as Meritt has argued (*op. cit.*, p. 63), Hippias' son, the younger Peisistratus, remained in Athens; an ostrakon bearing his name has been found in the excavations of the Agora, and Meritt is inclined to assign his archonship "to one of the available years between 499 and 497." But see, *contra*, A. W. Gomme, *A.J.P.*, LXV (1944), pp. 327-8.

<sup>21</sup> Raubitschek's recent argument (*A.J.A.*, LV [1951], pp. 221 ff.) that the ostracism was instituted by Cleisthenes in the same year (487) in which it was first used to expel Hipparchus, son of Charmus, fits exactly the words of Androton (frag. 6, Jacoby) and is perfectly consistent with the wording of *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 3-4—the only two texts we have to go by. It fits in with his earlier suggestion that 488 is the *terminus post quem* of the erection of the statue of the tyrannicides by Antenor (*A.J.A.*, XLIV [1940], p. 58, n. 2, with references to earlier sponsors of this date and also to other studies which reject it; to the latter K. Schefold, *Museum Helveticum*, III [1946], pp. 59 ff. should now

people who composed and sang these words were doubtless noblemen; but if these noblemen were Cleisthenean partisans, the last thing they could possibly mean by *Isonomia* under such circumstances is “equality of noblemen.” It could not have become the favourite song of the radical democrats,<sup>22</sup> unless its *Isonomia* was precisely the slogan of the equalitarian democracy which was founded by Cleisthenes and was realized in ever-increasing measure throughout the fifth century.

Nor does Alcmaeon’s fragment offer the slightest aid and comfort to the “aristocratic” conception of *Isonomia*. Ehrenberg<sup>23</sup>—and he is not the only one<sup>24</sup>—calls him “the Pythagorean physician.” Now as Heidel has pointed out, in what is by far the best extant refutation of the “Pythagoreanism” of Alcmaeon,<sup>25</sup> the only thing worthy of the name of evidence on

be added). If Raubitschek’s argument is accepted it would suggest (on the above theory) a dating for the *skolion* which fully accounts for the feature I mentioned above, n. 13 *sub fin.* However, the suggestion I make above is obviously not tied to Raubitschek’s theories. An earlier date for the enactment of ostracism—say, the year of Hipparchus’ archonship (496), which, since the archonship was still elective (*Ath. Pol.*, 22, 5), must have marked a high tide of his influence—would do almost as well. On no account could I accept Carcopino’s view (*Les origines de l’ostracisme* [Paris, 1935], p. 23) that the ostracism was enacted in 507 on the sole ground that “la constitution de Clisthène forme un tout indivisible”; it would surely be more than three years from the expulsion of Hippias before his Athenian kinsman could live down the Peisistratid disgrace and begin to recoup his political fortune.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Aristoph., *Wasps*, 1225.

<sup>23</sup> OD, p. 535. Cf. Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 9, who speaks of Alcmaeon as “a Pythagorean from Croton.”

<sup>24</sup> Zeller’s is typical of the earlier view. He includes Alcmaeon in his chapter on “The Pythagoreans,” though his examination of Alcmaeon’s doctrine leads only to the conclusion that Alcmaeon was “considerably influenced by the Pythagorean philosophy, without having actually adopted it in its totality,” *History of Greek Philosophy*, I (Eng. tr., London, 1881), p. 562. Recent writers are more guarded: K. Freeman, *Companion to the Pre-Socratics* (Oxford, 1946), p. 135: “Alcmaeon may or may not have been a Pythagorean.”

<sup>25</sup> “The Pythagoreans and Greek Mathematics,” *A.J.P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 1 ff. But Heidel weakened his case unnecessarily by swallowing Burnet’s assumption (*Early Greek Philosophy* [4th edition, 1930], p. 194) that “Alcmaeon dedicated his treatise” to the Pythagoreans, Brotinus, Leon, Bathyllus ( $\tauάδε \ddot{\epsilon}\lambdaε\ddot{\epsilon} \dots \text{B}ορτί\ddot{\nu}$ , etc.). There is really no reason for this view. We have no parallels for dedications in this period. A discourse which takes the form of personal address, as of

which such a characterization could rest is Aristotle's statement<sup>26</sup> that he *may* have derived his doctrine of opposites from the Pythagoreans. The only reason offered by Aristotle for this possibility is that "he expressed himself similarly to them." But when we compare Alcmaeon's opposites as listed by Aristotle himself in this passage (and also with those listed by Aetius at B 4), we find that the two pairs which, on any view (including Aristotle's own), are characteristic of Pythagoreanism—the *Peras-Apeiron*, Odd-Even contrasts—are conspicuously missing, and are indeed utterly alien to Alcmaeon's thought according to all our other information about it.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, the Pythagorean concept of *Harmonia* is as different from Alcmaeon's concept of *Isonomia* (in B 4) as from the general, Ionian, view from which Alcmaeon's is doubtless derived.<sup>28</sup> The general view of harmonious order in pre-Socratic cosmology and Hippocratic medicine is that of equality, i. e. the 1/1 ratio.<sup>29</sup> But the Pythagorean discoveries of the concordant intervals in music led them to quite different ratios expressive of *Harmonia*: the 2/1, 3/2, 4/3 ratios, each of them pairs of unequal numbers and thus obviously contrary to the pattern of *Isonomia*. At the same time, Pythagoreanism was a deeply dualistic world-view in a sense which is without parallel in Alcmaeon or any other of the *physiologoi* or medical writers.<sup>30</sup> The basic Pythagorean opposites, *Peras-Apeiron*, Odd-Even, are designated Good and Evil principles

Empedocles to Pausanias, conveys exhortation or instruction and does not imply agreement with the views previously held by the addressee. In this case Alcmaeon is surely opposing the Pythagorean faith, for he starts off by declaring that (only) the gods can attain *σαφῆναι* about *τὰ ἀφανέα*, the very things which figured prominently in Pythagorean theology and cosmology, and goes on to limit inquiry to things determinable by means of evidential inference, *τεκμαρποθαι*, which expresses a very different temper of mind from that which would accept all kinds of mystical doctrines on the strength of the *αὐτὸς ἔφα* of Pythagoras.

<sup>26</sup> *Metaph.*, 986 a 26 ff. For the correct reading see Ross, *ad loc.*, and Heidel, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>27</sup> I have made this point and the one immediately following in a different connection in a review of Raven's *Pythagoreans and Eleatics, Gnomon*, XXV (1953), pp. 29 ff.

<sup>28</sup> See Section III, below, pp. 363-5.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. my "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," *C. P.*, XLII (1947), pp. 156 ff.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. my remarks in *Phil. Quarterly*, II (1952), at pp. 110 ff. and note...

respectively; whence it would follow that the *normal* pattern of good order which this philosophy would inspire would not be equality of the Good to the Evil principles, but the preponderance of the Good over the Evil. We simply do not know enough about their system to be able to say just how these two ideas—the inequality involved in musical harmonies and that required by the moral dualism of their metaphysics—would be merged in theory and applied to politics.<sup>31</sup> But what we do know is enough to show the opposition of the general lines of Pythagorean thought to Alcmaeon's pattern of *Isonomia*, so that we have no right, without positive evidence to the contrary, to tar Alcmaeon with the Pythagorean brush. If we had found the Pythagoreans themselves using the term *Isonomia* we *might* concede for it the sense of “equality of noblemen,” though we would then have to break our heads over the question whether what little we know, or think we know, of Pythagorean politics is aptly expressed by such a sense.<sup>32</sup> Fortunately, we need not agonize over this problem in the present argument. All we have on our hands is a text which in no proper sense is “Pythagorean” either in author-

<sup>31</sup> The most plausible guess is that it would favour some sort of hierarchic political order, a rule by the “wise” whose understanding of *Peras* confers on them unilateral authority to govern the state. (Cf. E. L. Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics* [Baltimore, 1942], pp. 98 ff.) This is not inconsistent with the acceptance of equality in the form of the *talio* in corrective justice (*Arist. E.N.*, 1132 b 21 ff.).

<sup>32</sup> For various views see Minar, *op. cit.*; G. Thomson, *Aeschylus and Athens* (London, 1941), pp. 210 ff.; K. von Fritz, *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy* (New York, 1940), Ch. 5; A. Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne* (Liege, 1922). I agree with Minar that in its origins and throughout the 5th century Pythagoreanism was generally anti-democratic. But I believe he is wrong in thinking of them as proponents of “an aristocracy of the landed nobles” (*op. cit.*, p. 111); as I have remarked elsewhere (*Philos. Review*, LI [1942], p. 423), at the time when Pythagoreanism was a political innovation its “intellectual aristocracy must have appeared as a challenge to the *ancien régime* of hereditary aristocracy.” But this does not exclude in the least an eventual Pythagorean alliance with the conservatives against the popular forces, which seems to be implied by the most reliable of all our historical texts on this topic, that of Polyb., II, 39, 1-4: the burning down of the Pythagorean *synhedria* must have been a popular revolt since it led to the “destruction of the leading men of each city.” This, in turn, does not preclude a later accommodation to democracy on the part of some Pythagoreans, as of Archytas at Tarentum. On all this see especially, von Fritz, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 ff.

ship or derivation; its true affinities are with Ionian medicine and *physiologia*; and if we are to regard it, as I believe we should, as a generalization from politics, we must look for the political model which inspired it not in the Pythagorean movement, but in the general advance of democracy throughout the Greek world, especially in Ionia where, I believe, the generalization first arose. Further discussion of this latter point must await the third section of this paper.

## II.

I do not wish to dwell longer on the historical priority of *Isonomia* as the name of democracy, important as this is in its own context. It is the meaning of the word which I shall seek to ascertain in the remainder of this essay. For while *Demokratia* does no more than describe a fact, *Isonomia* expresses an idea, indeed a whole set of ideas, by which the partisans of democracy *justified* the rule of the people. These ideas were so appealing in themselves, and so appealingly expressed by *Isonomia* that well before the fifth century had run its course the word was being borrowed by the proponents of alternative forms of government. The Thebans in a well-known passage in Thucydides<sup>33</sup> speak of their own political order as *Oligarchia isonomos*. Even Plato in the Seventh Letter speaks ingratiatingly of his own ideal as that of a "just and *isonomos* constitution."<sup>34</sup> What values lent such splendor to the word that even rivals and critics of democracy were eager to poach on enemy territory and use for their own purposes a word which continued to take pride of place in the vocabulary of the partisans of democracy?<sup>35</sup>

Let us begin with the second word in the compound. Does it mean 'distribution' (deriving *-vouía* from *véμειν*, 'to distribute') or 'law' (taking *-vouía* as a derivative of *vómos* with the

<sup>33</sup> III, 62, 3; to be discussed in Section III, below.

<sup>34</sup> Ep. 7, 326D; and cf. *Menex.*, 239A; and see below, n. 78. Plato's willingness to appropriate the word in the Seventh Letter is all the more remarkable in view of the scorn he had heaped on *isonomikos*, *Isonomia* many years earlier (*Rep.*, 561E, 563B) in his wholesale attack on democratic ideas and institutions.

<sup>35</sup> 'Ισονομία πολιτική is the δημος εὐπρεπές par excellence among the democratic leaders, Thuc., III, 82, 8. *Isonomia* has a similar, though less striking, function in Isoer., *Arcop.*, 20; also Aesch., I, 5 with n. 70, below.

sense of ‘law’)? Ehrenberg has argued for the former,<sup>36</sup> and his arguments suffice to show that among the many associations of *Isonomia* in fifth and fourth century usage, that of *ἴσα νέμειν* would be one, and, at times, might even be the dominant sense in the speaker’s mind.<sup>37</sup> Now ‘equal distribution’ fits perfectly the deeply rooted notion of the democratic state as a common pool of rights and privileges equally shared by all its citizens.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, I do not believe this is the primary meaning of *Isonomia* as generally understood—i. e. the one which most people would take as the literal sense of the word, rather than one of its implications and allusions. Its proper meaning, I believe, is definitely *not* equality of distribution but equality of law; and this for the following reason.

In the parallel compounds, *ἀνομία*, *εὐνομία*, *ἀντονομία* the derivation of *-νομία* from *νέμειν* is either impossible or unlikely. It is flatly impossible in the case of *ἀνομία* which, as Heinemann has reminded us,<sup>39</sup> already occurs in adjectival form in Hesiod (*Th.*, 307). The Titan, Typhon, is “terrible, outrageous (*ἱβριστήν*), and lawless (*ἀνόμον*).” In *ἄνομος* here *-νόμος* could only refer to

<sup>36</sup> In his *R.-E.* article, cited above, n. 11. He seems to surrender the view in *Aspects of the Ancient World*, p. 75. Larsen (*op. cit.*, p. 5, n. 13) remarks that *Nomos* “is derived from a root meaning to ‘distribute or divide,’ but the question is whether it is formed directly from some noun with this primary meaning or from the latter noun *Nomos* meaning ‘law,’” and refers to Ehrenberg’s *R.-E.* article. I hope that my discussion will be a decisive answer to this question. The earlier view had favoured the derivation from *nemein*: R. Hirzel, *Themis* (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 243 ff., widely followed as, e. g., by G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde*, I (3rd ed., Munich, 1920), p. 418.

<sup>37</sup> At col. 293 of his *R.-E.* article he collects the passages in which *ἴσα νέμειν* occurs, some of them in direct association with the idea of democracy, and also *ἴσων τυγχάνειν* or *ἴσα ἔχειν* (the direct result of *ἴσα νέμειν*).

<sup>38</sup> See e. g. statements to this effect by the opponents or critics of democracy: ps.-Xen., *Aih. Pol.*, 1, 2; Plato, *Rep.*, 557A; Arist., *Pol.*, 1275a 22-23 with b 6, *et passim*, and by pro-democratic sources: Lys., XXV, 3; Demosth., XXI, 67; XXIV, 59; and LI, 11. Most striking is the expression employed by Herodotus (III, 80, 2 and III, 142, 3) for the institution of *Isonomia*: that of making power “common” (*ἐς μέτον καραθεῖναι* or *τιθέναι*), the same expression which is used by Aristophanes in the *Ecclesiazusae* (602) for the communizing of property.

<sup>39</sup> *Nomos und Physis* (*Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, Heft 1 [Basel, 1945]), p. 64, to whose discussion of *Nomos* in archaic thought, pp. 61 ff., I am greatly indebted.

law, though, to be sure, the law in question here would not be positive, written law. Ehrenberg has rightly stressed the point that *vόμος* did not acquire the sense of positive law before the sixth century.<sup>40</sup> The earliest sense of the word is that which survives in the *\*Αγραφος νόμος* of the classical period; it is that of custom, usage, employed, of course, not merely as a descriptive term, but also (and always so in moral contexts) as a vehicle of the strongest normative import, to denote that divinely sanctioned order whose observance is of the essence of justice.<sup>41</sup> The

<sup>40</sup> *Aspects of the Ancient World*, p. 75. His own statement of the point goes too far: "It is beyond doubt that *vόμος* did not gain the meaning of 'law' before the end of the sixth century." (For a similar view as now "generally recognized," see Heinemann, *op. cit.*, p. 72.) By 'law' here Ehrenberg understands the "unity of traditional and enacted standards" (p. 91); and, since *vόμος* always had the sense of 'traditional' standards, the question is whether it was not stretched to include positive enactment till the *end* of the 6th century. Such a late date seems to me inadmissible, since as soon as written law was introduced, i.e., by the end of the 7th century, the general sense of *Dike* would include the observance of written, along with that of unwritten, law, and *Nomos*, as the rule whose observance constitutes *Dike*, would be correspondingly enlarged. This is exactly what happened to *Thesmos*: originally 'traditional usage' (*Od.*, XXIII, 296, λέκτροι παλαιοῦ θεσμού), it is used as the name of Draco's law (*I. G.*, I<sup>a</sup>, 61) and by Solon, frag. 24, 18, Diehl, for his own written enactments. *Theognis*, 54, saying of the new masters of Megara that they formerly "knew neither δίκας nor νόμους" (echoing *Od.*, IX, 215 [so Heinemann, p. 62; n. 13], with the significant substitution of *vόμους* for θέμιστας), is surely using *Nomos* in just this enlarged sense; the laws which these new men did not know, since "they ranged like deer outside the *Polis*," are the laws of the *Polis* which by this time (middle of 6th century) would certainly include written laws. The disputed text of Solon, frag. 24, 16, Diehl (*vόμουν* of Diehl's first edition *vs.* δμοῦ of the second, favoured by Ehrenberg and many others) cannot, of course, be used as an argument against my view. On my view *vόμουν* would be possible, and would make a better reading, since κράτει νόμουν . . . ἔρεξα matches beautifully βίην τε καὶ δίκην συναρμότας (both clauses presenting the junction of similar opposites, κράτος / βία, and νόμος / δίκη), and the idea of νόμος / δίκη in these lines would match that of θεσμός / δίκη in the next two verses.

<sup>41</sup> In this respect *Nomos* is strictly parallel to *Dike* and *Themis*: all three may denote no more than a uniformity of human life without any particular moral connotation; e.g., *Od.*, XXIV, 255, the δίκη γερόντων is to rest after a bath; *Od.*, XIV, 130, weeping and lamentation is θέμις γυναικός when her husband has perished far from home; Aleman, frag. 93, Diehl, δρυτήχων νόμως, which probably means "the ways of birds" (cf. Heinemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-5), and Herodotus, VIII, 89, 1. ἐν χειρῶν

(substantival) opposite to *ἀνόμοιος* in the epic is *εὐνομία*, as we see from the earliest instance of this latter compound at *Od.*, XVII, 487: “the gods in the guise of strangers . . . visit the cities, observing the *ὑβρίς* and the *εὐνομίη* of men.” *Eunomie* cannot mean here “good distribution”; for what the gods are looking for in this context is not whether there is good distribution, but proper observance of the sacred *Nomos* of respect for strangers.<sup>42</sup> Finally, in *Autonomia* we encounter a distinctly later term,<sup>43</sup> which may be even later than *Isonomia*; and here we see all over again how strongly *-νομία* in a compound would carry the sense of ‘law,’ though here, of course, with a strong accent on positive legislation which was entirely absent in *Anomos* and *Eunomia*. It is unlikely, to say the least, that those who used *Autonomia*, in contrast to despotism, to denote “(being ruled by) one’s own law” would normally employ the parallel *Isonomia* in any sense other than that of “(being ruled by) equal law.”

If “equality of law” is then the literal sense of *Isonomia*, it poses immediately the question whether it means merely (i) ‘equality before the law’ or (ii) ‘equality maintained through law.’ The first is not only compatible with the literal sense of the word, but is even the most natural rendering of it. Nevertheless, it is clear on historical grounds, and it is now generally agreed, that this is *not* the full meaning of *Isonomia*.<sup>44</sup> For *unequal* laws, i. e. laws which sanction the unequal distribution of political rights and privileges to different social classes, *might* be upheld quite ‘equally,’ i. e. impartially. This is precisely the

*νόμως*, which means “in hand-to-hand fighting” (cf. J. L. Myres, *Political Ideas of the Greeks* [1927], p. 248, who observes that here the word comes “very near to Aeschylus’ use of the verb for ‘wielding’ a shield or other implement”). Beyond this morally neutral sense, all three words have, of course, the specifically moral sense of “right usage.” Hesiod’s employment of *ἄνομος* in conjunction with *ὑβριστής* at *Th.*, 307 may be compared with a corresponding expression in the *Odyssey* in terms of *Dike* and *Themis*: the Cyclopes are *ὑβρισταλ* . . . *οὐδὲ δίκαιοι* (IX, 175) and (106) *ἀθέμιστοι*.

<sup>42</sup> I believe this would agree with Ehrenberg’s present view, *Aspects of the Ancient World*, pp. 75-6.

<sup>43</sup> The first occurrence of *αὐτόνομος* is in Herodotus (*L.S.J.*, s. v.); cf. also Hippocr., π. ἀ. β. τ., 16.

<sup>44</sup> See Ehrenberg’s excellent remarks on this point in his *R.-E.* article, cols. 295 ff.

central conception of the Solonian reforms. Solon's "equal<sup>45</sup> laws for the noble and the base" define sharply graded political privilege; they restrict the magistracies to the members of the upper income classes.<sup>46</sup> But the seriousness of the intent of their impartial application is witnessed by the admission of every citizen to the courts before which ordinary suits could be tried and the magistrates themselves could be called to account under the law.<sup>47</sup> It is instructive that these reforms which go so far in the direction of judicial equality should not have been termed *Isonomia* in either Solon's poems, whose ideal is *Eunomia* (frag. 3, Diehl), or any of our later sources.

No less instructive is the case of Sparta. Dedicated to the conception of the "lordship of the law" (*δεσπότης νόμος*),<sup>48</sup> exemplary throughout the Greek world for its stern fidelity to law, its watchword was *Eunomia*,<sup>49</sup> not *Isonomia*, and this for the good reason that its members, though social "peers" (*δημοιοι*), were not political equals; the hereditary status of kings and nobles entitled them to constitutional privileges denied to their fellow citizens.<sup>50</sup> That *Isonomia* was not applied to the

<sup>45</sup> The word is *δημότες* (frag. 24, 18, Diehl), but this may well carry the sense of equality; see my "Equality and Justice" (cited above, n. 29), n. 51. The sense of the "equality" of these laws is illuminated by "straight . . . justice" in the following line, the opposite of the "crooked" justice (cf. frag. 3, 37, Diehl) of the corrupt aristocracy, i. e., undeviating, impartial justice.

<sup>46</sup> See on this my "Solonian Justice," *C. P.*, XLI (1946), pp. 79-80.

<sup>47</sup> Arist., *Pol.*, 1274 a 3, "he constituted the jury-courts from all the citizens," including the thetes (*Ath. Pol.*, 7, 3). We can assume that it would be through appeals to a popular court (*ἢ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἔφεσις*, *Ath. Pol.*, 9, 1) that the people would exercise the power "to call magistrates to account" (*Pol.*, 1274 a 17; cf. 1281 b 34). The only limit to the full judicial equality here granted the people would be the continuing jurisdiction of the Areopagus over cases of homicide (the statement that the jury-courts "had the decision in all matters both public and private," *Ath. Pol.*, 9, 1 must be read with this qualification) and its power to "guard the laws," "supervise the constitution," and "call offenders to account" (*Ath. Pol.*, 8, 4).

<sup>48</sup> Herodotus, VII, 104, 4.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Ehrenberg, *Aspects of the Ancient World*, pp. 77 ff., and the *C. Q.* papers by Andrews and Wade-Gery to which he refers at p. 81, n. 1. *Eunomia* is also the term which Pindar (*I.*, 5, 22) applies to the aristocratic order of Aegina.

<sup>50</sup> The case of the kings is too obvious to call for documentation; for the exclusive eligibility of the nobles to the *Gerousia* see G. Gilbert,

aristocratic régime of Sparta by its most ardent sympathizers<sup>51</sup> is powerful witness to the fact that what the word asserts is not merely that the laws should be equally upheld, but that they should be equal in the wholly different sense of defining the equal share of all the citizens in the control of the state. This is the sense it carries in Herodotus who uses it to denote the "communizing" of political power, its transference into the hands of the masses;<sup>52</sup> and this is abundantly borne out by later uses of *Isonomia* to express the peculiar ethos of the equalitarian state.<sup>53</sup>

But if *this* is the right sense of the word, why should it not mean 'equal distribution'? Because 'equal distribution' says too much, as 'equality before the law' says too little. For what is conceived as equally distributed in *Isonomia* is restricted to *Nomos*, i. e. to the political domain. Long before the term *Isonomia* had been coined there had been a perfectly good word for "equal distribution": *Isomoiria*; the adjective *isomoros* already occurs in Homer (*Il.*, XV, 209). When the embattled peasantry of Attica rebelled against eupatrid oppression they did ask for *Isomoiria*,<sup>54</sup> and their demands included redivision

*Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens* (Eng. tr., London, 1895), p. 48, n. 2.

<sup>51</sup> The one instance which might be adduced as evidence against this statement, Isochr. *Panath.*, 178, actually confirms it. Here Isocrates says that the Spartans established *Isonomia* and *Demokratia* among themselves; naturally, if we are going to turn the Spartans into democrats (cf. also *Areop.*, 61), we may credit them, by the same token, with *Isonomia*. *Isonomous* may, or may not, be the right reading in Ephorus, *ap.* Strabo, VIII, 5, 4 (= frag. 18 Müller, frag. 117 Jacoby). If it is, it refers not to the classical Spartan constitution, but to an earlier period in which the Spartans were on a footing of equality with the *perioikoi*. But I think Jacoby is right in adopting the alternative reading of *isotimous*.

<sup>52</sup> See n. 38, above.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. especially Thuc., VI, 38, 5; Plato, *Rep.*, 561E, 563B. In all this I do not mean, of course, that to the democrats themselves *Eunomia* and *Isonomia* would be mutually exclusive terms; they would certainly think of the good observance of their "equal" constitution as *euno-meisthai* (so e.g. Aeschines, I, 5). One could hardly claim *Isonomia* to the exclusion of *Eunomia*, though *Eunomia* could be, and was claimed, by those who would have no truck with *Isonomia*, e.g. by Plato in the *Republic* (425A *et passim*) where *Isonomia* occurs only as a term of abuse (n. 34, above).

<sup>54</sup> So much I hope will be conceded from Solon's refusal to grant "to

of the land as well as redistribution of political rights and privileges. We know what happened to their demands. They got under Solon a share, though nothing like an equal share, of political power. On the score of economic equality they got nothing at all, beyond cancellation of debts secured on the debtor's person and the emancipation of those who had fallen into slavery through debt.<sup>55</sup> In the subsequent development of Athenian democracy the separation of the two demands became formally complete. The demand for political equality, first voiced by only the poorest sections of the *demos*, became the first article of the democratic creed and was progressively implemented in waves of far-reaching reforms which swept away one by one all constitutional guarantees of political privilege for the upper classes.<sup>56</sup>

The demand for equality in the land was quickly dropped from the responsible democratic platform. It was only under the tyrant, Peisistratus,<sup>57</sup> never again under Cleisthenes, or Pericles, or Cleon, or any other democratic leader that the landless were

the base *Isomoiria* of the rich fatherland with the good" in frag. 23, Diehl. The people's demand for redivision of the land is amply attested in our sources (*Ath. Pol.*, 11, 2; Plut., *Sol.*, 13, 3 and 16, 1), as well as the general claim to equality (Plut., *Sol.*, 14, 2); the slogan *Isomoiria* would be the natural vehicle for the demand for redivision of the land (*Ath. Pol.*, 11, 2; Plut., *Sol.*, 13, 3 and 16, 1) backed by the general claim to equality (*τὸ διορθωτικόν*, Plut., *Sol.*, 14, 2). I believe it is misleading to suggest (Ehrenberg in his *R.-E.* article, col. 298) that the demand for equality played no part in the earlier struggles of the people against the aristocracy, and came to the fore only later in the struggle against tyranny. In this instance the demand was for *τὸ διορθωτικόν* and *ἰσορροπία* as well as for *Dike*.

<sup>55</sup> For the interpretation of the economic aspects of Solon's reforms see my "Solonian Justice" (cited above, n. 45), pp. 73 ff. They consist mainly in the *legal* provision which made all debts secured on the debtor's person unenforceable by law, as well as (probably) the use of state funds to ransom Athenian citizens already sold as slaves in foreign lands. The latter would involve, of course, a certain amount of indirect redistribution of property; but that is as far as Solon went.

<sup>56</sup> The Cleisthenean constitution, 508 B. C., and the subsequent reforms listed at *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 1-2; the reforms of Ephialtes, 462; admission of Zeugitai to eligibility for appointment by lot to archonship, 457; pay for jury-service and for Councillors, ca. 450; pay for attendance at the Assembly, soon after 403.

<sup>57</sup> Though this is only a conjecture; see my "Solonian Justice," p. 79.

given Attic land by the state.<sup>58</sup> In Athens such a demand became a lost cause, the desperate hope of the wholly dispossessed,<sup>59</sup> who never once had the chance to get sponsorship for it from even the most extreme of demagogues. We can see now precisely why *Isomoiria* could never serve as the watchword of the democratic state; it was too deeply compromised with redision of the land.<sup>60</sup> The banner which was to fly from the democratic mast-head had to proclaim the equal share of all the citizens in the laws yet also to pledge the state to maintain by these same laws the established inequalities of property.<sup>61</sup> What slogan would fit this purpose better than *Isonomia*?

<sup>58</sup> The Athenian empire did give land to the landless (some 10,000 Athenians may have left Athens as cleruchs between 509 and 430, A. W. Gomme, "Cleruchy," in *Oxford Classical Dictionary* [1949]), but only at the price of expatriation. That a good many of the cleruchs came from the poorer classes is what we would expect; and we know from *I. G.*, I<sup>a</sup>, 45 (B) that at least in some cases the cleruchy was reserved exclusively to the *zeugitai* and the *thetes*.

<sup>59</sup> Aristotle speaks as though redision of the land was a regular feature of democratic revolutions in Greece (*Ath. Pol.*, 40, 3) and cites "redision of estates" as one cause of oligarchic revolutions at *Pol.*, 1305 a 5; cf. also the undertaking not to countenance "cancellation of private debts or redision of the land or the houses of Athenians" in the heliastic oath *ap. Demosth.*, XXIV (*Ag. Timocr.*), 149. From these facts alone we could infer that the hope of redision of the land remained alive in the poorest strata of Athenian society; and this is confirmed by the vogue of utopian communistic schemes such as that of the *Ecclesiazusae*, though this also tells us that such demands were not a serious threat to the propertied classes, else they could not be joked about so good-naturedly on the public stage. We can also learn something from the proposals of conservatives like Isocrates (*Peace*, 24; *To Phil.*, 120; *Areop.*, 35) and Aristotle (*Pol.*, 1320 a 36 ff.) for settling the destitute on small plots of land.

<sup>60</sup> It can hardly be an accident that *Isomoiria*, so natural a vehicle for the democratic concept of the state as an equalitarian community, is never used for this purpose in any surviving fifth or fourth century historical or political source. Its application to democracy at Thuc., VI, 29, 1 does not refer to the equal share of each and every citizen in the state but to the equal shares of the three "parts" of the state (the rich, the wise, and the masses). In legal contexts the word is used of equality of shares in an estate (Demosth., XLVIII, 19; Is., I, II, and XXXV), which shows how strongly the word retains its connection with allotment of property, as in *Il.*, XV, 209 and 704-5, and Solon, frag. 23, Diehl.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. the heliastic oath (n. 59, above), and the declaration of the *archon eponymus* on his induction "that everyone will have and hold

If this interpretation is correct, *Isonomia* is the record of a defeat for the poorest section of the *demos*. It signalizes that paradox of Greek democratic society: the astonishing fact that the man who, as citizen, shares the kingly dignity, the sovereign power of the *demos*, may yet as a private individual labor under the indignity of utter destitution.<sup>62</sup> Everyone must have felt the discrepancy, though it was only the conservatives who dragged this skeleton out of the democratic closet. No impartial estimate of the democratic state can close its eyes to the consequences of this contradiction in terms of moral degradation, political corruption, and ceaseless class conflict, to which Plato with merciless logic directs our attention.<sup>63</sup> Yet it would be an even graver distortion of history to overdraw, as Plato does, this negative side of the picture. If the landless did not get land, they got in *Isonomia* more than the common people had yet won for themselves anywhere else since the dawn of history. Hitherto material progress had normally been coeval with the concentration of both political and economic power in the hands of kings and nobles. *Isonomia* refused to countenance either the ancient monopoly of law in the hands of a hereditary aristocracy or the claims to political privilege of the new plutocracy whose social power rivalled that of the old nobility. It promised the poorest citizen an equal right in the law-making, law-administering, law-enforcing power of the state. It expressed the spirit

to the end of his term of office whatever (property) he possessed at the beginning of his office" *Ath. Pol.*, 56, 2. The most likely date of the introduction of both pledges is the time of the Solonian reforms; Bonner and Smith, *Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, I (Chicago, 1930), p. 62, assume that the declaration of the *archon epynomus* is "at least as early as 683-82," but without positive evidence. The need for such a pledge would be felt most acutely after widespread agitation for redistribution of property which, so far as we know, did not arise until the end of this century.

<sup>62</sup> I am not ignoring the fact that the poor could and did use their political power to extract all kinds of economic tribute from the state at the expense of their wealthier fellow-citizens and/or the "allies." A very considerable redistribution of property was achieved indirectly by these means; but in the last analysis they were only palliatives, never cures, for the chronic malady of poverty. The man who depended on the heliastic *tribolon* for his daily food and that of his family (*Aristoph., Wasps*, 300 ff.) was in a very poor position to maintain self-respecting independence *vis-à-vis* the rich.

<sup>63</sup> *Rep.*, 421E ff.; *Laws*, 715B and 832B, C.

of a constitution, hitherto undreamed of in civilized society, which declared that the poor man's share in law and political office was equal to that of the noble and the rich.<sup>64</sup> This was implied in *Isonomia*, and one can see why a word which said so much should pass from a description of a special feature of democracy into a name for the whole constitution. The same thing happened in the case of *Isegoria* and *Isokratia*,<sup>65</sup> but with nothing like the success of *Isonomia*. Equal law, equal liberty of speech, equal power in government—each of these seizes on features so essential to democracy that none of them could exist without the others, none could be realized without the support of the whole constitution, so that any of them singly could serve to designate the whole. It is an impressive witness to the importance which the members of the democratic *Polis* attached to its equal law that *Isonomia* should be their favorite ideological slogan, pre-eminent over even *Isegoria* and *Isokratia*.

### III.

But there is something more in *Isonomia* than the sense that we have so far explored. This is a subtler, more elusive meaning, and it is hard to state it without overstating it. Yet the attempt must be made, for to omit it would be to ignore a part of its meaning which was not only a vital part of democratic ideology but accounts in large measure for the appeal of *Isonomia* to more conservative shades of political opinion. I can best suggest what this is by calling attention to the fact that the junction of equality and law may be read not only in the sense of law as the guarantee of equality, but also in the converse sense of equality as the guarantee of law. In the former sense, which has occupied our attention in the preceding section, law appears as the means to the end of political equality; in the latter, law, or the rule of law, is the end, political equality is the means to

<sup>64</sup> Eur., *Suppl.*, 404-37.

<sup>65</sup> Herodotus, V, 78 and V, 92, a, 1 respectively. In none of the other 5th and 4th century instances known to me (Eupolis, 291; ps.-Xen., *Ath. Pol.*, 1, 12; Xen., *Cyr.*, I, 3, 10; Demosth., XXI, 124) does *Isegoria* seem to stand as a generalized expression for democracy, though the importance attached to the idea which it expresses is, of course, enormous (see, e. g., Eur., *Suppl.*, 435-41). Nor do I know of any such usage of *Isokratia* outside of Herodotus.

this end. To take the word in this latter sense is to assert that its conformity to law will be ensured by its equalitarian distribution of political power. It is my contention that to a thoughtful democrat *Isonomia* would convey both of these senses, though one or the other might predominate in different contexts, and that the latter sense will account, as the former alone would not, for the reluctant admiration which even opponents of democracy could feel for *Isonomia*.

Long before Aristotle produced his classical formulation of the Rule of Law,<sup>66</sup> it had been the conviction of the democrats that their constitution, and theirs alone, measured up to this ideal.<sup>67</sup> Thus, to take comparatively late expressions of this conviction, Demosthenes identifies democracy with government by law in explicit contrast to both monarchy and oligarchy;<sup>68</sup> Aeschines remarks that “tyrannies and oligarchies are governed by the tempers of their lords, democratic states by the established laws.”<sup>69</sup> On what grounds would they justify this conviction? What is there about their state which makes democrats assert so confidently that it alone is governed by law? The question unfortunately remains unanswered in the orators, probably because the answer seemed too obvious to themselves and their audience to call for statement and discussion. It seems to be taken for granted in Aeschines’ cursory contrast between “the oligarchs and those who are governed by an unequal consti-

<sup>66</sup> *Pol.*, 1286 a 8 ff., 1287 a 19 ff.

<sup>67</sup> The assessment of the historical accuracy of this claim is not my business in this paper; all that matters strictly to my argument is that the conviction was actually held by the democrats themselves, which one would hardly suspect from Aristotle’s identification of “extreme democracy” with “mass-rule” *against* the “rule of law” (*Pol.*, 1292 a 5 ff.). If I may venture an unsupported opinion, it is that, in spite of a margin of ever-present lawlessness, radical democracy did substantially conform to the rule of law both in constitutional design (e.g., the γραφὴ παρανόμων) and in the bulk of its day-to-day practice. I do think, however, that the Attic orators were wrong in blanketeting oligarchy as a whole with the charge of lawlessness; there is no good reason to doubt that an enlightened oligarchy, like that of Thebes, would substantially conform in its way to the ideal of the rule of law. The Attic orators could only make their point stick by picking out lawless oligarchies, of which there were doubtless plenty.

<sup>68</sup> VI (2 *Phil.*), 25 for the first, XXIV (*Ag. Timocr.*), 75-6 for the second.

<sup>69</sup> I (*Ag. Timarch.*), 4.

tution" and the Athenians, "who have the equal and law-abiding constitution,"<sup>70</sup> without any responsible encounter with the question why an "equal constitution" should be in fact more "law-abiding" than an "unequal" one.<sup>71</sup> For an account of the nexus between equality and the rule of law we must go back to a time when habit had not yet turned a profound idea into a shallow dogma.

Otanes' main argument for *Isonomia* in the Debate on Constitutions is that this will be a law-abiding state, free from the lawlessness of tyranny. But he does not rest his case with asserting and documenting the tyrant's *hybris*. He adds an *explanation* of the causes of the tyrant's flouting of the holy restraints of *Dike* which is our first Western record of a revolutionary advance in man's understanding of the problem of government. The traditional explanation of the perversion of justice by its official guardians had been couched in terms of purely personal morality. Hesiod's bitter invectives against the bribe-eating kings had been premised on the assumption that their crooked judgements were caused by their personal "foolishness" and "evil mind."<sup>72</sup> There is never a hint in all his complaints that their offenses against *Dike* might be due to the essential injustice of the institutions which made them the irresponsible dispensers of law and judgement. Even Solon, who, unlike Hesiod, is most emphatically a political reformer, has no clear perception of the fact that unequal political privilege is *per se* the source of the *Dysnomia* of the eupatrids. He blames their political vices on their personal immorality: "they know

<sup>70</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 5. As Ehrenberg has remarked, *ἴσην καὶ ἔννομον* here is doubtless a periphrasis for *Isonomia*.

<sup>71</sup> Aeschines' reasoning, such as it is, is that "in a democracy the persons of the citizens and the constitution are safeguarded by the laws, while those of tyrants and oligarchs (are safeguarded) by suspicion and armed force," i. e., that democratic law does the job which coercive force does in undemocratic states. Taken at face value this is nonsense, since, on the one hand, law is no monopoly of democracy and, on the other, democratic law has also coercive sanctions. What Aeschines doubtless means to say is that in democracy law has the added sanction of voluntary compliance and is, to that extent, a better safeguard of the person and the constitution. This is a valuable insight so far as it goes, but it ignores the vital question why coercive power should also be used more law-abidingly in the "equal" constitutions.

<sup>72</sup> *Op.*, 38-41, 260-64.

not how to restrain themselves from excess, nor to order their pleasures in peacableness of life.”<sup>73</sup> Indeed even Plato, who understood as well as anyone ever did the interdependence of personal and social virtue, was to remain under the spell of the moralistic over-simplification of the problem of social justice. He holds that a man whose personal wisdom and virtue meet the high standards of philosophic perfection, *should* be entrusted with absolute, irresponsible power, and that his personal integrity, armed with sufficient resources of persuasion and compulsion, could and would establish the perfectly just state.<sup>74</sup>

The exponent of democracy in Herodotus strikes out along a radically different path when he traces the vices of tyranny to the vicious scheme of unequal power of which the tyrant's personal character is itself the inevitable victim. The tyrant's *hybris*, says Otanes, is the result not of the envy which is common to all men,<sup>75</sup> but of the special privilege of his position. “Even the best of men,” he asserts, placed in the tyrant's seat of irresponsible power, “would be changed from his wonted mind.” When he defends the rule of the people under the rubric of *Isonomia*, Otanes does not idealize the people's virtue. He does not claim that the people's rule will be good because the people are just and wise. He says only that their rule will be responsible and equal, assuming that it will be saved by this very fact from the *hybris* which not even the best of monarchs can avoid. He believes that the power of any man in office, when counterpoised against the equal power of his fellows to bring him to judgement under the law, will be held under constraint of equality within the just limits of lawful rule.

It is this sense of *Isonomia*—that of an equalitarian distribution of political power, assuring responsible and, therefore, law-abiding government—which best explains the use of *Oligarchia isonomos* by the Theban spokesmen in Thuc., III, 62. The point at issue in this discussion is whether the city of Thebes can be held responsible for the act of its government when it be-

<sup>73</sup> Frag. 3, 9-10, Diehl; cf. 4, 3-5, Diehl. The charge of *ādikos νόος*, frag. 3, 7, is repeated from Hesiod, *Op.*, 260.

<sup>74</sup> This is the view of the *Republic* and the *Politicus*. It is not withdrawn in the *Laws*, where Plato merely gives up the hope that such a man can be found (691C, D; 713C); see especially 876C, D.

<sup>75</sup> Being inherent in man's nature: *φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφέρεται ἀνθρώπῳ*, III, 80, 3.

trayed the Greek cause at the time of the Persian invasion. The Theban's argument to the contrary is premised on a distinction between two types of government, which we may call isonomic and non-isonomic respectively. The contemporary constitution of Thebes is brought under the first head by attaching specifically the term *isonomos* to their brand of oligarchy; while their mention of democracy *tout court* under the same head assumes that its title to *Isonomia* is so obvious that it does not call for special mention. On the other side, there is tyranny and the earlier government of Thebes, where "a *Dynasteia* of a few men held power." The difference between the two types consists in the fact that the first, and only the first, is (i) a government of law, (ii) a responsible government, whose decisions are those of "the whole of a state having the power to govern itself ( $\xi\mu\pi\alpha\sigma\alpha\ \pi\boldsymbol{\lambda}\lambda\iota\mu\nu\ a\acute{u}t\kappa\rho\kappa\rho\tau\omega\rho$ )."<sup>76</sup> What accounts for the difference is not spelled out: but it is clearly implied in the statement that when the earlier *Dynasteia* led Thebes to the Persian alliance, it did so by "forcibly coercing the masses ( $\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\chi\omega\tau\epsilon\ i\sigma\chi\mu\ \tau\delta\ \pi\lambda\tilde{\eta}\theta\omega\sigma$ )."<sup>77</sup> It is the unequal power of the rulers of a non-isonomic state that accounts for their ability to act without restraint of law and force their own arbitrary will upon the governed, pushing them into a course of action for which they cannot be held responsible, since they lacked the power to accept or reject it for themselves. Clearly this cannot happen in democracy where power belongs to the people, and officials do not decide the policies of the state but administer the policies which the people decide.<sup>78</sup> By grafting the democratic slogan of *Isonomia* on their own constitution the Theban speakers claim that neither can this happen in their own contemporary state and for the same reason as in democracy. And they can make this claim in good faith because, as we know from independent sources, their constitution was a genuinely equalitarian one within the limits of its restricted franchise.<sup>79</sup> Though oligarchic, because it excluded over half of native Thebans from full-fledged citizenship, it

<sup>76</sup> Exactly the same construction is put on *Isonomia* by Thucydides at IV, 79, 2-3: Brasidas passed through Thessaly; but, since the Thessalian masses were always friendly to Athens, "if *Isonomia*, rather than *Dynasteia*, had been the local Thessalian usage, Brasidas would not have passed."

<sup>77</sup> The evidence is best collected and discussed in H. Swoboda, "Studien zur Verfassung Boiotiens," *Klio*, X (1910), pp. 315 ff.

could nonetheless be justly termed an *Oligarchia isonomos*, because it gave every member of the enfranchised civic body an equal share in the government, with no special privilege for the nobility; it entrusted the sovereign decisions of the state to *Boulai*, in which each hoplite-citizen took his place by regular rotation. Thus here, too, as in Otanes' speech in Herodotus, *Isonomia* designates a political order in which the rule of law and responsible government are maintained by the equal distribution of political power.<sup>78</sup>

But what lay back of Otanes' speech? So profound an apprehension of the corrupting effects of irresponsible power on the character of those who hold it and of the equal diffusion of power as the remedy for injustice, expressed so confidently yet unpretentiously by this exponent of *Isonomia*, suggests a long antecedent development. How far back this development extends we can judge from the fact that by the middle of the sixth century the implied idea had been projected from politics to cosmology; and nothing gives us a better sense of the force with which this political insight struck the minds of its discoverers than the fact that it provided the pattern on which the first Western concept of nature as a domain of inherent, unexceptionable order was designed.<sup>79</sup> The word, *Isonomia*, does not occur, of course, in the fragments of Anaximander, the

<sup>78</sup> I forego an extensive analysis of the Platonic use of *Isonomos* (n. 34, above). Briefly, in *Ep.*, 7, 326D the contrast is between the "just and *isonomos politia*" and the arbitrary rule (*δυναστείας*) which he imputes to "tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies"; he is turning the table on the democrats by saying, in effect, that their own slogan is too good for them, as for their tyrannic and oligarchic rivals. By *Isonomia* he clearly understands a rule of stable law (cf. 326C, *ἡρεμήσαι κατὰ νόμους*); though what he would do with the first half of the compound is hard to say, unless he would reinterpret it in accordance with his concept of "proportional" equality (*Laws*, 744C, 757A ff.; cf. *Rep.*, 558C), which is, of course, the denial of democratic ("arithmetical") equality. The use of *Isonomia* at *Menex.*, 239A is less instructive for our purpose. The same semantic legerdemain which transforms that which is "called" democracy into "aristocracy with the good opinion of the mass" reduces *Isonomia* to (i) *Isogonia* and (ii) government by those preeminent in "repute of virtue and wisdom" (239A and cf. 238D); (i) and (ii) are the qualifications which *would* make *Isonomia* acceptable to Plato, if Athens could measure up to them.

<sup>79</sup> For the reconstruction of Anaximander's cosmology which I assume in this discussion see the paper cited above (n. 29), pp. 168 ff.

founder of this concept of nature; we cannot say that he used the word or knew it. His famous fragment (B 1) speaks not of law but "justice" (*δίκη*) and "reparation" (*τίσις*). But what matters here is that in his system the guarantee of this "just" order, where "injustice" is unfailingly redressed, is not the preponderant power of some higher, law-ordinating, law-enforcing agency, but the equal power of the basic constituents of nature to hold each other in check. The former idea would have been naturally suggested to his mind by the traditional, Hesiodic conception of divine justice. Hesiod's poems had impressed on the Greek imagination the conviction that Zeus is the guardian of justice, his wisdom and might its only sure support; if there is law and order on Olympus above, in the Tartarus below, and in the human *polis* upon the earth, it is because Zeus has fought and subdued every rebellious power, and is now able to crush, according to his own designs and in his own good time, any one who flouts the ordinances of his sovereign will.<sup>80</sup> Anaximander, who thinks of his *Apeiron* as divine, and endows it with the traditional attributes of divinity, immortality and agelessness, would have every reason to transfer to it a guardianship of justice patterned on that of Hesiod's Zeus. His alternative solution of the problem has the force of a deliberate rejection of this traditional conception. He chooses to think of nature as a self-regulative equilibrium, a system whose "justice" is preserved by the internal equipoise of its components, not by the intervention of any higher, external power.<sup>81</sup> His solution of the problem of cosmic justice is modelled on a notion of political

<sup>80</sup> The goddess, *Dike*, of course, is very much concerned with human justice and does some punishing of injustice on her own account (*Op.*, 223); but she is the "daughter" of Zeus and anyhow she, like all the other gods, has received her "honour" or office from Zeus (*Th.*, 74, 885); whatever power she has is derived from Zeus and ultimately dependent on his supreme force (*Op.*, 259 ff.). Similarly for "Oath who gives most woe to mortal men if anyone wilfully swears a false oath" (*Th.*, 231), for "Zeus' thrice ten thousand" guardians of "judgments and deeds of wrong" (*Op.*, 253-5), and the Fates who "pursue the transgressions of men and of gods" (*Th.*, 220). In some passages (*Op.*, 2-8, 267-9) Zeus is directly the watcher and rewarder of human justice. Cf. F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca, 1949), pp. 47 ff., 64 ff., 83 ff., 90 ff.

<sup>81</sup> For the "government" of the created world by the *Apeiron* in accordance with this pattern see *op. cit.* (at n. 29), pp. 172-3.

justice which is utterly different from either the aristocratic justice of Hesiod's *polis* or the monarchic justice of Hesiod's pantheon: the notion which answers substantially to *Isonomia*, for it assumes that the only reliable preservative of justice in a community is the equal distribution of power among its members.

Just such a notion is designated by *Isonomia* in Alcmaeon's fragment. The equalitarian order which is normative for Anaximander's universe is now applied to the *kosmos* of health within the human organism. For Alcmaeon, as for the "Hippocratic" medicine of Ionia and the Sicilian medicine of the Empedoclean school,<sup>82</sup> the normal constitution of the organism is the *krasis* of equal "powers"; the "monarchic" preponderance of any power is a diseased condition, destructive of the organism. Such a medical use of *Isonomia* is certainly patterned on a democratic concept of the political order, though it is by no means necessary to assume that Alcmaeon so used it because he was himself a partisan of democracy. Once we have got rid of his "Pythagoreanism" we must admit that of his political persuasion we know exactly nothing.<sup>83</sup> This leaves us with several possibilities: He may have been himself an admirer of the régime which his namesakes, the Alcmaeonids, had recently established at Athens. That a rationalistic physician of Croton might have just such sympathies is perfectly possible, even (as is not unlikely) if he himself were a member of the ruling "thousand"; liberal aristocrats there must have been everywhere throughout Greece; and in the case of Croton we have one

<sup>82</sup> For the Hippocratics see *op. cit.* (at n. 29), pp. 156-8. For Empedocles see e.g. his theory that vision is best when the dark-light opposites (water-fire) are in equilibrium, "for the best tempered and most excellent [state of the organism with respect to vision] is the one which consists of both in equal proportions"; also his view that "all those in whom the mixture [of the four elements] is equal or nearly so . . . are the wisest and have the most exact perceptions" (*Theophr., De Sens.*, 9 and 11 = *Emp.*, A 86; translations after Burnet).

<sup>83</sup> The only information supplied us by our sources on this point is purely negative: no political activity or opinion is ever imputed to him. This may be significant, since political attitudes or legislative functions are imputed to nearly all the major philosophical figures of the sixth and fifth centuries: Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles. Had he played a political rôle of any prominence we would expect some trace of it, especially in the lives of Pythagoras which claim Alcmaeon as a "Pythagorean."

tradition which informs us that the proposal to democratize the constitution was sponsored by some members of the "thousand."<sup>84</sup> Alternatively, he may have used *Isonomia*, the term which Cleisthenean democracy (at the latest) had popularized in Greek speech, as simply the most appropriate metaphor for his equalitarian conception of healthful order. Finally, it is not impossible that the same metaphor had been already applied to Anaximander's concept of nature; if so, Alcmaeon could have borrowed both the word and the concept of order which it expressed, with or without the wish to underwrite its political connotations.<sup>85</sup> I do not see how we can decide among these possibilities, or that we need to; though in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that a man who gave *Isonomia* so prominent a place in his medical thought would not be unfriendly to its political import. The one possibility which, I believe, should be ruled out is that *Isonomia* was a generalization from the political structure of contemporary Croton.<sup>86</sup> As aristocracies go, this was not an

<sup>84</sup> Iambl., *V. P.*, 257, with the generally accepted emendation of χρόνων (which makes no sense at all) to χλιῶν. I see no reason to doubt that this part of the account comes from Timaeus, though the names "Hippasus, Diodorus, Theages" may not be due to him but to Apollonius (von Fritz, *op. cit.*, pp. 59 f.). I should be more inclined to date this episode somewhat later than 509 (as does Minar, *op. cit.*, pp. 53 f.), perhaps by a few years (T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* [Oxford, 1948], p. 366, n. 9) or decades (von Fritz, p. 87), but in any case doubtless within Alcmaeon's lifetime. I see no reason to doubt the statement of the source (*loc. cit.*) that Pythagorean speakers opposed the proposal.

<sup>85</sup> I consider this the least likely of the three possibilities, since (i) we have no evidence that Anaximander used *Isonomia* (though what we know of his philosophical vocabulary is so meager, that neither can we say that he did not) and (ii) Alcmaeon's interests were medical and physiological, not cosmological (though this too is not a conclusive objection, since the analogy of physical macrocosm and human microcosm was so vivid in Greek thought that had a physician found *Isonomia* in a cosmology, he could have transferred it to medicine without any sort of commitment to its cosmological validity).

<sup>86</sup> As seems to be assumed by both Larsen (*op. cit.*, p. 9) and Ehrenberg (OD, p. 535), taking Alcmaeon's *Isonomia* to mean a "balanced state." What kind of "balanced state" would Croton be, if it disfranchised the overwhelming proportion of the *demos* (n. 87, below)? But if "balanced state" were in Alcmaeon's mind, then, as Ehrenberg himself remarks (*loc. cit.*), he would have spoken of it as *Eunomia*, not *Isonomia*.

excessively narrow one; but it was certainly a far more restricted one than, say, the oligarchy established at Thebes after the Persian wars, barring from so much as attendance at the Assembly all but the privileged "thousand," who, on any estimate, must have been a tiny fraction of the native population.<sup>87</sup> Such a constitution, whose marked inequalities were the butt of sharp attacks by democratic forces, could scarcely be named by the word whose hallmark was Equality.

Larsen has rightly stressed that in this fragment, as indeed in all of the major contexts in which the word occurs, *Isonomia* appears in sharpest opposition to the one-man rule of tyranny. But it would be an error to infer from this<sup>88</sup> that *Isonomia* is, therefore, simply the rejection of the extreme inequality of tyranny and could be used by aristocrats no less than by the champions of democracy. Such an inference, as I have urged above, cannot be supported by a single item of positive evidence. But my objection can be grounded on far larger historical grounds, by recalling the role of equality in the political struggles of the Greek world. The demand for equality was first raised against those who held, by hereditary right, the monopoly of government long before tyranny reared its head in Greece. In their struggle against the nobility, the people saw that, without an equal share in the law, they could not be safe from legal oppression. But it was only in the later encounter with tyranny that the people discovered how vain is the promise of equality unless grounded in the rule of law and, conversely, that only the attainment of equality can secure the rule of law. Time and

<sup>87</sup> Dunbabin (*op. cit.*, p. 365) does not seem to think the figure of half a million excessive for the population of sixth-century Sybaris. If Croton were only half its size—and a state which destroyed Sybaris and established a hegemony over several of its neighbours between 510 and 480 (Dunbabin, p. 368) could not be a small one—the restriction of political rights to a thousand would mean the disfranchisement of well over 90 per cent of the native Crotoniats.

<sup>88</sup> As Larsen, of course, does not, except in his treatment of Alcmaeon's fragment (*loc. cit.*). This is the only part of his paper to which I have grave objections. Its revision along the lines suggested here would be wholly in accord with his general thesis and make his argument completely coherent. Ehrenberg's view of *Isonomia* as the watchword of the Cleisthenean reforms would be similarly strengthened and simplified by surrendering the notion that it had been an "aristocratic" slogan only a couple of years earlier.

again a tyrant must have won popular support by promising the people to break by force the legal power of the nobles. When they accepted his gift, the people found through bitter experience that the hope of equality under the tyrant's lawless rule was illusory, and that the only way this hope could be realized was to make government responsible to the governed by extending the equal share of all the citizens in the control of the state.

It was this lesson from past experience and goal for future endeavour that was crystallized in the slogan of *Isonomia*. It was not an aristocratic idea, for though the nobles at times made common cause with the people against the tyrant, their goal was not an advance to the equality of *Isonomia* but a retreat to traditional inequalities sanctioned by *Eunomia*. Oligarchies could use the term *Isonomia*, but only by borrowing it from democracy and only by approximating as best they could the democratic pattern. In the degree in which a liberal oligarchy, such as that of Thebes, suppressed the political privileges of its noble clans and attained a measure of responsible government by granting an equal share in government to its fully enfranchised civic body, it too could speak of its constitution as *Oligarchia isonomos*. Democracy had travelled much further along this road when this "fairest of names" had become the proud title of its own constitution. When in due course this was displaced as a proper name by the more prosaic and more precise *Demokratia*, *Isonomia* still remained the favorite slogan of democracy, for it alone expressed its greatest achievement, its pursuit of the goal of political equality to the farthest limits envisaged by the Greek mind, and this not in defiance, but in support, of the rule of law.<sup>89</sup>

GREGORY VLASTOS.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

<sup>89</sup> I wish to make grateful acknowledgment of a Fellowship granted me by the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation which has enabled me to undertake this and other studies in Greek political ideas. A debt of another sort I owe my colleague, Friedrich Solmsen, who read an earlier draft of this paper and made a number of valuable criticisms and suggestions.

## THE DECLENSION OF LATIN COMPOUND ADJECTIVES.

The strong predilection of Latin adjectives for *i*-stem inflection, infrequent in the adjectives of most IE languages, shows itself: 1) in the extension of original *u*-stems by means of *-i* (e. g. *suavis*, Gk. ἡδύς, Skt. *svādūś*) ; 2) in such occasional correspondences as *similis*, Gk. ὁμαλός; *humilis*, χθαμαλός; 3) in the intrusion of *i*-stem inflection into adjectives originally having stems ending in consonants, especially the present participle and, to a much slighter extent, the comparative; 4) in the frequent transfer to the third declension in compounds whose second members are *o*-stem or *ā*-stem nouns: e. g. *barba : imberbis*; *remus : biremis*.<sup>1</sup> It is with this last phenomenon that the present paper is concerned.

The material is based on an examination of compounds having as first member a prepositional prefix or the negative *in-* or a numeral stem or the stem of a declinable adjective, and having as second member a recognizable noun-stem ordinarily following the first or second declension. The collection was made with the help of Gradenwitz<sup>2</sup> and the indices of a sufficiently wide range of authors to give an adequate general picture of the usage in the Republic and early Empire: Plautus, Terence, Cicero's orations, letters, and philosophical works; the *Corpus Caesareanum*, Sallust, Nepos, Lucretius, Catullus, Vergil, the *Appendix Vergiliana*, Horace, Propertius, Ovid, Vitruvius, Petronius, Seneca's tragedies, Lucan, Statius, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Apuleius. The compounds will be found to be of two types: 1) there is no change in the stem-final beyond the fact that the adjective uses *o*-stem endings as masculine and neuter and *ā*-stem endings as feminine, regardless of the stem-final of the noun entering into composition (e. g. *modus : commodus*, *-a*, *-um*; *via : inviua*, *-a*, *-um*) ; this type, which is the standard formation in Sanskrit and Greek,<sup>3</sup> will be called in this paper Type A; 2) the com-

<sup>1</sup> Of the numerous and mostly very brief references to this feature of Latin word-formation I here cite only Leumann-Hofmann, pp. 233-4.

<sup>2</sup> Otto Gradenwitz, *Laterculi vocum latinarum* (Leipzig, 1904).

<sup>3</sup> In Greek with feminine usually like masculine, the forms being familiarly known as "adjectives of two terminations."

pound adjective is an *i*-stem, as in the examples shown in the first paragraph; this formation will be known as Type B. As a result of analogical influences working in both directions there was some fluctuation, and it is safe to assume that there was some debate among Roman grammarians as to which of two rival forms was "correct"; also there are many manuscript variants,<sup>4</sup> and in giving figures a small margin of error must be allowed. Consequently I have generally not used statistics to support my main arguments, unless they weigh very heavily in favor of one side. Yet the situation is by no means one of hopeless disorder, and after the material has been presented it will be possible to make certain generalizations which may have some value in connection with the development of literary style.

In the following lists, taken from the texts cited above, the compounds are arranged in the alphabetical order of their second member, the significant part for our purposes:<sup>5</sup>

#### TYPE A.

1. The prior member is a preposition or inseparable prefix (not including negative *in*-): *ex-animus*, *pro-clivus*, *se-curus*, *se-dulus*,<sup>6</sup> *sub-dolus*, *pro-fanus*, *ef-frenus*, *pro-fundus*, *sub-iugus*, *de-lirus*, *com-modus* (*ac*-, *in*-, *per-commodus*), *e-nervus*, *praeposterus*, *ab-sonus*, *con-sonus*, *dis-sonus*, *alti-sonus*, etc., *conterminus*, *ad-uncus*, *ob-uncus*, *red-uncus*, *sub-vesperus*, *a-vius*, *de-vius*, *ob-vius*, *per-vius*, *im-per-vius*, *prae-vius*.

2. The prior member is the negative *in*-: *in-animus*, *imberbus*, *in-ermus*, *in-frenus*, *in-glorius*, *in-numerus*, *in-terminus*, *in-vius*.

<sup>4</sup> Neue-Wagener, *Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache*<sup>2</sup>, II (Berlin, 1892), pp. 149-70, give a very detailed treatment of these variants.

<sup>5</sup> I have excluded the etymologically uncertain *inanis*, *obscoenus*, *obscurus*, *sublimis*, and also *debilis* and *illistris*, for which no corresponding noun exists in Latin; the adverbial forms *omnimodis*, *multimodis*; nouns of the type *duovir*; the proper names *Ahenobarbus*, *Longarenus*, and *Perennia*; forms which rest purely on emendation or which have been removed by emendation from the standard texts; compounds which are in whole or in part Greek, though I have admitted Cicero's *decemscalmus* (*Ad Att.*, XVI, 3, 6) and Horace's *depugis* (*Serm.*, I, 2, 93). In word-counting I have disregarded comparative and superlative forms, because they do not show the distinction between Types A and B.

<sup>6</sup> I see no reason to question the derivation from *se* + *dolō* 'without guilt,' approved by Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet<sup>3</sup>.

3. The prior member is a numeral stem (including *semi-*, *sesqui-*, *ter-*, *tot-*) : *sesqui-alter*,<sup>7</sup> *oct-angulus*, *sex-angulus*, *tri-angulus*, *viginti-angulus*, *semi-animus*, *un-animus*, *semi-circulus*, *sesqui-digitus*, *sem(i)-ermus*, *quadri-fluvius*, *bi-furcus*, *bi-iugus*, *quadri-iugus*, *ter-iugus*, *tot-iugus*, *tri-iugus*, *se-libra*, *tri-modius*,<sup>8</sup> *tot-modus*, *uni-modus*, *sesqui-octavus*, *un(i)-oculus*, *decem-scalmus*, *semi-somnus*, *bi-sulcus*, *quadri-sulcus*, *tri-sulcus*, *sesqui-tertius*, *bi-vius*, *quadri-vius*, *tri-vius* (including *Trivia*, *trivium*).

4. The prior member is the stem of a declinable adjective (in one case the noun-stem *angui-*) : *aequ-aevus*, *prim-aevus*, *grand-aevus*, *long-aevus*, *mult(i)-angulus*, *flex-animus*, *magn-animus*, *illuti-barbus*, *albi-capillus*, *angui-comus*, *auri-comus*, *lauri-comus*, *multi-modus*, *omni-modus*, *multi-nodus*, *fer-oculus*, *sicc-oculus*, *levi-somnus*, *multi-vius*.

#### TYPE B.

1. The prior member is a preposition or inseparable prefix (not including the negative *in-*) : *ex-animis*, *re-bellis*, *ac-clivis*, *de-clivis*, *pro-clivis*, *per-pro-clivis*, *per-duellis*, *per-ennis*, *de-famis*, *de-formis*, *trans-formis*, *e-linguis*, *e-lumbis*, *e-nervis*, *e-nodis*, *ab-normis*, *e-normis*, *in-e-normis*, *com-pernis*, *de-pugis*, *in-signis*, *per-in-signis*, *prae-signis*, *de-somnis*, *ex-somnis*, *ex-torris*.

2. The prior member is the negative *in-* : *in-animis*, *im-bellis*, *im-berbis*, *in-ermis*, *in-famis*, *per-in-famis*, *in-formis*, *in-frenis*, *il-limis*, *im-plumis*, *im-punis*, *in-somnis*.

3. The prior member is a numeral stem: *semi-animis*, *un-animis*, *bi-ennis*, *dec-ennis*, *quinqu-ennis*, *sex-ennis*, *sept-ennis*, *sem(i)-ermis*, *bi-formis*, *tri-formis*, *decem-iugis*, *quadri-iugis*, *se-iugis*, *tot-iugis*, *quadri-libris*, *tri-libris*, *bi-linguis*, *tri-linguis*, *bi-membris*, *tri-nodis*, *bi-pennis*, *bi-remis*, *quadri-remis*, *quinque-remis*, *tri-remis*, *semi-somnis*, *bi-sulcis*.

4. The prior member is the stem of a declinable adjective (in one case the noun stem *tauri-*) : *horri-comis*, *sol-ennis*,<sup>9</sup> *multi-*

<sup>7</sup> Cie., *Tim.*, 7, 20; Vitr., III, 1, 6, = 'one and a half,' lit. 'having a half as second.' *sesqui-octavus* and *sesqui-tertius* are similar in formation.

<sup>8</sup> *trimodius* may be regarded as an adjective related in meaning to noun *modius* as *triremis* : *remus*.

<sup>9</sup> For conjectures on the etymology of this obscure word and its confusion with *-cnnis* from *annus* see Ernout-Meillet,<sup>10</sup> p. 1118.

*formis, omni-formis, pluri-formis, tauri-formis, multi-iugis, aequi-libris.*

Most of the compounds of both types are bahuvrīhi;<sup>10</sup> so almost all with negative *in-*, or numeral or adjective stems as prior member; but some of the prepositional compounds are hypostases,<sup>11</sup> and a few, such as *rebellis, transformis*, and some of the compounds of *sonus* are probably deveritative back-formations in origin, although in structure they do not differ from other compounds of the kind here treated. The distinction of classes according to origin will receive more attention later, especially when it appears to affect the choice between *o*-stem and *i*-stem inflection. The most striking fact about compounds of Type B is that almost all of them have a long penult: out of thirty<sup>12</sup> stems serving as second member only *-animi-, -comi-, and -iugi-* fail to conform to this rule, and only a few additional exceptions can be found outside of the texts used in this collection. *bimus* <\**dui-himos, trimus, quadrimus* ‘two (three, four) winters old,’ *bi-rōtus, -a,* are further examples of Type A compounds with short radical syllables. It is also interesting in this connection that among fourth-declension nouns *cornu* makes a series of compounds in *-cornis*, some in common use, and generally avoids the other type (except for *capricornus*), while *gradus* and *manus* generally make forms in *-us*. Conversely we might hope to find that stems with long penult rarely serve as second member of compounds of Type A; that is, rarely fail to change over to *i*-stems. Actually Type A compounds are almost equally divided: twenty<sup>13</sup> second members have a short penult and eighteen a long penult, but many of the latter are subject to special explanation. In any case it is proper to proceed in confidence that there is some relation between the long penult and the transfer to the *i*-stem class, and to attempt to discover the origin of this relation. It cannot be connected with metrical necessity, for in many of the grammatical cases (nom. sg. masc., acc. masc. and fem., dat.

<sup>10</sup> I use this designation as being probably the one in most common use for the class of compounds otherwise known as “possessive,” “mutated,” or “exocentric.” The history of these terms is discussed by Hirt, *Indogermanische Grammatik*, IV (Heidelberg, 1928), p. 38.

<sup>11</sup> For example, *obvius, securus, sedulus*. For this type in general see Leumann-Hofmann, pp. 197, 247, 254.

<sup>12</sup> *-animis*, from *animus* and *anima*, counted as one.

<sup>13</sup> In *-alter* I count *-te-* as the penult, taking the oblique forms as the basis.

and abl. sg. of all genders, acc. pl. masc. and fem.) Types A and B are fully equivalent in this respect, and even in certain other cases they are to some extent interchangeable metrically. As a matter of fact a majority of the variations such as *inermus* : *inermis* in the hexameter poets occur in cases or in situations where one form is as good as the other. Moreover the existence of traces of a similar relation between stem-class and syllabic length in cognate languages, which will be discussed in the last part of the article, lends support to the belief that the conditions in Latin are quite ancient, but at present it is best to continue the treatment of the compounds in Latin itself.

Among the compounds of Type B with a preposition as first member *abnormis*, *enormis*, *perennis*, and *extorris* show between their members the relation of preposition to object and hence are to be classed as hypostases and not as bahuvrīhis.<sup>14</sup> Yet one at least among them, *extorris*, is very old, if we may judge from the gradation *terra* : *extorris*.<sup>15</sup> *perennis* may be cognate with Umb. *peraknem*, a term of not altogether certain meaning, applied to sacrificial victims.<sup>16</sup> But most of the hypostases, if made from nouns of the first and second declensions, follow Type A: e. g. *sedulus*, *securus*, *profanus*, *delirus*; and their origin is probably to be placed very late within the prehistoric period of Latin, or even within the historic period. The adverbial ablative *sedulo* is far more frequent in Plautus than the other case-forms, and is the only form that occurs in the orations, letters, and philosophical works of Cicero. There are strong grounds for believing that the compounds of *aevum* also are of phrasal origin. These compounds, which belong exclusively to Type A, are *grandaevus* (Lucil. +), *primaevus* (Catul. +), *aequaevus* (Verg. +), *longaevus* (Verg. +), *magnaevus*· *grandaevus* Gloss., *coaevus* (Aug. +). Compounds in which the first member is the stem of a declinable adjective, as distinguished from those made with prepositions, *in-* privative, and numerals, are relatively infrequent in Latin. They stand in a sort of supplementary relation to the ablative and genitive of quality. Thus in Sanskrit and Greek these two constructions are virtually nonexistent, while compounds of the type *anyárūpah*, *λευκώλενος* are

<sup>14</sup> H. Jacobsohn, *GL.*, XVI (1928), pp. 56-7, thinks that the hypostases adopted *i*-stem inflection after the analogy of the bahuvrīhis.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Ernout-Meillet<sup>10</sup>, p. 1214.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

very frequent, but in Latin the situation is almost reversed.<sup>17</sup> It is curious that the most frequent adjectives of this type are those in *-aevus*, *-animus*, *-oculus*, *-comus*, with a thin scattering of others. Now phrases consisting of adjective and noun are most easily turned into compounds when the noun begins with a vowel, making elision possible,<sup>18</sup> and this may be precisely the manner in which *grandaevus*, etc. arose. Naturally this explanation will not hold for all of the compounds of Type A whose long syllables, according to the view adopted here, should lead us to expect Type B. *ad-*, *ob-*, *reducus* are probably compounded from the adjective *uncus* (as in *recurvus*) rather than from the noun, and *selibra* ‘half-pound’ is not an adjective at all but a noun like *libra*. Thus it is possible to explain away some of the compounds which tend to work against the theory: long syllable + *-is* : short syllable + *-us*, and the ratio of short and long syllables in compounds of Type A is not nearly so even as the figures 20 : 18 make it appear. Yet there are some Type A compounds with long syllables where no such explanation is possible. Fluctuation is especially noticeable in the compounds of *arma*, *clivus*, *frēnum*, *furus*, *somnus*, *sulcus*. From most of these the compounds are too few in number to justify any generalizations, but the distribution of *inermis* and *inermus* in the texts examined in this study seems to confirm the view of Neue-Wagener<sup>19</sup> that the tendency to substitute second-declension forms for third-declension forms in adjectives is a mark of early Latin: for our texts the figures are: Republic: *inermus* 13 : *inermis* 27; Empire: *inermus* 8 : *inermis* 64. The cases of *inermus* in imperial litera-

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Delbrück, *Gdr.*, III, I, pp. 240-2 (instrumental-ablative), 348-9 (genitive). He believes that the development of the genitive of quality followed after the breakdown of the old compounds. Modern Indo-Europeanists might be inclined to lean less heavily on Indo-Iranian and Greek for their reconstruction of the situation in the parent speech and to regard the great development of compounds in these branches as independent developments. On the Latin restraint in the use of compounds in general cf. E. Norden<sup>2</sup> on *Aen.*, VI, 141 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1916).

<sup>18</sup> Elision is possible if the adjective precedes and stands in the genitive case (2nd decl.) or ablative case (2nd or 3rd decl.). Final *d* in \**longōd* or \**grandīd* might be an obstacle, but we might assume the elision after loss of *-d* or possibly go back to the time when the instrumental (without *-d*) still had a separate existence.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 150, with reference to *inermus*. Cf. S. L. Fighiera, *La lingua e la grammatica di c. Crispo Sallustio* (Savona, 1896), p. 27.

ture are from Vergil and Tacitus. *sublimis* has so far been ignored in this article because of the uncertainty of its etymology,<sup>20</sup> but the fluctuation in its declension does have some relevance to the question of early, classical, and imperial usage, especially in view of the fact that the figures for both types are fairly high. Beside the standard form *sublimis*, of which our texts show around 140 examples, forms from *sublimus*, -*a*, occur in Enn., fr. 30 (V.); Acc., fr. 563, 576 (Rib.); Sall., *Hist.*, III, fr. 27 (Maurenbrecher); Lucr., I, 340; Apul., *Met.*, III, 2, 15; 23, 2. In Sen., *Med.*, 1026 with Leo's correction *aethere*, adopted by Peiper and Richter, *sublimi* must be ablative and hence an *i*-stem. Special mention should also be made of the curious forms *sollemmo*, *C. I. L.*, VI, 28117; *triresmos* (acc. pl.), *septeremom*, *C. I. L.*, I, 195 (Columna Rostrata). Except for *aequiremus*, Chalcid., *Transl.*, 34 (not earlier than third century, A. D.) no other *o*-stem forms occur beside the very frequent series *biremis*, *triremis*, etc., and the use of second declension forms with the feminine *naveis* arouses suspicion that these compounds were simply made in the Greek manner.

If the intrusion of *o*-stem inflection into adjectives which normally follow the third declension was a feature of early Latin, one might ask whether there was any strong reaction in favor of Type B at a later period. Two of the most frequent adjectives in question, *inermis* and *sublimis*, did largely succeed in driving their rivals out of use. The few occurrences of *inermus* in Vergil (*Aen.*, X, 425; XII, 131, neither under metrical necessity) and Tacitus (6 examples, all in the *Annals*<sup>21</sup>), and of *sublimus* in Apuleius probably deserve to be classed as archaisms. If my theory about the connection between adherence to Type A or B and the syllabic length of the penult is correct, it is important to examine the cases in which nouns with short penult become second members of compounds of Type B. Here must probably belong *debilis*, which I have so far ignored because of the lack of any Latin noun to which it might be referred; but etymological authorities, including Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet<sup>3</sup> are

<sup>20</sup> Jacobsohn, *loc. cit.*, pp. 48-61, esp. 58, as bahuvrīhi "*sub-lim(e)n-i*" = 'der, bei dem die Schwelle unten ist.' Walde also from *sub* + *limen*, but as hypostasis. Quite otherwise Ernout-Meillet<sup>3</sup>, from *sub* + *limus* 'qui monte en ligne oblique.'

<sup>21</sup> On the progressively poetic and archaizing tendency in Tacitus' style, cf. Löfstedt, *Syntactica*, II (Lund, 1933), pp. 276-8.

nearly unanimous in taking it as a bahuvrīhi compound whose second member is cognate with Skt. *bálam* 'strength.' The ἀπαξ λεγόμενον *illiberis* 'childless,' Tert., *Adv. Marc.*, IV, 34, is a natural enough coinage when the intended meaning is taken into account. Beside the series *auricomus*, etc., of which we have about sixteen compounds, mostly very late, the *i*-stem *bicomis* occurs in Veg., *Mulom.*, I, 56, 36, *Quodsi bicomis fuerit quod vulgus appellat . . . ; horricomis* Apul., *Met.*, IV, 19; VII, 11; but *leucomomis* and *erythrocomis*, Plin., *N. H.*, XIII, 113, are simply Greek borrowings. *interminis* occurs in Iul Valer., *Res Gestae Alex.*, I, 30, against three examples of *interminus* in Apuleius and a fair number of examples of *conterminus* from Ovid on. *monosōlis*, *bisōlis*, of shoes, occur in *C. I. L.*, III, 2, 833: 9, lines 12, 13, 15, 16 (Edict of Diocletian) with no rival forms attested. *remōris*, Paul. *Fest.*, 276 (Müll.), of augural birds which cause delay in the transaction of business, follows the analogy of other deverbatives in *-is*. The fourth declension *gradus*, which has a moderately frequent series of compounds in *-gradus* (in origin perhaps better taken as back-formations from *gradior*) makes *retrogradis*, Apul., *Met.*, IV, 20. Adjectives in *-iugis* are quite frequent: *multiiugis*, Cic., *Att.*, XIV, 9, 1; *biuuges*, Verg., *G.*, III, 91, *biuugis* (acc. pl.), *Aen.*, XII, 355, and other examples, especially with numeral as first member, beside *subiugus*, *biuugus*, *quadriiugus*, etc., and the contracted forms *bigae*, *quadrigae*; but a special explanation is possible: the root \**iug-*, which produced unthematic verbs in Greek and Sanskrit, also produced unthematic nominal compounds, e. g. σύζυξ, Lat. *coniunx*, *-iugis*. This type then may be the real basis for *biuugis*, etc., especially when we consider that unambiguous *i*-stem forms like the nom. sg. are virtually non-existent. Vergil's acc. pl. *biuugis* and the gloss *coniugis* · *consociatus* (*Gloss.*, V, 447, 29) merely show the eventual assimilation of the radical stem to the *i*-inflection which was such a common feature of Latin adjectives. The series *-animus*, *-animis* are so important that one might wonder why they have not been mentioned before. First a few remarks on their distribution. Of *magnanimus* our texts furnish over 60 examples, while *magnanimis* first occurs in Tert., *Pat.*, 12, and *T. L. L.* gives only about a dozen examples. The ratio of *exanimus* to *exanimis* is 25 : 57 in our selection, 39 : 72 in a statistical table in *T. L. L.* Their selection differs from ours in a number of respects, but the lower ratio of *exanimis* in *T. L. L.*

is mainly due to their failure to include Ovid (*-us* : *-is* = 0 : 14). *unanimus* : *unanimis* appear in our texts in the ratio of 14 : 0, and very few examples of Type B occur even in late Latin; but *semianimus* : *semianimis* (— ~ —) in our texts are in the ratio 6 : 30, with *-us* in Lucr., Stat., Sen., to which a few examples may be added from texts not in our selection. Of *inanimus* (*in-negative*) our texts furnish 23 examples from Cic., Tac., and Apul. The last-named author has also 3 examples of *inanimis*, and his 3 examples of *-us* are in cases where third declension forms would be unsuitable. Other compounds are too rare to be used as a basis for making generalizations,<sup>22</sup> but one further fact worth noting is that the dat.-abl. pl. \**-animibus* and neut. pl. \**-animia* are avoided not only in hexameter verse, where their use is impossible, but in the language generally. According to *T. L. L.* there are no such forms from *exanimis*, and I have not succeeded in finding any from any other adjective in *-animis*; they are regularly replaced by forms in *-is*, *-a*. The adjectives now under consideration present a special problem, because of the existence of the two nouns *animus* and *anima* which serve as second members. The following view seems to explain the facts most satisfactorily: *magnanimus* and *unanimus* are compounds of *animus* formed in the regular manner, but the former is rather rare in prose and is probably best regarded as a loan translation of *μεγάθυμος*<sup>23</sup> or some other such Greek adjective. *exanimis* and *semianimis* on the other hand are compounds of *anima*—‘with life gone out’ and ‘half possessing life’—with the preference for *i*-stem inflection probably designed to distinguish them from compounds of *animus*, after the analogy of the numerous *i*-stem compounds made from feminine nouns of the first declension. *inanimus* should also be referred to *anima*, but for some reason did not change to an *i*-stem until very late. The rare and late formations *magnanimis* and *unanimis* may reflect a certain overlapping of meanings between *animus* and *anima*, but more probably are a manifestation of the late Latin

<sup>22</sup> Italian literature has *magnanimo*, but *esanime*, *inanime*, *unanime*; *equanime*, *longanime*, *pusillanime* have also o-forms in Bellini, *Dizionario della lingua italiana* (Turin, 1861—). The extent to which the Latin conditions are reflected in Romance has some bearing on our problem but would take us too far afield and is complicated by the task of trying to distinguish between literary and popular usage.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Skutsch, *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1914), pp. 207-8.

tendency to generalize Type B in bahuvrīhi compounds, which has been mentioned above. On the other hand *exanimis* and *semianimis* never fully succeeded in displacing their rival forms of Type A, and the persistence of dat.-abl. pl. -*is* and neut. pl. -*a* even in prose, although it has an obvious rhythmical basis, may have extended far back into the history of the language.

We have now reached the point at which it is fitting to summarize the foregoing and to make some broad generalizations on the history of compounds of Types A and B in the language taken as a whole. I regard the connection between length of penult and type of inflection, represented in the formula: short syllable + -*us* : long syllable + -*is*, as too strongly supported to admit of reasonable doubt. In order not to interrupt the treatment of the Latin material with a long digression, I have postponed the discussion of similar conditions in certain cognate languages, but they will be found to bear out the validity of the formula to a certain extent. Latin then, for whatever reason (and it is unfortunately less easy to find the reason than to prove the fact), inherited two principal types of compounds where the second member is an *o*-stem or *ā*-stem noun. To a considerable extent the original conditions were protected from effacement by the metrical equivalence of the grammatical terminations in many of the cases most frequently used. Certain adjectives, such as *biennis*, etc., *biformis*, etc., *defamis*, *infamis*, *bilinguis*, *trilinguis*, *insignis*, and the -*remis* series never, or only very rarely, depart from their original type. Since the sporadic examples of change to Type A occur chiefly in early texts, I suspect that they may be partly artificial formations after the analogy of the Greek pattern seen in *τυμή* : *ἄτυμος*, etc., designed for elegance and mostly destined to a short life. Their occurrence in imperial writers like Vergil and Tacitus is a literary archaism. In certain others, however, such as those from *somnus*, *sulcus*, *furcus*, and *clivus*, the rivalry is very close, and it is impossible to say how far back into the prehistory of Latin the adjectives *semisomnus*, etc., extend. *delirus*, *securus*, *profanus*, and quite possibly *grandaevus* developed out of phrases, and never departed from *o/ā*-stem inflection. In later Latin there is evidence of a feeling that adjectives of the type which we call "bahuvrīhi" should be *i*-stems, and this tendency even affected some adjectives with short penults. The remaining

portions of this article are devoted to a treatment of the problem from a comparative viewpoint.<sup>24</sup>

For Indo-Iranian Wackernagel<sup>25</sup> furnishes the following examples: *ardha-* : *prátyardhi-*, ‘having an equal share’: *Rigveda*, X, 1, 5; 26, 5; *rādha-* : *kṛṣṭārādhi-*, ‘rich in farm-land’: *Atharvaveda*, VIII, 10, 24; several compounds in *-gandhi-* from *gandha-* ‘odor,’ the only series of this type which survives in classical Sanskrit; Avestan *avi-miθri-* ‘having Mithra as enemy, enemy of Mithra,’ and *daura-maēši-* ‘having few sheep.’ From the reverse index in the back of Grassmann’s *Wörterbuch zum Rigveda* (Leipzig, 1873) it is possible to add *áyopāṣṭhi* ‘having iron barbs’: *apāṣṭá*. Among the four doubtful forms which Wackernagel adds, one or two have a short penult, but all the sure examples have a long penult.

From Armenian Meillet<sup>26</sup> assembled fourteen substantives (9 *o*-stems, 1 *a*-stem, 2 *u*-stems, 1 *r*-stem, 1 *n*-stem) which on entering into composition (usually with *an*-privative) become *i*-stems, and he called attention to the resemblance between the conditions in Armenian and in Latin. Since the material is difficult to treat because of the scantiness of sources from which to work and still more because of my own ignorance of the language, I shall limit myself to the mention of a few etyma: *gorec* ‘work’ (Gk. (*f*) *épyov*: Brugmann, *Gdr.*<sup>2</sup>, I, I, pp. 140, 303, 434, 549; Walde-Pokorny, I, p. 290) : *an-gorec. olorm* ‘compassion’ (Meillet, *M. S. L.*, X [1898], p. 280; W-P, I, p. 184, under the heading *orbho-*) : *an-olorm. loys* (*lois*) ‘light’ (*Gdr.*, I, I, pp. 194, 429, 546, 581; W-P, II, p. 409, under *leuk-*, with *oi* < *eu* or *ou*) : *an-loys. ūnč* ‘breath, spirit’ (W-P, I, p. 475, refers to stem *kuonqio-* after Lidén; Pedersen, *K. Z.*, XXXVIII [1905], p. 198; XXXIX [1906], p. 397, refers to suffixal *nč*) : *an-ūnč*. The *i*-stem character of the compounds is apparent from the oblique forms given in Meillet’s list. The four forms here cited seem to have etymologically long root-syllables, but whether there is a consistent relation between this syllabic length and the change to *i*-inflection, as in Latin, is for others to decide.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Brugmann, *Gdr.*<sup>2</sup>, II, pp. 112-13. Hirt, *op. cit.*, III, p. 275, IV, p. 41. The Italic dialects furnish the forms Umb. *per-akni-* (= *perennis?*), *scv-akni-* (*sol-cnnis?*), which, however, are too few and too uncertain to have any value for the problem as a whole.

<sup>25</sup> *Allindische Grammatik*, II (Göttingen, 1905), p. 105.

<sup>26</sup> *M. S. L.*, XI (1900), pp. 390-1.

In Greek ἀλκή : ἄναλκις are sometimes cited<sup>27</sup> as an example of the change to *i*-stems in composition. As in many other words of its type, the suffix *-i-* has been extended into *-iδ-*. In fact this extension and the productiveness of the new suffix in making feminine adjectives have largely altered the original conditions, so that Greek offers very little help in the solution of our problem.

The situation in Old and Middle Irish<sup>28</sup> is similar in some respects to that in Latin, but the type with declinable adjective as first member (= Latin *aequanimus*) has largely been replaced by a type with adjective as second member (= Latin *animaequus*). Our examples then consist mostly of compounds with prepositions or *so-* (= Skt. *su-*) or *do-* (= Skt. *dus-*, Gk. *δυσ-*) as first member. The change to *i*-stem inflection in composition (indirectly attested through infection of the radical vowel) is frequent; in fact Thurneysen (*loc. cit.*) declares the preservation of the original *o-* or *ā*-stem to be very rare. The following examples, all with etymologically long radical syllables, will serve as illustrations: *nert* ‘strength’ (< \**ner-to-m*, Pedersen,<sup>29</sup> II, p. 82; W-P, II, p. 232) : *son(a)irt* ‘strong.’ *format* ‘envy’ (< \**-men-to-*, Pedersen, I, pp. 168, 266; II, pp. 34, 581) : *Diarmait* (man’s name, = ‘without envy’). *cíall* ‘understanding’ (< \**g̃rei-slā* or \**q̃eit-slā*, Brugmann, *Gdr.*<sup>2</sup>, I, p. 773; W-P, I, p. 509) : *túachil* ‘sly.’ The following compounds lend some support to the argument of this paper because of their etymologically short radical syllables and failure to change to *i*-stems: *gal* ‘valor’ : *ecal* ‘timid,’ nom. pl. masc. *ecil* (: Gk. *χόλος*, *χολή*, according to Pedersen, II, pp. 25, 521); *sochrud* ‘well-formed,’ *dochrud* ‘ill-formed’ (< \**q̃rtu-*, W-P, I, p. 517, cf. Pedersen, I, p. 43); perhaps also Gaulish-Latin *petorritum* ‘four-wheeler’ (< \**qt-*, W-P, II, p. 368, under \**rēth-*). Some of the examples with short radical syllable and *i*-stem, which work against our theory, may reflect the gradual extension of *i*-stems in these compounds beyond their original sphere. The partial transfer of *u*-stem adjectives to the *i*-declension is treated by Pedersen, II, pp. 91, 94, 117, and the growth of the *i*-stems is interestingly

<sup>27</sup> Wackernagel, *loc. cit.*; Hirt, *op. cit.*, III, p. 275.

<sup>28</sup> R. Thurneysen, *A Grammar of Old Irish* (Dublin, 1946), p. 219. C. J. S. Marstrander, *Skrifter utgit av Videnskapsseksjonen i Kristiania*, Hist.-Filos. Kl., 1924, pp. 47-8, gives a longer list of examples.

<sup>29</sup> *Vergleichende Grammatik der keltischen Sprachen*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1908-13).

illustrated by the distribution of one particular set of compounds, which may be traced from the glossary in Windisch's *Irische Texte*, I (Leipzig, 1880): *do-, so-chruth* (*u*-stem) in Old Irish glosses, but *do-, so-chraid* (*i*-stem) in Middle Irish texts preserved in manuscripts of the late eleventh (or early twelfth) to sixteenth centuries. But the Celtic material is not conclusive in the form in which I have treated it here, although a more thorough treatment by a scholar competent in this field might lead to some interesting results.

The bahuvrihi compounds in the early Germanic languages are treated in a rather comprehensive manner by Kluge,<sup>30</sup> who distinguishes an "older" type without change in the stem-final of the second member, and a "younger" type with *i*, that is Gmc. *-ja-*, IE *-io-*. The distribution is in large part a dialectal one, with the first type favored in Gothic and the second in North and West Germanic. Moreover, since the material which Kluge presents does not show any relation between stem-final and length of the penult, it is best not to pursue the matter further.

In Balto-Slavic, as for the most part in Germanic,<sup>31</sup> *i*-stem adjectives have become indistinguishable from *io*-stems, and in Lithuanian practically all compound adjectives follow the *io*-type.<sup>32</sup> Slavic on the other hand shows compounds in *-o-* (as in Latin Type A) as well as in *-io-*, but the examples given by Meillet<sup>33</sup> and Hirt<sup>34</sup> give no indication of a distribution along the lines observed in Latin.

We come now to the difficult problem of why the stem-final was to such a large extent determined by the quantity of the penult. The phenomenon is probably very ancient, partly because of the impossibility of explaining it by rhythmical factors within Latin alone and partly because of the suspicion of similar conditions in Indo-Iranian and Celtic, although in these two branches the material is admittedly very scanty.<sup>35</sup> Some inter-

<sup>30</sup> *Nominale Stammbildungslehre der altgermanischen Dialekte* (Halle, 1926), pp. 88-9.

<sup>31</sup> *i*-stem (as distinct from *io*-stem) adjectives have disappeared in Germanic except for some traces in Gothic. Cf. Kluge, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. F. T. Wood, *The Accentuation of Nominal Compounds in Lithuanian* (Language Dissertation No. 7 [Baltimore, 1930]), pp. 30-1.

<sup>33</sup> *Le slave commun* (Paris, 1924), pp. 323-4.

<sup>34</sup> *Indogermanische Grammatik*, IV, p. 40.

<sup>35</sup> The fact that the two types can often be used indifferently in verse

esting correspondences in uncompounded forms may provide an answer to our question. The following etymological pairs show a contrast between long root-syllable with *i*-stem or consonant-stem and short root-syllable with *o*-stem or *ā*-stem:<sup>36</sup>

consonant-stems	<i>i</i> -stems	<i>o</i> -stems	<i>ā</i> -stems
<i>θῆρ</i>	Lith. <i>žvér̄is</i> Goth. <i>qēns</i>	<i>ferus</i>	Goth. <i>qinō</i> ( <i>&lt; *gūenā</i> )
<i>κλώψ</i> <i>φώρ</i>	OHG <i>scin-bāri</i> 'scheinbar' <i>iūgis</i> <sup>37</sup>	<i>κλοπός</i> <i>φόρος</i>	<i>φορά</i>
<i>δῶ</i> <sup>38</sup> <i>vōx, vōcis</i> <i>lēx, lēgis</i> <sup>40</sup>		<i>iūgum</i> <sup>39</sup> <i>δόμος domus</i> <i>-vōcus</i> <i>-lēgus</i>	
	OHG <i>un-māzi</i>	<i>mōdus</i>	

has been noted above. It has been suggested as a tentative conjecture that / + ~ + us : ~ + is emphasizes the opposition between the simplex and the compound; that is, if I understand correctly, the change of stem came about in the forms with long (and hence accented) penult because here the accent could not serve to mark the opposition between the nouns and the bahuvrihi adjectives derived from them: thus, *rēmus* : *birēmis*, but *mōdus* : *tōtmōdus*, with no change of declension because the change of accent marks the opposition. Of course if we adopt this explanation we must assume that the distribution of Types A and B remained fluid, or was different, until after the classical system of accent had gone into effect, because under the older system the initial stress on the first member would have served to mark the opposition to the simplex no matter what was the quantity of the penult. The change in the accentual system was almost but not quite complete in the time of Plautus, according to Kent, *Sounds of Latin*<sup>3</sup>, p. 66; cf. Buck, *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, p. 165. This theory might have one advantage in explaining the early prevalence of *inermus*, etc.: the change of declension would first have become necessary after the change of accent had produced *inērmus* : *árma*, *semisómnu* : *sómnus*. But there is a serious difficulty: if the change operated in those compounds where accent failed to show opposition between noun and compound adjective, then we should expect to meet such contrasts as *númerus* : *\*innúmeris*, *ángulus* : *\*triángulís*, *óculus* : *\*unbóculis*, etc.; yet actually nouns of the forms ~ ~ ~, ~ ~ ~ make compounds of Type A as consistently as do those of pyrrhic form.

<sup>36</sup> Lengthened grade in the first and second columns contrasts with normal (including *o*-) grade in the third and fourth columns, except that *iūgis* : *iūgum* = normal grade : zero grade. All forms in italic type are Latin unless otherwise designated. The material is collected in part from Buck, *A. J. P.*, XVII (1896), pp. 458-72 *passim*.

We must not ignore the fact that many *i*-stems and consonant-stems have a short penult (e. g., *coniūgem*, *σύνυντα*, beside *i*-stem *iūgis* and *o*-stem *iūgum*) and that conversely many *o*-stems have a long penult. Certainly we could not use statistical method to prove that such a correspondence as, for example, *θήρ* : *ferus* was the original and normal one. Moreover one might object to the above examples as being irrelevant to our argument, since in almost every case they involve an ablaut-relation between the long grade and full grade, while such forms as *rēmus* : *birēmis* involve no ablaut-variation at all. But what is important is the strong probability that the thematic vowel *o/e* was first at home in stems of the types *iugo-* (root in zero grade), *mōdo-* (root in *o*-grade), etc., in other words in stems of the type which make up a fair proportion of the Latin compounds of Type A.<sup>41</sup> The stems with long radical syllable in full grade or lengthened grade then sometimes remained as root-stems, or changed to *i*-stems, especially in Latin, where consonant- and *i*-stems are largely amalgamated, and in Lithuanian (e. g. *žvēris*). It would be tempting but very hazardous to suggest that a rhythmical principle thus arose which had enough vitality to account for such *i*-stems as *imberbis*, *trilinguis*, *defamis*, and even the hybrid *depugis* (cf. *ἀπύγος*). A safer explanation is to emphasize the relative slowness with which thematic inflection spread into various noun- and adjective-classes.<sup>42</sup> There may also be signifi-

<sup>37</sup> *iūgis* ‘continuous’ \**ieug-is*. Connection with *iugum*, *iungo*, etc. maintained by Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet<sup>43</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> In Hom. *ἡμέτερον δῶ*. Derivation < \**dōm* as a sandhi-doublet favored by Walde-Hofmann and Ernout-Meillet<sup>44</sup> under *domus*.

<sup>39</sup> *o*-stem in Greek, *u*-stem in Slavic, fluctuation in Latin.

<sup>40</sup> Because of semantic difficulties this etymology cannot be regarded as certain.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Hirt, *Griechische Laut- und Formenlehre*<sup>2</sup> (Heidelberg, 1912), p. 353.

<sup>42</sup> According to Streitberg’s *Dehnstufengesetz* (*I. F.*, III [1894], pp. 305-416, especially 313, 415) forms like *φώρ* developed from thematic stems, with compensatory lengthening of the root vowel when the final syllable was lost. Our theory is not necessarily in conflict with the *Dehnstufengesetz*, because the long-vowel root-stems in question, whatever their origin, were unthematic and were capable of becoming second members of compounds with unthematic stems or (secondarily) *i*-stems. Streitberg’s view seems to imply a rather extensive prehistoric loss of thematic inflection, followed by a gradual gain at the expense of the unthematic type, as seen especially in the history of the Sanskrit and

cance in the fact that many of the nouns making Type B compounds are feminines of the first declension and thus had no *-o/e* in the first place.<sup>48</sup> It is masculines and neuters like *arma*, *clivus*, *frenum*, *furcus*, *somnus*, *sulcus* which show the greatest instability and which tend to use second- as well as third-declension forms. The theory which seems to offer the best solution for our problem, then, may be summarized briefly as follows: *o*-stems with short radical syllable constituted the oldest stratum of substantives with *-o/e*- inflection, and they retained this inflection on becoming second members of compounds. Nouns with long radical syllables (lengthened grade, full grade in diphthong *-eu-*, etc., or length by position before consonantal suffix) only later assumed thematic (or *-ā-*) inflection, and their compounds were made without *o/e*, the consonant stem being often extended to an *i*-stem. The abundance of *i*-stem adjectives in general in Indo-Hittite was emphasized by Sturtevant (*Lang.*, X [1934], pp. 266-73) who at the same time called attention to their frequency in Latin as an archaism not shared by most of the other branches. In its treatment of bahuvrihi compounds Latin stands midway between Indo-Iranian and Greek on the one hand and Celtic on the other: the former generalized the *o*-inflection, the latter the *i*-inflection. If Latin has preserved the two types in what was approximately their original distribution, we have here a further striking archaism of the language.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

Greek verbs; a possibility not in itself inconceivable. But the theory enjoys little favor at the present time; cf., for example, Schwyzer-Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik*, I, pp. 355-6. Moreover the vowel *o/e* is generally regarded as suffixal rather than radical, and its relatively recent extension is affirmed by Meillet, *B. S. L.*, XXXII (1931), p. 203; Benveniste, *Origines de la formation des noms*, p. 172.

<sup>48</sup> The doublets *φῆμις* (K 207 and *Od.*) and *φῆμη* (*Od.* +) may have some connection with the correspondence *fama* : *defamis*.

## IS PLATO'S SEVENTH EPISTLE SPURIOUS?

So far as we know, the ancients did not doubt the Platonic epistles; and not long ago it might have seemed as if the dispute about their genuineness which started in the 19th century had abated. The majority of scholars in England, France, Italy, Germany had accepted at least the two most important letters, the seventh and eighth—if not more. But a few years ago the dispute flared up again. New doubts were raised, on philological evidence, at first in America, where the letters had never been generally acknowledged, and in Italy. In Germany Gerhard Müller undertook to prove in a paper “Die Philosophie im pseudoplatonischen VII. Brief” (*Archiv für Philosophie*, III, 3 [1949], pp. 251 ff.) that *Letter VII* is the work of an imitator. The proof is not based on stylistic or other philological evidence, but on detailed arguments that the philosophy contained in the *Letter* is absolutely alien to Platonic doctrine. Müller says rightly that to remove the philosophical passage for the sake of saving the *Letter* as an historical document would not be possible because this passage is inseparably linked with the *Letter* as a whole. If, therefore, the philosophical passage is spurious, the complete *Seventh Letter* and, with it, the whole collection of the *Platonic Letters* will fall.

Müller has good philological attainments and great confidence in his cause. He seems already to have convinced many people. The principal reasons for his claim that the philosophy of 340 B ff. is not Platonic are the following:

- (1) The philosophical passage pretends to offer Plato's theory of ideas but wholly contradicts this theory. For it states emphatically that philosophy is inexpressible in words and inaccessible to reason. The genuine Plato, however, only deprecates the written word but never doubts the conclusiveness of reason (*logos*). Furthermore, the philosophy presented in the *Letter* is, lastly, a simple psychological theory clothed in a cloak of secrecy. The view that Plato's philosophy is a mysterious secret doctrine appears only in the *Laws*, in the spurious *Epinomis*, and in the *Letters*.
- (2) The writer's personality is alien to Plato's (*Platonfremd*);

he shows an unbearable arrogance, while Plato's ego is completely hidden behind his work. Furthermore, the character of the writer is that of a militaristic man of action, while Plato never dreamed of trying to realize his political theories. Both the *Republic* and the *Laws* are literary fictions.

- (3) The political theories in the *Letter* are mixed with a pan-hellenic ideology. This is alien to Plato. It occurs only in the spurious *Menexenus* and in an extended passage (469 B-471 C) of the *Republic* which ought to be thrown out. The passage *Republic* VII, 540 D ff. with the barbaric proposal to "exile"<sup>1</sup> all persons over 10 years of age must also be removed.
- (4) One cannot quote the *Laws* to explain the philosophical passage. Both the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* have discarded the theory of ideas in favor of a cosmic and astral theology. The *Laws* was written much later than the *Letter* is to be dated if it is genuine. Whatever, therefore, in the *Letter* corresponds to the *Laws* must have been taken from the latter work—a further proof of the spuriousness of the *Letter*.
- (5) The terminology is not Platonic, but based on Aristotelian distinctions. And what Plato calls science is never concerned with objects of nature.
- (6) As a source of history, the *Letter* may have some merit, though what it contains beyond mere fact is novelistic. Dion's character is in no way Platonic but that of an autocrat. One may be sure that the genuine Plato would have told Dion and Dionysius things very different from those told in the *Letter*—things which these autocrats were unable to understand.

I shall now try to examine the validity of Müller's arguments in the order of these six points.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The text says: ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς.

<sup>2</sup> For the interpretation of the *Letter* as a whole see Fr. Novotny, *Platonis Epistulae* (Brno, 1930); J. Harward, *The Platonic Epistles* (Cambridge, 1932); Glenn Morrow, "Studies in the Platonic Epistles," *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, XVIII, Nos. 3-4 (1935); R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Seventh and Eighth Letters* (Cambridge, 1945).

## 1.

*The Philosophy in the Seventh Letter*

The philosophical passage, beginning 340 B 4, is not a mere summary of the theory of Ideas, it is an exposition of the way in which Plato's philosophy can be communicated to others. It does not say that philosophy is "inexpressible by words and inaccessible to reason," it only says that it cannot be taught and learned 'like other sciences'<sup>3</sup> by transmission from teacher to pupil through spoken or written words.

Plato's dialogues—and especially the role of Socrates in the dialogues—are the implicit proof of the truth of this statement: one cannot teach this philosophy as a system of propositions or *logoi*; one can only teach people to philosophize. To philosophize means for Plato a joint endeavor of teacher and pupil<sup>4</sup> to grasp the truth with the whole power of their souls. Because it demands a persistent intensive study, it asks for a sober and self-controlled life, of which Socrates is an example. From all this it results that Plato himself, a poet as much as a philosopher, represented dramatically men who philosophize, that he wrote dialogues, but never formulated a system of philosophy.

The *Seventh Letter*, the only document whose author speaks in detail of Plato's philosophy in Plato's own name, gives explicitly the reasons implied in the form of this philosophy—that it is laid down in dialogues: one cannot write this thing ( $\tau\delta\pi\rho\gamma\mu\alpha$ ). Therefore Plato himself has never written it nor will he ever write it (341 B 7 ff.). You can learn by heart *logoi* on other sciences that contain facts and theories, but not philosophy which implies the inner comprehension of the truth. Philosophy can be learned only 'by much discussion of the matter itself in a life lived together. Then, suddenly, as if by a leaping spark, a light is kindled in the soul<sup>5</sup> and thereafter

<sup>3</sup> I am using single quotes for quotations from Plato, double quotes for quotations from other people.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. J. Stenzel, *Platon der Erzieher* (Leipzig, 1928).

<sup>5</sup> Harward, referring to A. E. Taylor, "The Analysis of the 'Επιστήμη in Plato's Seventh Epistle," *Mind*, N. S. XXI (1912), pp. 347-70, translates "kindled in one soul by another." He justifies his translation in his note 92: ". . . the fuller description of the process of kindling the light at 344b3-8 makes it clear that the fire comes from the soul of the Master, and that συνουσία and συζῆν refer, not to the prolonged

nourishes itself' (341 C 6 ff.). Philosophy, therefore, cannot be put into simple words, and still less be written down. Therefore Dionysius' mere attempt to do so is the proof that he had not understood Plato.<sup>6</sup> All this is not alien to Plato; there is no mystical secret theory in the *Letter*.

The test which is to reveal the difficulty of philosophical endeavor is meant to show two things: whether he who is tested has a genuine zeal for philosophy, and why philosophy cannot be laid down in writing (342 A 7 ff.) 'There are three things by which, of necessity, cognizance must be imparted, the fourth being cognizance itself; as fifth one must place that which is to be known and has true Being. The first is the name, the second the definition, the third the image, the fourth cognizance.' In the following detailed explanation the fifth is not mentioned again because it is not an instrument of cognizance but what cognizance strives to recognize, true Being." Müller speaks incorrectly of "five steps of Being" (p. 254). The five terms are explained by the example of the circle. None of the first three gives us the circle as it is 'itself'; the name may be changed completely; and since the definition (*logos*) is composed of names and of the assertions<sup>7</sup> made from them, it may be changed also. Being composed of names and of what is asserted of them, it consists, lastly, of articulate sounds (φωναῖς 342 C 6); but it is nowhere said in the *Letter* as Müller claims (p. 255), that these sounds must be uttered and that utterance is the distinctive trait of the definition (*logos*). Every dialectical Platonic dialogue where one definition after another is attempted and rejected shows that definitions are never final; and many passages state that empirical images never correspond to mathematical or geometrical concepts.

The fourth instrument of cognizance which had been generally called *episteme*, is now divided into *episteme* proper (knowledge), *nous* (the active mind which achieves knowledge), and

solitary pondering over problems, but to intercourse with a teacher. The mention of ἔλεγχοι which proceed by question and answer places this beyond doubt; cf. *Laws* 968c6, where διδαχὴ μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς is used to describe the education of the members of the Nocturnal Council." See the interpretation of 344 B 3-8 on pp. 389 f. below.

<sup>6</sup> See Müller's arguments on this subject, pp. 253 ff.

<sup>7</sup> For this translation of φῆμα see J. Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, translated by D. J. Allan (Oxford, 1940), p. 126.

*doxa alethes* (true opinion). That *nous*, *episteme*, *doxa alethes* are first taken together under the general heading ‘*episteme*’ because, in contrast to the other three, they are ‘in the souls,’<sup>8</sup> corresponds with the *Philebus*, where in some places *episteme* is taken together with *doxa* under the head of cognizance in general,<sup>9</sup> and where in other places *episteme* and *nous* are singled out as the highest of the cognitive faculties. The *Letter* says: the *nous* is ‘nearest of these (*τούτων* 342 D 1)<sup>10</sup> to the fifth.’ ‘Without getting hold of the four things one can in no other way<sup>11</sup> finally become a partaker of the fifth.’ An ambiguous meaning of *episteme* (Müller, p. 255) can be found in the *Letter* only in the same sense as in the *Philebus*.

Müller complains (p. 256) of the lack of sense in the statement of the *Letter* (342 E 2) that the ‘weakness of the *logoi*’ is responsible for the unreliability of the image and the faculties of cognizance. The image, since it is an element of the knowledge of all things, e. g. also of moral concepts, 342 D 4, means a *paradeigma* or representative example. As far as a *paradeigma* must be explained, and as far as opinions and convictions must be imparted to other people, words must be used. The four things, therefore, reveal ‘just as much of that which a thing is like (*ποιὸν*) as of that which a thing really is’ (*τὸ δὲ*). What a thing is like (E 3 f.)—that is, what it has in common with other things and what thus shows only qualities of the thing—

<sup>8</sup> 342 C 4 ff.: τέταρτον δὲ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς ἀληθής τε δόξα . . . ὡς δὲ ἐν τούτῳ αὐτῷ πᾶν θετέον, οὐκ ἐν φωναῖς οὐδέ ἐν σωμάτων σχήμασιν ἀλλ' ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν—φ δῆλον ἔτερόν τε δν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν τε ἐμπροσθεν λεχθέντων τριῶν. τούτων. . . .

<sup>9</sup> τέταρτα δὲ τῇ ψυχῇς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας δρθάς . . . *Phileb.* 66 B 8 f.; τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας 60 D 5. Cf., on the other hand, 59 B 7 ff. and 61 D 10 ff.

<sup>10</sup> To make it clear that φ δῆλον . . . τριῶν (see note 8) is a parenthesis, and that *τούτων* refers to *τοῦτο πᾶν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν* I have made a dash after *ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν*, instead of Burnet's comma; this punctuation seems implied in Harward's translation, p. 136. Müller (p. 255 and note 10) refers *τούτων* to the immediately preceding *τριῶν*, and, consequently, claims that knowledge and true opinion are here “directed” towards name, definition, image (p. 258), which is “a confusing contradiction to the genuine Platonic philosophy,” whereas all four together (cf. 343 D 8 *τῶν τεττάρων φύσις*) refer to the ‘fifth.’ From this translation arises Müller's misinterpretation of the *Letter* on pp. 257 ff.

<sup>11</sup> I read, on the advice of Professor Friedlander, with MSS A and O λάβῃ, ἄλλως γέ πως instead of Burnet's λάβῃ ἀμῶς γέ πως A<sup>2</sup>.

is never exhaustive in regard to its real essence. But because of the weakness of language you can never name, define, imagine, even conceive of anything without comparing it with other things; in other words, the insufficiency of language is apparent in all four instruments of cognizance. The *Letter* continues (343 A 5 ff.) to speak once more, in another order, of the uncertainty of all these instruments. First, the image of the circle which is drawn or turned (for practical purposes) is, when used for the cognizance of the ideal circle of the mathematicians, full of qualities contradicting the concept of this ‘real’ circle: it always has, e. g., some straightness. The name is completely arbitrary because one could also call straight what is now called circular. The definition too is never conclusive, nor are the opinions and convictions based on these three.

343 B 7 ff.: ‘The worst is, as said just before, that of the two alternatives, the Being ( $\tauού \deltaντος$ ) of a thing and what a thing is like ( $\piοιοῦ$ ),<sup>12</sup> it is not what the thing is like but its Being which the soul strives to grasp, while all the four instruments present, in word and deed,<sup>13</sup> to the soul what it does not seek, and “by their reliance on sense perception” (Morrow) make it easy to refute what they say and point out.’ This does not matter so much in the dealings of every day life where we are not accustomed to seek for the full truth and where it suffices to understand one another through images and examples. But as soon as we try to give an account of the ‘fifth’ (343 D 2) and to explain it in words and in script or by answering questions, we may be made ridiculous before any crowd of listeners by any eristic. ‘For they often do not realize that what is refuted is not the soul of him who writes or speaks’ (the true meaning of Being, for which the soul is seeking), ‘but each of the four instruments which are bad by nature.’

343 E 1 ff.: The discussion ‘goes up and down between the four things,’<sup>14</sup> that is, it examines again and again whether the

<sup>12</sup> See Müller, p. 256 on the “Ungereimtheiten” of the contrast of  $\tauί$  and  $\piοιον$ .

<sup>13</sup> The writer has in mind, not the simple example of the circle, but discussions  $\piερί τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου . . . καὶ περὶ παιδιάτα καὶ παθήματα σύμπαντα$ , for which the same is valid as for the example of the circle (342 D 4 ff.).

<sup>14</sup>  $\deltaιὰ πάντων αὐτῶν$  E 1, referring back to  $\tauῶν τεττάρων$  D 8. I do not agree with Harvard (note 107) that there is here “a slight verbal

name is right for that which is in the mind, whether the definition fits the name, whether this or that image or instance or deed corresponds to the definition, whether the opinion based on all three is true. This process of going up and down mutually clears the four instruments of knowledge; it therefore generates 'hardly,' with toil and pain, knowledge of a well constituted thing in a well constituted mind.

344 B 4 ff.: 'When all of them, names and definitions, and also what is seen and its impressions upon the soul,<sup>15</sup> are rubbed hard<sup>16</sup> against one another, in discussions where arguments are argued kindly by those who use<sup>17</sup> questions and answers without jealousy, then right sense, and insight into everything, by straining every human power, flare up.' This is the commentary to the passage 341 C 7<sup>18</sup> on the spark of fire which is lighted in the soul (by the teacher) and then nourishes itself in the soul (of the pupil). It is no "simple psychological I've got it (ich hab's)" or "a mystical flash of the inexpressible in the soul," as Müller (p. 263) claims, who always confuses that

confusion because *ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς, δόξα ἀληθής*, which "belong to the soul" of the speaker, are included in the 'four things,' from which "the soul" here is differentiated. Though human *ἐπιστήμη* and *νοῦς* are 'in the souls,' they are not identical with the soul itself, because they are defective (343 D 8).

<sup>15</sup> οὐφεις τε καὶ αἰσθῆσεις : οὐφεις can have an objective sense, *αἰσθῆσεις* the subjective meaning of sensation. The *Definitiones* 414 C 5 define *αἰσθῆσις* as ψυχῆς φορά· νοῦ κίνησις. οὐφεις, sights, would then stand for images, *αἰσθῆσεις*, sensations, for the lowest cognitive faculty of the soul by which opinions are formed. In this way the parallelism between the two phrases δύναματά τε καὶ λόγοι and οὐφεις τε καὶ αἰσθῆσεις, and the parallelism also between the two passages 343 E 1 ή διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν (= τῶν τεττάρων) διαγωγή and 344 B 4 *τριβόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν ἔκαστα* would be expressed. Müller's translation (p. 258) is somewhat like Harward's but takes οὐφεις τε καὶ αἰσθῆσεις in a more subjective sense "Anschauungen und (andere) Wahrnehmungen." For him the passage is a confirmation of his translation of 342 D 1 and of his interpretation of *episteme* as referring to "the three." See note 10 above.

<sup>16</sup> *τριβόμενα*. Harward says in his note 110: "the word *τριβή* which suggests friction as well as practice, prepares the way, as Taylor points out, for the metaphor of the sudden breaking out of the flame in the next sentence."

<sup>17</sup> For this translation see Harward's note 111.—Without jealousy: where nobody is bent only upon being right himself, but where all together seek for the truth.

<sup>18</sup> See above, note 5, Harward's translation and commentary.

which cannot be communicated by word and script with that which cannot be expressed at all. He further claims that this mystical enlightenment, in contrast to *Republic* 508 D, has "no object," because he fails to observe that the 'life together' is strictly occupied with the search for 'the thing itself,' for the Being of 'everything.'<sup>19</sup>

344 C 4: From all this he who sees another's writings—be it laws or something else—will immediately realize that these writings 'are not for that man the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot he possesses' (Harward)—that is, in his soul.<sup>20</sup> Plato implies that what he himself had written is not for him 'the thing of highest worth'; it is written, as the *Phaedrus* says, *παιδίας χάριν*, and for the sake of reminding himself and 'those who know' (275 D 1). Müller, however, says (p. 264, note 31) that 'the fairest spot a man possesses' is an incomprehensible phrase without *Phaedrus* 276 B, where it means the Adonis gardens which this man has planted—a wrong interpretation of the *Phaedrus* also.

Since, according to 342 D 3, what was said of the example of the circle is valid of 'everything,' among other things of the objects of moral inquiry, good, beautiful, just,<sup>21</sup> the whole procedure of 'going up and down' may well be compared with Socrates' discussions in the dialogues. In the first and second books of the *Republic*, e. g., the name 'just' is given by Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adimantus to that which is unjust. The 'images' or instances of love presented in the speeches of Socrates' companions in the *Symposium* are full of qualities opposite to those of love. None of the definitions, even those

<sup>19</sup> περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό 341 C 7, περὶ ἔκαστον 344 B 7. One may ask, speaking generally and disregarding the text of the *Letter*: is there any sense in saying "I have got it" without having got "an object"?

<sup>20</sup> See Harward's note 113 with Taylor's detailed commentary.

<sup>21</sup> Müller, p. 261, quoting *Politicus* 286 A, objects that it is not Platonic to speak of images of the ideas. But what the *Politicus* says is: there are no clear images of these things, one can give an exact account of them only by reasoning: *τοῖς μεγίστοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδωλον οὐδὲν . . . εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς . . . ψυχὴν ἵκανῶς πληράσει . . . λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλῷ δὲ οὐδὲν σαφῶς δείκνυται.* And reasoning, for Socrates-Plato, is 'going up and down.' See also, on the use of *paradeigmata*, *Politicus* 277 D ff.: *χαλεπόν . . . μὴ παραδείγμασι χράμενον ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι τῶν μειζόνων* and the following explication of the *παραδείγμα παραδείγματος*.

attained by division, can ever be regarded as final. Consequently, no cognizance based upon these three is ever fixed.

344 A 2 ff.: There are two conditions for such an inquiry: he who wants to philosophize must have, first, an inner kinship with the subject ( $\tauὸ\ πρᾶγμα$ ), and he must, second, be quick at learning. Müller objects that these two conditions tear apart in an unbearable way morality and intellectuality (p. 258), which the genuine Plato never does. But the *Letter* states only briefly the conditions for the education of a guardian which are developed in detail in *Republic* 485 C ff. There, 519 A ff., where the malicious little soul is described which is 'wise' and sharp-sighted, it is also implied that intelligence without a morally sound mind is dangerous.

The demand to learn 'as far as possible the truth about goodness and badness' (344 A 8 f.) is also alien to Plato, according to Müller. The genuine Plato withholds the knowledge of badness from young people and allows only old men to come into contact with badness; therefore this demand must "refer to two great rivalling powers in the world," that is, to "the two kinds of soul" in the *Laws*. In the *Laws* these two souls have a place "because of the decay of the theory of ideas," but not in the *Letter* where the theory of ideas "is not yet replaced by a cosmotheology" (Müller, p. 259). What is meant in the *Letter*, however, has nothing to do with a good and a bad world-soul. It corresponds to *Republic* 402 C: 'We shall not be able to educate our guardians before we know the forms of self-control and courage, of freedom and generosity of the mind, and all that which is akin and also what is opposite to these' (C 4). The *Letter* corresponds also to the all-important address of Socrates to Glaucon at the end of the *Republic* (618 B ff.): Our greatest need is to find someone who can teach us 'in which disposition of the soul bad deeds or good deeds are done,' D 1 f. The *Letter* expresses a similar thought more generally by the words 'to learn to know the truth about goodness and badness.'

I call attention, at the end of this section, to another misinterpretation with which Müller starts his whole discussion. The *Letter* says: One may show that philosophy cannot be laid down in writing and, at the same time, one may test whether a man has a genuine zeal for philosophy. Philosophy, as we have seen, demands not only persistent study, but also a change of life.

The genuine philosophical nature, when shown what philosophy really is, will be stimulated to the highest effort. Men of a pseudophilosophical mind, however, will soon realize that such a study and such a life are too difficult for them, and that they have heard enough. 341 A 3: ‘This test is a clear and infallible way of exposing those who live in luxury and are incapable of hard work; it will bring it about that such a one can never incriminate his teacher but only himself, who is unable to put forth the efforts that the task demands.’ Müller translates 341 A 5 ὡς μηδέποτε βαλεῖν ἐν ἀιτίᾳ τὸν δεικνύντα ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν αὐτόν: “They (the unphilosophical men) “seek the blame in themselves . . . and not in the teacher” (p. 253), taking that which the test is meant to achieve as a fact, while the fact implied is that the unphilosophical men do the opposite: they blame their teacher and not themselves. Müller concludes from his translation that it is a weird psychology which expects from unphilosophical men insight into their own inability (note 9). From this misinterpretation follows another, Müller, p. 253: The third alternative, that is the real reason, why Dionysius had only one conversation with Plato, was Dionysius’ “insight into his own inability.”

But the trend of thought in the *Letter* 345 A 7 ff. is the following. The writer asks: (1a) Does Dionysius believe that he knows, after one conversation, what Plato means by philosophy, (b) ‘and does he really know enough of it,’ either by having found it out himself or by having learned it, before this one conversation, from others, or (2) does he believe that what has been said is bad, or (3) does he realize that this philosophy is over his head, and that he is, in fact, unable to live the life it demands? If Dionysius believed that Plato’s philosophy was bad, others would have told him the opposite. Furthermore, ‘if he really thought he had learned it or found it out himself, he must have believed that it was valuable for the education of a free mind. (If however, he believed this), how could he, if he was not the strangest of men, so recklessly mistreat him who guided him to these things and mastered them?’ In other words, Dionysius ‘does not know enough of Plato’s philosophy’ (1b), because he is unable to live and act in accordance with its demands (cf. 341 A 6). The *Letter* then continues, 345 C 2 ff., to relate how Dionysius had mistreated Plato.

## 2.

*The Personality of the Writer*

With our last quotation, we have already mentioned one of the reasons for Müller's argument that the writer of *Epistle VII* has an overbearing, arrogant, and self-glorifying personality which cannot be Plato's but must be that of an admiring imitator who in his biography of Plato wants to enhance his hero. The sentence: if Dionysius had recognized the worth of these teachings, how could he have mistreated thus 'the guide to and master of them' (*τὸν ἡγεμόνα τούτων καὶ κύριον* 345 C 1 f.) is a stumbling-block for Müller; Harward, also, feels bound to excuse Plato (note 120) because he uses "this strong phrase of himself." Müller translates *ἡγεμόνα τούτων καὶ κύριον* "Führer und Meister dieser Lehre," and speaks of "the arrogant bearing of a spiritual Führer" (p. 266); he may, unconsciously, imply in *ἡγεμόνα* something of the German "Führergedanken." But is it really necessary to understand it thus? Novotny, pp. 235 f., quotes several passages from Plato's dialogues where *ἡγεμών* means teacher, and *κύριος* somebody who is entitled to take care of somebody or something, *κύριος* being a legal expression for guardian. Morrow and Bluck follow Novotny's comments.<sup>22</sup> But even if the combination of the two words would imply a higher sense, is it arrogance on the part of a great man when he refers to himself as the guide to his own teachings and the one who masters them? And if we do not find any similar passages in the dialogues—is not a letter a different and more personal pronouncement?

Another instance for the claim that the writer cannot be Plato is 341 D 2 f. (Müller, p. 266). The trend of thought is the following: After having said that he himself has never written nor will ever write about 'these things' because they differ from other sciences (341 C 5 f., see above p. 385), the writer continues: '... If the things were written or put into words, it would be done best by me, and ... if they were written badly, I should be the person most pained' (Harward). Harward, in his note

<sup>22</sup> One might add to the passages cited by Novotny, for *ἡγεμών*, *Laws* 670D: *ἴνα . . . οὐλ τ' ὀσιν . . . ἔδοντες αὐτοῖς . . . τοῖς νεωτέροις ἡγεμόνες* *ἥθων χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ προσήκοντος γίγνωνται* and for *κύριος* *Phileb.* 12 A: *οὐκ ἀν ἔτι κύριος εἶη τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη διολογίας η καὶ τούναντίον.*

93, quotes Taylor, *loc. cit.*, p. 355: "It is Plato's apology . . . for giving to the public . . . only 'discourses of Socrates.' . . . If the Platonic philosophy could have been imparted to the world at large in a book, Plato was obviously neglecting his duty in not writing that book." So much for the "selfglorification" of the author of *Epistle VII*.

The author says, in the beginning of the *Letter*, 328 C 3 ff.: I left home (for Syracuse), not for the reasons some people insinuate, but 'because I felt the deepest shame that I might some day appear to myself to be nothing but simply a word, and never to have tried, by my own will, to attack a deed.' These moving words are, according to Müller, on account of the opposition of word and deed (*logos* and *ergon*) absolutely alien to Plato, because they imply a depreciation of *logos*. The genuine Plato never meant to put his theories in the *Republic* or the *Laws* into *praxis*, *logos* was to him worth more than *praxis*, and the *Republic* has sense only in the sphere of the idea (Müller, p. 270). "The centuries have seen in Plato a thinker who conquered the world by his ideas; the last decades have made him an unsuccessful man of action." But the belief of the centuries did not imply the view that Plato never aimed at the actual reform of the Greek city-state. If this belief may have sometimes overrated Plato's intellectual idealism (as does Müller) and underrated his zeal for politics, it may be due to taking into account merely Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and disregarding his *Politics*. The historians of the 19th century—first Grote, and then Eduard Meyer—have taught us to see more clearly. They have made us realize that Plato was an Athenian nobleman, and that, as such, he was born to political action. Aristotle, the citizen of a small Northern Greek community and the teacher of Alexander, felt that the glory of Athens had gone; Plato hoped and worked for its rebirth unto the end of his life.

Müller is right in arguing (against Wilamowitz) that the *Republic* was not meant as a challenge to the Athenian people to abdicate power in favor of Plato and his Academy. But he is wrong in claiming that Plato never thought of political action, and in weakening the implication of the *Republic* that this ideal state is the aim at which any real political effort has ultimately

to be directed.<sup>23</sup> He is wrong also in claiming that the very opposition of *logos* and *ergon* is not Platonic. It is a natural opposition which is found, explicitly, e.g. in the *Crito*, the *Meno*, the *Timaeus*.<sup>24</sup> The *Laws* seriously proclaims that real reformation could be achieved best and most quickly by a young autocrat whose helper and adviser is a thinker and lawmaker—a belief which stands behind *Letter VII*. Müller is led by this theory to re-interpret or reject anything which might indicate that there was ever a thought of political activity in Plato's mind. Therefore he wants to delete, for instance, the passage *Republic* VII, 540 D 1–541 B 5, where Plato proposes to send into the country all citizens over 10 years, in order to begin reforms with a clean slate.

### 3.

#### *Müller's other arguments*

Müller's other arguments can be dealt with more briefly.

*Argument 3.* That "Panhellenism" is absolutely alien to Plato refutes itself by its absurd consequences: the rejection of the long passage of the *Republic* (464 C 5–471 C 3) which belongs to the whole context,<sup>25</sup> and has never been doubted by anybody. Müller claims that the passage is written in bad Greek, as is the whole *Menexenus* also, a dialogue "considered genuine only from the time when scholars came to believe in a political Plato" (p. 270).<sup>26</sup> Müller rejects the *Ion* also as spurious, though he gives no reason for doing so. Maybe it is on account of the statement *Ion* 531 C ff. that he who is an expert in any field must be able to judge both what is well done and badly done. This may remind Müller of the sentence in the "spurious" *Letter* that it is necessary to learn the truth about both virtue and vice.

<sup>23</sup> On the "Daseinsform" of the *Republic* see P. Friedländer, *Platon*, II (1930), pp. 412 ff.

<sup>24</sup> *Crito* 52 D 5, *Meno* 86 C 2, *Tim.* 51 C 5.

<sup>25</sup> On the trend of thought which leads up to the "panhellenic" demand that Greeks ought not to fight Greeks, and from there to the question how this State could be realized, see Friedländer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 381 ff.

<sup>26</sup> See Friedländer, *loc. cit.*, Chapter 16, which interprets the *Menexenus* convincingly. P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (1933), p. 186, states that the genuineness of the *Menexenus* is "beyond question."

*Argument 4.* A great work of the size of the *Laws* dwells in the mind of its author for a very long time; to write it down would have taken a great many years. Therefore, though *Epistle VII* must have been written earlier than part of the *Laws*, nothing prevents us from comparing the *Letter* with the *Laws*, and if we find a similar style and similar thoughts in both of them, there is not the slightest reason for the belief that the *Letter* copies the *Laws*.

*Argument 5.* Müller claims (p. 267) that the use of certain terms is not Platonic, but Aristotelian; therefore he assigns the *Letter* to the epoch when Theophrastus wrote his *Characters*, that is, towards the beginning of the third century B. C.

“Aristotelian terms” are e. g. ἔξις, πρᾶγμα in the pointed sense of philosophy, ἐπιχείρησις, φύσις. But ἔξις combined with soul (= state of mind), as in the *Letter*,<sup>27</sup> is to be found in the *Laws* 650 B 7<sup>28</sup> and, above all, in Socrates’ address to Glaucon at the end of the *Republic*, 618 D 1. In this passage, as in the whole philosophical passage of the *Letter*, the relationship between teacher and pupil is implied. The teacher has to help the pupil to learn ‘which is the state of mind’ (*μετὰ πολας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἔξεως*) ‘in which a bad or a good deed is done.’<sup>29</sup> τὸ πρᾶγμα “in the pointed meaning of philosophy,” as Socrates’ occupation (*Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα*), occurs e. g. in the *Crito* (53 C) where it refers back to the teaching of Socrates that virtue and justice are of higher value than customary law. It occurs e. g. in the *Euthydemus* (274 E) as ‘the problem whether virtue can be learned’ (*τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀρετὴν μαθητέον*). For ἐπιχείρησις see the passages adduced by Ast. φύσις in the phrase 344 D 4 f. ‘on the highest matters and first principles of nature,’ which Müller considers incriminating, may have come into the writer’s mind as a reminiscence of the books ‘written by other philosophers, small or great’ (D 5) which sentence follows the phrase. Müller stresses (against Stenzel) that Plato never believed in any science of nature. But even if Stenzel’s view of Plato’s philosophical development were wrong, we know that the Academy was occupied with biological research. A fragment of the comic

<sup>27</sup> *Ep. VII*, 343 E ἔξις τῆς ψυχῆς, and implying ψυχῆς in ἔξις 339 A 1, 344 A 4.

<sup>28</sup> γρῦναι τὰς φύσεις καὶ ἔξις τῶν ψυχῶν. . . .

<sup>29</sup> Cf. p. 391 above.

poet Epicrates caricatures a discussion in the Academy, where, under Plato's and Speusippus' direction, by the method of class division, the right place of the pumpkin in the system of botany is sought. And, furthermore, we have the fragments of Speusippus which deal with history of nature.<sup>30</sup>

*Argument 6.* Dion, as he appears in the *Letter*, and as he is well portrayed in Harward's and Morrow's introductions and translations, is a man of a sound and somewhat stern character, and of deep moral convictions. He is no tyrant or "Machtmensch" (Müller, p. 276), but a man of goodwill, who is driven by enthusiasm for Plato's teachings to undertake a task which, under the circumstances, would have needed an iron fist, while Dion tried to apply to politics the self-control and mildness demanded by Plato. When Dionysius, after many admonishments, had denied him his rights, he had lost patience and had begun his ill-starred war, that is, 'his advice to Dionysius took the form of action' (*εργώνθέτησεν*, *Ep.* VII, 333 B 3, Harward). This sentence, according to Müller (pp. 275 f.) is a "strong phrase of ideological and propagandistic deception," and against such "ambiguity" Müller feels bound to defend Plato. Finally, that Plato would have said things "quite different from those reported in the *Letter* to the autocrats Dion and Dionysius" is something which Müller certainly cannot know.

It was the purpose of these pages to show that Müller's arguments, because they are based, to a great extent, on incorrect interpretations and sweeping statements, do not suffice to prove that *Letter VII* is spurious. If Müller is unable to hear in the *Seventh Letter* "the sound of divine Plato's voice," there are many other students of Plato who feel otherwise. If such personal reactions are of any value at all, I, for one, have never read this letter without feeling deeply the touch of the master.

BERTHA STENZEL.

<sup>30</sup> See P. Lang, *De Speusippi Academici Scriptis* (Diss., Bonn, 1911), pp. 57 ff., and J. Stenzel's article "Speusippos" in R.E.

## THE MEANING OF THE *HISPERICA FAMINA*.

Among the more exotic developments in the history of the Latin language is the medieval *Geheimsprach* known as Hisperic Latin. The origin, purpose, and much of the meaning of this strange tongue are obscure. About all that can be said is that its vocabulary was derived from Hebrew, Greek, vulgar Latin, and unidentifiable sources, and that its influence was considerable during the sixth and seventh centuries. There are a few traces of its effect on continental letters, among them the *Epitomae* and *Epistolae* of the obscurantist grammarian, Virgilius Maro of Toulouse,<sup>1</sup> and the impenetrable third book of the *Bella Parisiacae urbis* by Abbo of St. Germain.<sup>2</sup> But it was in Ireland and south-west Britain that Hisperic apparently enjoyed its widest and most lasting popularity. F. J. E. Raby writes, “That it (Hisperic) was taken seriously we cannot doubt, and it exercised a fascination over the mind of Aldhelm and over generations of Irish writers.”<sup>3</sup> Here is a typical specimen of the Irish style:

Adelphus adelpha meter  
alle pilus hius tegater  
dedronte tonaliter,  
Blebomen agialius  
nicate dodrantibus  
sic mundi vita huius,

which Professor Raby translates, “Brother, sister, mother, father (?), son, daughter die together; we see the shore beaten by the waves, so is the life of this world.”

The most remarkable and best known of the works composed in this learned argot is the *Hisperica Famina*, or “Occidental Talkitudes,” a rambling, rather bardic account of life in an early medieval center of learning.<sup>4</sup> The first half is a log of events during a typical day in the scholarly community, and the second half is a collection of sketches describing common

<sup>1</sup> J. Huemer, *Virgilii Maronis grammatici opera* (Leipzig, 1886).

<sup>2</sup> *Mon. Germ. Hist., Poet. Lat. Aevi Car.*, IV, p. 77.

<sup>3</sup> F. J. E. Raby, *Secular Latin Poetry* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934), I, p. 167.

<sup>4</sup> For general discussions of this work, see Raby, *loc. cit.*; M. Roger, *L'enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin* (Paris, Picard, 1905), chapt. VII; and R. A. S. Macalister, *The Secret Languages of Ireland* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1937), chapt. III.

school-room and domestic articles. The *Famina* are written in what appears to be an assonating, highly stylized form of Hisperic prose, or possibly, as some critics have thought, in a kind of free verse vaguely influenced by the classical hexameter. In any event, one must agree with Professor Raby that the work "is poetically conceived, whether it is to be called verse or prose." It seems most likely to have been composed in sixth century Ireland, though this cannot be called a certainty. The only complete manuscript is found in *Vat. Reg. Lat.* 81.

Cardinal Angelo Mai, the first scholar to wrestle with the text of the *Famina*, was openly incredulous. "Quis hunc Aethiopem lavet?" he inquired in his bemused commentary,<sup>5</sup> and in that *quis* plainly wrote a *nemo*. John Rhys, coming upon the fragmentary version of the work in the Echternach manuscript, grew bitter and described it as "opening with a kind of rhythmic twaddle about astronomy and ending with the prophet in the lion's den."<sup>6</sup> Since the days of these reluctant pioneers, the *Famina* have been the object of somewhat more informed and sympathetic study, but much in them still remains dark. And probably the darkest part is the 132 line passage which comprises the first five *capita* of the Vatican manuscript.<sup>7</sup> The two best efforts to get at the sense of this forbidding piece of rhetoric have been those of F. J. H. Jenkinson<sup>8</sup> and E. K. Rand.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Angelo Mai, *Classici Auctores*, V, p. 479.

<sup>6</sup> John Rhys, "The Glosses in the Luxemburg Fragment," *Revue Celtique*, I, p. 52.

<sup>7</sup> Robinson Ellis ("On the Hisperica Famina," *Journal of Philology*, XXVIII, p. 221) claimed this distinction for the relatively innocuous passage which is headed *De taberna* in the Vatican manuscript. "It is," he wrote, "quite uncertain *what* is described." Jenkinson thought that the object described might be a bookcase. Actually the first seven lines of the passage describe a kind of knapsack in which books were carried. (This article is also mentioned in lines 71 and 507.) The following eleven lines outline the manner in which a page of parchment should be prepared.

<sup>8</sup> F. J. H. Jenkinson, *The Hisperica Famina* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1908). Jenkinson followed Henry Bradshaw's suggestion that the *Famina* should be printed as verse. In the one passage I have quoted from the original Latin, I have reproduced Jenkinson's format, not because I agree with it, but simply for the convenience of the reader. All the references are to the Jenkinson's edition.

<sup>9</sup> E. K. Rand, "The Irish Flavor of the Hisperica Famina," *Studies in the English Renaissance* (M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1931).

Jenkinson, whose account of the work has been the basis of all subsequent discussions, regards this passage as a monologue in which the *faminator* (to use Robinson Ellis' fine word) first exalts himself and his school, then heaps ridicule on a would-be scholar, next illustrates the excellence of his own Latin with some choice similes, and finally points out some common faults of style. Rand also saw the passage as a monologue and agreed with Jenkinson's main divisions, but thought that the deprecatory remarks were the author's own conventional "confession of exceeding rusticity" rather than insults aimed at someone else. The monologue is, he added, by way of a prologue to the narrative account of the scholars' works and days which follows it.

Both these interpretations appear to be based on reasonably sound, if not always literally accurate constructions of many individual images and ideas. But they leave the passage a most tortuous and uncohesive thing, bestrewn with difficulties which would in any other text be called desperate. Let us look at a typical example of the problems which beset the views of Rand and Jenkinson. Lines 110-115 say something like this:

As far as the eastern bourne is distant from the western limit; as far as the solar disc excels in its fuller ruddiness the blazing stars; as the sonorous clangor of contending hawks surpasses the mellifluous murmur of bees and the strength of the raging bear that of the feeble sheep, so far is the power of my loquacious eloquence distinguishable from that of the others. (*Intantum nostri loquelosi tenoris segregantur altrinsecus numina.*)

Immediately after this (116-132) comes a passage which, as I have ventured to translate it, reads:

I have studied the twelve defects which lacerate the Ausonian palate. Two of these outrages in particular wound the verbal structure with their viperous touch. One, a barbarous growth, assaults the foot-path of language. It functions in two ways, confounds the four types, adds unwonted letters to traditional literature, drags established writing to death and damnation, rearranges the elements of urbane eloquence, and transmutes the stable tenor of description with its destructive venom. The other defect arose on eastern soil, and by it Hisperic eulogy is pierced with a viperous stroke which corrodes the ready wits of the initiate. Other disgraces which disfigure the pure gold of Italic diction are also in evidence, since from these (twelve defects) you have compounded your own special outrage against loquacious elo-

quence in this assertion. (*Quod ex his propriferum loqueli tenoris in hac assertione affigis facinus.*)<sup>10</sup>

It is difficult to see how the second passage can be explained as anything but a rejoinder to the first, as a sarcastic contradiction of an inflated boast. There is nothing to which the phrase, "in hac assertione," can refer except the assertion made in lines 110-115. And "propriferum loqueli tenoris . . . facinus" must almost certainly be taken as an ironic reference to "nostri loqueli tenoris . . . numina." Jenkinson granted that on the basis of his general analysis, "the connection of this passage (116-132) with what precedes is not clear." Rand, however, ignored the difficulty and said simply that the speaker, having assessed his own accomplishment, now "proceeds to lay low twelve unnamed writers who have offended all the canons of unity . . ."<sup>11</sup> Ellis, to his credit, saw the absurdity of supposing that the two remarks concerning "loquacious eloquence" are both parts of the same monologue, but rather than abandon this supposition, he proposed, unhappily, to athetize "Quod . . . facinus" as the interpolation of a *commentator irrisor*.

Every such transition between commendation and obloquy in these 132 lines (I count six of them) resists the interpretations of Rand and Jenkinson with the same vigor. If we assume with Rand that the speaker's sole theme is himself, we must reduce his discourse to this unlikely summary: (1-48) "We are the best group of rhetoricians in the world, and I am the best rhetorician among among us. I have never seen my peer in eloquence and never expect to." (49-86) "Owing to my inexperience I cut a sorry figure as an orator. You (i. e., I) really should go back to the farm instead of foolishly trying to imitate your (my) betters." (87-102) "My eloquence flows along like a mighty river, carrying all before it. The very thought of me suffices to terrify lesser talents." (103-115) "Alas, you (i. e., I) will sooner touch the sky with your (my) hand, see fish dwelling on land and men in the sea than you (I) will learn to speak properly." (116-132) "My superior learning enables me to distinguish these sundry faults in other rhetoricians." Jenkinson's

<sup>10</sup> For a detailed and thoroughly convincing explanation of the terms used in this passage, see J. H. Stowasser, *Archiv für lateinische Lexicographie*, III, p. 168.

<sup>11</sup> It is not, of course, writers, but rather styles of writing which are being attacked here.

notion that the *faminator* is alternately praising himself and denouncing another does not involve as bad a tangle as this, but it results in a confused, disconnected sequence of thought that even Jenkinson did not claim to follow. Why, to choose just one example, are lines 53-60, which are deprecatory in tone, in the first person, while lines 61-86, which continue in the same vein, are in the second person? Such confusion of thought and lack of structural cohesion are not at all typical of the rest of the work. The account of the scholars' day is, underneath its opaque and fantastic verbiage, a well-ordered, straightforward narrative. And the descriptive essays which conclude the *Famina* are, saving vocabulary, so innocent of all complexity that they have been taken for classroom exercises by more than one critic. So it seems not unreasonable to look for an explanation of the first five *capita* that will avoid the worst of these logical entanglements and produce at least a rudimentary unity.

The first point to be noted is that the passage is evidently not a monologue but a dialogue. The purely mechanical evidence for this seems plain. Lines 53, 61, and 87, each of which begins one of the transitions between praise and blame, are indented in the manuscript. And indentation, as appears from its use in two other places, is the manuscript's method of indicating a change of speaker. The first of these two places occurs in the passage describing the beginning of the scholars' day:

Sonorous tumult rouses us from our chambers. Fasten the soft vestments to your limbs . . . Start your scholarly endeavors and begin to scan your letters. That scholar wins no trophies who guards health-giving sleep in the cloister of his breast and does not, when Phoebus glows in the east, pluck the pleasures of sleep from his eyelids and fashion a studious industry.

Why do you disturb us with this thunderous clangor of speech? Why perturb the inner caverns of our ears with vocal tumor? For we have devoted the whole station of the nocturnal plow to studious watches while you indulged your limbs with sleep, and the goad of somnolence presses us.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Ellis took the phrase "nocturni ligonis" as a corruption of "nocturnae lagenaæ," and translated, "We have devoted the whole time that might be given to nocturnal revels to reading." The manuscript reading, which clearly means, "We have outwatched the Bear," seems preferable. It also furnishes a convincing (though unused) argument against those who have unaccountably thought the *Famina* of Spanish rather than Irish origin.

The second indented line is found in the section recounting the scholars' activities at noon-day:

Phoebus' disc divides the lofty center of the heavens, and mid-day approaches. Now the breast burns with consuming hunger. Visit we therefore the surrounding neighborhood that the inhabitants may provide sweet refreshment for the hungry scholars. What knowledgeable man will lead this decent band along the roadways?

I have often roamed these secret crags and have hunted out the remote resources of this borderland. I know the dear inhabitants who feed the wandering bands of scholars.

In the 225 lines comprising the account of the scholars' day, these are the only two places where we find what may be thought to be an exchange of dialogue. It can hardly be a coincidence that at these places we find the only two instances of indentation in this account. Let us make the working hypothesis that the indented lines in the first five *capita* may also indicate dialogue, and see what can be made of them on that basis.

The *Famina* begin with a general eulogy of the rhetoricians and their school. These lines should probably be thought of as an introductory soliloquy by the *faminator*, but they may conceivably have been intended as a formal address (possibly on the occasion of the opening of school):

Ample joy stirs the pectoral hollow, and I pluck mournful sadness from my breast. But I confine in the arteries of my chest a storm of gladness when I behold the glorious guardians of wisdom, who produce a noble strain of eloquence from their jaws . . . From the limits of the round earth the flower-bearing throng has bent its reins and deserted the remote cross-ways of the vast foundation.

"Then follow, it would seem," says Rand, "descriptions of a bloody fight and of an awful shipwreck . . ." But the subject has not shifted as abruptly as this. The speaker is still praising the rhetoricians and describing (rather empathetically, it is true) their mastery of the standard *suasoria* and other rhetorical exercises which formed the basis of medieval instruction:

(I rejoice) whether they discourse of treasured fables (Will deadly contention arise among rival heirs or will the sons ascend their thrones peacefully?) or whether fierce bands of warriors clash in the fatal battle-line and wet their shining limbs in rivers of blood, or whether the foaming wave of the roaring sea drives the tiring oars to shipwreck, or whether

frightful slaughter seizes whole peoples in common destruction.<sup>13</sup>

The eulogy closes with the question, “Quos edocetis fastos cuique adheretis rhetori?” which seems to mean, “(Professors,) what books do you teach? (Students,) what professor do you follow?”<sup>14</sup> This query carries the implication, “Now let’s see this splendid school in action,” and serves to introduce what I take to be a classroom scene.

As the scene opens, we hear a rather self-assertive lecturer advertising his own abilities and challenging any of his auditors to debate. “I invite,” he cries, “any debater seeking an audience to match wits with a man who has eagerly prepared an arena for learned battle.” He then launches into an account of an epic encounter in which he was able to best three mighty opponents. The remarkable translation is Rand’s:

<sup>13</sup> This involved passage had perhaps best be cited in the original.

Ampla pectoralem suscitat vernia cavernam;  
mestum extrico pulmone tonstrum.  
Sed gaudifluam pectoreis arto procellam arthereis  
Cum insignes sophie speculator arcatores,  
Qui egregiam urbani tenoris propinant faucibus linpham  
Vipereos que litterature plasmant syllogismos,  
Cui mundano triquadre telluris artico  
rhetorum florigera flectit habenas caterva,  
Et qui remota vasti fundaminis deseruere competa,  
Utrum fabulosas per ora depromunt gazas  
(Num trucida altercaminum inter soboles pubescunt litigia  
An placorea abucant proles sceptrum?)  
Utrum sevus armatorum coetus  
toxica corruit certandi in acie,  
Ut furis ostrei cruaris rivis  
candida olivarent madiada,  
Seu spumaticum bombosi tithis flustrum  
inertes oppresit naufragio remiges,  
An horridum communi stragi rapuit acculas loetum.

Rand’s rendering of lines 10-11, “. . . whether they broach treasures of fable from their lips or fierce battle is rife among the sons of disputation (i. e., the rhetoricians),” cannot stand. Lines 12-19 must also be included in the series of alternatives, and on the basis of Rand’s translation this cannot be done. And *num* is not likely, even in the *Famina*, to be used correlatively with *utrum*. The *soboles* of the text may very well be Polynices and Eteocles. Statius was a great medieval favorite, and the situation of his princely rivals would make an ideal *suasoria*.

<sup>14</sup> *Cuique* is not, I think, the dative of *quisque* here, but the equivalent of *et qui*.

And I pounded the lazy galoots, and I smashed my sturdy coevals, and I downed in battle the cyclopes mightier than I. From none of my coevals did I slink away. The while their truculent darts would pluck at me, I forthwith unsheathed my crafty sword (I raised my good shillalegh), that butchers gentle statues, and I grasp in my hand my sylvan targe that folds in its protection my fleshy hambones. I flourish my fatal dagger, whose beak tears through my adversary's shield. Thus do I invite all my coevals to the fray. Here shines a splendid sprinkling of poetry (*dictaminum*); none in the mass of wise sayings is out of line.

The rhetorician concludes this immodest auto-critique with a few remarks on the general distinction of his audience, and then rather sourly takes note of an apparently distasteful intrusion:

But behold the approach of a horrid serpent who will wound the members of this splendid band with a viperous stroke unless they pray to the ruler of the vast heavens, and will throw the flower-bearing troupe into poisonous discord.

This sudden shift of attention, considered in the context which I have outlined, suggests that a student (one thinks of Abelard and William of Champeaux) has risen to meet the challenge with which the rhetorician so confidently began his harangue. And the passage which follows the rhetorician's insult seems to confirm this suggestion. The indented line with which it begins and the completely new note of modesty and apology which informs it clearly indicate the presence of another speaker, one who is not wholly at home in the rhetorician's "arena for learned battle."

In a young cycle of revolving time (i. e., while still in my youth), I have tried to grasp the Hisperic sceptre, and therefore I fashion a rude discourse and a small stream issues from my lips. But if the Ausonian chain had bound me for an ample stage of temporal length (i. e., if I were older and more practiced), a sonorous draught of speech had passed through my throat, and a great river of urbane eloquence had poured from my jaws.<sup>15</sup>

Such diffidence as this, as we know by now, is not in the best

<sup>15</sup> Rand translates the opening phrase, "novello temporei globaminis cyclo," as "born late in time." This translation makes satisfactory sense only on the assumption that a contrast is intended between the Hisperic and Ausonian styles; in other words, that the speaker means, "As a child of the decadence, I speak only rude Hisperic. Had I been born in earlier times, I should speak polished Ausonian." But Stowasser (*op. cit.*) has shown that the two terms are strictly synonymous.

Hisperic tradition, and the rhetorician feelingly points this fact out. The transition from the student's effort at oratory to the teacher's sarcastic comment on it is also marked by indentation:

What trade do you practice? Are you a woodcutter? A carpenter? Blacksmith? A fiddler, perhaps, or a flute player? But I don't expect an intelligent answer.

With mock solicitude, he advises the would-be scholar to abandon the profession of letters, which is clearly beyond him, and to go back to the farm, where his absence is causing ruin. The animals are eating the crops, his mother weeps constantly, and the worst sort of domestic difficulties threaten his home. "Let all these calamities," he concludes, "spur you to retire to your natal acres."

The unhappy student does not retire, however, but boldly continues. And having learned something from experience, he resumes on a note that is less calculated to play into the hands of the rhetorician. Again we find indentation:

As a mountain torrent roars through the steep gorge and a devouring wave tears up leafy trunks, rolling along with a mighty tumult, staining the meadows with mud, sweeping boulders along in its course, with such exuberant power do I beget a flood of Ausonian speech.

Two equally muscular similes follow, but to no avail. The rhetorician's ridicule is as biting as before. Here indentation ceases, but by now the structure is clear without it.

You will touch the clear sky with your hand and the two stars of especial brightness will traverse the boreal limits of the seven-zoned heavens; you will count the sandy grains of the level shore; schools of fish will dwell on land and the inhabitants of the earth will judge the pools of the deep a fit habitation before you will ever beget in your eager throat a flood of Hisperic speech.

The unequal debate closes with the exchange on the subject of "loquacious eloquence" which was quoted earlier. In his final effort to carry the day, the student makes as hyperbolical a claim to excellence as anyone could ask for, but the rhetorician coolly turns aside his boast with a learned reference to the twelve ordinary faults of diction and the thirteenth fault invented in the course of the debate. With this the scene ends, and the *faminator* passes on to other incidents in the life of the scholarly community.

PHILLIP W. DAMON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

## THE EXEGETES OF ATHENS AND THE PRYTANEION DECREE.

One of the generally accepted results of Felix Jacoby's *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949)<sup>1</sup> is the refutation of Wilamowitz' theory<sup>2</sup> that the *Atthides* of the fourth century were derived from a pre-literary chronicle which was kept by the exegetes and published about 380 B. C. Jacoby based his discussion of this theory on a very thorough examination of the whole evidence on the admittedly most difficult problem of the exegetes.<sup>3</sup>

It so happened that soon after the appearance of Jacoby's book another study of the exegetes of Athens was published, James H. Oliver's *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* (Baltimore, 1950). Oliver deviates from all earlier treatments of this subject, including Jacoby's, in that he proposes that the exegetes were introduced in Athens as late as "after 403 B. C." in connection with the revision of the laws of Solon. According to him, the idea of the official exegetes came to Athens from Southern Italy whence it had been introduced "from fifty to a hundred-and-ten years earlier at Rome than at Athens."<sup>4</sup> Jacoby, on the other hand, believes that the official exegetes were a creation of Solon, and earlier scholars, in any case, had not doubted the existence of exegetes in the fifth century.<sup>5</sup>

As a compromise between Oliver and traditional opinion, now best represented by Jacoby, is patently impossible, a re-examination of the issue is all the more called for because neither author had an opportunity to make use of the arguments of the other and no reviewer of either book has been able or willing to perform this task.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *A. J. P.*, LXXIV (1953), pp. 293-5.

<sup>2</sup> Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin, 1893), I, pp. 280-8.

<sup>3</sup> Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 8-51. For the earlier literature cf. *ibid.*, p. 236, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 31 and 121.

<sup>5</sup> Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 36-41.

<sup>6</sup> To M. P. Nilsson, *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), p. 423 Oliver's date "seems fairly probable"; M. Ostwald, *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 24 ff. accepted it; other reviewers of Oliver's book are non-committal. Oliver's rejoinder to some of his critics, "On the Exegetes and the Mantic or

## I

Leaving aside for later consideration the hotly disputed Prytaneion decree *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 77 of 445/33 B. C. as a testimony for the existence of the board of exegetes in the fifth century, and foregoing altogether a discussion of the reference to Lampon οὐξηγγῆτής in Eupolis,<sup>7</sup> in order to eliminate any hypothetical or fragmentary evidence from the argument, what are the reasons for Oliver's novel theory? It is simply the fact that in his opinion the exegetes do not occur in the literature and in the inscriptions of the fifth century.

An official exegete is first mentioned in Plato's *Euthyphro*, 4 C-D, the dramatic date of which is 399 B. C. It is Oliver's belief that the exegetes of the fourth century actually took the place of the chresmologoi, discredited in the public eye by the end of the fifth century. "Before the creation of official exegetes at Athens it had been customary to call the unofficial or merely semi-official experts χρησμολόγοι καὶ μάντεις" (Oliver, p. 105). The connection which is so evident to Oliver seems even more open to doubt than his identification of chresmologoi and mantis which has been dealt with convincingly by Nilsson.<sup>8</sup> For whereas the chresmologoi, as their name and the evidence indi-

Manic Chresmologists," *A. J. P.*, LXXXIII (1952), pp. 406-13, mostly concerns problems with which the present article does not deal. As it is not our purpose to discuss the question of the exegetes in its entirety, the procedure of the election of the exegetes in Plato's *Laws* has been deliberately omitted from the following discussion; cf. on this point N. G. L. Hammond, "The Exegetai in Plato's *Laws*," *C. Q.*, XLVI (1952), pp. 4-12 and Oliver, *A. J. P.*, LXXXIII (1952), pp. 411-13.

<sup>7</sup> Eupolis, Fr. 297 Kock. Cf. Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 239, n. 17 and his commentary on Philochorus, *F. Gr. Hist.*, 328 T 2-3 in his forthcoming *The Ancient Historians of Athens. A Commentary*; Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 24-8; 124, T 8; V. Ehrenberg, *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), p. 164.

<sup>8</sup> Nilsson, *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 421-3; cf. Oliver, *A. J. P.*, LXXXIII (1952), pp. 410-11. Nilsson's objections are proved to be correct by Aristophanes, *Peace*, 1046-8, where the servant asks, upon the approach of Hierocles: "Is it a mantis?" and Trygaeus replies: "No, by Zeus, it is Hierocles, the chresmologos from Oreos." The anonymous scholium to this passage and *schol. Aristoph.*, *Clouds*, 339 (Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 131, T 16 and 125 T 11) are of no value compared with this testimony. Also in the decree on Chalcis, in which Hierocles is mentioned, he is to offer *ιερὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρησμῶν* (*I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 39, lines 65-6 = Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I, no. 42; cf. p. 85).

cate, were concerned with oracles,<sup>9</sup> the exegetes were not. This Jacoby has conclusively proved against A. W. Persson who is responsible for the confusion of chresmologoi and exegetes and for the belief that the exegetes used to explain oracles, a view for which there exists not a shred of proof.<sup>10</sup> Aristophanes in his two famous parodies of the chresmologos Hierocles (*Peace*, 1046-1126) and of a nameless chresmologos (*Birds*, 959-91) is perfectly clear in his characterization of these men, who constantly pour forth oracles which—and this is significant, too—need not be of Delphic origin (Bacis!).

The fourth century evidence for the Athenian exegetes (apart from the exegetes of the Eumolpidae, about whom there is no serious disagreement) consists of cases mentioned mainly, but not exclusively, by the orators, which are “inquiries of private persons in the domain of justice, particularly as concerned with homicide.”<sup>11</sup> They are, without exception, *unpolitical* in character.

This strictly unpolitical activity of the exegetes, engaged as they were with purification and information about ritual, is confirmed by the pertinent passages in Plato’s *Laws*, where he speaks of the duties of the exegetes in his ideal state.<sup>12</sup> They have nothing to do with either oracles or politics. Even Persson had to admit this.<sup>13</sup> In other words: None of the activities of the

<sup>9</sup> K. Latte, “Orakel,” *R.-E.*, XVIII, 1 (1939), cols. 851-2; Nilsson, *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 421-3.

<sup>10</sup> A. W. Persson, “Die Exegeten und Delphi,” *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift*, N. F., Avd. 1, vol. XIV, no. 22 (1918), pp. 31, 39, 42, 71. In his list of the activities of the exegetes (p. 39) he mentions “Erklärung von Orakelsprüchen,” although the passages to which he refers and which I have checked have no bearing at all on this point. Persson’s view was accepted by Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I (1941), p. 603, and rejected by Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 31-2; 47; 265-6, n. 172-4, whose unfavorable opinion of certain aspects of Persson’s study (p. 236, n. 1) I share.

<sup>11</sup> Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 48.

<sup>12</sup> Cf., e. g., Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 13-15; 248, n. 50; Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 63-4; A. H. Chase, “The Influence of Athenian Institutions upon the *Laws* of Plato,” *H. S. C. P.*, XLIV (1933), p. 150, presents only a fraction of the evidence. It is impossible to list here again the striking resemblances between the functions of Plato’s three exegetes and those of the actual exegetes of Athens of the fourth century known to us from the *Euthyphro*, the orators, and Theophrastus, *Char.*, 16, 6.

<sup>13</sup> Persson, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

chresmologoi of the fifth century can be ascribed to the exegetes of the fourth century, and conversely, none of the well-known functions of the exegetes of the fourth century is known to have been entrusted to the chresmologoi during the fifth century. As for the manteis, their co-existence beside the exegetes in Theophrastus and in Plato's *Laws*<sup>14</sup> is proof enough that the exegetes cannot possibly be regarded as "successors" of the manteis.

It is the nature of the preserved documents of the fifth century which accounts for the absence of the exegetes in fifth century literature. Once one remembers the fundamental difference between the writings of the fifth and those of the fourth century, it becomes perfectly clear that in the entire literature of the fifth century there is no place where the exegetes ought to have been mentioned.

This applies in particular to Thucydides. "Thucydides never uses the word *exegete*."<sup>15</sup> True. Why should he? He naturally mentions chresmologoi and manteis who pronounced oracles and foretold the future on the basis of oracles and signs and thus exercised considerable influence on the conduct of the war.<sup>16</sup> Yet he had not the slightest reason to refer anywhere in his work to the exegetes if their functions in his time were what they obviously are in the fourth century.

Therefore, even if the exegetes were completely absent from fifth century inscriptions, nothing could be inferred as to their existence, for exactly the same reason, just as the fact that the word chresmologos does not figure in the epigraphical vocabulary of the fifth century cannot be used for statistical purposes.

On the other hand, no positive argument has been set forth in support of the alleged introduction of the official exegetes between 403 and 399 B. C. The whole idea that an institution of this nature, bound up as it is with obviously ancient ritual, should have been imported from Southern Italy by the Athenians as late as the end of the fifth century seems to me utterly

<sup>14</sup> Theophrastus, *Char.*, 16, 11 (cf. 6): when the superstitious man has a dream, he hurries to the interpreters of dreams, to the manteis, to the diviners who foretell the future by the flight and the cries of birds (the exegetes, mentioned in the episode in 16, 6 do not occur here). Plato, *Laws*, VIII, 828 A-B; IX, 871 C.

<sup>15</sup> Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, p. 25.

<sup>16</sup> Thuc., II, 8, 2; 21, 3; VIII, 1, 1; cf. II, 54 and V, 26, 3. See Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 268, n. 188; Tod, *J. H. S.*, LXXI (1951), p. 270.

incredible, especially when combined with the notion that the Romans of the fifth or sixth century B. C. should have introduced the same type of institution from the same source long before the Athenians. This theory of a common borrowing which implies that Rome in the time of the Decemvirs was more advanced in matters of religious organization than contemporary Athens—the Athens of Pericles, Sophocles, and Phidias—stands in glaring contrast to the historical tradition and to all historical probability.<sup>17</sup> Against such an unnecessary assumption it will be well to heed A. D. Nock's sober warning: “Much of what can be said about the religion of any one nation or culture can be said about many others: for religion is largely determined by the human situation, and in considerable measure this is a constant.”<sup>18</sup> Nor is it likely that Plato would have adopted for his ideal state a “brand-new” institution created by the democracy of 403.

Our preliminary conclusion is then that the date of the establishment of the exegetes remains, for the time being, an open question. We have no right to postulate that it must coincide, as it were, with their first appearance in literature. Who would deny the existence of the Arval Brethren in the early Republic, because they are mentioned for the first time in the second half of the first century B. C., and that in a work which has been preserved in only one manuscript, Varro's *De lingua latina*: “aetate liberae rei publicae non laudantur nisi a Varrone *ling. 5, 85*”?<sup>19</sup> This complete lack of evidence about the Arval Brethren for so many centuries of Roman history is all the more striking because for the early history of Rome two detailed accounts have come down to us, those of Livy and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whereas for Athens the only work of comparable scope, Philochorus' *Atthis*,<sup>20</sup> has survived only in meagre fragments.

A further strong disagreement between Oliver and Jacoby exists with regard to the composition, number, and character of

<sup>17</sup> Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 120-1. For a striking example of Athenian influence on Rome about the time of the Decemvirs cf. the brilliant article by E. Sjöqvist, “Pnyx and Comitium,” *Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson*, I, pp. 400-11.

<sup>18</sup> Nock, “Religious Attitudes of the Ancient Greeks,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, LXXXV (1942), p. 479.

<sup>19</sup> *T. L. L.*, II, p. 725.

<sup>20</sup> The comparison has been made by Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 98.

the boards of exegetes. Here a few observations of a more general nature must suffice. Oliver bases his conclusions on the epigraphical evidence which is late. As a matter of fact, there is a long gap in the tradition about the exegetes which extends from 329/8 to 129/8 B. C.<sup>21</sup> In this gap also belongs Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* in which they are not mentioned, a significant indication of the decline of the institution. According to Oliver (p. 35) "the reader should not attach undue importance to the absence of epigraphical evidence before the end of the second century B. C." Why, if the alleged absence of these officials in the sources of the fifth century has been used as a proof for their non-existence in that period? Jacoby, on the contrary, inferred, correctly in my opinion, that this situation reflects a loss in importance of this office.<sup>22</sup>

Oliver's reconstruction of the numbers of exegetes of each type (the exegetes of the Eumolpidae must again be disregarded here) from ca. 400 B. C. on rests on the Pythaist and other inscriptions of the Roman period from 129/8 B. C. on, and especially, on *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1092 = Oliver, p. 155, I 37, an inscription which is dated in the second century after Christ. For the "exegete elected by the Demos from the Eupatridae" the epigraphical evidence extends from 106/5 B. C. to ca. 180 A. D., for the "pythochrestus exegete" from 128/7 B. C. to 312 A. D.<sup>23</sup> It is taken for granted that between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the period of the Gracchi no change in the organization of the exegetes occurred. The theory that the number of exegetes was larger during the classical period "can be defended only by throwing out the epigraphical evidence" (Oliver, pp. 36-7). The reliance on Roman evidence for reconstructing in detail an institution of Plato's Athens seems to me open to most serious objections,<sup>24</sup> the more so because Oliver himself suggests

<sup>21</sup> Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 142-3, I 6-7. N. b.: the first of the two inscriptions refers to the exegetes of the Eumolpidae.

<sup>22</sup> The importance of Aristotle's silence has been rightly stressed by Jacoby, *Athis*, pp. 22-3.

<sup>23</sup> Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, p. 144, I 13 and pp. 156-7, I 40-43; p. 143, I 8 and pp. 160-1, I 52. Oliver's collection of the epigraphical evidence of the Late Hellenistic and Roman periods is excellent and most useful.

<sup>24</sup> Already R. Schoell, *Hermes*, XXII (1887), p. 564, had warned

changes in the number of exegetes within the fourth century: Euthyphro's father and Isaeus' client (VIII, 39) consulted *one* exegete, in 399 and before 363 respectively, whereas the speaker in [Demosth.], XLVII, 68-71 appeals to a board of exegetes in the fifties of the fourth century. Hence, in Oliver's words (p. 44): "Sometime between the events recorded in the oration of Isaeus and the year 357/6 a board would seem to have replaced the one exegete in the official exegesis concerning such points of law." While this interpretation of the collective singular cannot be maintained in the light of the crucial passage *Euthyphro*,<sup>9</sup> A where the plural is used (*παρὰ τῶν ἔγγυητῶν . . . πυθέσθαι*),<sup>25</sup> the admission as such of the possibility of such a change is valuable.

Changes of this type are common enough elsewhere. A striking example within the Roman period is preserved in a long series of documents discovered in Olympia. These lists of officials for the sacrifices offered by the Eleans in Olympia reach from 36 B. C. to 265 A. D.<sup>26</sup> Among these, a fluteplayer and an exegete (occasionally called "periegete") regularly occur up to shortly before the middle of the second century (no. 95). The next dated document (no. 102, from the end of the second century) names *two* exegetes and three fluteplayers, and this remains the number until these records cease. Obviously, sometime toward the middle or during the second half of the second century a reform took place in which the number of these officials was increased.

A further analogy, from the history of Roman religion, may be instructive. The *XV viri sacris faciundis* were one of the most important priesthoods in Rome. If we were as ill informed about the development of Roman priesthoods as we are about those of Classical Athens, we might infer from the evidence of the Empire and the conservative character of the Romans that this board was created as a board of fifteen at the end of the sixth century B. C. But in this case we know: the board started

against relying on Roman evidence for the understanding of the original character of Athenian institutions. Cf. Jacoby, *Attis*, p. 35.

<sup>25</sup> Jacoby called attention to this passage, *Attis*, p. 243, n. 42. It confirms C. B. Welles' objections, *Traditio*, VII (1949-51), p. 473.

<sup>26</sup> *Olympia. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen*, V (Berlin, 1896), nos. 59-122.

out as *duoviri s. f.*, it was increased to a membership of ten in 367 B. C., and finally was brought up to fifteen by Sulla.<sup>27</sup> Other examples could be given, all pointing to a gradual increase of the membership of the priesthoods, for obvious reasons. Would not, conversely, a tendency toward shrinkage be something to be expected in Athens, in accordance with her decline, during the long period, full of revolutionary changes, between Demosthenes and the end of the second century B. C.?

## II

So far the Prytaneion decree has been deliberately excluded from the discussion (cf. p. 408 *supra*). The author of the most recent treatment of this document<sup>28</sup> concludes his study with the hope that he has "demonstrated that the Prytaneion decree cannot be used to prove the existence of ἔξιγγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι in the fifth century." In this he follows Oliver, although he does not accept Oliver's restorations of the pertinent portions of the inscription. While it has been our intention to show that the existence of official exegetes in Athens during the fifth century does not depend on the interpretation of the Prytaneion decree, the issue still remains whether in this inscription, in which the privilege of permanent public maintenance is conferred upon various categories of Athenians, the exegetes are included or not.

R. Schoell, in his still fundamental first publication of the text,<sup>29</sup> recognized the exegetes in lines 9-11; and this has been the established view ever since, taken for instance by Preuner, Wade-Gery, and Jacoby. W. Bannier, in the belief that the phrase *κατὰ τὰ [δέ]εδομ[ένα]* "in itself is insufficient," suggested alternatives which did away with the exegetes, but proved to be unacceptable because they are contradicted by the stone.<sup>30</sup> However, this conjecture was used in a modified form by Hiller von

<sup>27</sup> G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (Munich, 1912<sup>o</sup>), pp. 534-5. On the development of this college cf. A. A. Boyce, "The Development of the Decemviri Sacris Faciundis," *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. 161-87. Oliver, too, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 119-20, has referred to this priesthood.

<sup>28</sup> Martin Ostwald, "The Prytaneion Decree Re-examined," *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 24-46.

<sup>29</sup> Schoell, *Hermes*, VI (1872), pp. 30-42.

<sup>30</sup> W. Bannier, *Berl. phil. Woch.*, XXXVII (1917), pp. 1216-17; cf. Ostwald, *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), p. 33.

Gaertringen in his edition in *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 77 to read κατὰ τὰ [δ]εδομένα κατὰ τὴν μαντείαν ἡ[ε]ν. This phrase, which was accepted by Oliver, is in Jacoby's words "hardly Greek," an opinion shared by Ostwald.<sup>31</sup> The sentence resulting from Hiller's restoration was termed by Wade-Gery, with an understatement, as "not elegant,"<sup>32</sup> whereas Jacoby called it "unintelligible."<sup>33</sup> It has been generally overlooked that Bannier himself later withdrew his proposal, without endorsing Hiller's alternative, and reintroduced the exegete (one only!) in another restoration of the text,<sup>34</sup> so that up to the appearance of Oliver's book Hiller's reading represented everything but standard opinion. As a matter of fact, Wade-Gery's thorough re-examination of the inscription, in which he returns to and improves on Schoell's original restoration, would have seemed to lay the ghost.<sup>35</sup> Oliver's readings of the lines 7-11 are, as we have seen, strongly influenced by Hiller and the elimination of the exegetes is for him naturally a *condicio sine qua non*. As Ostwald, a close adherent of Oliver's views about the official exegetes, has already rejected these restorations with good reasons, it will suffice to refer to his treatment.<sup>36</sup>

Ostwald himself brings into the discussion a novel element: he maintains that the complete absence of the movable N in the preserved portions of the decree is "likely to indicate that it was carefully avoided and should caution us not to use it in any restorations here."<sup>37</sup> But is it really probable that such a simple rule, if it were actually valid, should have escaped the attention of so many distinguished specialists in this field? Professor B. D. Meritt whom I consulted about this alleged rule denied its existence, and Ostwald's own evidence, *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 39 = Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I (Oxford, 1946<sup>2</sup>), no. 42 (a. 446/5), and *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 76 = Tod I, no. 74 (about a. 418),

<sup>31</sup> Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, pp. 139-41; Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 238, n. 5; Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, pp. 33-4.

<sup>32</sup> H. T. Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932/3), p. 126.

<sup>33</sup> Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 237, n. 3.

<sup>34</sup> Bannier, *Rhein. Mus.*, LXXVII (1928), p. 283; cf. Hondius and Raubitschek, *S. E. G.*, X (1949), no. 40.

<sup>35</sup> Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932/3), pp. 123-7. His readings and interpretation were accepted by Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 8, no. 1; 238, n. 5.

<sup>36</sup> Ostwald, *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 27, 33, 39.

<sup>37</sup> Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, pp. 26-7.

is not conclusive, if one considers individual sections of the two inscriptions and remembers the fragmentary character of the Prytaneion decree. How untenable Ostwald's argument is will be clear after examining for a moment the first of the two financial decrees moved by Callias in 434, *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 91 = Tod I, no. 51. Here movable N is missing three times in lines 1-2, once in line 6, and twice in lines 29 and 31; it is present in lines 5, 11, 13, 20, 23; that is in twenty-six consecutive lines (e. g., 3-28) movable N is missing once, present five times, a situation completely analogous (though in reverse) to the Prytaneion decree as restored by Schoell and Wade-Gery, where in eighteen half preserved lines movable N is missing six times (but in four of the six cases in datives ending in *-οῖσι*; in fact, *all* six words end in *-σι*, a circumstance which further weakens the force of Ostwald's argument); it has been restored in only two instances, in lines 5 and 9. In the latter case Wade-Gery reads *ἀνθελ[ε]ν* because he believes that "a trace of this N can be read on the stone";<sup>38</sup> Ostwald, who has purged all restorations of movable N's, has removed also this one.<sup>39</sup> Professor Sterling Dow very kindly examined his excellent squeeze of the inscription in my presence with the result, which seems convincing to me, that what remains of the disputed letter is inconsistent with a I and seems to be the lower end of the left hasta of a N (n. b., the letter must be either I or N). We therefore entirely agree with Wade-Gery's reading.

There is little to add to Ostwald's own reading of the passage in question. He virtually returns to Schoell's proposals, replacing, however, the word *ἐχσεγέτας* with *τὸν μάντεον ἡός*. His main argument is really a negative one, to wit Oliver's theory that the exegetes did not exist in the fifth century. His positive reasons<sup>40</sup> are so conjectural in the decisive points that I may be allowed to forego their further discussion. Suffice it to say that there is no evidence whatsoever suggesting the appointment of manteis or of a group of manteis by Apollo.

This leads us to the last question: what about the original

<sup>38</sup> *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1932/3), p. 126, n. 3.

<sup>39</sup> Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, p. 38. It should be remembered that the word in question does *not* end in *-σι!* Cf. also *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 78, p. 417 *infra*.

<sup>40</sup> Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, pp. 39-45.

insertion of the exegetes by Schoell, as modified by Wade-Gery? The main argument, already set forth by Schoell and ably discussed again by Jacoby,<sup>41</sup> is that the category dealt with in line 9 is characterized as ordained by Apollo—hὸς νῦν ἡ Απόλλων ἀνήλε[ε]ν—and that this is exactly the phrase used by Plato of his exegetes, *Laws*, IX, 865 D: τούτων δέξηγητάς είναι κυρίους οὓς ἀν δέος ἀνέλη. The passage gains in importance if we remember how close the connection is between Plato's exegetes and the exegetes of Athens.<sup>42</sup> Oliver has not even mentioned this crucial argument in his discussion of the Prytaneion decree (pp. 139-41), and Ostwald's attempt to explain it away in three lines is ununderstandable to me.<sup>43</sup>

There remains, finally, *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 78, a document strangely neglected in this discussion.<sup>44</sup> This decree, moved by Philoxenus and to be dated, it seems, about 430 B. C., begins as follows: . . . Φιλόχοσενος εἰπε· τοῖ [Απόλλωνι θύσαι, ἐπ]ειδὴ ἀνεῖλεν ἔαυτὸν ἔχσεγετε[ν γενόμενον Ἀθεναίο]ις, θρόνον τε ἔχσελεν ἐν τοῖ πρ[υτανεοί . . .]. Here the same phrase that appears in the Prytaneion decree and in the Plato passage is used with respect to Apollo himself (cf. the underlined words in all three quotations). Not less suggestive is the request in the same inscription that a seat be reserved for the god in the Prytaneion, obviously in his quality as exegete, and obviously because it was there that the officials ordained by him were already enjoying—in human terms—this very honor. By declaring himself exegete of the Athenians, he joins the exegetes ordained by him and partakes symbolically in their privileges.

<sup>41</sup> Schoell, *Hermes*, VI (1872), p. 36; Jacoby, *Atthis*, pp. 29; 248, n. 53.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. p. 409 *supra*.

<sup>43</sup> Ostwald, *loc. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>44</sup> Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, p. 139, I 2, reproduces only the first portion of the motion of Philoxenus. His only comment (p. 121) “Apollo replied (*scil.* when the Athenians consulted Delphi about the establishment of official exegetes) that he himself would serve as their exegete (I 2) so that human exegetes would be unnecessary,” seems in no way warranted by the text of the inscription. Cf. about this document also Busolt-Swoboda, *Grichische Staatskunde*, II (Munich, 1926), p. 1106, n. 1; Jacoby, *Atthis*, p. 238, n. 3; p. 273, n. 242; Raubitschek, *C. W.*, XLIV (1951), p. 136, who refers to *S. E. G.*, X (1949), no. 63.

In conclusion it may be said that the traditional interpretation of lines 9-11 of the Prytaneion decree by Schoell, Wade-Gery, and Jacoby has not been invalidated by Oliver and Ostwald. On the contrary, Jacoby's penetrating treatment of the problem of the exegetes has rendered it even more certain that the exegetes are the officials ordained by Apollo who are honored in the Prytaneion decree. Their existence during the fifth century is assured also without the evidence of this document.

HERBERT BLOCH.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

---

### THE HOROSCOPE OF CEIONIUS RUFIUΣ ALBINUS.

In 1894 Theodor Mommsen suggested<sup>1</sup> that Ceionius Rufius Albinus was the person to whom the horoscope contained in the second book of the *Mathesis* of Firmicus Maternus referred. Circumstantial evidence led Mommsen to the conclusion that it was the *praefectus urbi* of the year 336/337 A.D. whose horoscope is discussed in detail by Firmicus. Mommsen did not, however, submit his thesis to the final test: whether or not the astronomical data agree with his hypothesis. It is the purpose of the present note to fill this gap. At the same time I wish to point out how easily problems of this type can be solved without going into a great many unnecessary details which are usually invoked in the dating of horoscopes by professional astronomers who are not familiar with the techniques of ancient astronomy and astrology, techniques which by their approximative character make quite meaningless the application of modern high precision tools.

Our horoscope contains as data only the zodiacal signs in which the seven planets and the Horoscopus, the rising point, are located. As starting-point we use the positions of Saturn and Jupiter in Virgo and Pisces respectively. I know of twelve Greek horoscopes with Saturn in Virgo, three of which show Jupiter in Virgo also. Their dates, A.D. 65, 124, and 125 respectively,<sup>2</sup> are too far away from the critical years around 300

<sup>1</sup> *Hermes*, XXIX, pp. 468-72 = *Gesammelte Schriften*, VII, pp. 446-50.

<sup>2</sup> These texts are Vettius Valens, II, 21; VII, 5; P. Fouad 6 respectively.

which alone are interesting for our problem. With *P. Harris* 53, however, we reach the year 245 A. D. but both planets are one sign farther ahead than required. The common period of Saturn and Jupiter is 59 years, thus the same situation will prevail in 304 A. D. Jupiter moves one sign per year; thus 303 will give the right sign for this planet and it can be hoped that Saturn is one sign back also. Thus 303 is our only chance before 336 A. D. Other possibilities are either 59 years earlier or later, and thus incompatible with Mommsen's hypothesis.

The first step consists in finding the approximate positions of Saturn and Jupiter in 303 A. D. We now have to consider the position of the sun in Pisces. This requires a date shortly before the vernal equinox. I choose 303 March 1 because the sun is then in the middle of Pisces (about Pisces 12). For this date one can find the mean longitudes of Saturn and Jupiter by two additions of triplets of numbers,<sup>3</sup> and one more addition gives the required positions as Virgo 24 and Pisces 26 respectively. Thus 303 is possible. We repeat the same process for Mars and find Aquarius 5, again in agreement with the data of the text. Though the longitudes computed so far may be wrong by several degrees, March 303 is certainly a possible date.

Narrower limits are obtainable when we consider the longitude of the moon, which was located in Cancer. We again use mean motion in longitude alone and find by adding twice three numbers each<sup>4</sup> that the moon was in the middle of Cancer either on February 15 or on March 14 of 303 A. D., i. e., either 13 days before or 13 days after our preliminary date, at which the sun was near Pisces 12. Because the sun moves about  $1^\circ$  per day the earlier date will barely lead to a position in Pisces whereas the second is still well inside this sign. Consequently we compute the longitudes of Venus and Mercury for the more plausible date, 303 March 14. We now use the tables quoted in note 3 to their full accuracy (requiring the addition of six numbers for each planet) and find for Mercury Aquarius 28, for Venus Taurus 11. The text gives Aquarius and Taurus respectively.

This result also tells us that we need not check the second

<sup>3</sup> Denoted by  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$ ,  $a_3$  in the *Genäherte Tafeln für Sonne und Planeten* by P. V. Neugebauer, *Astronomische Nachrichten*, 248 (1932), cols. 161 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Denoted by  $L_1$ ,  $L_2$ ,  $L_3$  in the *Tafeln zur astronomischen Chronologie*, II, by P. V. Neugebauer (Leipzig, 1914).

possibility, February 15, because one month back Venus cannot have reached Taurus. Finally, change from March 1 to March 14 can only improve on the position of Mars and will not change appreciably the longitudes of Jupiter and Saturn. Thus A. D. 303 March 14 satisfies all requirements. Because we have placed the moon only approximately in the middle of Cancer one must consider not only March 14 but also March 13 or March 15 as equivalent dates. Knowing from Firmicus that Scorpio was rising while the sun was located at the end of Pisces, we see that the hour of birth must have been about 9 p. m. Computing the longitude of the moon for this hour of March 13 or March 15 shows that the moon was entering Cancer in the first case, leaving it in the second; consequently only 303 March 14 remains as the date of the birth.

We have thus removed the only serious possible argument against Mommsen's conclusions, namely that the age of the person in question might not fit the other data. We may now from the opposite point of view as well see in the perfect agreement of all external data with the data of the horoscope an explicit confirmation of the fact that horoscopes in ancient astrological literature were not artificially made up examples but constitute a valuable source both of historical and astronomical information.

O. NEUGEBAUER.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

## MORE ON THE CONSULS OF A. D. 13.

In July, 1951, this Journal (LXXII, pp. 283-92) published our article entitled "Roman Names and the Consuls of A. D. 13." Recently, quite by chance, we stumbled upon a long and difficult paper which presents essentially the same arguments in support of the same thesis, namely that A. Caecina Largus was a separate person from C. Silius and was a consul suffect for the year 13. The author of it, Luigi Grifi, who was then Cavaliere (later Commendatore) and "Segretario Generale del Ministero del Commercio, Belle Arti, Industria e Agricoltura, socio ordinario e conservatore dell'archivio e libri della Pontificia (Romana) Accademia di Archeologia," read his paper on June 12, 1861, before that Academy, and it was printed in volume XV (Rome, 1864) of their *Dissertazioni* (pp. 1-42) under the title "Sopra un tratto dei fasti consolari del tempo di Augusto" and the subtitle "In continuazione della illustrazione della epigrafe dell' auriga Scirto e in risposta ad una operetta stampata in Lipsia" (i. e. Leipzig).

In two previous papers delivered to the same group and printed in vols. XIII (1855, pp. 385-497, 3 plates) and XIV (1860, pp. 81-113) he had published the Scirtus inscription<sup>1</sup> (which lists the consuls ordinary for A. D. 13-25) together with remarks on the consuls of those years and on the Lesser Fasti of Antium. In the combined *Monumenti, Annali e Bulletttini* of the Instituto di Corrispondenza Archeologica for 1855 (pp. 3-17) Henzen re-edited those two inscriptions, making some objections—stated quite properly—to Grifi's editing and interpretation, and including two long letters from Borghesi in support of his own position. It was to this article that Grifi replied in 1861.

The first question that must occur to anyone is why Grifi's long article is missing from the later-19th-century bibliography on the year 13 in the fasti and on the Scirtus inscription.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Now *C. I. L.*, VI, 10051; Dessau, 5283; cf. *C. I. L.*, I<sup>1</sup>, p. 475; I<sup>2</sup>, 1, p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Capitoline Fasti, Lesser Fasti from Antium, and Scirtus inscription: *C. I. L.*, I<sup>1</sup> (1863), pp. 450 f. (year 766), 475; *C. I. L.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 1 (1893), pp. 39 f. (year 766), 72 f.; *C. I. L.*, VI, 2 (1882), 10051: *C. I. L.*, X, 1 (1883), 6639; fragments of the Fasti of the Arval Brethren covering A. D. 13, found in 1868 and published by Henzen, *Bull. dell'Inst. di Corr.*

answer must lie in the circumstances out of which the article grew, perhaps in the character of the protagonists of the opposed views, and surely in the tone of Griffi's article. It is polemic and impassioned, even angry, rhetorical, and often sarcastic. Griffi leaves nothing unsaid, he over-argues his case and over-buttresses it with observations sometimes irrelevant and sometimes inaccurate. He is scarcely less bristling in refuting Borghesi (as quoted by Henzen), who had died only the year before (1860), a greatly venerated scholar. Much of what Griffi says must be judged not only unwise but in poor taste. So perhaps it is no wonder that the scholarly world chose neither to accept nor to answer his paper, but simply to ignore it.<sup>3</sup>

We call attention to Griffi now with three purposes: (1) to complete the bibliography, (2) to give proper credit to one who anticipated our thesis by nearly 100 years, and (3) to offer his work as some confirmation of ours. Though the wheat and the chaff must be separated in what he has to say, he omits none of the data then known and he offers independent testimony—contemporaneous with Borghesi's and Henzen's—about the erasure in the Capitoline Fasti under the names of the consuls ordinary of A. D. 13. Here, like Degrassi 75 years later (see p. 290 of our previous article), he could find no remains of specific letters,<sup>4</sup> and, as we do (pp. 290 f.), he found the erasure too long for just the name "Caecina Largus" or even "A. Caecina Largus."

JOYCE S. and ARTHUR E. GORDON.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

*Arch.*, 1869, pp. 121-4 (cf. *C. I. L.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 1, pp. 70 f.), which confirm the existence of at least one consul suffect for that year.

<sup>3</sup> In the *Bull. dell' Inst. di Corr. Arch.* published July 25, 1861 (pp. 158-60) Henzen reviews Griffi's speech (three or four years before it was published). He calls attention to Griffi's unfair tactics and inaccurate scholarship, deplores his shabby treatment of Borghesi, but does not answer any positive arguments put forth by Griffi, saying only that he [Henzen] has already discussed the subject adequately.

<sup>4</sup> He says (p. 7): . . . orme, che più ho guardato nella scritta cassata, meno mi è riuscito di ritrovare. . . ."

## REVIEWS.

GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH. *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. ix + 501; 8 plates. \$7.50.

Classical readers of Professor Duckworth's book will not long be deceived by the modest disclaimer in the preface (p. vi): "This book is not written for the specialist in Roman comedy." It may not be written for him—it is indeed an admirable and completely trustworthy synthesis for scholars in other fields—but from it the specialist can learn much. It is a massive, important, indispensable book. It summarizes succinctly, ranges widely, quotes appositely, adjudicates coolly. It categorizes without dullness and expounds without condescension. It steers a safe and sane course between the Scylla of Greek perfection and the Charybdis of Roman originality. It is in short the book we have been waiting for; there has never been anything to match it in English in its field.

Duckworth begins with an account of the influence on Plautus and Terence of pre-literary comedy: Fescennine verses, the so-called dramatic *satura*, the Atellan farce, and the Graeco-Roman mime. (Here he might have done more with the *phlyax* vases, were it not for the prohibitive cost of further illustrative plates.) Popular influences may perhaps be traced in the cantica, and in slapstick, trickery, and coarseness of many literary comedies.

The author next turns to a brief account of Greek comedy. His pages on New Comedy (pp. 25-30) are admirably concise and up-to-date; his judgment on Menander avoids both overpraise and condemnation: "Menander understood the human heart and delineated his characters with vigor and charm. It is a great loss to world literature that so little of his drama has been preserved" (p. 33). In his rejection of claims of large Euripidean influence on Menander, Duckworth very sanely follows Prescott. Perhaps he lays less stress than he should on Peripatetic influence upon Menander: a good account of this is to be found in T. B. L. Webster's *Studies in Menander* (Manchester, 1950), pp. 175-84, 195-219, which reached Duckworth too late for him to use.

In his discussion of the Golden Age of the drama at Rome, Duckworth gives (p. 52) a useful list of the authors and titles of the Greek originals of Plautus. Here he might have mentioned Webster's tentative attribution (*Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XXXI [1948], pp. 191-8) of the *Aulularia* to Menander's *Apistos* (reprinted in *Studies*, pp. 120-7). Duckworth's chronology of Terence's plays (p. 60) is also useful. On the vexed question of the quarrel between Terence and Lanuvinus, Duckworth holds (p. 65) that "at the bottom of the whole affair was the corporate jealousy of the poets' guild," and relegates to a footnote Minar's suggestion that political opposition to Terence's noble friends and sponsors may also have played a part. On *retractatio* in Plautus he has missed or ignored A. Boutemy's suggestion (probably wrong!) in *R.E.A.*, XXXVIII

(1936), p. 29 that *Stichus* 491 (on the Ambracian ambassadors) proves revision in 187.

The chapter on presentation and staging is a most convenient summary, to be supplemented by W. Beare's *The Roman Stage* (London, 1950). We learn that the number of days devoted to dramatic festivals was four times as many under Augustus as in 200 B. C.; that the plays were sometimes presented in the Forum (perhaps, it might be added, in the Basilica Porcia or Aemilia, if we may judge by the basilica of the Latin colony of Cosa, which was remodelled, probably in the age of Nero, into a *théâtre intime*); that no curtain was in use before 133 B. C. In accordance with the Athenian convention, the wing entrance on the spectator's right led from the forum, that on the left from the harbor and foreign parts. To Duckworth, *angiportum* means not "alley" but "street." On costume, Duckworth does not refer to Pollux (IV, 118-20), a primary source; on masks, he produces adequate evidence for believing that they came into use early. Doubling of rôles was common but not restricting; act division is of course late.

In dealing with stage conventions and techniques (Chapter 5) Duckworth is at his best when he points out (p. 102) what bad method it is to lump Plautus and Terence together "as a kind of dim reflection of Greek comedy," and then use them "as a quarry for the restoration of the supposedly flawless Greek original." We learn the various uses of monologue (exposition, announcement, commentary, deliberation, characterizing, moralizing, comie, topical, or rhetorical effect); in Plautus, 44% of the monologues are by slaves; in Terence, 33% are by young men. Other conventions include eavesdropping and asides, entrance and exit announcements, limitation of the stage-setting to the out-of-doors (on this see Virginia Woolf's perceptive essay "On Not Knowing Greek" in *The Common Reader*), the elasticity of dramatic time, the violating of dramatic illusion by a sort of parabasis. Duckworth's analysis provides interesting corroboration for Harry Levin's important critical point of view, midway between the sociologists and the New Critics, in "Literature as an Institution" (*Accent*, VI [1946], pp. 159-68). In sum, Plautus follows the inherited conventions of New Comedy; Terence is in revolt against them.

The chapter on theme and treatment is one of the most valuable in the book. The emphasis is on "the importance of being mistaken": *Agnoia* is the presiding genius of Roman comedy (p. 140). The 26 extant plays are most helpfully divided into four categories: plays of character (e. g., the *Adelphoe*), of innocent mistakes (e. g., *Rudens*, *Menaechmi*), of mistaken identity and deception (e. g., *Andria*), and of guileful deception (e. g., *Miles Gloriosus*, *Mostellaria*). Here Webster's categories for Menander (*Studies*, pp. 57-8) are interesting to compare: single-character plays (*Apistos*), plays of reconciliation (*Perikieromene*), of social criticism (*Second Adelphoi*), of adventure and satire (*First Adelphoi = Stichus*).

In methods of composition Plautus' plays, except the *Stichus*, are unified; Terence, like Menander, prefers an intricate duality. Plautus is repetitious and digresses much; Terence is more closely-knit. Plautus, too, is full of improbabilities and contradictions, but they

do not constitute serious structural flaws. Duckworth is properly reluctant to assume *contaminatio* overmuch; on the other hand he does not go as far as Beare, who denies it in Plautus almost entirely. Webster (*Studies*, pp. 139-45) ingeniously avoids the issue for the *Stichus* by assuming that it had an alternative title in the Greek: *Philadelphoi*.

In his chapter on foreshadowing and suspense, Duckworth finds in the Plautine prologue more variety than is commonly supposed. He does not deny irony to Terence, nor to Plautus a realization of the value of dramatic tension and surprise. Among devices to arouse suspense Duckworth emphasizes the *servus currans* (he began running at least as early as *Acharnians*, 176).

In discussing characters and characterization Duckworth draws, one suspects, from his lecture room—clearly a pleasant place for a student to be—the comparison of the *adulescens* and his *servus* to Bertie Wooster and Jeeves. He collects, and condemns, from the scholarly literature a priceless collection of adjectives used to refer to the comic *adulescens*: slinking, whining, sensual, spineless, secretive, weak, timid, hysterical, self-indulgent. *Senes* are more than ancient gallants or tedious moralizers: they are parents, aged lovers, or helpful friends. Sanely as always, Duckworth withdraws assent from Dunkin's allegation that the clever slave represents the "instinctive reaction of a vigorous poor man to an oppressive capitalistic system." In general what one misses here is what Webster provides: an adequate discussion of the debt of New Comedy types to Aristotle's *Ethics* and Theophrastus' *Characters* (but see p. 392).

The thought of Roman comedy centers around wealth and poverty, love and marriage ("love is that emotion which causes a man to forget for the time being how many minas there are in a talent"), the problems of education, the relations of master and slave, religion and the gods. As for the moral tone, πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς: "Hough finds an average of only about four obscene allusions per play" (p. 295) in Plautus! The stage acquainted Rome with Greek philosophy before the final introduction of it to the city: we too often forget that Terence was dead before Panaetius arrived. Duckworth might have noted that part of the comic effect of Sceledrus in the *Miles*, that stalwart believer in sense-evidence, lies in the parody of epistemological discussions in the philosophers. On the whole Plautus is more steadfastly against sin than Terence. In this section Duckworth's characteristic caution, and his low view of the excesses of writers like Dunkin, perhaps lead him to dismiss too cavalierly themes of social and political significance in Roman comedy. The *Adelphoe* particularly may have political overtones; the ideal relation of master and slave in the *Captivi* has perhaps deeper social implications than Duckworth is prepared to grant; the *Miles* could be social satire of a familiar war-time personality, and reasons other than aesthetic may explain the repeated failures of the previous play of married life" the *Hecyra*.

The last section ("Conclusion 111 p.") Terence adds up to what of Plautus is humor. Superiority, degradation, surprise, incongruity, irrelevance, exaggeration, all are stimuli to laughter. A character is

Menander, carefully subordinates the ridiculous to the serious; in Plautus, quite the other way.

Much of the humor in Roman comedy depends on linguistic and stylistic devices. Plautus abounds in puns; he differentiates his characters' language far more than Terence, and two Plautine jests out of every five are put in the mouths of slaves. And they are the despair of the translator; but Professor Harry Leon's translation of *Most.* 770 (*Sarsinatis ecqua est, si Umbram non habes?*) is worth quoting: "Well, if you haven't got any shade, maybe you've got a Venetian blonde." Plautus ranges wider and is more flexible; Terence, like Menander in his later plays, is more restrained and refined. Plautus has the lighter touch, Terence the greater warmth and sympathy.

In metre and song, and in festival endings, may be traced the influence of pre-literary comedy, though Plautus uses them with great sophistication to lend symmetry of structure (fascinating analysis, p. 374)—an important part of his originality—and his metres would do credit to a Gay or a Gilbert.

The penultimate and summary chapter deals with the originality of Roman comedy. Plautus, whom Duckworth prefers throughout, is an original artist whose technique developed and matured; he is more farcical than the Greek; he gradually increased the amount of song and dance until the result is musical comedy; he added Roman references, a spice of vulgarity, and elements of suspense and surprise. Terence is subtler: he represents the philosophic concepts of the Greek originals more faithfully than Plautus. In Plautus there is a variety of theme, simplicity of thought, *Romanità* of character, wider range and variety in comic devices, language and metre. For Duckworth the final originality of Roman comedy lies in its making two types out of Greek social comedy: (1) the comedy of farce and robust humor, song and dance, gay and improbable plots, amusing and grotesque characters, the whole embellished with jokes, puns and word-play; (2) the sentimental family comedy of subtlety and artistry, without coarseness or the *gros rire*, but with intricate plots, heightened suspense, and dignified characters. To have created and developed these two divergent trends is the true significance and originality of Roman comedy.

A final chapter treats the influence of Plautus and Terence on later comedy, down to Dickens and modern mass media. There is an appendix on MSS and editions, an exhaustive bibliography (pp. 447-64) and a good usable analytical index. The book is illustrated from miniatures of Terentian MSS.

Professor Chandler Post's classes in Aristophanes used in examinations to be adjured to "translate, with elucidation of jests." Elucidation of jests is likely to be a sober, though for antiquity a necessary business. When that is said, adverse criticism of *The Nature of Roman Comedy* is at an end. The book is a *vade mecum* for students of Roman comedy which will hold the field for years to come. Professor Duckworth has put us all in his debt.

PAUL MACKENDRICK.

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

W. BEARE. *The Roman Stage: A Short History of Latin Drama in the Time of the Republic*. London, Methuen & Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 292. 25s.

This book is well described by its title. The first one hundred fifty pages are taken up with eighteen chapters, only four of which are devoted specifically to Plautus and Terence. Thus, this book differs fundamentally from the more recent work of Duckworth (*The Nature of Roman Comedy*), which is directed towards an exhaustive and very profitable analysis of the extant plays. Compared with Duckworth's work, Beare's treatment of the extant plays must seem inadequate. But Beare's treatment of the other material touched upon in both works compares more favorably. For instance, Beare's chapter on Naevius, though it does not attempt to cite or summarize recent work in the field, is spirited, and his appreciation of Naevius is probably as good as any that has been written. Besides this, there is much in Beare's work on dramatic antiquities which Duckworth treats only incidentally or not at all. This book, then, is a valuable and very welcome contribution.

Beare has a tendency to vacillate between general literary appreciation and somewhat detailed scholarly discussion. Thus, if only twenty-four pages are to be devoted to Terence, less should be given over to a discussion of the details concerning contamination, even though the author has original views here which he is naturally anxious to present. The space devoted to refuting various views concerning the law of five acts (23 pages) also seems disproportionate. The style of this book, which eschews footnotes except in the lengthy appendices, does not lend itself to detailed discussion.<sup>1</sup> Finally, Beare is at his best in his general accounts and his literary appreciations.

Beare expresses many judgments that are either new or at least contrary to the usually accepted views. He (p. 28) thinks it probable that all actors on the Roman stage except the mimes normally wore masks. He (p. 37) questions the authenticity of the *Asinaria* and the *Mercator*, pointing out their lack of metrical variety. (Why not include the *Miles*, then, since it resembles these plays in its metrical simplicity? Is not metrical development more plausible?) He (p. 60) points out that Graeco-Roman tragedy had at least as long a career on the Roman stage as any other form of literary drama, and thinks that its effect on the popular mind must have been far-reaching. He (p. 92) thinks that never in Latin was there a recognized method of composing plays by the fusion of two or more originals. In treating Accius, he (p. 113) keenly remarks: "But the continual straining after rhetorical effect tends to eliminate all the delicate half-tones necessary to credible character-drawing

<sup>1</sup> For instance, Beare (p. 150) does not give the location (*Epist.*, 108, 8) of the two-line quotation from Seneca. In citing Menander, *Epitrepontes*, he (p. 43; cf. pp. 243, 244) uses the numbering of the editions of Capps and Allinson without noting the fact. Since references are now usually made to Körte's third edition (or to Jensen's edition), in which the numbering is quite different, it would have been advisable to specify the edition cited.

and to leave us nothing but superhuman virtue and inhuman vice." (This should be noted by students of Seneca.) He (p. 224) also concludes: "There is no song in Plautus." (This seems extreme, though we may readily admit that Greek or Roman "song" was markedly different from our own.)

Various details of the book might be criticized. Beare (p. 88) refers to Donatus as an individual, "an honest if unintelligent student." Now it is true that there is some valuable and some worthless material in the Commentary, and, as Beare insists, careful distinction should be made. But it is fallacious to view all the material as coming from one hand: the Commentary is a compilation; some of the annotators were learned and keen, some ignorant and stupid. Again, Beare (p. 99) says: "Ancient drama, on the whole, does not seem to have aimed at surprise effects . . ." He cites the famous fragment of Antiphanes (191 K); but in citing this, one should always include the somewhat contradictory statement of Aristotle (*Poet.*, 1451 b 26). In general, the ancient poets, like Shakespeare, seemed to have felt that great tragedy is more effective when it appears inevitable. Perhaps this is the main reason why they do not strive more for effects of surprise. But such effects, as Duckworth rightly insists, are far more frequent, especially in comedy, than critics usually recognize.

Beare is normally sensitive to etymological nuances. It is doubtless a mere infelicity of phrasing, therefore, that seems to suggest that he is overlooking the literal meaning of *scortum*, that is, "skin," when he (p. 138) says: "Rustics in Atellanae referred to a *scortum* ('wench') as 'a bit of skin' (*pellicula*). . . ."

Beare (p. 152) says that the prologues of Plautus and Terence are quite different from what we know of the Greek prologues. But the lengthy papyrus fragment which refers to the "long-winded god" would seem to refer to a type of prologue similar to those of Plautus, and to be of such a type itself.<sup>2</sup>

The conclusion (pp. 182-3) that costume may have played comparatively little part in helping spectators identify a character seems extreme. In the relief which Beare (facing p. 38) reproduces, the gentlemen are dressed very differently from the slave; and it is risky to argue from the silence concerning the clothes of Tyndarus and Philocrates, since they are captives of war and would have presumably been stripped of all finery.

Beare (p. 183) refers to "the immensely thick soles which we see on the ivory statuette from Rieti." This has been a frequent interpretation of the pegs beneath the feet of this well-known statuette. Other scholars, however, view these pegs as designed to fit into a base in order to hold the statuette upright.<sup>3</sup>

PHILIP WHALEY HARSH.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Otto Schroeder, *Novae Comoediae Fragmenta in Papyris Reperta* . . . (Bonn, 1915), pp. 46-8.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. James Turney Allen, *Stage Antiquities of the Greeks and Romans and Their Influence* (New York, 1927), Fig. 22, fac. p. 164.

H. MICHELL. Sparta. Cambridge (England), At the University Press, 1952. Pp. ix + 348. \$7.00.

The last three decades have produced quite a number of sizable books on Sparta, by U. Kahrstedt (*Griechisches Staatsrecht*, vol. I, 1922), V. Ehrenberg (*Neugründer des Staates*, 1925), F. Ollier (*Le mirage spartiate*, 1933), H. Berve (*Sparta*, 1937), P. Roussel (*Sparte*, 1939), Th. Meier, (*Das Wesen der spartanischen Staatsordnung*, 1939), P. Coleman-Norton (*Socialism at Sparta*, 1941), and K. M. T. Chrimes (*Ancient Sparta*, 1951), to mention only the most important ones, and an enormous wealth of articles on special problems concerning its history and political institutions. The most recent of the more extensive works mentioned was not yet known to the author of the present book. Yet there is but very little duplication. By far the most valuable part of the work by K. Chrimes is based on a minute study of Spartan inscriptions of the Roman period, most of which were discovered through the excavations of the temple of Artemis Orthia in the first decade of the present century. The remainder of the book by K. Chrimes, especially as far as it deals with early Spartan history and institutions, is full of sometimes interesting but mostly highly speculative conjectures, many of which replace whatever information we can find in ancient authors by rather fanciful reconstructions.

The work under review, on the contrary, mentions the inscriptions of the Roman period only incidentally and devotes only comparatively little space to the question of the origin of the Spartan constitution but concentrates mostly on the Sparta of the period from the sixth to the fourth century B.C., with a brief appendix on Hellenistic Sparta. In compensation it contains a rather full discussion of the interesting problem of the Spartan system of land tenure, of the military and naval organization of Sparta, and of the Spartan monetary system and financial organization, three subjects which are hardly touched upon in the work by K. Chrimes. Apart from the three chapters just mentioned, which are in many ways the most interesting, the work contains an introductory chapter on the origin and early history of the Spartan state and chapters on general Spartan institutions (citizenship, civil rights, marriage, burial customs, etc.), on the relations between the Spartans, the Perioeci, and the helots, on the Spartan constitution, on the Spartan discipline, on the syssitia or public meals of the Spartans, and, by way of an appendix, a very brief chapter on Agis IV, Cleomenes III, and Nabis.

The work is distinguished by the completeness with which—apart from the first and the last chapter—all the evidence from antiquity is collected and by the great care with which all relevant modern suggestions concerning the many problems which the subject presents are adduced and discussed. Since the work deals with a very great number of intricate problems which have been endlessly discussed, it is difficult to give an adequate summary of its contents, but the following interesting suggestions which the author has made or theories that he has adopted may perhaps be mentioned.

The author tries to show that the *δρυοι*, i.e. the full Spartan

citizens, differed greatly in wealth, but that, apart from this, there were no differences of social or political rank among them, in other words that there was no aristocracy within the aristocracy which the Spartan citizens as such constituted in regard to the rest of the population. This is probably correct within the period for which it is claimed by the author. The author believes, however, also that the perioeci were essentially Dorians, perhaps slightly mixed with "Achaeans," but essentially Dorians, i. e. not a conquered people but the commoners among the conquerors, who perhaps to some extent had mingled with the native population. As the author himself points out, this is essentially the explanation of the origin of the perioeci given by Isoerates in his *Panathenaicus* (177 f.), in contrast to Ephorus and other ancient authors; and more or less the same explanation has also been accepted by a number of modern scholars. The main reasons given by the author are as follows. Since the perioeci were acknowledged as Lacedaemonians, though not as Spartans, and since we find them fighting loyally side by side with the Spartans in their wars, they cannot have been "inconvenient unsubdued foes," who had proved too strong for the Spartans to be turned into helots. For the same reason they cannot have been of a different race. Their non-servile status and their status as Lacedaemonians is further attested by the fact that they competed at Olympia, and that, according to the Lycurgus legend, they shared in the original distribution of the land. Finally, the author argues, the few perioec inscriptions that we have are written in the Dorian dialect though interspersed with some "Achaean" forms. All this proves that the perioeci must have been preponderantly, if not completely, Doric.

These arguments do not appear to me particularly convincing. In the first place it may be pointed out that, even according to the author's own theory, the Dorian perioeci had mingled with the Achaeans. This presupposes that not all the native inhabitants had been reduced to serfdom, i. e. to the status of helots, when the Dorians first conquered the Eurotas valley; and in fact it is quite incredible that the Dorian conquerors should have been able to reduce the whole native population to outright slavery. But if this much is granted we do have non-Dorian perioeci, whether mingled with Dorians or not. To contend that these Achaean perioeci cannot have been inconvenient unsubdued foes, and therefore cannot have existed or cannot have existed in considerable numbers, is to set up a wrong and unwarranted alternative. It is a very common occurrence in the conquest of one nation by another that, after the decisive battles are lost, a part of the population makes its peace with the conqueror on acceptable conditions while a part fights on to the bitter end and, when finally subdued, is dealt with much more harshly. The analogy of the Roman conquest of Italy is quite instructive. The Romans, to be sure, did not make helots. But they too had different kinds of citizenship, and there was a considerable period in which those Italians who had no full Roman citizenship were nevertheless greatly favored over subject populations outside of Italy. Over a long period of time Italians who had no full citizen rights fought loyally in the Roman armies; and

when the Italians finally did revolt in the so-called Social War we find again that those who, while the war was still going on, laudably submitted were the first to be granted full citizenship and that this citizenship was extended to the rest only some time later. All this is of course different from what appears to have happened after the Dorian conquest. But it shows that it is wrong to argue that the perioeci cannot have been "an inconvenient unsubdued foe" who had proved too strong to be enslaved. If the perioeci were "Achaeans" they were the descendants of those who had found it profitable to make their peace with the conquerors on advantageous terms and so enabled the latter to reduce to slavery those others who were not willing to submit in any way until compelled by force. This is also what the ancient tradition—apart from Isocrates who is certainly no historian but makes up his history to suit his purposes—suggests. The argument from the dialect does not appear very convincing either if one considers how rapidly in the same period the Ionian dialect spread all over the coast of Asia Minor.

Whether, in addition to the "Achaean" perioeci, whose existence, it seems to me, can hardly be denied, there were also Dorian perioeci who, through a victory of the aristocracy over the common people, had lost even the right to participate in the ecclesia, is a different question. It is impossible to discuss this question fully in a review. But before answering it in the affirmative one should consider what this implies. The analogy would be a victory of the patricians over the plebeians so great as to eliminate the plebeians from the *comitia*. For, that in the primitive old times of the Dorian conquest the assembly of the warriors, which at that time included all Dorians, had to be consulted on important decisions, the author does not doubt. Is it likely that in early Sparta conditions existed which made such a victory possible?

In regard to land tenure the author (pp. 205 ff.) tries to show that Plutarch's statement (*Lyc.*, 16) according to which every male child after having been found healthy at birth immediately was assigned a *κλῆρος* by the ephors is in all likelihood correct. He believes that this *κλῆρος* was inalienable but nevertheless could be mortgaged; which would explain how some Spartans could become desperately poor in spite of the fact that they could not lose their *κλῆρος*. He further believes that, though most of the land originally consisted of *κλῆροι*, which remained state property and at the death of the person to whom they had been assigned reverted to the state, the ephors could be bribed to sell such land to individuals as outright property and that this accounts for the accumulation of large estates in the hands of a few families and of rich heiresses which plagued the Spartan state from the late fifth century. Obviously this solution of the problem is open to grave objections. But the ancient tradition on land tenure and the laws of inheritance in Sparta is so contradictory and confusing that it is doubtful whether a satisfactory solution of the problems which it presents will ever be found.

In the beginning of his chapter on money and public finance (p. 298) the author contends that, at least in historic times, the Spartans used gold and silver coins just as freely as any other

nation, though the Spartans did not make any gold or silver coins of their own before 280 B. C. He explains the statement in Xenophon's *Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία* that the Spartans were forbidden to own any gold or silver coins privately as referring only to a very temporary condition after the year 404 B. C. when a law to that effect had actually been passed.

The author believes that, contrary to the belief of Pericles on which he based his grand strategy in the Peloponnesian War, the poverty of the Spartan treasury as compared to that of Athens, in the long run worked to the advantage of the Spartans. For, he argues, the Athenian treasury, however rich in the beginning of the war, was bound to be exhausted some time and the tributes imposed on the Athenian allies in order to refill it were bound to cause increasing resentment. The Spartans, on the contrary, who from the beginning had no such resources, had to wage the war on a different basis, and therefore, if they only held out long enough, were bound to win in the end.

In his last chapter the author (p. 326) points out that it was Aratus who, in 228/7, by his movements in Arcadia, provoked the counter measures of the Spartans which were later continued by Cleomenes' expeditions of conquest, though Polybius has tried to conceal this fact and has deceived most modern historians.

It is unfortunate that a work which, whether one may always agree with its conclusions or not, on the whole is so careful in the collection of the evidence and so sober in its discussion of it, should sometimes be marred by almost inexplicable inaccuracies. Thus on pp. 106-7 we find the statement that "the divine origin of the double kingship was explained by contemporaries on the ground that the two royal houses were *Tyndarids*, descended from the *Dioscuri* or great twin brothers, *Castor* and *Pollux*, sons of *Tyndareus*, king of *Lacedaemon*, who, after the death of their father, reigned as two kings of Sparta." As evidence the author adduces *Od.*, XI, 298; Pausan., III, 1, 5; and Herodotus, VI, 52. In actual fact the passage in the *Odyssey* says nothing whatever except that Castor and Polydeuces were sons of Leda and Tyndareus. Pausanias, to be sure, says that the sons of Tyndareus for some time ruled over Sparta. He continues, however, by telling the well-known story of the return of the Heraclidai, who superseded the previously ruling royal house, and makes it quite clear that the kings of Sparta were the descendants of the twin sons of the Heraclid king Aristodemus: not a word about the two royal houses of historical Sparta being considered descendants of the Dioscuri nor any suggestion that there continued to be a double kingship immediately after the mythic peace rule of these demi-gods. Herodotus, in the chapter quoted, does not mention the Dioscuri at all but tells the story of the twin sons of the Heraclid king Aristodemus and of the descent of the two royal houses from them at very great length. Now it is true that the Dioscuri were very highly revered at Sparta and that they were supposed to accompany the kings in war. From this one may possibly derive the hypothesis that there existed at some time a version according to which the Spartan royal houses were descendants of the Dioscuri and that this version was later replaced by the Heraclid

legend. But simply to state that the historical kings were believed to be descendants of the Dioscuri, and to adduce as evidence passages which either say nothing of the kind or say the very opposite, is a somewhat unusual procedure. It is in fact all the more astounding since, on p. 132, the author clearly implies that the Heraclid legend was the predominating one, though in the place where he discusses the legendary origin of the double kingship he does not mention this version at all.

In his discussion of the various age-classes of Spartan boys in the sixth chapter the author points out correctly that to the Greeks the "first birthday" of a person was the day when he was born and not the day on which he became one year old. Starting from this observation the author argues that the expression  $\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\tau\eta\ \gamma\epsilon\gamma\omega\nu\varsigma$  does not mean "twenty years old," in the sense in which we use this expression, but "after someone's twentieth birthday," i. e. after his nineteenth birthday—or when he is nineteen years old—in our sense. This interpretation of the Greek term is controversial. But there is certainly no semantic or mathematical possibility of interpreting the expression mentioned to mean "upon entering the nineteenth year of his life," as the author on p. 171 contends, which would be "when he becomes eighteen years old," in our idiom.

On p. 143 one finds the strong statement concerning Aristotle's account of the Carthaginian constitution (*Politics*, 1273 a 6): "The sense of the passage therefore is that in Carthage unanimity in the Senate is necessary before a proposal is brought up in the Ecclesia. If the vote is not unanimous then it is referred to the Ecclesia." What Aristotle actually says is that if the suffetes and the Senate agree on a proposed measure then they can, but need not, submit it to the Assembly for ratification, but if they disagree then the measure must be brought before the Ecclesia, which in this case has the final decision.

On p. 142 the author says that it was impossible in Athens to make motions from the floor of the house (i. e. the ecclesia). In support he quotes Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians*, XLV, 4. But what Aristotle actually says there is merely that it was unlawful to put a motion to the final vote before it had been discussed in the Council and then formally submitted to the assembly by the prytaneis. This is quite a different matter.

In note 2 on p. 19, V. Ehrenberg's book *Neugründer des Staates* is attributed to Kahrstedt, though in the bibliography the author is given correctly.

On p. 135 the author accepts Kahrstedt's unfortunate idea that the original form of the term *γεροντία* was *γερωχία* and that this meant not a council of elders but the assembly of the *γέρας ἔχοντες*, i. e. of those who enjoyed special honors. How *γερωχία* could ever become *γεροντία* remains unexplained, quite apart from the fact that such a compound with *ἔχειν* would be most unusual in so early a period. In actual fact the form *γερωχία*, which occurs only once in a comedy of Aristophanes, is clearly a joke on the Doric dialect in which intervocalic *σ* had become a rough breathing: *γεροτία* > *γερῶτία* (spelled *γερωτία*) > *γερωχία*. Both because the Ionic alphabet had no means of expressing a simple rough breathing, since it used the

letter H for the long open e, and perhaps also in order to produce an exaggerated and therefore comic effect, Aristophanes expressed the rough breathing by the letter χ, thus replacing it by an aspirated κ. Likewise due to an unsufficient knowledge of the Spartan dialect appears the author's explanation (p. 100) of φυλάξαντα in the rhetra quoted by Plutarch, *Lyc.*, 5, as derived from φυλάσσειν. The aorist in ἔξι is regular in the Laconic dialect with verbs in -άζειν, and there is the analogy of the verb ἀπελλάξειν from ἀπέλλα to φύλαξειν from φύλα, so that there is no reason to assume that ὠβάξαντα was formed by analogy to φυλάξαντα from φυλάσσειν, which would be very strange anyway.

For the reader who is mainly interested in the history of Spartan political and social institutions all these may be points of minor importance, though this can hardly be said of the correct interpretation of the rhetra. But there are also occasionally certain, though much less glaring, inconsistencies in regard to important problems concerning the Spartan constitution. On p. 95, for instance, the author says: "We know that the powers of the *Ecclesia* were limited to a consultative capacity, but nevertheless it certainly functioned and the gravest issues of state were within its jurisdiction." It is difficult to see how an assembly whose powers are limited to a consultative capacity can have jurisdiction over anything. In actual fact the problem of the powers of the *Ecclesia* is discussed later on at considerable length, and the author sometimes (p. 126 and p. 144) seems to incline towards the view that these powers were rather considerable while at other times (p. 136) he seems to incline towards the opposite view. Perhaps one may say that the author's statement quoted above is not so contradictory as it may appear at first sight, if one distinguishes between legal and actual powers. Thus it may be pointed out that in the course of the third century B. C. the Roman Senate, for instance, acquired very far-reaching actual powers though legislation of the fourth and the early third century had reduced its legal function to that of an advisory body. It is not impossible that the development in regard to the powers of the Spartan *Ecclesia* went, during a certain period of time, in the opposite direction, i. e. that under certain conditions it became possible to disregard to some extent the legal (= traditional) rights of the *Ecclesia*. On p. 144 the author starts on an analysis of this kind. But this analysis is not carried through and thus the problem posed by the somewhat paradoxical statement on p. 95 remains unsolved.

Deficiencies like those mentioned make it impossible to use the work as a ready source of accurate information on the various aspects of the Spartan state. The reader must always be on his guard. But as pointed out in the beginning of this review the work has also very great merits and deserves to be carefully studied.

KURT VON FRITZ.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

L. A. Post. From Homer to Menander. Forces in Greek Poetic Fiction. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1951. Pp. 333. \$3.75. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XXIII.)

The first eight chapters of Professor Post's book are the lectures he delivered at the University of California in 1948 as Sather Professor of Classical Literature. He has added a ninth and final chapter in which he generalizes on his preceding analysis and discusses the theory of fiction or, in the Aristotelian sense, Poetics; and indeed the term "fiction" is understood in this, to a classical philologist perhaps the natural sense.

The purpose of the book is to "study forces in fiction and fiction as a force" (p. 3). Its method is to analyse the Homeric poems, the tragic poets and Menander, and to see their essential significance (as did Aristotle) in their fashioning and handling of plot. This method does not restrict itself, however, to problems of artistic creation and of technique, but is extended to ethical aspects of fiction. "The total impact of our authors is highly moral in intention" (p. 5).

The first chapter considers the *Odyssey* as "The Pattern of Success." It is analysed as a success story, and "a success story should be moral" (p. 14). "Penelope is represented as a creative personality who, when all men doubt and disapprove, wins a personal success and glory by gambling against odds on the hope of regaining her husband" (p. 20), and Penelope is said to be "the emotional centre of the epic" (p. 20). When one is reconciled to the exigencies of Post's method it is illuminating to see the *Odyssey* cut down to Aristotelian size. Whatever one's antipathy to success stories (did the Greeks have a word for success?), it must be conceded that the tale of Ulysses, in its essential plot, is the tale of the happy ending.<sup>1</sup>

The plot of the *Iliad* is analysed as the prototype of tragic plot—the wrath of Achilles, the consequent death of Patroclus, and the reconciling conclusion in the encounter of Priam and Achilles. "The *Iliad* preaches glory, loyalty to a loved one, and, last of all pity; but the greatest of these is pity" (p. 55).

The tragic poets are studied only in part separately. Their plays are grouped according to the character of their plots. Aeschylus, because his plays are dominated by "social consciousness," is considered as a poet of political aims "concerned to strengthen institutions and to present examples of devotion to rational progress" (p. 87). Sophocles—in the *Ajax*, *Antigone*, *Trachiniae*, and *Oedipus Tyrannus*—is "more philosophical because his plots introduce more of the appearance of design. Unfortunately, life in this particular design seems to be cruel and unjust. This is the essence of tragedy" (p. 120). Euripides, in seven of his greatest plays, is presented as the tragedian of "desperate detachment from life" (p. 155).

The three tragic poets having been considered in what is perhaps

<sup>1</sup> It seems to me unnecessary to the theme to insist on "one genius called Homer" (p. 10) and hardly justifiable to state that in the eighth century "Greek cultural life was without form and void" (p. 9).

their most characteristic productions, the remaining plays of Sophocles and all but four of the other plays of Euripides are considered under the heading "Propaganda, Idealism and Romance" (Chap. VI, p. 157). A further chapter on "Vacillation, Burlesque and Variety" discusses the *Helen*, *Orestes*, *Phoenissae*, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, and the *Rhesus*. A final chapter deals with the comedy of Menander.

A brief sketch of contents, such as I have given, is necessarily inadequate. But, tempting as it is to discuss at the outset Post's many provocative points of view, justice can be done to an analysis of large sweep only if one has a clear idea of the author's plan and the criteria of judgment he is applying. These are set forth in the last, appended, chapter—"Aristotle and the Philosophy of Fiction." In that chapter he makes it clear that his point of departure is Aristotle's *Poetics*.

It may not be justifiable in a reviewer to wish that Post, who has given us an excellent book on Plato's *Epistles* and who in this book amply demonstrates an understanding of Plato's view of fiction, had chosen as his point of departure Plato rather than Aristotle. Plato, despite his to us unacceptable conclusions, asks the questions we still ask—what is the relation of a work of creative imagination to the "real" world, what is its ethical and political function. Aristotle begged these questions. For once he indulged in no polemic with Plato. He brushed aside problems of aesthetics and ethics, and simply applied his scientific method to the criticism of poetry. Consequently his *Poetics* is not a treatise in aesthetics nor, in the strict sense, in literary criticism. It is a sort of writers' manual in which, in the interests of an intellectual scheme, poetry is seen in distorting generalizations; and many of them are, to us, simply not true. Post is well aware of this. "Aristotle," he says (p. 245), "is but a pedestrian guide to Greek poetry." He "followed in the Poetics the principles that were dear to him in biology" (p. 246). Nevertheless he chooses to follow in general the Aristotelian plan. He chooses to follow it, however, in an aspect in which it is fundamentally sound.

"The Telos of tragedy," Aristotle says (1450 a 10), "is the incidents and the plot." This statement is true of all fiction. It is true of a detective story writer or a Somerset Maugham who deliberately contrives a plot. It is true of the great plots like *Moby Dick*, in which a writer has evolved in his plot an adequate symbol. It is true in the case of Shakespeare or James Joyce when they borrow a plot, but a plot that appeals to them as an adequate vehicle for creation (cf. *Poetics*, 1451 b 18). Such a concept of plot, however, assigns to it a deeper meaning than does the Aristotelian concept. And Post seems to accept Aristotle's restricted meaning when he states that "drama tells us how something abnormal happens to a character, what he decides to do about it, and how this decision leads to success or failure, happiness or unhappiness" (p. 252). This limitation in the concept of plot, while it allows for consideration of ethical purpose, excludes what we call loosely "poetry." It is easily applicable to Menander (the chapter on Menander is to my mind the best in the book), as it is to the Restoration dramatists or Noel Coward. It is sometimes illuminating

when applied to Euripides. But with Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles we feel that the pith of the matter is lacking.

In judging a book, however, we must accept the restrictions of method the author has imposed on himself. Post has chosen to look back at the *epos* and at tragedy from the standpoint of Aristotle's *Poetics*, and to analyse them especially as to plot. He does not rigorously adhere to this plan, and it would be easier to follow if his terms had been defined.<sup>2</sup> But with this wellnigh crippling limitation of method he achieves results of analysis that are often both provocative and illuminating.

In order to see how this criterion is applied let us turn to the most difficult case, the *Iliad*. To the modern reader it is hard to see why Plato should call Homer *ποιητικώτατον καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν* (*Rep.*, 607A, also 595C), and in what respects the *Iliad* was for the Greeks at the source of tragic poetry. "Homer invented tragedy," Post writes (p. 30),

and, by communicating his vision of life through the medium of art, became a force in the lives of others. Tragedy is itself a triumph over despair, for it clears the mind of emotional weakness and enables it to pursue a rational goal. The more pity and terror there are in a picture of life, so long as the poet's vision is not distorted by pity or terror for himself, the greater the potential of his salutary shock.

The tragic sense of life is a sense of the tremendous power of ideals, a sense of something the worth of which transcends all defeat by circumstance. The best things in life are the flashes of joy and courage and insight that beckon and reward the individual, yet seem always to elude the attempt to imprison them in any institutionalized form of social security. Virtue and honesty and beauty are brightest in a setting of tragedy, and this is Homer's great discovery. He has consequently designed the *Iliad* in a pattern that emphasizes personality rather than a code of polite or moral behaviour that succeeds because we think it should.

Here the Aristotelian excuse for tragedy, that it purges of pity and fear, is used. Presumably, at a time when transposition of medical terminology to psychological phenomena was fashionable, and playgoing might be thought to effect a similar catharsis to a sea voyage or horseback riding, beneficial effects of purgation might be alleged. In our day this psychological approach to the effects on the spectator (lumped in one type and suffering from surfeit of ill-described emotions) is too simple to be useful or acceptable. Our psychology has acquired other dimensions.

The plot, however is not considered only under this aspect. It

<sup>2</sup> Sometimes he is admirably lucid. At other times it is difficult to understand precisely what he means by such statements as "Thus imagination is a crystal ball into which we gaze and see the truth about ourselves. Such truth is a kind of Aristotelian god, self-moving and self-contemplating, and possessing power to integrate subordinate powers and functions in subjection to itself" (p. 257).

is considered chiefly as a technical device, in which the gods are the mainspring. But

The Gods in Homer are thus in the main more than machinery. They represent to some extent the forces of nature that may aid or thwart men. They represent also forces that operate in social organization and a kind of hierarchy of classes and functions. . . . The gods also represent to some extent the forces that operate in the activity of an individual (p. 45).

and further (p. 47)

Achilles' tragedy is the loss of his illusions. He had lost his honor in surviving Patroclus. That to him was worse than death, and no reconciliation of his quarrel with his fate was now possible. . . . The tragedy of Achilles was complete in Book 18 of the Iliad when he learned of the death of Patroclus. He might have fought beside his friend, but had not done so because he was thinking of glory and honor and would not fight before Agamemnon had apologized. His pride was his downfall, and the greater blow to his pride, when his friend was lost, was his tragedy.

I find it difficult to accept the underlying presumption, into which Aristotle seems to have led the author, that, as opposed to the fiction of optimism and success, there is a fiction of failure and pessimism called tragedy; and that both attitudes could be used in fiction by the same poet to present two equally valid pictures of life.

If, however, one takes partisan exception to the scheme of Post's book, in so far as it is based on the *Poetics*, one cannot but be grateful for the acute, detailed and often novel discussions of plot in which the book mainly consists. They form a valuable survey of an aspect of Greek poetry to which sometimes, either entranced by Diction and Thought or seduced by philological interests, we pay too little heed.

J. A. PHILIP.

TRINITY COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

---

*Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, Vol. XX. Rome, American Academy in Rome, 1951. Pp. 166; 106 text figs.; 3 maps. \$6.00.

The new volume of the *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* contains only two articles, but both of them are important contributions to Roman art and archaeology: Frank E. Brown presents the first section of the publication of the Academy's excavations at Cosa, and Marion Lawrence gives us a most useful supplement to the corpus of Asiatic sarcophagi.

When the American Academy reorganized its activities after the long interval imposed by the war, it was happily decided to revivify its School of Classical Studies by undertaking an excavation. The site wisely chosen by Professor Brown is ancient Cosa, the medieval

Ansedonia, situated on a small promontory between two lagoons just south of Orbetello in Tuscany. Cosa was the first Roman colony on newly conquered, actual Etruscan territory and was founded in 273 B.C. Its foundation reflects the Roman naval strategy of the time: to cut off the Etruscans from access to the sea and to consolidate Rome's new naval power. Throughout its long life, the harbour of Cosa remained its principal *raison d'être*, and the fortifications of the town still bear eloquent witness of its military strength and importance.

One might have expected that the Roman Cosa superseded an earlier Etruscan settlement and that its stratigraphy would have revealed at least some of the phases of Etrusco-Roman relations in historic times, but so far the excavations of the site have yielded no evidence whatsoever of a pre-Roman Cosa. This negative result does not detract in the least from the interest of the exploration. On the contrary, Cosa gives us a unique opportunity to study the lay-out and architecture of an early Roman colony in its pure and uncontaminated shape, to get a typical view of Roman civic and military town-planning of the third century, and to trace its development through the following centuries. The author-excavator does not lose this opportunity.

What strikes the reviewer when reading Brown's treatise is above all the rare combination of a well-handled and refined field-archaeological method and a broad humanistic approach when evaluating the results. Secondly, it is particularly gratifying to see how much factual knowledge can be acquired from a careful and experienced surface survey without actually putting the spade to the soil. Many of the fundamental results already gained in Cosa are due to the excellent field survey, and they are made accessible to the reader in three remarkably fine maps and a series of beautiful photographs, some taken from the air, which may well serve as models of their kinds.

The massive city-walls of Cosa enclose an area of some 34 acres and are pierced by three main gates. The irregular area is subdivided by a strictly rectangular street net. The main streets are laid out so as to match the gates, and the positions of the gates are ultimately dependent upon the demands of fortification. The planning was functional, not ritual. Thus, the street system became the armature of the town plan, and the size of the different blocks was determined by the street net, not vice versa. It is worth quoting what the author states in this context: "They (the blocks) do not form an inflexible system of equal units of area rigorously imposed, of which the streets are merely separators, but themselves are the product of the functional dissection of the terrain by the streets." This is a clear and important principle of town-planning. It seems to have been a specific Roman solution, employed for early colonial foundations in the late fourth and third centuries B.C. One cannot help contrasting it with the old, undisciplined, and organically developed habitation quarters of Rome itself, or with Republican Ostia, as it has lately been traced by the new trial excavations. These latter reflect the gradual development of important towns where private enterprise and private interests dictated the general

lay-out and where no masterplan can be detected in the irregular labyrinth of the housing quarters. The town-plan of Cosa is, as the author rightly points out, a single act resulting in an intrinsically Roman plan. No direct influence from the gridiron plans of the Hellenistic world can be traced. The oblong blocks, the three different widths of the streets, adapted to their various functions, the absence of thoroughfares from gate to gate are all original features not met with in the Classical or Hellenistic East. The author points to the Etruscan Marzabotto as a probable archetype of the plan. The parallelism between the two plans is striking, and again brings into focus the desirability of a renewed and thorough exploration of that site. What the old excavations of the 1860's and 1880's were unable to prove was precisely the crucial problem of the date of the town. If it really dates from the 6th and the early 5th century B. C., as the author presumes, Cosa can rightly be considered as a late Roman version of the Etruscan tradition of town-planning. Until further proofs of the early date of Marzabotto are available, the reviewer prefers to leave open the question of Cosa's Etruscan ancestry as regards the principles of its town-plan.

The city-plan and the fortifications are all of the same date. The mighty city-wall with its three gates and 22 towers is the work of the first Roman colonists. To have been able to prove this beyond any doubt is one of the greatest merits of the publication. The consequences are important, and give full support to the more and more generally recognized presumption that the similar polygonal constructions at Cori, Segni, Norba, Terracina, and all the other sites in Latium are "no older than the Roman colonization of those regions." Thanks to the evidence from Cosa we can also confidently date the appearance of the portcullis to the early third century, and the gateways testify to a confident handling of the wide-spanning arch.

The main lay-out of the Forum is fairly well ascertained, virtually without any excavation. It is an oblong, open place, about 90 m. x 30 m., surrounded by buildings, two of which were temples, one a basilica, and one most probably an *aerarium*. A free-standing triple-arched gateway, placed in the centre of its northwest end, leads into the public place. Archway and basilica seem to date from the 2nd century B. C. while the sacral and other buildings on the Forum are more or less contemporary with the foundation of the colony. There is no consistent alignment of the facades toward the Forum, and there were no bordering colonnades flanking its sides. A building of paramount interest is the basilica of which a preliminary plan is presented. Since the publication it has been fully explored and one looks forward to its full publication in the next Cosa volume.

The excavations of the first seasons concentrated on the *arx* situated on a hillock in the southwest corner of the town and separated from the habitation quarters by a low massive wall. A broad *via sacra* leads up to the sacred area, dominated by a remarkably well preserved three-cell temple, the Capitolium of the colony. This building dates from the beginning of the 2nd century B. C. An earlier temple, not yet explored, and already destroyed in antiquity, was most probably contemporary with the foundation of the colony, while a small third temple seems to be approximately

coeval with the Capitolium. The three sanctuaries form a rather irregular lay-out which, however, becomes clearly understandable thanks to the convincing analysis of their respective building histories.

Of particular interest is the section dedicated to the building technique. The local grayish limestone is the main material, but it is treated and used in different ways. One meets it in the city-walls and in some of the temple-podia as beautifully finished polygonal masonry, laid without mortar. The bulk of the civic and domestic buildings of Cosa is constructed in what is called "random rubble-work," i. e. small unshaped blocks of limestone bonded together by a fairly hard mortar of lime and sea sand. This type of masonry can rightly be considered a forerunner of *opus concretum*, and was freely used from the very beginning of Cosa's life as a Roman colony. Everyone who has followed the discussion of the original date of *opus concretum* in Rome can appreciate the importance of this new and certain evidence from Cosa. It is particularly worth mentioning that this type of construction is contemporary with the dry polygonal masonry of the city-walls, and that it was in continuous use as long as building activities went on in Cosa, i. e. to about the middle of the 1st century B. C.

It is surprising that the time of the Empire signifies the final decline of Cosa as a town. The downward trend had actually started even earlier. The original colonists and their descendants were farmers and soldiers. The military rôle of Cosa soon became of decreasing importance and the free peasant fought an uneven struggle against the social and economic tendencies which were so marked in the agricultural structure of Italy of the late Republic. The great villas in the immediate neighbourhood of Cosa testify to the extinction of the free peasants as a class in society and to the creation of the large estates owned by the senatorial aristocracy of Rome, a feature which is still characteristic of the "Maremma."

The first report of the excavations at Cosa thus not only gives much important archaeological information on early Roman architecture and town-planning, but also yields historical material of far-reaching interest. One looks forward to the continuation of the work, and the reviewer interprets as a good omen for the future the misspelling of the term "Foreword" which constantly appears in the form of "Forward."

Miss Marion Lawrence's article carries the title "Additional Asiatic Sarcophagi" and consists of a most careful and judicious catalogue of the columnar sarcophagi which have appeared since C. R. Morey published his fundamental work on the subject in 1924. The author follows Morey's chronology in the main, and corroborates it with new arguments based on sound stylistic analysis. Morey's type B with undivided figure-frieze is omitted in the series and we are promised a separate study of it as an offshoot of the Asiatic types. Likewise, type E, with the central gable and lateral arches, is rightly considered a specific type made for the Western market. Description and diagnosis of the 45 additional pieces leave nothing to be desired and the dating of them, ranging from about A. D. 160 to the second half of the third century, is admirably precise and very well founded.

ERIK SJÖQVIST.

CARL W. BLEGEN, JOHN L. CASKEY, MARION RAWSON. *Troy. Volume II: The Third, Fourth and Fifth Settlements.* Part I, Text: pp. xxii + 325; Part II, Plates: 318 figs. (including 59 plans and sections). Princeton, Princeton University Press for the University of Cincinnati, 1951. \$36.00.

Just as this volume is a continuation of the account of the Cincinnati excavations at Troy begun in the first volume, which included the general introduction and the First and Second Settlements, so the review of it must be considered as a continuation of that of Volume I which appeared in this Journal in the issue of January, 1953 (LXXIV, pp. 86-91). The scheme of presentation of the results of the excavations is identical with that followed for the first two settlements; continuity is obtained through a brief recapitulation in the Foreword and through the re-publication of seventeen plans, sections and charts, as well as Tables 22 to 28 in the Appendix. The charts and tables are designed to illustrate the general cultural continuity which the excavators ascribed to Troy for the five major phases of the Early Bronze Age, with not less than thirty architectural phases, a period of a millennium. This cultural development, best illustrated by the pottery, is said to show slow progress of the native Trojan culture, but also to show a persistent local tradition virtually unaffected by alien influences.

Yet, in the face of considerable evidence for continuity, this reviewer was impressed with the factors indicating the introduction of several new cultural traits at the beginning of Troy III and wonders if the three settlements reported in this second volume do not form a cultural unit somewhat separated from Troy I and II, just as the excavators see them almost completely separated from Troy VI and the subsequent development. Most striking is the introduction at the very beginning of Troy III, built over the burnt débris of IIg, of a completely new building technique, walls built entirely of stone and often standing to a height of two metres or more, rather than the walls of brick on stone foundations of the previous settlements. The orientation of the third settlement is different; from the scant available evidence the general plan seems to be blocks of houses separated by narrow streets and lanes. There are in Troy III to V some scant traces of heavy retaining walls which may possibly have been fortifications, but the well-established architectural scheme of Troy I and II—megaron, forecourt, fortifications with propylon opposite the megaron—disappears at the end of II, not to emerge again until the beginning of VI, after the end of the Early Bronze Age. The disappearance and re-emergence of this architectural complex is paralleled on the Greek mainland, where the identical scheme was known in late neolithic Thessaly, at Sesklo and Dimini, contemporary in part at least with Troy I. The Early Bronze Age culture known as Early Helladic, which flourished in the Peloponnesus and Central Greece and touched southern Thessaly, was ignorant of the scheme, preferring instead the groups of multi-roomed houses, not unlike those of Troy III-V. But with the beginning of the Middle Helladic the megaron returned and not long after the entire complex as known earlier was again employed in

the well-known Mycenaean megaron, just as it was in contemporary Troy VI.

While this is the major rupture that shows up in the report, there is also the fact that of the forty-six pottery shapes found in Troy III, twelve are newly introduced; some of those of II no longer appear and were possibly discarded. Less tangible, but equally interesting, is the much more frequent comparison of Trojan material in settlements III-V with that from Anatolia. It is also important to note that in Troy III the deer suddenly became a common item of food and deer horn was widely used for implements and weapons. All this might indicate that the burning of Troy II and the building of the new settlement was caused by an incursion from the Anatolian hinterland, perhaps from the same region which had previously sent to Greece the founders of its Early Bronze Age, for the excavators have noted the strong similarities between the Troad and the Aegean which persisted although actual imports from the Aegean fell off. Certainly a large portion of the Trojan population must have remained to serve or be assimilated, if such a disruption did occur, for the continuity is still very considerable. To this reviewer it has always seemed likely that the Indo-Europeans credited with beginning the Middle Helladic period in Greece had brought along with them from the north, perhaps Thrace and Macedonia, those survivors of the neolithic culture who knew the megaron-fortification complex and were responsible for its reintroduction into Greece; it now appears likely that a parallel phenomenon occurred with the arrival of the equestrian settlers of Troy VI, for in its earliest phase there appear already the free-standing house and fortifications, very like those of Troy II.

For all three settlements this is the first clear picture to emerge, for the earlier excavators considered them poor villages and lumped together all the material from them. Unfortunately, the areas left for profitable excavation by the Cincinnati expedition were too small for important architectural information; just what was the area excavated is not indicated in every case and the lack of this information makes it difficult to appraise the importance of the results. However, pottery and small finds were abundant, though there was little that the excavators considered sufficiently useful to give precise information on external relations and chronology. Yet for Troy III there are clear indications of contacts with the Aegean and with Central Anatolia, and the period, which lasted perhaps a century, is placed well before the end of the third millennium. Troy IV, which witnessed a reversion to the brick and stone wall construction of Troy II, and in which the first domed ovens were used, still seems to have communicated primarily with the Aegean, but no doubt had contacts with Central Anatolia and with the Near East as well. To it the excavators ascribe a century and a half, coeval with a late, but not the last, phase of the Aegean Early Bronze Age. Schliemann dug away most of Troy V, and what he called Vc, d, and e are now shown to belong to early Troy VI. But the remaining patches indicate a town as large as Troy VI. It was a settlement of neater, more orderly, and larger houses than IV, with better internal fittings; the pottery and miscellaneous objects reflect the same improvement in taste and craftsmanship. Connec-

tions with the Aegean, though more elusive, are unquestionable; those with Anatolia seem to loom larger. After a hundred or a hundred and fifty years, at about 1900 B. C., the inhabitants of Troy V were overwhelmed by the same movement of peoples that ushered in the Middle Bronze Age in Greece, and the excavators intimate further that this incident coincided fairly closely with the arrival of the advance guard of the Hittites.

Such, in brief outline, are the main conclusions which the excavators have drawn from the mass of material so meticulously described in these volumes. But though the architecture is described in detail for each section and each level, there is no general consideration of the architectural development and the excavators have not yet touched on the problem of the disappearance of the megaron, though perhaps this will be considered with its re-emergence in Troy VI. Again the reader is made to feel the loss of valuable information in the excavators' decision to leave aside the material from earlier excavations. This is especially clear from the statement on page 118 that "many pots in the Schliemann collection might now be safely assigned on stylistic grounds to the Fourth Settlement, but we have not undertaken to reclassify them." We can but express once more the hope that this will be done as a supplementary publication.

With the appearance of Volume II, the account of Early Bronze Age Troy is finished; the two volumes describing the first five settlements together form the most monumental and complete publication of any East Mediterranean site of the period. With their copious illustrations, both photographs and drawings of the site and the finds, they offer a model description. Yet one of the finest passages (p. 226) deals not with settlements III-V, but rather with the sixth settlement; in a brief, but brilliant, summation of the characteristics of the new town which inaugurates the Middle Bronze Age, the reader is given an enticing glimpse of the fascinating material that will be published in the forthcoming Volume III.

SAUL S. WEINBERG.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

---

ANDREW ALFÖLDI. *A Conflict of Ideas in the Late Roman Empire: The Clash between the Senate and Valentinian I.* Translated by Harold Mattingly. Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1952. Pp. viii + 151. \$3.75.

This is the second of a series of monographs in which the distinguished author undertakes to reverse or modify the generally accepted estimate of certain emperors and their policy during the fourth century. The first, entitled *The Conversion of Constantine and Pagan Rome*, appeared in 1948. Whether or not one agreed with all of its conclusions, it was a brilliant essay dealing with a world-historic figure, whose personality and career will always fascinate the student of history. The present volume is of more restricted appeal and will hardly interest other than specialists. Dr. Alföldi is at pains to rehabilitate Valentinian I, "the last of the

great Pannonian emperors," as well as certain of his subordinates, particularly the Praetorian Prefect of the Gauls, Maximinus. He contends that Ammianus and the other ancient sources are bitterly hostile to this emperor and his entourage, because they are all on the side of the senatorial aristocracy, whose attitude towards the Danubian *soldatesca* was a mixture of fear and contempt; and that the majority of modern writers have followed this lead in blackening the characters of Valentinian and of some of his ministers. The author's intimate familiarity with the history of the Later Empire is patent on every page and his main contention is sound, that the usual estimate of Valentinian is too severe and needs to be revised. He is also justified in saying that Valentinian, in all fairness, should be judged by the standards of his age. That the threat to the security of the empire from its "barbarian" neighbors was becoming more and more menacing, and that the resulting economic conditions, made worse by much official corruption, were deplorable, is a matter of common knowledge. Consequently, many measures which in happier times would have been harshly despotic can in the fourth century be justified on grounds of necessity, even though our final estimate may resemble the poet's bitter epigram on the regime of Sulla:

Excessit medicina modum, nimiumque secuta est,  
Qua morbi duxere, manus. Periere nocentes,  
Sed cum iam soli possent superesse nocentes.

There is no dispute among scholars about certain beneficial aspects of Valentinian's reign. Ancient and modern authors agree that he strove for economy against appalling odds; that he tried to lighten the fiscal burden imposed on the humbler citizens of the empire; that his religious policy was tolerant and his private life above criticism. The mass of the population in Rome, moreover, as Alföldi describes in some detail (pp. 60-5), benefited by the emperor's drastic reform of the *annona* and other improvements. Nor will one disagree with the author that the senatorial reaction in the fourth century was "of the greatest historical importance"; but it is surely a phenomenon of which scholars have long been aware.

And yet, after reading this book, one is assailed by two serious doubts. First, Alföldi's great erudition is marred by a violence of partisanship as extreme as the hatred that he attributes to Ammianus. The ancient historian, we are told, is "beside himself with rage" and "positively revels in describing the agony of death by fire of one of the judges." Words like "malice" and "malicious" are applied not only to the ancient writers but to some of their modern successors. The reader must judge for himself, in the light of the passages quoted in support, whether these violent expressions are justified. And it is easy, though the very negation of objectivity, to give a slight twist to a phrase, to heighten the effect intended. "A scrap of humanity sunk in endless filth" (p. 68) is neither a fair nor an accurate rendering of *mancipia squalore diuturno marcentia*. Seeck (p. 6) did not say that Valentinian "had no brain in his skull"; what he wrote is "sein enges Hirn, das nicht leicht mehrere Gedanken auf einmal fassen konnte." If Valentinian and Maximinus are to be judged by the standards of the age, is not the same criterion

valid for Probus, Symmachus, Aelius, and others? Or again, when Alföldi condemns the rhetoric of the fourth century in unmeasured terms (pp. 108 ff.) and represents it as the only avenue leading to advancement in the imperial service, does he not forget that in Libanius' time (cf. *Orat.* 43, 5; 48, 22) flocks of young men were still attending the law-schools at Berytus and Rome? The second criticism may be put in the form of a question: Was it needful, in order to do belated justice to Valentinian and his problems, to compose a book of one hundred and fifty pages, in which there is much repetition and in which the same *testimonia* often appear twice (cf. p. 21, n. 1 with p. 43, n. 4; p. 27, n. 1 with p. 47, n. 2; p. 105, n. 2 with part of p. 141, n. 46). To your reviewer at least it seems that the essential points could have been stated concisely and persuasively in an article of little more than average length. Mr. Mattingly, who turned the previous volume into English, has again achieved an impeccable translation.

M. L. W. LAISTNER.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

---

DENYS L. PAGE. Aleman: *The Partheneion*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951. Pp. xii + 179. \$4.25.

The *Partheneion* of Aleman has many claims on our attention. First, it is by any standards a lovely poem, and one which recreates for us a Spartan world of delicacy and beauty not yet blasted by an overriding concern with military efficiency. It is also the earliest considerable fragment of Greek choral lyric: four stanzas, of a probable ten, survive virtually intact, and there are appreciable remains of four others; enough, then, to provide a better measure of the poet's work than all the other fragments combined. Moreover, the poem comes to us, not through the distorting medium of citation, but in a carefully written papyrus, complete with scholia (mutilated but still useful), and evidently deriving from a good Alexandrian edition. Here is a text which carries considerable authority, and this fact, together with the character and extent of the poem, serves to make it a capital document, which fully deserves the elaborate edition and commentary which the new Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge University has here lovingly devoted to its mere hundred lines.

It is something of a paradox that, as Page notes, this essentially simple poem should, for us, bristle with difficulties, and it might well be that many of these difficulties would remain even if we had the poem in its entirety. Since it was first published in 1863 it has, of course, been repeatedly studied and analyzed, albeit with a disconcerting lack of agreement in the interpretations proposed. Yet not until now has there been an adequate and comprehensive study of the poem as a whole, based on a reliable text, and taking full account of the mythological, religious, and linguistic problems on which a proper understanding of the poem must depend. In dealing with these problems Page's methods are essentially conservative. Only the most certain supplements are admitted to the text. Where the

evidence is inadequate for a decision he is not afraid to conclude with a *non liquet*, and where several interpretations are admissible he is willing to indicate his preference without prejudice to the alternatives. He ascribes to the papyrus the authority it obviously deserves, and will not for example countenance suggestions of a division into semichoirs of which the papyrus (so rich in paragraphoi and other symbols) gives no hint. At the same time he is ready to correct the orthography of the papyrus where the linguistic and epigraphical evidence is conclusive: accordingly he disregards the "Doric"  $\sigma=\theta$  of the papyrus, and prints πάθον, θιῶν, παρθένος, not πάσον, σιῶν, παρσένος. And elsewhere, as in the interpretation of the myth, his well-grounded conservatism leads him, in fact, to quite revolutionary conclusions. After the unfettered speculation to which the poem has so often been subjected, this approach is as refreshing as it is sound, and the results are, in the main, entirely convincing.

The text of the poem is presented twice, first in a transcript of the papyrus, based on the readings of Blass, Barrett, and Page himself (with one important new reading, τείραι for τηρεῖ in line 77, attributed to Lobel); and again as emended and reconstructed. Only the most certain supplements have been admitted to the text, and only the more plausible ones are recorded in the critical apparatus, though some others find mention in the commentary. As compared with the text as printed in Diehl's *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca* (ed. 1, 1925; I have not seen the second volume, published in 1942, of ed. 2), the differences, quite apart from the presence or absence of supplements, while individually often quite slight, are so numerous that Page's claim (p. v) that he could find "no reliable text" seems only too true. As to Page's own deviations from the readings he records for the papyrus, it should be noted that the justification is to be sought, not in the critical apparatus, but in the detailed study of the Dialect which forms the third portion of the present work. The text is followed by a translation, a procedure which should be regarded as essential in all publications of new or debatable texts.

It is not possible without gross oversimplification to summarize Page's interpretation, but some few points should be noted. Aleman's whole treatment of the legendary portion of the poem shows an affectionate concern with ancient Laconian traditions. In particular, the native Dioscuri overshadow Heracles in the chief legend, which thus appears in an unfamiliar form and is not to be reconstructed simply on the basis of Pausanias' account of the feud between Heracles and the sons of Hippocoon.—As to the much debated constitution of the choir, Page readily establishes that Hagesichora, to whose praises the song constantly reverts, is the Leader, and Agido no more than a Second-in-Command; the full complement of the choir is ten (not eleven), the eight members of the rank and file being the girls named in vv. 70-76 (excluding Aenesimbrota), who sing the praises of their leaders while Hagesichora and Agido are engaged in ritual and prayer; the Peleiades are a rival choir. In order to assign a function to Agido it may be supposed that part or all of the *dancing* was semichoral, but attempts to divide up the singing parts by individuals or semichoirs are misguided and lead

only to confusion. The objections adduced to such a procedure are decisive, and it is to be hoped that this particular will-o'-the-wisp will not again distract the unwary.—Finally, Page is duly circumspect in regard to the religious occasion for the poem. He resolutely retains *δρηπίαι* as the reading of the text in v. 61, whether it be taken as nominative plural or dative singular, and rejects the variant *Ορθίαι* offered by the Scholion. At the same time he allows that the ancient commentators were presumably well informed on the identity of the goddess for whose festival the poem was composed, and he shows that nothing in the text is inconsistent with what is known of the cult of Ortheia. Beyond this, it is impossible to go.

The Supplementary Notes (pp. 82-101) include much detailed discussion in support and justification of the interpretation previously offered, as well as the usual line by line commentary. The final section of the work, as already noted, is a study, based on the manuscript tradition of all the fragments, of Aleman's dialect, which is found to be basically and preponderantly the Laconian vernacular, uncontaminated by any alien dialect except the Epic.

This is a sound, even a model, piece of literary criticism, carried out with sensitivity and discretion. Thanks to Page's efforts the *Partheneneion* stands freed from the encumbrance of much unfounded speculation and unnecessary complication. Individual points of interpretation and judgment may be open to question. It is unlikely that Page's major conclusion will be seriously challenged.

FRANCIS R. WALTON.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY.

---

CHARLES ALEXANDER ROBINSON, JR. *Ancient History from Prehistoric Times to the Death of Justinian*. New York, Macmillan Company, 1951. Pp. xxiii + 738; 138 illustrations; 83 maps and diagrams. \$6.00.

This is a textbook which will no doubt be welcomed by many instructors in ancient history. Physically, the book is attractive: it is well-made, handsomely illustrated, and provided with numerous maps. As regards arrangement and content, established conventions have been followed. It should also be said that Professor Robinson writes reasonably well and shows familiarity with recent publications dealing with many phases of ancient history.

It would be exceedingly unfair to criticize this particular book for defects traditional as well as fundamental which are common to most "ancient histories." Does a textbook of this kind need to begin with a chapter on prehistory? Probably not. If, however, such a chapter is to be included, the author should be warned that eleven pages will hardly be sufficient for an adequate treatment of the subject. Prehistory involves something beyond opening a closet door for a peek at a couple of skeletons.

Far more serious, however, is the universal mishandling of ancient

Near Eastern history. In this field the average textbook writer is hopelessly lost. There is no available pattern or synthesis for him to follow, for the Near Eastern field is the happy hunting ground of specialists who seldom share their game with lesser mortals.

Ideally, the author of a textbook on ancient history should try to achieve three goals in his treatment of the Near East. In the first place, an attempt should be made at a synthesis; the usual hodge-podge only bewilders and antagonizes the reader. Secondly, the people of the ancient Near East must be brought to life, projected in three dimensions instead of two. If this can be done for the Greeks and Romans, it can be done for the Sumerians, Egyptians, and Hittites. Thirdly, Near Eastern history should be given its proper place in the larger story of ancient civilization. It is essential to explain that ancient civilization began in the Near East and was diffused to Mediterranean lands. This continuity of culture ought to be the central theme of any ancient history, and it is not enough to state on page 1 that such a continuity exists. Subsequent demonstration is required if the statement is to be meaningful.

Putting aside these general criticisms which might be made of almost any "ancient history," two specific faults of this book ought to be mentioned. It contains more than its quota of glittering generalization, and it lacks balance. Prehistory and the Near East are covered in 75 actual pages of text; 250 pages are devoted to Greece, and 207 to Rome. Quite a point is made of the fact that this book carries the story down to 565 A. D., but it is instructive to observe that the period from the death of Commodus to that of Justinian is covered in 47 pages.

TOM B. JONES.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

---

DAVID DIRINGER. *The Alphabet: A Key to the History of Mankind.*

New York, Philosophical Library, 1948. Second and Revised Edition (no date). Pp. 607, with 256 cuts in the text. \$12.00.

In spite of the size and cost of this work, the sale of the first edition was so heavy that it was exhausted within a year, and the preface to the revised edition is dated only fifteen months after the preface to the first. This gives some idea of the need which the appearance of Diringer's work has filled. The reviewer noticed the first edition in *Modern Language Notes*, March, 1949, pp. 182 ff.; it is therefore not necessary to go into details again. The current revision has utilized all comments and criticisms received by the author in the first few months of publication. Needless to say, additional literature on the subject has been accumulating, and further revisions would now be necessary. Among the more important items now available should be listed J. G. Février, *Histoire de l'écriture* (Paris, 1948), G. R. Driver, *Semitic Writing from Pictogram to Alphabet* (London, 1947), T. J. G. Hill, *A Short History of Writing* (London, 1948), L. W. King, *Assyrian and Babylonian Cuneiform*, Vol. II (Oxford, 1932). This last work, completed with W. L. Bonatti's *The Prism Tablets, a Preliminary Transcription* (Princeton, 1951), provides a

solid basis for decipherment of the Cretan system of writing, though Johannes Sundwall is quite correct in emphasizing the obstacle still furnished by the absence of adequate photographic reproductions.

In the first edition Diringer omitted any reference to the debate between Berthold Ullman and Rhys Carpenter about the date of the borrowing of the Phoenician alphabet by the Hellenes. He has now introduced an allusion to this debate and the present state of the question (p. 452), but still without a bibliography. His statements are very unsatisfactory. While it is quite true that the debate now ranges between extremes in the eleventh and the eighth centuries B. C., very few hold to the impossible date in the eleventh, and no serious scholar, so far as the reviewer knows, maintains a date in the seventh century (line 2 of p. 452). It is a mystery how a Semitic epigrapher like Diringer can maintain such an impossible theory as that of Ullman. Gelb's date in the ninth century is also that of Driver and other Semitic epigraphers (*op. cit.*, pp. 180 f.). No Greek archaeologist, however, now maintains such high dates for the Thera and Dipylon inscriptions as the early eighth, "or even the late ninth century B. C.;" the most daring epigraphers limit themselves to the second half of the eighth century, and most students probably follow Rhys Carpenter in dating them in the seventh. The reviewer continues to insist strenuously on raising the date of the transition from geometric to orientalizing and "archaic" types of pottery in Cypriote and related Hellenic cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean from about 700 to nearer 750, but this does not mean that he is willing to date the borrowing of the alphabet before about 800 B. C. By far the closest analogies in form with the letters in the earliest Greek inscriptions are provided by Northwest-Semitic inscriptions from the first half of the eighth century.

W. F. ALBRIGHT.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

•

---

ATTILIO DEGRASSI. *I fasti consolari dell' impero romano dal 30 avanti Cristo al 613 dopo Cristo.* Rome, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1952. Pp. xviii + 298. Lire 2500. (*Sussidi Eruditi*, 3.)

The editor of the *fasti consulares et triumphales* needs no introduction. He is, of course, the foremost student of the list of consuls. The list published by Liebenam in 1909 has long been out of date, and a completely new one by a competent scholar really fills an urgent need. The author is not only a competent scholar but a great master of Latin Epigraphy, and he has performed this long awaited work in a manner which will not disappoint justified expectations.

The new list, beautifully printed on good paper, deserves special commendation also for its disposition, compactness, and ease of reference. Well over half the book is devoted to indices. The chrono-

logical list is drawn up on two levels, on the upper part of the page those consulships which are dated with certainty, and on the lower part those consulships which belong in the general period. The names are so printed that one can both see at a glance the main elements in a long name and also tell immediately where a year's record is completely known so that there is no longer room for further names.

The book is an indispensable reference work for a classical library. New discoveries will doubtless bring new names and greater precision of date in some cases, but the author has been so careful to avoid committing himself in cases of doubt that surprises in regard to old names are not to be expected.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Broughton (T. Robert S.). *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, Vol. II: 99 B. C.-31 B. C. New York, *American Philological Association* (to be ordered through Lancaster Press, Inc., Lancaster, Pa. and B. H. Blackwell, Ltd., Oxford), 1952. Pp. x + 648. \$10.00. (*Philological Monographs*, No. XV, vol. II.)

Busa (Roberto), S. J. *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Hymnorum Tirualium Varia Specimina Concordantiarum*. Milan, *Fratelli Bocca Editori*, 1951 (?). Pp. 175. (A first example of word index automatically compiled and printed by IBM punched card machines.)

Estrich (Robert M.) and Sparber (Hans). *Three Keys to Language*. New York, *Rinehart and Co.*, 1952. Pp. 358. \$4.00.

Klotz (Alfred). *C. Iuli Caesaris Commentarii*, Vol. I: *Commentarisi Belli Gallici* (4th ed.). Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1952. Pp. xlviii + 260. 8.50 DM. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*.)

Klotz (Alfred). *M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia*, Fasc. 8: *Oratio Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino* (2nd ed.). Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1949. Pp. viii + 63. \$0.90. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*.)

Klotz (Alfred). *M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia*, Fasc. 13: *In C. Verrem Actionis Secundae Libri IV-V*. Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1949. Pp. 351-528. \$2.15. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*.)

Knoche (Ulrich). *D. Iunius Juvenalis, Saturae*, mit kritischem Apparat. München, *Max Hueber Verlag*, 1950. Pp. xxxii + 161. 11.80 DM.; 13.80 DM. (bound).

Knudstzon (Erik J.). *Die Wiederbelebung der internationalen Papyrologie*. Berlin, *Akademie-Verlag*, 1950. Pp. 19. (*Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Vorträge und Schriften*, Heft 39.)

Krahe (Hans). *Die Indogermanisierung Griechenlands und Italiens*. Zwei Vorträge. Heidelberg, *Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag*, 1949. Pp. 59.

Krahe (Hans). *Ortsnamen als Geschichtsquelle*. Heidelberg, *Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag*, 1949. Pp. 30.

Kurfess (Alphonse). Appendix Sallustiana, Fase. Prior: C. Sallusti Crispi Epistulae ad Caesarem Senem de Re Publica (3rd ed.). Leipzig, Teubner, 1950. Pp. viii + 28. \$0.60. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*.)

Kurfess (Alphonse). Appendix Sallustiana, Fase. Posterior: [Sallusti] In Ciceronem et invicem Invectivae (2nd ed.). Leipzig, Teubner, 1950. Pp. vi + 25. \$0.57. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*.)

Leo (Federico). Literatura Romana. Traducción Castellana directa del Alemán, anotada y provista de adiciones bibliográficas y de varios índices alfabéticos, por P. U. González de le Calle. Bogota, 1950. Pp. ix + 292. (*Publicaciones del Instituto Caro y Cuervo, Series Minor, I*)

Leonard (Jean), S.J. Le bonheur chez Aristote. Bruxelles, *Palais des Académies*, 1948. Pp. 323. (*Académie Royale de Belgique, Mémoires, Tome XLIV, Fasc. 1*.)

Levi (Mario Attilio). C. Suetoni Tranquilli Divus Augustus. Firenze, *La Nuova Italia Editrice*, 1951. Pp. lxiv + 195. 1600 lire. (*Biblioteca di Studi Superiori, Storia Antica, XIII*.)

Levin (Saul). ΕΙΣ ΡΩΜΗΝ. To Rome. By Aelius Aristides. Translated with Notes and Introduction. Glencoe, Illinois, *The Free Press*, 1950. Pp. 31. \$1.00.

Linforth (Ivan M.). The Pyre on Mount Oeta in Sophocles' "Trachiniae." Berkeley and Los Angeles, *Univ. of California Press*, 1952. Pp. 255-268. \$0.25. (*Univ. of California Publ. in Classical Philology*, XIV, no. 7.)

Linforth (Ivan M.). Religion and Drama in "Oedipus at Colonus." Berkeley and Los Angeles, *Univ. of California Press*, 1951. Pp. 75-192. \$1.25. (*Univ. of California Publ. in Classical Philology*, XIV, no. 4.)

Linguistic Bibliography for the Years 1939-1947. Published by the Permanent International Committee of Linguists with a grant from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. New York, Hafner Publishing Co.; Utrecht-Brussels, Spectrum, 1949 and 1950. Vol. I: pp. xxiv + 237; Vol. II: pp. xxi + 589. \$4.50 and \$5.00.

Lobel (E.). Wegener (E.P.), Roberts (C.H.). The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part XX. Edited with Translations and Notes. London, *Egypt Exploration Society*, 1952. Pp. xvi + 192; 16 pls. £4.

Lobel (E.). The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part XXI. London, *Egypt Exploration Society*, 1951. Pp. 147.

Mariotti (Scevola). Livio Andronico e la traduzione artistica. Saggio critico ed edizione dei frammenti dell'Odissea. Milan, *Tipo grafia Giovanni de Silvestri*, 1952. Pp. 115. (*Pubblicazioni dell'Università di Urbino, Serie di Lettere e Filosofia, I*.)

Marshall (R. T.). Studies in the Political and Socio-Religious Terminology of the *De Civitate Dei*. Washington, D. C., *Catholic Univ. of America Press*, 1952. Pp. vii + 96. \$1.25. (*Patristic Studies*, LXXXVI.)


Marzullo (Benedetto). Il problema omerico. Firenze, *La Nuova Italia Editrice*, 1952. Pp. xvi + 502. (*Il Pensiero Storico*, 37.)

Mette (Hans Joachim). Pytheas von Massalia. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1952. Pp. 52. 5.50 DM. (*Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen*, 173.)

Milhan (Mary Ella). A Glossarial Index to *De Re Coquinaria* of Apicius. Madison, *Univ. of Wisconsin Press*, 1952. (Microfilm cards.)

Moulinier (Louis). Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs, d'Homère à Aristote. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1952. Pp. 450. 1800 fr. (*Études et Commentaires*, XII.)

Nunn (H. P. V.). Christian Inscriptions. New York, *Philosophical Library*, 1952. Pp. 72. \$2.50.



## INDEX TO VOLUME LXXIV.

---

PAGE	PAGE
Achilles, The Propitiation of, 137-148	Epicurus on the Growth and Decline of the Cosmos, 34-51
Agrarian Taxation in the Byzantine Empire, from the Fourth Century to the Fourth Crusade, On the Importance of Land Tenure and, 225-259	Exegetes (The) of Athens and the Prytaneion Decree, 407-418
Aristotle, <i>Rhetoric</i> , III, 16, 11 (1417 b 12-20), 281-286	<i>Gaetulicus</i> , Sejanus, and Seneca, 70-85
BLOCH, HERBERT. The Exegetes of Athens and the Prytaneion Decree, 407-418	Golden Bough, Reflections on the. <i>Discolor Aura</i> , 260-280
BOOKS RECEIVED, 112, 223-224, 332-336, 451-452	GORDON, ARTHUR E. More on the Consuls of A.D. 13 (with JOYCE S. GORDON), 421-422
BROOKS, ROBERT A. <i>Discolor Aura</i> . Reflections on the Golden Bough, 260-280	GORDON, JOYCE S. <i>See above</i> .
Catullus, 35, 149-160	GRAY, LOUIS H. A Non-Latin Italic and Cornish Parallel, 286-287
Ceionius Rufius Albinus, The Horoscope of, 418-420	<i>Hisperica Famina</i> , The Meaning of the, 398-406
Comitia Centuriata, The Reform of the, 1-33	Horoscope (The) of Ceionius Rufius Albinus, 418-420
Consuls of A.D. 13, More on the, 421-422	<i>Imperium Maius</i> in the Roman Republic, 113-136
COPLEX, FRANK O. Catullus, 35, 149-160	<i>Isonomia</i> , 337-366
Cornish Parallel, A Non-Latin Italic and, 286-287	Is Plato's Seventh Epistle Spurious, 383-397
Cosmos, Epicurus on the Growth and Decline of the, 34-51	Italic, A Non-Latin, and Cornish Parallel, 286-287
DAMON, PHILLIP W. The Meaning of the <i>Hisperica Famina</i> , 398-406	Land Tenure and Agrarian Taxation in the Byzantine Empire, from the Fourth Century to the Fourth Crusade, On the Importance of, 225-259
Declension (The) of Latin Compound Adjectives, 367-382	Latin Compound Adjectives, The Declension of, 367-382
<i>Discolor Aura</i> . Reflections on the Golden Bough, 260-280	MACKAY, L. A. Aristotle, <i>Rhetic</i> , III, 16, 11 (1417 b 12-20), 281-286
EHRENFELD, VICTOR. <i>Imperium Maius</i> in the Roman Republic, 113-136	Meaning (The) of the <i>Hisperica Famina</i> , 398-406
EICHENHOIZ, DAVID E. The Propitiation of Achilles, 137-148	More on the Consuls of A.D. 13, 421-422

PAGE	PAGE
NEUGEBAUER, O. The Horoscope of Ceionius Rufius Albinus, 418-420	<i>Bengtson's</i> Griechische Geschichte (ELIAS J. BICKERMAN), 96-99
Non-Latin (A) Italic and Cornish Parallel, 286-287	<i>Blegen, Caskey, Rawson, Sperling's</i> Troy. Volume I: General Introduction: The First and Second Settlements, Parts I and II (SAUL S. WEINBERG), 86-91
On the Importance of Land Tenure and Agrarian Taxation in the Byzantine Empire, from the Fourth Century to the Fourth Crusade, 225-259	<i>Blegen, Caskey, Rawson's</i> Troy. Volume II: The Third, Fourth and Fifth Settlements. Parts I and II (SAUL S. WEINBERG), 442-444
Plato's Seventh Epistle Spurious, Is., 383-397	<i>Braga's</i> Catullo e i poeti greci (J. P. ELDER), 314-316
POULTNEY, JAMES W. The Declension of Latin Compound Adjectives, 367-382	<i>Caskey, see Blegen.</i>
Propitiation (The) of Achilles, 137-148	<i>Degrassi's</i> I fasti consolari dell' impero romano dal 30 avanti Cristo al 613 dopo Cristo (JAMES H. OLIVER), 450-451
Prytaneion (the) Decree, The Exegetes of Athens and, 407-418	<i>Demougeot's</i> De l'unité à la division de l'Empire Romain, 395-410. Essai sur le gouvernement impérial (LUDWIG BIELER), 306-310
Quod, Relative Pronoun and Conjunction, 52-69	<i>Dinsmoor's</i> The Architecture of Ancient Greece: An account of its Historic Development. Revised and Enlarged Edition based on the first part of <i>The Architecture of Greece and Rome</i> by William J. Anderson and R. Phéné Spiers (A. HENRY DETWEILER), 212-214
Reform (The) of the <i>Comitia Centuriata</i> , 1-33	<i>Diringer's</i> The Alphabet: A Key to the History of Mankind. Second and Revised Edition (W. F. ALBRIGHT), 449-450
REVIEWS:	<i>Duckworth's</i> The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment (PAUL MACKENDRICK), 423-426
<i>Alföldi's</i> A Conflict of Ideas in the Late Roman Empire: The Clash between the Senate and Valentinian I (M. L. W. LAISTERNER), 444-446	<i>Ernout and Meillet's</i> Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine: histoire des mots. Troisième édition, revue, corrigée et augmentée d'un index
<i>Angel's</i> Troy. The Human Remains. Supplementary Monograph I (SAUL S. WEINBERG), 91-92	
<i>Barlow's</i> Martini Episcopi Bracarensis Opera Omnia (C. J. BISHKO), 183-186	
<i>Bataille's</i> Les inscriptions grecques du Temple de Hatshepsout à Deir el-Bahari (JAMES H. OLIVER), 221-222	
<i>Beare's</i> The Roman Stage: A Short History of Latin Drama in the Time of the Republic (PHILIP WHALEY HARSH), 427-428	
<i>Beazley's</i> The Development of Attic Black-figure (EUGENE VANDERPOOL), 321-323	

PAGE	PAGE
(JAMES W. POULTNEY), 326-329	297-607 (HERBERT BLOCH), 288-296
† <i>Faidher, Favez, van de Woestijne's Sénèque de la Clémence. Deuxième Partie: Commentaire et Index Verborum</i> (WILLIAM HARDY ALEXANDER), 187-190	<i>Johnson's Egypt and the Roman Empire</i> (NATHALI LEWIS), 214-215
<i>Ferrero's Poetica nuova in Lucrezio</i> (AGNES KIRSOPP MICHELS), 220-221	<i>Kapp, see von Fritz. Katz's Plotinus' Search for the Good</i> (HANS-RUDOLF SCHWYZER), 200-201
<i>Fine's Horoi: Studies in Mortgage, Real Security and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens</i> (JAMES H. OLIVER), 104-107	<i>Klotz's C. Iuli Caesaris Commentarii</i> , Vol. II, 2nd ed. (LLOYD W. DALY), 194-197
<i>Goessler's Wilhelm Dörpfeld. Ein Leben in Dienst der Antike</i> (MARGARETE BIEBER), 323-326	<i>Labour's Saint Jérôme, Lettres, Tome II</i> (ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE), 222-223
<i>Goldman's Excavations at Gözlü Kule, Tarsus. Volume I (text and plates): The Hellenistic and Roman Periods</i> (J. H. YOUNG), 190-193	<i>Lasserre's Les Épodes d'Archiloque</i> (FRANZ STOESSL), 296-302
<i>Grant's Roman Anniversary Issues. An Exploratory Study of the Numismatic and Medallic Commemoration of Anniversary Years, 49 B.C.-A.D. 375</i> (ALFRED R. BELLINGER), 174-179	<i>Legrand's Hérodote, Histories, Livre VII. Texte établi et traduit</i> (LIONEL PEARSON), 302-306
<i>Grene's Man in His Pride: A Study in the Political Philosophy of Thucydides and Plato</i> (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR), 179-183	<i>Marmorale's Cato Maior. Secunda Edizione</i> (RICHARD M. HAYWOOD), 111-112
<i>Hadas' Aristeas to Philocrates (Letter of Aristeas)</i> (MORTON S. ENSLIN), 197-200	<i>Meillet, see Ernout. Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome, Vol. XX</i> (ERIK SJÖKVIST), 438-441
<i>Hansen's The Attalids of Pergamon</i> (T. ROBERT S. BROOKTON), 210-212	<i>Michell's Sparta</i> (KURT VON FRITZ), 429-434
<i>Jacoby's Attis. The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens</i> (HERBERT BLOCH), 288-296	<i>Nilsson's Geschichte der griechischen Religion. Zweiter Band: Die hellenistische und römische Zeit</i> (CAMPBELL BONNER), 92-95
<i>Jacoby's Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. Dritter Teil. Geschichte von Städten und Völkern (Topographie und Ethnographie), B: Autoren über einzelne Städte (Laender), Nr.</i>	<i>Page's Aleman: The Parthenon</i> (FRANCIS R. WALTON), 446-448
	<i>Pasoli's Acta Fratrum Arvalium Quae Post Annum MDCCCLXXIV Reperta Sunt</i> (ALINE ABAECHERLI BOYCE), 207-210
	<i>Post's From Homer to Menander. Forces in Greek Poetic Fiction</i> (J. A. PHILIP), 435-438
	<i>Radel's Alexandre le Grand</i> (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.), 222
	<i>Rawson, see Blegen. Reinach's Gaius, Institutes. Texte établi et traduit</i> (HANS JULIUS WOLFF), 202-204

PAGE	PAGE
<i>Roberts' The Antinoopolis Papyri</i> , Part I (J. F. GILLIAM), 317-320	Youtie and Winter's Pa- pyri and Ostraca from Karanis, Second Series (LIONEL CASSON), 217-219
<i>Robinson's Ancient History from Prehistoric Times to the Death of Justinian</i> (TOM B. JONES), 448-449	Zafiropulo's Anaxagore de Clazomène: I, Le mythe grec traditionnel de Thalès à Platon; II, Théorie et fragments (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.), 205-20
<i>Robinson's Excavations at Olynthus</i> , Part XIII: Vases found in 1934 and 1938 (DIETRICH VON BOTHMER), 216-217	Zafiropulo's L'école éléate: Parménide — Zénon — Mélios (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.), 205-21
<i>Schachermeyr's Poseidon und die Entstehung des griechischen Götterglaubens</i> (MARTIN P. NILSSON), 161-168	Roman Republic, <i>Imperium Maius</i> in the, 113-136
<i>Snell's Der Aufbau der Sprache</i> (JOSHUA WHITMOUGH), 329-331	Sejanus, Gaetulicus, and Seneca, 70-85
<i>Sperling, see Blegen.</i>	
<i>Sutherland's Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy</i> , 31 B.C.-A.D. 68 (ALFRED R. BELLINGER), 332	SETTON, KENNETH M. On the Importance of Land Tenure and Agrarian Taxation in the Byzantine Empire, from the Fourth Century to the Fourth Crusade, 225-25
<i>von Fritz and Kapp's Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. Translated with an Introduction and Notes</i> (STERLING DOW), 100-104	SOLMSEN, FRIEDRICH. Epicurus on the Growth and Decline of the Cosmos, 34-51
<i>Webster's Greek Terracottas</i> (DAVID M. ROBINSON), 331-332	STAVELEY, E. S. The Reform of the <i>Comitia Centuriata</i> , 1-3
<i>Webster's Studies in Menander</i> (L. A. POST), 107-109	STENZEL, BERTHA. Is Plato's Seventh Epistle Spurious, 383-385
<i>Whitman's Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism</i> (GILBERT NORWOOD), 168-174	STEWART, ZEPH. Sejanus, Gætulicus, and Seneca, 70-85
<i>Winter, see Youtie.</i>	
<i>Yale Classical Studies</i> , Volume XI (RICHMOND LATIMORE), 109-111	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> , 100
<i>Yale Classical Studies</i> , Volume XII (W. C. HELM-BOLD), 310-313	VLASTOS, GREGORY. <i>Isonomia</i> , 337-366
	WOOLSEY, ROBERT B. <i>Quod, Relative Pronoun and Conjunction</i> , 52-69

PAGE	PAGE
(JAMES W. POULTNEY), 326-329	297-607 (HERBERT BLOCH), 288-296
† Faider, Favez, van de Woe- stijne's Sénèque de la Clé- mence. Deuxième Partie: Commentaire et Index Verborum (WILLIAM HARDY ALEXANDER), 187-190	Johnson's Egypt and the Roman Empire (NAPHTALI LEWIS), 214-215
Ferrero's Poetica nuova in Lucrezio (AGNES KIR- SOPP MICHELS), 220-221	Kapp, see von Fritz. Katz's Plotinus' Search for the Good (HANS-RUDOLF SCHWYZER), 200-201
Fine's Horoi: Studies in Mortgage, Real Security and Land Tenure in An- cient Athens (JAMES H. OLIVER), 104-107	Klotz's C. Iuli Caesaris Commentarii, Vol. II, 2nd ed. (LLOYD W. DALY), 194-197
Goessler's Wilhelm Dörpf- feld. Ein Leben in Dienst der Antike (MARGARETE BIEBER), 323-326	Labour's Saint Jérôme, <i>Lettres</i> , Tome II (ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE), 222-223
Goldman's Excavations at Gözlü Kule, Tarsus. Vol- ume I (text and plates): The Hellenistic and Ro- man Periods (J. H. YOUNG), 190-193	Lasserre's Les Épodes d'Ar- chiloque (FRANZ STOESSL), 296-302
Grant's Roman Anniversary Issues. An Exploratory Study of the Numismatic and Medallistic Commemora- tion of Anniversary Years, 49 B.C.-A.D. 375 (AL- FRED R. BELLINGER), 174-179	Legrand's Hérodote, His- toires, Livre VII. Texte établi et traduit (LIONEL PEARSON), 302-306
Grene's Man in His Pride: A Study in the Political Philosophy of Thucydides and Plato (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR), 179-183	Marmorale's Cato Maior. Secunda Edizione (RICH- ARD M. HAYWOOD), 111-112
Hadas' Aristeas to Philocra- tes (Letter of Aristeas) (MORTON S. ENSLIN), 197-200	Meillet, see Ernout. <i>Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome</i> , Vol. XX (ERIK SJÖQVIST), 438-441
Hansen's The Attalids of Pergamon (T. ROBERT S. BROUGHTON), 210-212	Michell's Sparta (KURT VON FRITZ), 429-434
Jacoby's Attis. The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens (HERBERT BLOCH), 288-296	Nilsson's Geschichte der griechischen Religion. Zweiter Band: Die hel- lenistische und römische Zeit (CAMPBELL BONNER), 92-95
Jacoby's Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Dritter Teil. Geschichte von Städten und Volk- ern (Horographie und Ethnographie), B: Au- toren ueber einzelne Städte (Laender), Nr.	Page's Alcman: The Par- thenon (FRANCIS R. WALTON), 446-448
	Pasoli's Acta Fratrum Ar- valium Quae Post Annum MDCCCLXXIV Reperta Sunt (ALINE ABACHERLI BOYCE), 207-210
	Post's From Homer to Me- nander. Forces in Greek Poetic Fiction (J. A. PHILIP), 435-438
	Radet's Alexandre le Grand (C. A. ROBINSON, Jr.), 222
	Rawson, see Blegen. Reinach's Gaius, Institutes. Texte établi et traduit (HANS JULIUS WOLFF), 202-204

PAGE	
<i>Roberts' The Antinoopolis Papyri, Part I (J. F. GILLIAM)</i> , 317-320	<i>Youtie and Winter's Papyri and Ostraca from Karanis, Second Series (LIONEL CASSON)</i> , 217-219
<i>Robinson's Ancient History from Prehistoric Times to the Death of Justinian (TOM B. JONES)</i> , 448-449	<i>Zafiropulo's Anaxagore de Clazomène</i> : I, <i>Le mythe grec traditionnel de Thalès à Platon</i> ; II, <i>Théorie et fragments</i> (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.), 205-20
<i>Robinson's Excavations at Olynthus, Part XIII: Vases found in 1934 and 1938 (DIETRICH VON BOTHMER)</i> , 216-217	<i>Zafiropulo's L'École éléate: Parménide — Zénon — Mélios (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.)</i> , 205-21
<i>Schachermeyr's Poseidon und die Entstehung des griechischen Götterglaubens (MARTIN P. NILSSON)</i> , 161-168	<i>Roman Republic, Imperium Maius in the</i> , 113-138
<i>Snell's Der Aufbau der Sprache (JOSHUA WHATMOUGH)</i> , 329-331	<i>Sejanus, Gaetulicus, and Seneca</i> , 70-85
<i>Sperling, see Blegen.</i>	
<i>Sutherland's Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy</i> , 31	
B. C.-A. D. 68 (ALFRED R. BELLINGER), 332	
<i>von Fritz and Kapp's Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. Translated with an Introduction and Notes (STERLING DOW)</i> , 100-104	<i>SETTON, KENNETH M. On the Importance of Land Tenure and Agrarian Taxation in the Byzantine Empire, from the Fourth Century to the Fourth Crusade</i> , 225-25
<i>Webster's Greek Terracottas (DAVID M. ROBINSON)</i> , 331-332	
<i>Webster's Studies in Menander (L. A. Post)</i> , 107-109	<i>SOLMSEN, FRIEDRICH. Epicurus on the Growth and Decline of the Cosmos</i> , 34-51
<i>Whitman's Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism (GILBERT NORWOOD)</i> , 168-174	<i>STAVELEY, E. S. The Reform of the Comitia Centuriata</i> , 1-3
<i>Winter, see Youtie.</i>	
<i>Yale Classical Studies, Volume XI (RICHMOND LATIMORE)</i> , 109-111	<i>SWENZEL, BERTHA. Is Plato's Seventh Epistle Spurious</i> , 383-38
<i>Yale Classical Studies, Volume XII (W. C. HELMBOLD)</i> , 310-313	<i>STEWART, ZEPH. Sejanus, Gae-tulicus, and Seneca</i> , 70-85
	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> , 160
	<i>VLASTOS, GREGORY. Isonomia</i> , 337-366
	<i>WOOLSEY, ROBERT B. Quod, Relative Pronoun and Conjunction</i> , 52-69